LIBRARY
OF THE
CHURCH DIVINITY SCHOOL
OF THE PACIFIC
✠
No. 3639 Class 824 4
Ex Dono, MRS. ELIZABETH BUCHANAN
Date, Jan. 10th, 1902

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2026 with funding from
Graduate Theological Union

https://archive.org/details/essaytowardstheo02norr

AN ESSAY Towards the THEORY OF THE Ideal or Intelligible WORLD.

Being the Relative Part of it.

Wherein the Intelligible World is consider'd with relation to *Humane Understanding*. Whereof some Account is here attempted and proposed.

PART II.

By *JOHN NORRIS*, Rector of *Bemerton* near *Sarum*.

———*Immensum rerum confecimus æquor,*
Et jam tempus equum fumantia solvere colla.

LONDON,
Printed for *S. Manship*, at the *Ship* in *Cornhill*, near the *Royal-Exchange*; and *W. Hawes*, at the *Rose* in *Ludgate-street*, near the *West-End* of St. *Paul's* Church. MDCCIV.

CHURCH DIVINITY SCHOOL of the PACIFIC LIBRARY

RBR
L518
N856
v.2

To the Right Worſhipful Sir Thomas Cookes Winford, *of* Aſtly *in the County of* Worceſter, *Baronet.*

SIR,

THE Reſpect that I intend You, and the real Honour that I do my Self, in prefixing your Name to theſe Papers, will, I hope, excuſe my Preſumption in waiting upon You with ſo mean a Preſent: If not, your own Goodneſs I am perſwaded will, of which the greateſt Commendation that I can give, will be my Reliance upon it. Should You meet with any thing like Entertainment here, I ſhould be well pleaſed, tho' I dare not promiſe You any. You are deſired, Sir, to ſit down at a Philoſophers Table, which does not uſe to be either very nicely, or very magnificently ſpread, but whoſe chief Furni-

3639

ture is Temperance and Frugality. However, if you can Feaſt upon *Ideas*, which indeed is Angels Food, perhaps You may not riſe altogether Empty, unleſs the Celeſtial Diet (which is what I fear) be rendered leſs acceptable by the undue Management of the Hand that prepares it.

But be it never ſo well prepared, I know ſuch *Ideal* Fair is too thin and aery a Repaſt for moſt Palates, next kin indeed to what they call a *Welch* Bait, and ſome witty Men (as they think themſelves) will perhaps affect the recommending and diſtinguiſhing the niceneſs and juſtneſs of their Taſte, by diſreliſhing it. But St. *Auſtin*, who had a Taſte as nice as any of theirs, will not ſtick to tell them, that the Doctrine of Ideas is of ſuch importance, that there is no being Wiſe without it. *Tanta vis in Ideis conſtituitur, ut niſi his intellectis, ſapiens eſſe nemo poſſit.* As indeed how is it poſſible it ſhould be otherwiſe, ſince as Wiſdom is founded upon Truth, ſo the Foundation

Foundation of that Truth which Wiſdom contemplates, is laid in Ideas, as in this Syſtem you will find, if I miſtake not, ſufficiently ſhewn.

As for the more general Prejudice that may lie againſt this as a *Metaphyſical* Theory, I am well aware of it, tho' not ſo much concerned at it, as being well ſatisfy'd in my ſelf of the great Value and high Importance of *Metaphyſicks*, notwithſtanding the neglect and diſuſe, if not contempt of it, among thoſe who ſhould be better Judges of the worth of things. For ſure the Stream of Philoſophy and Divinity too, muſt quickly run low, if not fed by a Metaphyſical Spring. And indeed I muſt needs ſay, that unleſs it be the Mathematical Sciences, I know nothing ſo fit to inform, clear, and inlarge the Mind, as *true Metaphyſicks*, which may be called the Key of Knowledge, and is of it ſelf a kind of univerſal Science, as containing within its pregnant Boſom ſuch general Truths as may ſerve for Princi-

ples to the particular Sciences. And he deſerves not the Name of a Scholar, at leaſt of a Divine or Philoſopher, that is not competently inſtructed in it. The intereſt of Truth demands ſo much, tho' perhaps my own may not adviſe me to urge the Matter ſo far, unleſs the following Account were a better Specimen of what I commend.

But, Sir, ſuch as it is, I make bold to put it into Your Hands, and if You find nothing worthy of Your ſelf in it, yet be pleas'd to accept of the good Will, and well-meanning Endeavours of one, who by the very Poverty of his Preſent, ſhews how ambitious he would be to ſerve You, if he had any thing better to offer. But I fear I am troubleſome, and ſo begging Your Pardon for this Interruption, I take leave, being, Sir, with all Philoſophick Truth and Reality,

Your very humble

and reſpectful Servant,

JOHN NORRIS.

THE

PREFACE.

IN the Concluſion of the former Part of this Theory, I expreſs'd my ſelf with ſome ſuſpenſe and irreſolution, or at leaſt with ſome uncertainty, whether I ſhould proceed further in it my ſelf, or deliver up the Grounds which I had laid to be built upon by ſome other Hand. And according to the uncertainty of the undertaking, ſo was the Delay. *After I had finiſhed my firſt Part (it being ſo miſerably abuſed and diſguiſed by the Errors of the Preſs, I may own it for* mine*) I did not preſently ſet about this, but ſpent ſome time in taking a view of my great and formidable Subject, before I advanced to lay a cloſe Siege to it, as the* Roman *General did before the Walls of* Jeruſalem. *At length, finding my ſelf in an indifferent State of Health, and thinking it pity that a Syſtem already carried on ſo far ſhould remain unfiniſhed, and withal deſpairing of its being*

ever compleated by any other, I set my self to it, not as a Task to be done out of the way with Riddance and Dispatch (for Systems are not made up like Suits of Mourning) but taking time for it I went on with it as with Church-Work, *doing it by little and little, as my Health and Leisure would give me leave. And now for want of a better Hand, I do here present it to the Reader finished with my own, thinking it better so than not at all.*

And now Reader thou hast (such a one as it is) a perfect and complete System: Perfect I mean as to the Intireness *of it, as having now in thy Hands both the* Globes *of the Intelligible* World. *But as for any other Perfection expect it not, for I do not pretend to it: So far from that, that I do not think it comes up to the Idea which I my self have of it, nor has all the Perfection which I my self could have given it, if the Circumstances of my Condition did more favour the designs of my Mind. Those who enjoy abundance of Leisure, and are retired from the noise of the World, and have their Time at their own disposal (as* Religious *Persons, Fellows of Colleges, and above all, private Country Gentlemen) and whose strong Admantin Bodies will indure so much Thought and Meditation as is necessary to inlighten their Minds, may, if they have any Genius to it, and Capacity for it, do great Things, even what they please. And indeed 'tis from such as these that the World may justly expect the most considerable Assistance towards the discovery of Truth, and the improvement of the Sciences. But we that want these Advantages, who*

have

have Parochial *Cures to attend upon, whose Hands are full, whose Engagements great, whose Interruptions many, who live in Noise and Hurry, much to others, and little to ourselves, and whose Time is render'd yet more short, for want of Health, it may be, to imploy it, we must do not as we would, but as we can, and take it for a Favour if the World will at all consider our Disadvantages, and make any allowance for them to excuse the shortness of our Performances.*

But the difficulty of the Subject *is to be regarded, as well as the disadvantageous Circumstances of the* Writer. *And if that may be admitted as a favourable Suggestion, perhaps I may now have as good a Plea as ever any Writer had: For sure never was there any Subject of a more abstract Nature, nor many of a larger Compass. For the abstractness of it, had I the Metaphysicks of Men and Angels, I could here imploy and bury it all; and for the Compass of it, could I live till the Revolution of* Plato's *Year, I could never hope to wade through it. Think not then to find the Subject here exhausted; I pretend only to make a kind of a* Visto *into the Intelligible World, and to have open'd some of the Head-Fountains of this great Deep, leaving my contemplative Reader to go on with the Streams of it in his own private Thoughts; to which, as a Suppliment for my Defects and Omissions, I leave what remains untouch'd of this immense Subject, as I do what I have perform'd in it to his* Pardon: *Whereof I am sensible I shall have*

but

but too much occaſion, ſince I find in many places that I need even my own.

For indeed when things are ſo very Fine, Subtile and Abſtract, 'tis a hard matter to be always Clear or Intelligible, either to ones ſelf, or to others. Clear in ones Conceptions, or Intelligible in ones Expreſſions and Repreſentations of Things. And when one is ſo oppreſs'd and overlaid with abundance of Matter, as in ſo copious an Argument as this is it muſt needs be, that one can hardly ſee Wood for Trees, to think of every thing, and to ſet every thing in its due and proper Place for the avoiding Confuſion and Diſorder, and to ſettle and diſpoſe the Cardinal Parts in an orderly Syſtem, according to the natural Dependencies of one thing upon another, is a Work of more Trouble and Difficulty than Men of mere Bookiſh Learning *can well be aware of, or than will eaſily be imagin'd even by the* Thoughtful, *without ſome Trial and Experience. Upon the whole, the beſt Judges will be the moſt ſenſible of the Difficulties I have labour'd with in this Undertaking (as knowing how hard it is to write well upon any Subject, much more upon one ſo abſtruſe as this is) and accordingly 'tis from them that I promiſe my ſelf moſt Favour and equitable Allowance in their cenſures of it.* Perito Judice nihil æquius. *And 'tis well that Skill and Favour go together, ſince we treat of great Things, ſuch as are hard to conceive, harder to explain.*

I do not pretend to the Character of a clear Writer, becauſe I think it to be the greateſt Qualification of its kind. Or if I could pretend to it in

a Sermon, or any other practical Discourse, or even in the management of some ordinary Church-Controversy *where the Way is beaten before me, and little falls under Consideration that is much out of it, yet I should not be forward to pretend to it here. And yet as Abstruse as the Argument of this Theory is, and as defective as my Abilities are to manage it as it deserves, I cannot but think however, that by Care and heedful Attention I have express'd my self so Intelligibly, that any Reader of a competent Apprehension, and that is not in too much hast to be at the end of the Book, may make a shift to understand me in some measure, and that because I find I understand my self. So that I hope there will be no great Dispute about what I mean, however unsatisfy'd any may be about the Truth of what is advanc'd. With the Commentators of* Aristotle, *the Truth of what he affirms is supposed, and all the Question is about what the Philosopher means. That's a certain Argument, or at least a strong Presumption of an obscure Writer, as the other is of a superstitious and bigotted Reader, to be so devoted to Humane Authority as to rest and acquiesce in it with an implicit Faith. 'Tis enough to pay that Deference to* Scripture.

I suppose my Reader to be something acquainted with the Terms of Art, and Distinctions of the School, which, for the sake of those that are not, I should not have used so much as I have, if I had known any better, or as good wherein to express my Sense, or illustrate the Truth. But indeed I do not; for however the Physicks, or Natural Philosophy

losophy of the Schools does not pleaſe me, as partly proceeding too much upon the falſe and confuſed Ideas of Senſe, and partly as explaining the particular effects of Nature, by the general and indeterminate Notions of pure Logick, *yet I have a great Value and Eſteem for their* Metaphyſicks, *and for their* Theology. *And tho' here they may ſometimes ſtart Queſtions, ſome of which may be too trifling and ſuperfluous, and others too curious and intruding, and may perhaps be too Elaborate in diſcuſſing the former, and a little too bold and peremptory in the determination of the latter, and too much influenc'd by* Authority *in both; yet whatever their Matter be, their Form and Method is always excellent, and the Terms whereby they expreſs themſelves, moſt happily (indeed admirably) fitted for the illuſtration and compendious Conveyance of their Notions, tho' perhaps every one that uſes them may not rightly apply them; nor, it may be, they always themſelves. And indeed I am pretty much of Opinion, that nothing of any moment, either in Philoſophy, or in Religion, can be either diſtinctly ſtated, or well underſtood, without the help of their uſeful, I might ſay, neceſſary Diſtinctions: Which, whoſoever is well inſtructed in, has a great advantage over him that has not, tho' otherwiſe never ſo ingenious; whereof I need go no further for an Inſtance than the Controverſy concerning Liberty and Neceſſity between Biſhop* Bramhall *and Mr.* Hobbes; *who, tho' a Man of ſome natural*

Wit

Wit and Parts, yet for want of Scholaſtick Education and Learning, was extreamly Confuſed and Defective, not only as to the Truth of his Notions, but as to the clearneſs of their Delivery, and ſo upon the whole became a cheap and eaſy Triumph to his acute and learned Adverſary. But whether I uſe the Terms of the School, or my own, my great Endeavour is to be clear and intelligible, that the Reader may comprehend my Meaning with as little Trouble as may be, for fear leſt it ſhould not be found to deſerve a great deal.

Not that I think Clearneſs *(as great a Perfection as it is in Writing) to be always of ſuch advantageous Conſequence. It contributes indeed to the Eaſe and Pleaſure of the Reader, and to the greater Perfection of the Work itſelf, but the* Writer *has not always that advantage by it. Thoſe who write in the Clouds, as we ſay, involving their Senſe in hard Words, as the Chymiſts, or perplexing it with ambiguous Expreſſions, or who keep within the Sphere of looſe and indefinite Generalities, eſpecially if they have ſuch a flow of Words as to draw out their Periods to great lengths, that the parts of the Argument may lie at a diſtance from one another, and are withal ſo much Maſters of Style as to give their Sentences a tunable turn, a ſmooth Movement, and a round graceful Cloſe, they have the happineſs not only to hide their Faults (ſince no body can ſee very far in a* Miſt*) but are oftentimes admired for their Profoundneſs. They walk in the Night, and tho' for that Reaſon they ſtumble ever now and*

and then, yet it passes unobserved, and their Darkness is their protection: Whereas, when a Man writes clearly and distinctly, and explains things of great Abstrusity upon clear and intelligible Principles, and in a perspicuous Manner and Method, he holds out a Light to his Reader whereby to discover his own Defects, and 'tis then easie to see whether he succeeds well or no in what he undertakes: For when 'tis once conceived what 'tis a Man means, 'twill not be very difficult to discern whether what he means be true. So that a Man that shall write clearly, had need advance that which is true and solid, or else his own Light will betray him. As a Man that has a light Shop had need sell good Ware. Clear Writing then is not always the best Policy, but 'tis the best Honesty and Ingenuity, and that's better than Policy, or all the false Colours of a corrupt and imposing Eloquence.

For the avoiding of which I have thought it convenient to use great plainness and chastness of Style, and to express my self not only Scholastically, but even sometimes Syllogistically, *as being not out of conceit with* Syllogism, *notwithstanding the late Address wherewith a well known Author has endeavour'd to disparage it, and bring it into disesteem: Which indeed seems not much less paradoxical and surprizing than to speak against Reasoning itself: For what is* Syllogism *but only a more recollected and express way of Reasoning, the putting together all the parts of an Argument, and nothing but those Parts, and that in their*

due

due Form and Order. To Syllogize is an Arithmetical *Term signifying the making up of an Account, or the Collection of the sum of several Numbers, whence, by an apt Traduction it is applied to signifie that form of Argumentation, which, for the proportion it bears to it, we call by the Name of* Syllogism, *for* Syllogism *is a sort of Numeration; that is, it is that in Reasoning or Logick, which* Addition *is in Arithmetick,* viz. *The laying together, or assembling the particular sums, and thence deducing the sum total or product of the whole. The particular Sums or Items, are the Premises or the sum Total resulting from them, is the Conclusion. Which, tho' potentially in the Premises, as the sum Total is in the particular sums, yet is really distinct from them, and indeed more than the sum Total is from the Items; the distinction here being only formal, whereas the Conclusion is a proposition really distinct from the Premises, as having but one only Term in common with each of them. To talk against* Syllogism *therefore in Reasoning, is like talking against* Addition *in Numbring, or casting Account. And a Man cannot talk rationally against it, without the practical Contradiction of falling into it, since 'tis that whereof all rational Discourses consist, and into which it finally resolves: For there is nothing strictly rational in any Discourse but what is either a premise of one sort or other, or a Conclusion. And whatever upon a due secretion or separation is found to be neither*

of

of these, whatever Figure *it may otherwise seem to make, or of what use soever it may really be in other respects (as* Definitions *and* Distinctions *for the right stating of the thing in Question, or* Division *for the more distinct and orderly proceeding in it) is yet the Account. So that the* Syllogism, *at least* materially *considered, is so much of the very Essence of Reasoning, that 'tis impossible to discourse rationally out of it. 'Tis true indeed, the parts may not be all expresly set down, nor those that are, duly ranged and disposed in their proper Order (which is all the difference that I know between a rational Discourse at large, and a formal* Syllogism*) but then what is wanting in each of these, must be mentally supplied, or else the Argument is imperfect; and if it be supplied, then 'tis a* Syllogism.

All the Question here will be whether a Conclusion may not immediately follow upon the premisal of one single Proposition. This indeed seems to be favour'd by the ordinary way of speaking, as when we say, that this, or that is the Consequence of this or that Principle; and so the fore-designed Author seems to intimate, when he tells us, That to infer is nothing, but by vertue of one Proposition laid down as true, to draw in another as true. *And the Instances he gives of Reasoning, are of this kind, as consisting of Inferences deduced from single Principles. But as far as I understand what belongs to Reasoning (which perhaps I am now convincing the World is but little)*

there

there can be no Conſequence juſtly drawn from one ſolitary Propoſition. There muſt be two Premiſes to ſupport a Concluſion, underſtood at leaſt if not expreſſed, and that for this clear Reaſon, becauſe the truth of the Concluſion as a Concluſion, or the force of the Illation depending upon the Union or Argreement which each of the extreams has with that intermediate Idea to which, as to a common Meaſure, they are applied (for even according to our Author, 'tis by vertue of the perceived Agreement of this Idea with the Extreams, that the Extreams are concluded to agree among themſelves) there is a neceſſity that each of them ſhould be diſtinctly applied to it, that ſo from their agreement with it, they may appear to agree with one another. And the ſeveral Application of this middle Idea to each of the Extreams, makes the two Propoſitions antecedent to the Concluſion, which accordingly we call Premiſes. *But an inſtance in Geometry (which indeed is the beſt Logick) will ſufficiently clear this Matter. In every Triangle the greateſt Angle is oppoſed to the greateſt Side, let that be the Propoſition. Now from this Propoſition, which is the ninteenth of* Euclid, *it may be ſaid to follow, and 'tis a Corollary which a Mathematician of note draws from it, that if from a Point out of a right Line, one draws upon this Line as many right Lines as one pleaſes; as ſuppoſe*



AB, AC, AD, AE, *one of which, namely,* AB *is Perpendicular, this Perpendicular will be the leaſt or ſhorteſt of them all, ſince it will be oppoſed to, or ſuſtain an Acute Angle, ſuch as* C, D, *and* E, *all of them are; whereas the others will be oppoſed to, or ſuſtain a right Angle, ſuch as is* B. *The ſum of which Argument is in effect this; That is the leaſt ſide which is oppoſed to the leaſt Angle, therefore* A B *is the leaſt ſide; or, to take the Minor inſtead of the Major,* AB *is oppoſed to the leaſt Angle, and therefore* A B *is the leaſt ſide; which ſeems a Conſequence drawn from one only Propoſition. But, 'tis plain, that this is an imperfect Argument, unleſs more is underſtood than is here expreſſed: And that to make it perfect and concluſive, it muſt be reduced to this or the like Form. That is the leaſt ſide which is oppoſed to the leaſt Angle. But* AB *is oppoſed to the leaſt Angle,* as being oppoſed to an Acute one, C. *Therefore* AB *is the leaſt ſide; whereby it appears, that tho' in a popular way of ſpeaking, a Conſequence may be ſaid to follow upon one Propoſition, as laying the main Ground upon which the Argument that proves or infers it may be built, yet another muſt be added to it before it actually and truly does or can follow. And when it is added, then what is the Argument but a Syllogiſm? Againſt which therefore*

it

it must be extream Absurdity for any Man to pretend to write.

But what shall we say to the Consequence of an Hypothetical Syllogism; *is not that a Consequence from one single Principle? No such Matter. Such a Consequence is no Consequence at all, but only a Proposition, declaring that such a thing would follow if such a Condition were put: But then till it be put, that is, till another Proposition be added, there is actually no Consequence, but only an Affirmation that if it were put; such would be the Consequence of it. So that what is here called a Consequence, is indeed only a Hypothetical Proposition, or an Affirmation of a Conditional, the connexion not lying between the subject and the simple Attribute, but between the subject and the complex Attribute, or intire Conditional, as I shew at large in my former Part. And this appears from the denial of, or contradiction to such a Consequence. For what is it that we then deny or contradict? Not the Part following, upon the Condition, but the intire Conditional itself. We say, indeed;* Negatur Consequentia, *but we must be supposed to deny the same that we contradict, and the Contradiction, as every Logician knows affects the whole Conditional. For we contradict here, with a* Non si, *which plainly shews that there the Affirmation must properly be understood to lie. And so also, when such a Consequence is proved, the Enthymematical way of proving it shews the same: For 'tis not any actual Consequence, or the Part following upon the Condition, that is pretended to be proved,*

but the intire Conditional itſelf. What we then prove is not any Conſequence that actually is, but a Propoſition, declaring a Conſequence that would be upon ſuch a Condition. As to return to our Geometrick Inſtance: If A B *be oppoſed to the leaſt Angle, then* A B *is the leaſt ſide. Suppoſe any one to deny this Conſequence (as we uſually ſpeak, tho' indeed we ſhould more properly ſay,* this Propoſition) *what is it that I am to prove? Not ſurely that* A B *is the leaſt ſide, but the intire Conditional, that if it be oppoſed to the leaſt Angle, that then it is the leaſt ſide. What I am to prove is the whole Conditional, the part following, or that would follow upon the Condition, being ſtill left in ſuſpenſe. For thus my proof proceeds: The leaſt ſide is oppoſed to the leaſt Angle; therefore if* A B *be oppoſed to the leaſt Angle, then* A B *is the leaſt ſide:* If *it be, but whether it be or no, is the buſineſs of another Propoſition to ſhew, and till that be done, nothing actually follows; but things hang in the ſame ſuſpenſe as before: By which it clearly appears, that the Conſequence (as 'tis called) of an Hypothetical* Syllogiſm *is not properly an actual Conſequence, that is a Propoſition actually following from ſomething premiſed, but only a ſingle Propoſition declarative of a Conſequence that would follow upon ſuch a Poſition. Which, by the way, I take to be the Reaſon (or elſe I am not Logician enough to aſſign any) why, tho' the* Concluſion *of a* Syllogiſm *may not be denied, yet the* Conſequence *of it may. But, I pray, why ſo? Is not a Conſequence and a Concluſion of the ſame?*

Yes,

Yes, an actual Consequence is, for what is a Conclusion but a Proposition following upon Premises. And therefore if the Consequence of such a Syllogism *were an actual Consequence, it ought no more to be denied than the Conclusion, but rather the Premises upon which it depends: But then this shews plainly that it is not. And indeed the true Reason that justifies the denial of such a Consequence, I take to be this, That the consequence of a Hypothetical* Syllogism *is considered not as an actual Consequence, but as a bare Proposition, tho' of a particular Kind or Form: And 'tis no strange thing for a Proposition to be denied. From all which it is clear, that the Consequence of an Hypothetical* Syllogism, *is indeed no actual Consequence as a Conclusion is (for then it would be no more to be denied than a Conclusion) but only a bare Enuntiation, till the Hypothesis be put; and when it is put, then indeed there will be an actual Consequence: But not from one Proposition, for then there will be another added to it, and a Consequence from two Propositions premised, is the very thing which we call a* Syllogism, *out of which therefore there is no actual Consequence to be found (for the true* Consequence *of an Hypothetick* Syllogism, *that is, that which actually and really follows, is no other than the* Conclusion) *nor consequently any effectual Arguing or Reasoning; and therefore for any Man to pretend to imploy his Reason to the disparagement of that wherein, and whereby all true Reasoning proceeds, must needs be an odd and a bold Extravagance.*

Now as to the uſefulneſs of Syllogiſm, *I might ſay a great deal, but touching upon it here only* en-paſſant, *ſhall but juſt glance at a few Conſiderations. As* 1ſt. *That it ſhortens and draws together our view of things, and brings a large Field of Truth under a narrow compaſs. This we look upon as the great advantage of* Algebra, *that it teaches us the way to abridge our Ideas, whereby the Capacity of the Mind is inlarged for the diſcovery of ſuch compounded Truths, as at firſt view appear incomprehenſible. For indeed the leaving out ſuch things as would needleſly fill and diſtract the Attention of the Mind, is equivalent to the inlarging of its Capacity; it being to all intents of Viſion the ſame thing, whether the ſight be carried further, and ſpread wider, or the proſpect be brought nearer home and made more contracted. But then this, in its proportion, is as true of* Syllogiſm. *Then again, as it contracts the ſubject of our Contemplation, ſo it ſerves* 2dly, *as a meaſure to us in the management and diſpoſal of our Thoughts in our Reaſonings and Diſcourſes to others, wherein we cannot otherwiſe avoid Confuſion and Diſorder, than by conſidering what the Concluſion is which we would prove, by what mediums we would prove it, and to which part of the Argument, whether Major or Minor, or Concluſion, this or that particular part of our Diſcourſe relates; ſo that tho' our Diſcourſe be not laid out in the exact formality of* Syllogiſm *(which ordinarily to affect, would perhaps ſavour a little too much of School-Pedantry)*

yet

yet we ſhould have a kind of a ſyllogiſtical Plan *before us, that ſo in every Stage of our Diſcourſe we may know where about we are, and what we are doing. But then* Laſtly, *as it regulates our own, ſo it will ſerve as a meaſure whereby to judge of the Diſcourſes of others. For paſſing a right Judgment upon which, we muſt conſider what the Concluſion is which they offer to prove, what the Premiſes are whereby they prove it, and whether ſuch Premiſes do indeed prove ſuch a Concluſion. And indeed I know no better way to form a right Judgment of any Diſcourſe; or, to prevent our being impoſed upon by the plauſible flouriſh of a long* Harangue, *than to reduce it to* Syllogiſm. *For then you will ſee all the parts of the Argument in* Miniature, *what truly belongs to it, and what is put in only for Shew, Pomp, Amuſement, and every part in its proper Place and Order; and withal what Connexion one part has with another, which is the beſt way that I know of whereby to judge of the whole. Whereby it may appear that there is ſome other uſe of Syllogiſm than what the Author is pleaſed to mention,* viz. *That* the chief and main Uſe of it is in the Schools, where Men are allow'd without Shame to deny the Agreement of Ideas which do manifeſtly agree. *Which Reflection perhaps is neither ſo True, nor yet ſo Pertinent as it ſhould be. Not ſo true, ſince by the Laws of Argumentation, the Reſpondent is not ſo at liberty to deny whatever comes in his way; but that in certain Caſes (whereof the denial of a manifeſt Truth is one) he may be juſtly required to aſſign a Reaſon for it. Nor*

yet so very pertinent: For since, as is well known, these Scholastick Engagements are intended for Trial and Exercise-sake, as well as for the Discovery of Truth, I see not where the Harm or Shame *of it lies, if, as the Opponent argues against a plain Truth, to see whether the Respondent can* defend *it; so the Respondent should be sometimes allow'd the liberty to deny a plain Truth (supposing it not to be so plain as to be uncapable of proof) to see if the Opponent can* prove *it. So that this Reflection, seems not very just or fair. But enough of this Matter, unless I had occasion to treat more professedly of it.*

There is a Passage in the former Part, which tho' otherwise clear enough in it self, may yet perhaps require a little farther clearing, because of a School-Objection which seems to brush hard against it. 'Tis where I represent the λόγος, *as concurring in the Work of the Creation, not so properly by way of a strict* Efficiency, *as by way of a* Rule *or* Exemplar. *Now this perhaps may be thought to clash with a receiv'd Rule in Divinity. The Rule is, That the Works of the Trinity which are* without, *are undivided; which seems to imply, that those that are within are on the contrary* divided. *The ground of which Difference I take to be this, That in those Operations whith are within the Formal Principle of the Operation, is not the Nature, but the Person. And because the Persons are distinct, therefore the Operations are also divided. And so we say, the Father generates, and not the Son; and the Son is generated, and not the Father. But now in those Operations which are without, and terminate in the Creature,*

ture, there the Principle of Operation is the Deity it self, or the whole Divine Nature; and consequently every Person must be jointly concern'd in them, and that because every Person equally communicates in that Divine Nature. But what then? Tho' they all jointly concur, yet there is no necessity by virtue of this Rule, or any other, that I know of, that they should all concur after the same manner. No, tho' they have the same external Work in common between them, because of the Unity of their Essence; yet the manner of their Concurrence in it may be different, according to the Distinction of their personal Properties. As appears plainly in the great Work of Man's Redemption, *which tho' as much a Work* without *as the* Creation, *and consequently, by virtue of our School-Maxim, as much* undivided, *that is, as equally common to all the Persons of the God-head; yet 'tis well known, and must be allowed, that they concurred in it very differently, one after one manner, and another after another, according to the Order and Oeconomy which each Person has in peculiar to himself in the same Divine Nature. So that there is no such great Difficulty in this Matter as may appear at first sight, and I believe no good School-Divine will have any Contention with me about it.*

Neither, I hope, will it be thought strange that in this present Part I make the λόγος *of St.* John *to be the same with* Solomon's Wisdom. *And to this purpose I here further remark, besides what is there alledged for it, that it seems not unreasonable to suppose, that St.* John *by his* λόγος *(since he*

he falls so directly, and, as it were, abruptly upon it, and says withal no more of it) did intend to express a Notion or Doctrine that was before received by th Jewish *Church, and contained in the Scriptures of the Old Testament. And, if so, it will be most reasonable to suppose, that it was therein contained under the Term of* Wisdom, *which occurs so often in the Writings of* Solomon, *the* Psalms, *and elsewhere, there being no other that carries so near an Affinity with it. And that St.* John *did chuse to express this old Doctrine by the word* λόγος *as being a Technological Term well known among the* Jews *(probably from the Writings of* Philo*) at that time. And herein I have Concurring with me, the very Learned Author of the Judgment of the antient* Jewish *Church against the* Unitarians. It cannot be denied, *says he,* that St. *John* being one of the Circumcision, did write with an especial respect to the *Jews*, that they might understand him, and receive benefit by it. And therefore it cannot be doubted but that when he called Jesus Christ the λόγος, he used a word that was commonly known among the *Jews* of those times in which he lived. Otherwise if he had used this word in a sense not commonly known to the *Jews*, he would have signified to them that new Idea he had affixed to it.

Judgment of the antient Jewish Church, Page (as I think) 162.

I am not ignorant that the success of Books depends not only upon the Judgments of the Writers, but also upon the Qualifications of the Readers.

And

And tho' there may be many more capable Readers than good Writers, there being not so much required for the former as for the latter; yet when 'tis considered how Mens Affections do betray their Understandings, and how far Men are under the Power of these Affections; and that, tho' they read with their Eyes, and conceive with their Understandings, yet they judge and give sentence generally by their Passions and Prejudices; and considering again how various these are in different Men, 'tis not easie to presage from the intrinsick Worth or Quality of any Book, what the fortune of it will be. That Account which Monsieur de Launoy *gives us of the various Fortune of* Aristotle *in the* Parisian *Academy, is a sufficient instance of this. Tho' upon the whole, I cannot but think that* Aristotle's *Books have had very* good *Fortune. How this may speed in the World is of less Consequence, tho' perhaps of more hazard, by reason of its incountring so many Prejudices, and its appearing in an Age of so much fineness and exactness. So that I have at once both old Prejudices, and new Light to contend with. 'Tis a great disadvantage to come abroad in a discerning Age. Many things that were written formally when the Chanel of Learning was at a low Ebb, being then well received and thought considerable, by reason of their* Comparative *Eminence, have liv'd upon the same Stock of Reputation ever since, and retain'd that Credit afterwards which they happen'd to have at their first Delivery; which, if they were now to make their first appearance into the World, would not, I am confident, be so much admired. And I am*

of

of Opinion, that few things of the Antients, except their Poetry *and their* Oratory, *if they were now first to see the Light without our knowing the true Date of their Age, would relish over and above with us. But the single Prejudice of that reconciles us to them.*

------Meliora Dies, ut vina, Poemata reddit.

How far this present Treatise needs the Favour and courteous Acceptance of the Publick, I am sufficiently sensible; but how far it may deserve it, it belongs to others to judge, tho' perhaps not to so many as will. All that I can say for it is, that I have inquir'd carefully after the Truth, and am ready to Correct whatever I shall find contrary to it. As thinking it as much below the Ingenuity of a Man to resolve to defend with pertinacious Animosity what he has once erroneously said, as above the present Condition of Mortality never to fall into any Mistakes.

This being the first time (as far as I know) that this Hypothesis has appear'd in the form of a System, *it may, upon that account, have some Pretence to hope for a kind and candid Reception: Which, if it meets with, perhaps I may be encouraged to trouble the World, once more, upon a Subject of more general concernment, as thinking it of the sooneſt to leave off Writing at an Age wherein perhaps it would be most advisable to begin. In the mean time, Reader, supposing thee to have consider'd the former Part, I now commit this to thy Hands; beseeching thee, if thou vouchsafest to peruse it, not to do it with*

with too much haſte, nor with any prejudice, but as thou readeſt me to inquire with me of him that teaches us both in the Secret of our Hearts. For we have all one common Maſter, and are Fellow-Scholars in the ſame School; and therefore as I would not impoſe any thing Magiſterally on thee, ſo neither ſhouldſt thou be forward to tax that as a fault in me, which is only a Prejudice in thy ſelf, nor judge well or ill any further than thou ſeeſt clear Reaſon for it in the Light of Interiour Truth. *But if after all thou diſſenteſt from me, there is no harm done, thou haſt liberty to abound in thy own Senſe; only let us joyn at leaſt in our* Prayers, *that God would lighten our Darkneſs for the diſcovery of that Truth which we do not ſee, and diſpoſe us to the Practice of that Good which we know. That he would pity our Ignorance, and forgive and rectifie our Miſtakes, and lead us into all neceſſary and ſaving Truth. And as for Truths of Speculation that are of more difficulty, and leſs importance, let us learn to forgive and tolerate one another, conſidering how ſhort-ſighted and fallible we all are. And as for for ſuch Truths as are above the pitch of our preſent Compreheſion, them let us have at leaſt the Prudence not to imploy our ſearch about, ſtudying only what is intelligible by us in this imperfect State, and leaving the reſt to that great and ſhining Day, when the Light of the* falſly Learn'd *ſhall be turn'd into Darkneſs, and the Darkneſs of thoſe who ſincerely and humbly apply themſelves to the inquiry of Truth, and the practice of true Righteouſneſs, ſhall be turned into Light.*

ERRATA.

EPistle Ded. Page 2. Line 10. Read *fair*. Preface, p. 1. l. 9. *it*. r. *if*. p. 6. l. 1. *as partly*, r. *partly as*. p. 9. l. 13. *or* r. *and*. ibid. l. 27. r. *Discourses*. p. 10. l. 6. supply what is wanting thus, *is yet as to the pure reasoning part of the Discourse, a mere Cypher that goes for nothing in the Account*. Ibid. *the Syllogism*, r. *Syllogism*. Ibid. l. 10, *after expressly*, add *and separately*.

Book, Page 9. Line 13. Read *is a*, p. 10. l. 28. r. *it is*, p. 23. l. 19. *Art* r. *Act*, p. 30. l. 26. r. *Eternal*, p. 80. l. 7. *as* r. *and*, p. 117. l. 2. r. *not perhaps*, p. 153. l. 2. *serv'd* r. *sever'd*, p. 170. l. ult. r. *after the highest Efforts*, p. 178. l. 6. r. *to the*, p. 191. l. 2. r. *no more*, p. 209. l. 1. r. *is not that, with an Interrogation*, p. 223. l. 11. r. *Consequence*, p. 229. l. 4. *or* r. *and*, p. 246. l. 19. r. *Colour*, p. 248. l. 14. *or* r. *as*, p. 253. l. 1. r. *there are*, ibid. l. 6. r. *things*, p. 258. l. 29. *in* r. *to*, p. 267. l. 30. *her* r. *our*, ibid. l. 31. r. *affection*, p. 289. l. 28. *as* r. *a*, p. 296. l. 3. r. *be not*, p. 305. l. 20. *he* r. *we*, p. 330. l. 6. *whence* r. *when*, p. 834. l. 5. r. *quojuscunq*; ibid. l. 17. r. *is of*, p. 345. l. 26. r. *intentional*, p. 346. l. 22. *of*, r. *if*, p. 359. l. 20. r. *Extant*, p. 361. l. 27. r. *an Organical Body*, p. 383. l. 15. *us* r. *use*, p. 393. l. 11. *World* r. *Word*, p. 394. 14. *this* r. *thus*, p. 402. l. 21. r. *Relations*; ibid. l. 31. r. *unintelligible*, p. 167. l. 3. *whoever* r. *who ever*, p. 418. l. 7. *'tis* r. *is*, p. 420. l. 1. *this* r. *his*, p. 422. l. 7. r. *whether*, p. 423. l. 14. r. *Outrer*, p. 436. l. 3. *shall* r. *all*, p. 450. l. 26. r. *he is*, p. 463. l. 23. r. *Aereasq*; p. 496. l. 25. del. *it*, p. 500. l. 14. r. *Considerations*, p. 521. l. 4. *Casually* r. *Causally*, p. 529. l. 7. r. *formerly*, p. 540. l. 11. r. *Concedimus*, p. 550. l. r. *implying*, p. 552. l. 21. r. *needed*, p. 554. l. 27. *whole* r. *whose*, p. 559. l. the last r. *Beatifying*, p. 569. l. 21. r. *Sense*, p. 572. l. 3. r. *Noli*, ibid. l. 18. r. *Hypotheses*, ibid. l. 28. *of* r. *with*.

These are the Mistakes of the greatest importance. But as for false Spellings, such as *Impenitrability*, *Modefy'd*, *Independant*, *Aristotelian*, *Suppliment*, *Anticedent*, &c. I leave them to the Correction of the Reader, And so also as to false Pointings; only there are a few which so very much affect the Sense, that I think fit here to rectify them, p. 241. l. 27. instead of, *representing Colour*, *at least as something*, r. *representing Colour at least*, &c. p. 313. l. 13. instead of, *but besides that, we may see*, &c, r. *But besides, that we may see*, &c. p. 384. l. 8. instead of, *making it even, as the Argument*, &c. r. *making it, even as the Argument runs*, &c. p. 492. l. 2. instead of, *been premised. First*, r. *been premised first*.

The kind Reader is desired to excuse the trouble which the Author's Absence from the Press gives him.

Books Printed for, and Sold by S. Manſhip, *at the* Ship *in* Cornhil, *near the* Royal-Exchange.

AN Eſſay concerning Humane Underſtanding, in Four Books: The Fourth Edition with large Additions: By *John Lock* Gent.

Practical Diſcourſes on the Parables of our Bleſſed Saviour, In Two Vol. 8*o*. By *F. Brage* Vicar of *Hitchin* in *Hertfordſhire*. Price Bound 10 *s*.

A New Voyage into *Italy*, with neceſſary Inſtructions for thoſe that undertake the ſame. By *Maxilian Miſſon*. In 2 Vol. The Second Edition, enlarged above one Third, and enriched with ſeveral New Figures.

The *Roman Hiſtory*, from the building of the City, to the perfect ſettlement of the Empire of *Auguſtus Cæſar*, to *Conſtantine* the Great. In Two Vol. By *L. Echard*, A. M.

A Compleat Body of Chyrurgical Operations, containing the whole Practice of Surgery, with Obſervations and Remarks upon each Caſe: Amongſt which are inſerted the ſeveral ways of delivering Women in natural and unnatural Labours. By *M. De la Vauguion*, M. D. and Intendant of the Royal Hoſpital about *Paris*. Done into Engliſh in 8*o* bound 6 *s*.

Moral Eſſays: Contained in ſeveral Treatiſes on many Important Duties. Written in *French* by *Meſſeurs du Port Royal*: Engliſhed by a Perſon of Quality. The Third Edition with Amendments. In 4 Vol. 8*o*. Price 10. *s*.

Chriſtian Conferences, demonſtrating the Truth of the Chriſtian Religion and Morality. By *Fa. Malebranch*.

Practical Diſcourſes upon ſeveral Subjects. Vol. I. & II.

The Chriſtian Life, wherein is ſhewed, I. *The Worth and Excellency of the Soul*. II. *The Divinity and Incarnation of our Saviour*. III. *The Authority of the Holy Scriptures*. IV. *A Diſſuaſive from Apoſtacy*. Vol. V. and Laſt. All Three by *John Scot*. D. D. late Rector of St. *Giles*'s in the Fields.

A Sermon before the Merchants Trading to the Levant-Seas. By *E. Chiſhul* Fellow of C. C. C. in *Oxon*. In 4*o*.

Of Wiſdom. In Three Books. Written Originally in *French* by the *Sieur de Charron*. Engliſhed by *G. Stanhope*, D. D. In Two Vol. 8*o*. Price bound 12 *s*.

The Compleat Horſeman, or the perfect Farrier, in Two Parts, Abridged from the Folio; done into Engliſh by Sir *Will. Hope*, in 8*o*. Bound 5 *s*.

Books

Books Printed for, and Sold by W. Hawes *at the* Roſe *in* Ludgate-ſtreet.

THE Grounds and Principles of the Chriſtian Religion, explain'd in a Catechetical Diſcourſe, for the Inſtruction of young People. Written in *French* by *J. F. Oſtervald*, Paſtor of the Church of *Neufchatel*, and Author of a Book, Entitled, *A Treatiſe concerning the Cauſes of the preſent Corruption of Chriſtians, and the Remedies thereof.* To which is added, a Liturgy: Or, *Form of publick Prayers*, which are ſaid in the Church of *Neufchatel* every *Saturday* at Five of the Clock in the Evening, and were Eſtabliſh'd in the Month of *May*, 1702. Rendred into *Engliſh* by Mr. *Hum. Wanley*: And Revis'd by *Geo. Stanhope*, D. D.

Fourteen Sermons preach'd at St. *James*'s Church in *Weſtminſter*. By *Charles Hickman*, D. D. Chaplain in Ordinary to His Hajeſty, and Domeſtick Chaplain to the Earl of *Rocheſter*.

A Treatiſe concerning the Lawfulneſs of Inſtrumental Muſick in Holy Offices. To which is prefix'd, a Preface in Vindication of Mr. *Newte*'s Sermon, concerning the Lawfulneſs and Uſe of Organs in the Chriſtian Church, *&c.* From the Exceptions of an Anonimous Letter to a Friend in the Country, concerning the Uſe of Inſtrumental Muſick in the Worſhip of God, *&c.* The Second Edition, with large Additions. By *Henry Dodwell*, M. A. Price 3. *s.*

A ſhort Diſcourſe upon the Doctrine of our Baptiſmal Covenant; being an Expoſition upon the preliminary Queſtions and Anſwers of our Church Catechiſm: Proper to be read by all Young Perſons, in order to their underſtanding the whole Frame and Tenor of the Chriſtian Religion, and to their being duly prepared for Confirmation. With Devotions preparatory to that Apoſtolick and Uſeful Ordinance. The fourth Edition: By *Thomas Bray*, D. D. Price 2 *s.* 6 *d.*

Mathematicks made eaſy: Or a compleat Mathematical Dictionary, explaining all the parts of the Mathematicks, with all the Terms of Art, and difficult Phraſes rendred plain and eaſy to every Capacity. Collected from Monſieur *Ozanam*'s *Dictionarie Mathematique*, *Vitalis*, and others; with an Appendix containing the Quantities of all ſorts of Weights and Meaſures, the characters and meaning of the Marks and Symbols, or Abbreviations commonly uſed in *Algebra*. Alſo, the Definition, Explanation, Nature and Meaning of the Principal Mathematical Inſtruments. Illuſtrated on Copper Cuts curiouſly Engraven. Price 3 *s.* 6 *d.*

THE THEORY OF THE Ideal World, &c.

Part the Second. *Being the Relative Part.*

CHAP. I.

A Preliminary Consideration concerning the Principle of Thought, or what it is that thinks in us; with a full Discussion of that great Question, Whether Matter can think?

1. THIS Theory (as was intimated in the beginning) admits of a double View or Prospect. One according to its Absolute State and Nature as it is in itself. And another according to the Relation

which it carries to *Human Underſtanding*. So that it muſt be conſidered both theſe ways by him that will exhibit a juſt and complete Syſtem of it. According to the firſt way we have already conſidered it in the former part of this Undertaking, wherein we have proved an Intelligible World, or World of Ideas eternally exiſting in the Divine Mind, and truly exhibitive of all that is out of it, as alſo have explained in a competent Meaſure the State, Nature, and Manner of this *Ideal Syſtem*, and that both as to the Ideas themſelves, and thoſe Eternal Truths which neceſſarily reſult from them, and depend upon them as their Central Stay and Fundamental Ground. We have alſo ſhewn our Divine Ideas to be the Ground of all Theory and Science, as well as of Truth, and indeed to be the formal and proper Objects of them, as being the true and very Eſſences of Things, thoſe *Intelligible* Eſſences of theirs which are diſtinct from their Exiſtences, and which therefore all Science ſolely regards, as having a ſtable, permanent, and immutable Intelligibility, whether the Things themſelves exiſt in Nature or no. Theſe and many other Things of this Abſtract Kind relating to the *Abſolute* Conſideration of the Ideal Syſtem, we have already accounted for. Let us now with Reliance on the Divine Aſſiſtance advance to the *Relative* part, the Application of the foregoing Principles, and ſee whether upon our Ideal Foundations we can give an Account of the true manner

ner of *Human Underſtanding*, or at leaſt erect an Intelligible Syſtem of it.

2. 'Tis a great thing which is now taken in Hand, to explain the way of our Underſtanding. All Knowledge of our ſelves is difficult, but there are two Parts of our ſelves which ſeem moſt to lurk and hide from us, and to be moſt unwilling to be traced and found out by us, the *Heart* and the *Head*, which are the two moſt intricate and puzling Pieces of the Human Frame, and that give the greateſt trouble to our *Metaphyſical*, as well as to our *Phyſical* Anatomy. The Heart is deceitful above all things (ſays the Holy Text) and deſperately wicked, who can know it? The Motions of the Moral Heart, like thoſe of the Natural, tho' eaſily felt, are very hard to be diſcern'd in their *Springs* and *Principles*. And tho' the Underſtanding ſeems to promiſe a Diſcovery of it ſelf by its own Light, yet it has a dark ſide to us ward, and that which perceives all other things, cannot ſo eaſily perceive it ſelf. Whether it is that the Soul has no Ideal View of its own Subſtance, as knowing it ſelf by a conſcious Sentiment rather than by Idea, or that it ſees other things by a direct Intuition, but it ſelf by Reflection, and that Reflex way of Perception be attended with peculiar Difficulties and Diſadvantages, by reaſon of the real Identity and Indiſtinction of the Faculty and of the Object, which may poſſibly require the greater Application and Attention for the one to diſ-

cern the other: But ſo it is, the Underſtanding that ſearches all things and finds ſome, is blindeſt at home, and knows leaſt of her ſelf and her own Functions.

3. Should we now ſuppoſe (what hereafter ſhall be conſider'd) that the Soul has no Idea of it ſelf, the preſent Inquiry may perhaps be thought not only a difficult, but a vain and impoſſible Undertaking. For where our Ideas fail us, to what purpoſe do we diſcourſe, or what ſucceſs can we promiſe our ſelves if we do? But for the prevention of this Objection, 'tis to be minded that we neither pretend nor undertake here to lay open and unfold the very Nature and Eſſence of the Soul, *(This Knowledge is too wonderful and excellent for me, I cannot attain unto it)* but only to give ſome Account of the manner of Underſtanding, and that tho' the Soul ſhould be found to have no Idea of it ſelf, yet it muſt be allowed to have a conſcious Sentiment, as of its Being, ſo alſo of its Operations, and to be able alſo to reflect upon them. This being the Privilege, (as * St. *Auſtin* obſerves) which the Spiritual has above the Carnal Eye, that whereas *the Eye of the Fleſh ſees other things but not it ſelf, the Underſtanding ſees other things and it ſelf too*, as being able not only to act, but to reflect upon its Actions, and ſo to make it ſelf its own Object. A Privilege peculiar to Spirit, and which exceeds the whole Power and Capacity of Matter.

* *Expoſ. in Evang. Joan. Tract.* 47.

4. But

4. But before we proceed to Conſider *how* we underſtand, perhaps it may be worth our while to take a Preliminary Conſideration in our way concerning the *Principle* of Thought, and to inquire *What* it is that thinks or underſtands in us. That we do Think is what we are inwardly conſcious of to our ſelves, what we feel and know by a Sentiment as clear and evident as that of Pleaſure or Pain. And as 'tis impoſſible to prove it to another, ſo we need not go to prove it to our ſelves, as having already ſuch a preventing Aſſurance of it as no Rational Proceedure can either abate or improve. But *how* we think, or what it is in us that is the Principle of Thought, are Diſcoveries not ſo eaſily made, and ſuch as we muſt be beholden for to Thought and Reflection if ever we make them.

5. Thinking is generally preſumed to be a Property belonging to the *Soul*. And indeed ſuppoſing my ſelf to conſiſt of Soul and Body, 'tis fairly *preſumable* that 'tis my Soul that thinks. Becauſe Thinking is the nobleſt Operation that I am conſcious to my ſelf of, and it ſeems reaſonable that the nobleſt Operation of my Nature ſhould be referr'd to the nobleſt Part of it. But perhaps (I ſpeak as a Philoſopher) it may be only a Suppoſition that I have a Soul, as that ſignifies a Principle or Subſtance diſtinct from Matter, or if it be a real Truth, yet how does it clearly appear to me from my having a Soul, that 'tis my Soul that thinks?

For may not this be as much a Preſumption as the other? But I would fain have ſomething, if I could, more convincing than a Preſumption as to both.

6. But this it will be impoſſible ever to have as to either of them, if Matter be allow'd to think, or to be ſo much as capable of Thought. For I cannot be aſſur'd of my having a Soul but by my *Thinking*. I do not ſee it, I only feel its Operations, (if I aſcribe them to the right Principle when I ſay ſo) and therefore ſetting Revelation aſide, and conſidering things only in a rational way, 'tis by *them* that I muſt expect all the Satisfaction I can hope to have in this Matter. 'Tis true indeed the different appearances of Life and Death, and the different States of the Body that are conſequent upon them do ſufficiently prove the Diſtinction of Soul and Body as to a groſs and popular Senſe, that is, they prove that this ſenſible and viſible Subſtance which we call our Body is not the whole Man, but that there is ſomething beſides that belongs to the Conſtitution of his Nature. But whether that Something be a Subſtance in its whole Kind diſtinct from what we call the Body, or only a Body of a finer Mould and Contexture than the other, no Obſervation drawn from the appearances of Life or Death can ſatisfy a rational Curioſity, ſince all thoſe things may be Mechanically accountable. No, this can be known only by our *Thinking*. But neither will *that* be a concluding

cluding Argument for the purpoſe, if Matter can think. For if ſo, how can I prove from my thinking that I have any ſuch Principle in me diſtinct from Matter as I call my Soul, ſince upon the Suppoſition of Matter's having a Capacity of Thought, that very Principle may be no other than Matter, which by my Thinking I would diſtinguiſh from it? And as I cannot know whether I have any thing in me diſtinct from Matter, ſo neither for the ſame Reaſon can I know whether that be it which thinks in me, if Matter be ſuppoſed capable of the ſame. So that both theſe Queſtions, Whether I have a Soul, or whether it be my Soul that thinks, muſt be determin'd by one and the ſame common Meaſure, and can neither of them be eſtabliſh'd in the Affirmative but upon this Principle, viz. *The utter Incapacity that Matter has to Think.*

7. Indeed, had I but a clear Idea of my own Soul, ſuch as I have of Extenſion, Numbers or Figures, I might then without troubling my ſelf about Matter, barely by conſulting that Idea, ſee in one and the ſame View what Properties and Modifications it includes, and conſequently whether *Thinking* be one of them. And ſo need not argue this round about way, that 'tis my Soul that thinks becauſe Matter is not capable of doing it. But ſuch an Idea I cannot at preſent find that I have, and if I had it yet even then tho' I ſhould know whether my Soul thought or no, yet I would not

be assured that 'tis my Soul *only* that thinks, unless I am also satisfy'd that Matter is not capable of Thought. For if it be, how know I but that I may think with my *Body* as well as with my *Soul*? But in case Matter be found not to have any capacity for thinking, then I shall know two things of no ordinary Importance, and which I have hitherto been used to take for granted. 1. That I have a Soul. 2. That 'tis my Soul, and that only, which is the true Principle of all that Thought which I am now, or any other time, Conscious of. So that the Question will still turn upon this, *Whether Matter can think?*

8. Those that think it can (of whom I hope the Philosophick World has not many) do as far as I can apprehend, make it plainly impossible to prove the *Immateriality*, and consequently the Natural *Immortality* of the Soul. Nay, indeed whether we have any such thing as a Soul in us, or no. I say the *Natural* Immortality of the Soul. For as to a Positive Immortality, such as is founded upon the pure Will of God, and the extraordinary influx of his Conservative Power, that any thing may have, be the Nature or Quality of it what it will, if God please to stay it in its Being, by such an External support. But for any thing to be Immortal in its own Nature so as to be above the Force of any created Power to destroy it, that I think Philosophy has always reserv'd as the Privilege of Spiritual and Immaterial Beings.

Beings. Indeed as Immortal ſignifies only *Unperiſhable*, and is oppoſed to *Annihilation*, ſo all things have a Natural Immortality, Matter as well as Spirit (from ſomething to fall to nothing, or from nothing to riſe to ſomething, being equally above the Force of Natural Cauſality) and accordingly in this Senſe, the Soul would be Immortal tho' it were not of a Subſtance, in its whole Kind diſtinct from the Body, provided it were a Subſtance at all, and not as ſome have fanſied, a *Modality*, or *Temperament* of the Body only. To be a Subſtance at large a ſufficient Qualification for this kind of Immortality: But as Immortal is taken for *indiſſolvible*, and as 'tis oppoſed to *Corruption*, ſo nothing but what is Immaterial, can be Immortal. Since if Material it will be diviſible and ſo Mortal or Corruptible. But now as I cannot know that I have any Subſtance in me diſtinct from my Body, but by my Thinking (for what elſe is there in me, that Matter may not do as well as Spirit?) ſo I cannot know it by that neither, if Matter can think. And conſequently upon this Suppoſition, tho by the aſſiſtance of Revelation, I may *Believe*, yet I cannot by any pure Method of Reaſon, *prove* that I have an Immortal Soul.

9. But to prevent any miſunderſtanding in a Point of ſo great Conſequence to be rightly underſtood, I think fit here to enter a double Caution, before we proceed any further. 1. That I do not pretend by this that the Queſtion of the

the Soul's Immortality is ſo far concern'd in that other, concerning the Cogitative Power of Matter, that the holding this in the *Affirmative*, ſhould oblige us to hold the other in the *Negative*, that is, that if Matter be allow'd to think, then the Soul is not Immortal. No, my meaning is not that it concludes againſt the Soul's Immortality in it *ſelf*, but only that it does ſo as to *us*, ſo far as it makes it impoſſible for us to know, or prove, but that our Souls may be as Corruptible as our Bodies. And ſo much I conceive it plainly does. For as the Soul cannot be Immortal, unleſs it be Immaterial, ſo it cannot be proved to be Immaterial but by its Thinking. Nor by that neither, if Thought be within the Power of Matter. Since if Matter can think, then my Soul notwithſtanding its thinking may be, for ought I know, no other than Matter, and ſo as liable to Corruption as Matter is. 2. That I would not be thought hereby to inſinuate that * all thoſe who allow a Power of thinking in Matter, do advance ſo ſingular a Notion with any deſign of prejudice, to the Doctrin of the Soul's Immortality, or even to the very poſſibility of its Proof, but only that is the Natural Conſequence and tendency of the thing which makes it impoſſible for us, in a rational way, to have any ſatisfaction concerning

* I ſay *All*, becauſe I think there is a certain late Author, who by his ſecond Thoughts of Human Soul (a Book which ſhews that ſecond Thoughts are not always the wiſeſt) has given us but too juſt an Occaſion, that we ſhould except him.

ing that great Article in Philoſophy as well as in Divinity, the Immortality of our Souls, as undermining the Foundation upon which it ſtands. That is in ſhort, we cannot upon this Principle know the Soul to be Immortal becauſe we cannot know it to be Immaterial.

10. Now tho' this be not only a great Prejudice, but alſo a conſiderable Objection againſt Matters being capable of thinking, and a good reaſon to make the Patrons of this Paradoxical Notion very ſuſpicious of it, as well as to make all others Cautious of admitting it, yet however ſince it will hardly amount to a ſatisfactory Reſolution of the Point, as expoſing rather than proving, and as tending rather to ſhew which ſide of the Queſtion is moſt for our Intereſt to have true, than poſitively to determine which is ſo, let us conſider whether we can confirm theſe Preſumptions by ſome more direct and convincing Evidence. And becauſe we cannot Judge of things any better, or indeed any otherwiſe than by thoſe Ideas which we have of them, we will firſt conſider what Idea we have of Matter, and then examine whether Matter according to that Idea, can have that Thought or Power of Thinking which we are conſcious of to our ſelves.

11. Matter or Body according to the Philoſophy of * ſome, is either *Phyſical* or *Geometrical*, which Geometrical Body is ſaid to be *Extenſi-*

* See the *Burgundian* Philoſophy *Tom.* 4. p. 184. as alſo *Du Hamel de Conſenſ. Vet. & Nov. Phil.* p. 666.

on.

on. But this is a distinction which I do not well understand, not being able to conceive any other Matter or Body, but what is Physical. 'Tis true indeed the Object of Geometry may in some Sense, be said to be extension. But what Extension is it? not that which is Local and Material, but *Intelligible Extension*, that is not Matter, but the Idea of Matter, or, not Matter as it is in Nature, but as it is in Idea. There seems to be a necessity for this, not only upon the Consideration largely insisted upon in the former
Page 51. part, *viz.* That the Figures which Geometry contemplates, are Ideal or Intelligible Figures only, as being consider'd according to such Exactness of Perfection as they have not in Nature, but also because Geometry being a strict Science, must have a stable, necessary and immutable Object for its Contemplation, such as the Natural and Corporeal World cannot afford, and is to be found only in the Intelligible. That Extension then which Geometry contemplates as its formal Object, is not Corporeal Extension, any more than the Figures are Corporeal Figures, but Ideal or Intelligible Extension, which has nothing of Corporeity in it, as not being a proper Extension, but only so call'd from the Power which it has of representing it to our Thoughts. There is no such thing then as Geometrical Matter, and that because the Object of Geometry is not Matter, but Idea. But then the Consequence of this is that the Distinction of Geometrial and Physical Matter

ter is without due Foundation in pure Reaſon. And indeed it has only a confuſe Imagination to ſupport it, as ariſing only from want of a right Apprehenſion of the Abſtractedneſs of the Science of Geometry, which is preſumed to Abſtract from Matter not in the reality of the Thing but only rationally and as to the manner of Conſideration, and ſo to have ſomething really Material for its Object. But this Miſtake we have already rectify'd, ſhewing that Geometry is every whit as Abſtract a Science as Metaphyſicks, and therefore for the preſent ſuppoſing no other Matter but what is Phyſical, I ſhall confine my Conſideration to that.

See Part I. p. 59.

12. Now of this I think the moſt ſimple and genuine Idea that will offer it ſelf to the Mind that attentively conſiders it, is that of an *Extended Being*. To this ſome perhaps would join Impenitrability, Diviſibility, Solidity, Hardneſs, *&c.* But I think when we have ſaid *Extended* Being, we have ſaid what ſufficiently expreſſes the Nature of the thing as to a general Conception of it, and that all thoſe Characters which are or can be further added, will be found to be either *Properties* belonging to Bodies, or ſuch Sentiments which we have in our ſelves upon their Occaſion. Now as for thoſe *Sentiments* which we have in our ſelves upon the Occaſion of Bodies, and are apt confuſedly to transfer from our ſelves to them, ſuch as Heat, Cold, Colour

lour, Hardneſs, *&c.* we muſt have a care how we make them enter into the Idea or Eſſence of Body. For theſe things do not ſo much as really *belong* to the Nature of Bodies, as being not (as is ordinarily conceiv'd) ſenſible Qualities really inherent in *them*, but only certain Senſations or Modalities of our own Souls, occaſion'd by them, as ſhall be ſhewn hereafter.

Princip. Philoſ. p. 25. Act. 4. *Des Cartes* indeed will tell you that ſuch Qualities do not belong to the Nature of Body becauſe they may be ſeparated from it, the Nature of Body ſtill remaining entire. But I believe it may and will hereafter be made appear that they were never ſo much as in it. And then as to the *Properties*, tho' they are (what the others are not) really appendant to Body, yet they ought not to be taken into the Idea of it, which ought to comprehend no more than the general Reaſon or Eſſence of the thing, that with which it can, and without which it cannot be conceiv'd, and that is Extended Being. He indeed that *touches* Bodies *feels* ſomething elſe, and ſo calls one Hot and another Cold, one Sweet and another Sour (how truly ſhall be conſider'd in its place) but he that *thinks* of them need think of nothing elſe, and can think of nothing elſe belonging to Bodies but what ſuppoſes and is built upon the other. But if he will add more becauſe there are more things that may be truly affirm'd of Body beſides that it is a Being

ing Extended, he may as well put together all the Properties that belong to a Figure comprehended within three right Lines, and call that a Triangle. Which if he does, he will have enough to *Define*, and nothing to *Demonſtrate*.

13. So now the Queſtion more explicitly propoſed, will be, Whether Extended Being can Think? In anſwer to which I ſhall not ſay, That as Extended Being is what we are to underſtand by Matter or Body, ſo Thinking Being is that which conſtitutes the Idea or Eſſence of the Soul, being not as yet ſuppoſed to know whether I have a Soul or no as not knowing what it is that thinks in me. But this however the Evidence of my Perception will warrant me to ſay at preſent, That Extenſion and Thought are two diſtinct Ideas, diſtinct in their whole Kind, as diſtinct as a Circle and a Triangle, or as any other two things can poſſibly be from one anther. And therefore as I can aſſuredly ſay, That a Circle is not a Triangle, becauſe I conceive them diſtinct, ſo for the ſame Reaſon and therefore with the ſame Aſſurance, I can ſay, That Extenſion is not Thought. And I have no cauſe to doubt of the Goodneſs of that Reaſon ſince we who know things by their Ideas, have no other way to diſcern the difference of them but by the Diverſity of their Reſpective Ideas.

14. Thus far then our way is clear. Extenſion is not Thought, that I diſtinctly perceive.

Sup-

Suppoſe now I ſhould further ſay, that as Extenſion and Thought are diſtinct becauſe the Ideas we have of them are ſo, ſo an Extended Being and a Thinking Being are no leſs diſtinct becauſe we have as diſtinct Ideas of *them*. An Extended Being then is one thing and a Thinking Being is another, and therefore as a Thinking Being is not an Extended Being, ſo neither is an Extended Being a Thinking Being. And if an Extended Being be not a Thinking Being, then is it not a plain Conſequence that an Extended Being cannot Think? which way of Arguing is according to the *Carteſian* Principles, and differs very little either as to Matter or Form, from that uſed by *Des Cartes*, when he ſays, *Omne id quod poteſt Cogitare eſt Mens, ſed cum Mens & Corpus realiter Diſtinguntur, nullum Corpus eſt Mens, Ergo nullum Corpus poteſt Cogitare.*

Reſp. ad ſecundas Object. p. 69.

15. This indeed is a diſpatching Demonſtration, if it be One. But the Concluſion turns ſo ſhort, and comes ſo quick upon one, that it ſeems by the very Surprize of it (as all Arguments of that ſort do) to be fallacious. But we ſhall be the better able to judge of it if we reduce it to Form, and then it will ſtand in this Poſture,

If an Extended Being be really diſtinct from a Thinking Being, then an Extended Being cannot Think;

But

But an Extended Being is really distinct from a Thinking Being;
Therefore an Extended Being cannot Think.

The Consequence of the Argument is most clear and certain, since for an Extended Being to be really distinct from a Thinking Being is the same as not to *be* a Thinking Being. And to be sure that which is not a Thinking Being cannot think. All the Question will light upon the minor Proposition, whether an Extended Being be really distinct from a Thinking Being? which is proved again thus,

If they are distinct in Conception, then they are also distinct in the Thing.
But they are distinct in Conception.

Or thus,

If the Ideas of an Extended Being and of a Thinking Being are distinct, then an Extended Being and a Thinking Being are really distinct.
But the Ideas of these Things are distinct:
Therefore the Things themselves are really so.

The Conſequence of this ſecond Argument cannot I think be reaſonably excepted againſt any more than the former. For we have no other way to judge of the real Diſtinction of Things than by the Diſtinction of thoſe Ideas we have of them when we think about them. And 'tis for no other Reaſon that we affirm a Circle not to be a Triangle, but only becauſe we conceive them, by diſtinct Ideas. This part of the Argument therefore cannot be denied. And indeed could it be made appear that the Idea of an extended Being is as diſtinct from that of a Thinking Being, as the Idea of a Circle is from that of a Triangle, I ſhould no more doubt to affirm that an Extended Being is not a Thinking Being, than I do to affirm that a Circle is not a Triangle.

16. And yet as clear as this is, ſome perhaps will demur upon this part of the Argument, and will ſay, That diverſity of Ideas does not always infer diverſity of Things. But then I ask, Does it ſometimes infer it? If they ſay, No; then I ſay, That we have no poſſible way whereby to judge of the diverſity of one thing from another. If they ſay, Yes; then they confeſs the Rule rightly ſtated and qualified to be good. And indeed there is but this one Condition wanting to ſet it right, and to juſtify the conſequence from the diverſity of Ideas to the diverſity of Things; and, that is, that the Ideas be diſtinct not by *Abſtraction* or inadequate Conception, but in them-

themſelves and in their own abſolute Natures; that is, that they be entire and complete, not inadequate Ideas. For indeed, if the Ideas be diſtinct only by Abſtraction, and for want of intireneſs of Conception, then, tho' *formally* diſtinct, they may be *really* the ſame, and ſo would not be two things but only inadequate Conceptions of the ſame thing. As for inſtance, a long Subſtance and a broad Subſtance, theſe are conceiv'd by diſtinct Ideas, but becauſe their diſtinctneſs is only from Abſtraction, wherein length is conſider'd without breadth, and breadth without length, tho' the ſame Subſtance in reality be both long and broad, it would be no Conſequence from the formal diſtinctneſs of their Ideas to infer a real diverſity between them. And accordingly were the Ideal diſtinction between an extended Subſtance and a thinking Subſtance no better than that between a long Subſtance and a broad Subſtance, the Conſequence as to the real diverſity of them would be no better; that is, they would not be really different things, but the ſame thing inadequately conceiv'd. But now if the Ideas are adequate and complete, and not made diſtinct only by Abſtraction and partial Conſideration, then the things themſelves are alſo really diſtinct, and we may ſecurely ſay, That one of them is not the other. And for this Reaſon it is that I can poſitively ſay, That Figure is not Motion, tho' I cannot ſay that a figured Subſtance is not really the

ſame with a moveable Subſtance, the Modes of things being *really* diſtinct from one another, tho' but *formally* from the things whoſe Modes they are. So then the difficulty is wholly transferr'd from the Conſequence to the minor Propoſition again, and all the Queſtion will be, whether the Ideas of an Extended Subſtance and of a Thinking Subſtance are thus truly diſtinct or no? That is, whether they are adequate and complete Ideas, and ſo diſtinct in themſelves; or only made diſtinct by Abſtraction, that is, whether *formally* or *really* diſtinct.

17. Let us conſider then what Abſtraction is, and how we may know when Ideas are by that means diſtinct. Abſtraction (otherwiſe called Preciſion) is not the bare conſidering one thing without another, as to think of a Circle without thinking of a Triangle, ſince theſe are things that *muſt* be thought of one without the other, as not being to be included in the ſame Idea. But it is the conſidering one thing without another in things that are not in reality deniable or excluſive of one another; ſo that the ſame Idea might comprehend them both, were there but a due Proportion between the Intelligence and the Intelligible. For Abſtraction is not making two Ideas of two, but making two Ideas of one, or the having two Ideas for one thing, and the conſidering only one of them at a time. We muſt diſtinguiſh here between the occaſion of Abſtraction and the real

real foundation of Abſtraction, that which I would call the *Abſtrahibility* of a Thing. The *occaſion* of Abſtraction is the Infirmity of the Underſtanding, and the narrowneſs of its capacity. For tho' it be an Argument of a good Underſtanding to be *able* to conceive Things abſtractly (which is the very fineneſs and excellency of Metaphyſical Contemplation) yet to *need* abſtraction, or to be under a *neceſſity* of conceiving things by abſtract, and inadequate Ideas argues narrowneſs in the Mind, which not being able to comprehend the whole of a Thing in one intire View, is forc'd to divide it as it were into its intelligible parts, and ſo to conſider it in *ſeveral*, wherein the Underſtanding ſeems to imitate the Eye, which views a large Object by piece-Meal, and according to the different Faces and Appearances which it has in different Lights.

18. The *Foundation* of Abſtraction is the various Intelligibility of one and the ſame thing, and that either according to the different Modes or Manners of Being, which it has in itſelf, or according to the different Reſpects which it bears to other Things. Thus in the latter way, when Things really diſtinct from each other, as taken intirely with the Differences, Accidents, and Circumſtances that determine them, are yet conſider'd not with thoſe diſtinguiſhing Conditions, but only ſo far as they agree, and according to what they have in common, that Formality under which they

are then conſider'd, is an *abſtract* Idea, and 'tis what we call a *General* or *Univerſal*. As ſuppoſe when a Circle, a Triangle and a Square, are conſider'd only under the general Idea of *Figure*, becauſe in that they have a formal Unity, tho' otherwiſe a real diverſity. And ſo again in the other way, as things may have different Reſpects according as they are differently compared with *other* things, ſo one and the ſame Subſtance, may have different Modes or Manners of Being in *itſelf*. As the ſame Body may have Motion and Figure, or elſe different Figures. Now this lays another ground for Abſtraction. For tho' there be a real Identity between Modes and the thing modefied, yet as Figure ſuppoſe may be conſider'd without Body, ſo Body may be conſider'd without its Figure, or ſometimes as having this Figure, ſometimes as having that, juſt as it is in *Dimenſions*. The former way of Abſtraction I would call for diſtinctions ſake, Abſtraction in the way of *Modality*, and the latter in the way of Habitude. Between which two ſorts of Abſtractions I conceive there may be this obſervable difference. That in the way of *Habitude* the abſtract Ideas, tho' formally diſtinct, are yet really the ſame not only with the things from which they are taken, but alſo with one another, As Rational and Animal, ſuppoſe have a real Identity with one another, as well as with *Man*. But now in the way of *Modality*, the Modes are really diſtinct from

one

one another, and are really the ſame, only with the *Thing* whoſe Modes they are. But herein indeed the Identity is no leſs real than in the other Caſe. And accordingly, tho' Figure and Motion be really diſtinct from each other (as Real is oppoſed to Rational diſtinction) yet a figured Subſtance and a moveable Subſtance *need* not be ſo, nor is there any arguing from the formal diſtinction of their Ideas that they *are* ſo, ſince the ſame Subſtance may admit of both thoſe Modes.

19. The great Point now is, how we may know when our Ideas owe their diſtinction only to Abſtraction? In the way of Habitude this may be well enough known, barely by reflecting upon our own Thoughts, by conſidering after what manner we think of things. Which if we heedfully do, we cannot abſtract, but we muſt be ſenſible of that Art of the Mind, whereby we do ſo as well as of any other. Becauſe we ſhall then obſerve that we conceive Things not completely, but only under a certain reſpect or formality of Conſideration, as ſuppoſe when we conſider a Triangle only as a Figure; which (if we think of what we think of) we muſt needs perceive to be an *abſtract* Idea, becauſe it goes not through the whole of a Triangle, that is I mean does not take in even what we intend or underſtand by it, but ſtops at that which it has in common with other Figures, from which we know a Triangle to be diſtinct.

20. But now in the way of *Modality* this perhaps may not be altogether so easy; because here tho' I know in the general that Mode, and the thing modified are really the same, and consequently that distinction of Modes is not repugnant to the Identity of that Being, whose Modes they are, and consequently again, that a Thing thus modified and a Thing thus modified, as suppose figured Substance and moveable Substance, tho' distinct in their Ideas, may yet possibly not be two distinct Things, but only inadequate Considerations of the same. I say, tho' I know all this, yet not knowing howmany ways some Beings may be modified, or what in particular are Modes and what not, I may not be able to know always by consulting the Ideas I have of them, whether they are really different things, or whether they are in reality the same Thing, only abstractly and incompletely consider'd. This is the great difficulty of *modal* Abstractions; and here I confess 'tis sometimes pretty hard to know whether our Ideas are complete, or incomplete, abstract or intire, and consequently whether Things are really distinct or indistinct from one another, by the formal Conceptions which we have of them.

21. But how then *shall* we know if not by the formal Conceptions? Why there may be a way for this too, and such as will be equally serviceable in the other Case. Things that are modally distinct, or distinct by a modal

Ab-

Abſtraction, that is, whoſe diſtinction is owing to the conſideration of them ſometimes with one Mode only, and ſometimes with another, tho' the ſame thing be in reality the common Subject of both; I ſay things that are thus diſtinct tho' they may be abſtracted from one another, that is, one of them may be conceiv'd without conceiving the other, yet they cannot be conceiv'd to be one without the other. And that becauſe they are not indeed one without the other, as being really the ſame one with the other. And they cannot be conceiv'd to be any otherwiſe than they are. As for Inſtance, Motion and Figure are Modes of extended Being. And tho' I can conceive Motion without Figure, and Figure without Motion, and abſtract both from extended Being, yet I cannot underſtand Motion or Figure tc be without extended Being, tho' on the contrary I can eaſily conceive extended Being to be without Motion or any determinate Figure. Nay, further, ſince Motion and Figure are ſuppoſed to be both Modes of extended Being, tho' I can abſtract a moveable Subſtance from a figured Subſtance, yet I cannot conceive a moveable Subſtance to be without a figured Subſtance, and that becauſe I cannot conceive Motion to be in that which has not Figure, nor Figure to be in that which is incapable of Motion. For Figure is in a Subſtance moveable, and Motion is in a Subſtance having Figure; therefore figured Subſtance cannot be

be conceiv'd to be without moveable Subſtance, nor moveable Subſtance without figured Subſtance, ſince if you take away moveable Subſtance, or that Subſtance which is moveable, we could have no Conception of Figure; and if you take away figured Subſtance, or that Subſtance which has Figure, we could have no Conception of Motion: Figured Subſtance then and movable Subſtance are diſtinct only by a modal Abſtraction, that is, the ſame Subſtance is really both one and the other, figured and moveable, tho' ſometimes conſider'd as affected with one of theſe Modes, and ſometimes as affected with the other, as appears from the impoſſibility of conceiving one to be without the other. Since if you take away figured Subſtance, you take away that very Subſtance which ſhould be the Subject of Motion; and if you take away moveable Subſtance, you take away that very Subſtance which ſhould ſuſtain Figure. Now I ſay this plainly ſhews that theſe things are in reality the ſame, and only diſtinct by a *Modal Abſtraction*, and accordingly that the Ideas whereby we conceive them are incomplete, not adequate Ideas.

22. That which is remark'd here of Abſtraction in the way of *Modality*, is no leſs applicable to thoſe in the way of *Habitude*, or to any other ſort of Abſtractions, if any ſuch there be. For as in things only modally diſtinct, one cannot be conceiv'd without the other, or if the other be conceiv'd not to be, ſo alſo in that

that formal distinction which is between things and that certain Habitude of Agreement under which they are consider'd, there is no possibility of conceiving one if the other should be removed, so much as in *Thought*. For so tho' I can conceive Figure in general, according to the abstract Reason of it, without thinking upon this or that in Particular, yet if there should be supposed to be no Circles, no Triangles, no Squares, *&c.* 'tis impossible I should have any Idea of Figure remaining after all these are taken away. And indeed this is no more than what follows from the general Nature of *Abstraction*, and therefore must be true in all the sorts of it. For an abstract Idea is supposed to be really the same with that from which it is abstracted, and to owe its distinction only to the operation of the Mind, that considers it without considering the other. And that indeed it may do. But if that other should be supposed not to *be*, the very Foundation of all Abstraction would be taken away, and so I should have nothing to abstract from, and so could have no abstract Idea.

23. From these Principles then I gather this Rule, That whensoever I find it in my power not only Negatively but Positively to Abstract, when I can so far divide and separate one thing from another in my Thoughts, as to be able not only to conceive one of them without conceiving the other, but to have a clear and distinct Conception of one as existing, tho' the other

other were removed out of being, or were supposed never to have been, I may then conclude this to be a sure sign that there is no Modal nor any other sort of Abstraction in the Case, but that the Ideas are absolute and complete, such as have no dependance upon, or communication with one another; and consequently that the things whose Ideas they are, are of a kind and order wholly distinct. There being no further condition wanting to confirm the consequence from the distinction of Ideas to the distinction of Things, than the compleatness and Intireness of those Ideas; which whoever denies to be a sufficient Mark or Argument of real distinction, makes it utterly *impossible* for us to *know* any thing, and very *impertinent* to *argue* or discourse about any thing.

24. To apply this Rule then to the Case which is now under Consideration; It seems in the first place very clear that I cannot only abstract a Thinking Being from an Extended Being, or Matter, but that I can conceive a Thinking Being to be, even tho' I should suppose Matter not to be, and that because I can so conceive it while I doubt whether Matter be or no. I can upon Metaphysical Principles doubt, till by a further pursuance of those Principles there appears Reason to be otherwise satisfy'd, whether there be any such thing as Matter or Body in the World. Not only for the Reasons assigned by *Des Cartes* taken from the Errors of the *Senses*, and the Imagination which we have of many non-existing things in our *sleep*, but also

alſo partly becauſe Bodies are not the Cauſes of thoſe Senſations which we have upon their occaſion, and partly becauſe we do not ſee them (as will be ſhewn in the ſequel) either by themſelves or by Ideas that proceed from them. And therefore our ſeeing them, or having Ideas of them, is no Argument that they really are. Therefore I can doubt, and that very juſtly and reaſonably, whether they are or no. But I cannot doubt of my Thinking, nor yet of my Being while I think, as *Des Cartes* rightly remarks. But then if I can neither doubt of my Thinking, nor of my Being while I think, 'tis plain I can conceive a Thinking Being to be (as conceiving my ſelf to be both Thinking and Being) and that while I doubt whether there be any ſuch thing as Matter or no. And if I can conceive a thinking Being to be even while I doubt whether there be any ſuch thing as Matter or no; this ſhews that my conceiving a Thinking Being to be, does no way depend upon my ſuppoſing the exiſtence of Matter, and conſequently that I might conceive it as well as I do now, tho' I ſhould ſuppoſe Matter not to exiſt, as indeed it does not as to me, while I doubt of it. Beſides, as I am fully ſure, that I do conceive a Thinking Being to be, ſo am I that there is ſuch a Thinking Being as I conceive, even while I doubt of the exiſtence of Matter: Which ſhews again that I might conceive the ſame thinking Being, tho' I ſhould ſuppoſe Matter to be a pure *Non Ens*, ſince that which I am certain of can no way depend upon that which I am in doubt of, ſince if it did, it would be as doubtful as the other. The ſhort is, that which I am ſure of, cannot as to the truth of it, depend upon what I am in doubt of whether it be or no: Therefore I may conceive a Thinking Being to be, tho' I ſhould ſuppoſe Matter not to be. But now this is more than can be ſaid of figured Subſtance and moveable Subſtance, for tho' I can conceive one of

theſe without conceiving the other (or elſe they would not be ſo much as *formally* diſtinct) yet I cannot conceive figured Subſtance at the ſame time ſuppoſing moveable Subſtance not to be, no, nor even if I ſhould doubt whether it be or no. And therefore from my being able to conceive a Thinking Being to be, tho' I ſhould ſuppoſe Extended Being not be, I conclude that the Ideas of theſe things are diſtinct not by modal Abſtraction, as figured Subſtance and moveable Subſtance, but really and intirely diſtinct from one another, and independant one upon another, and that becauſe things whenever they are muſt be according to their Ideas.

25. But to carry this Matter a little further; I think, and when I think I think of certain Truths, and when I think of theſe Truths I find I underſtand them; whence I gather, notwithſtanding my Ignorance of ſome Truths, that all Truth is intelligible. And ſome Truths I find I always underſtand in the ſame way and manner, as not being able to conceive them any otherwiſe. And theſe I perceive to be neceſſary, eternal and immutable Truths, whence I gather that ſuch Truths indeed there are, and that they are always intelligible, as being always Truths, and intelligible only after one determinate manner, which ſuppoſes their being ſimply ſo. As Intelligibility then is a Property or Affection of Truth, ſo conſtant and perpetual Intelligibility is a Property of neceſſary and external Truths. They are always and for ever intelligible. And this is as neceſſary a Truth as any of the reſt. But now this cannot be without ſuppoſing a *Thinking* Being, to which the Intelligibility of an Object carries a neceſſary Relation. Therefore a Thinking Being is full as neceſſary as any neceſſary Truth

Truth is. But now all Matter is contingent, and it being utterly impoſſible that what is neceſſary ſhould depend upon what is contingent, it ſeems ſufficiently plain that we may conceive a Thinking Being, tho' all Matter ſhould be ſuppoſed not to be, which again proves the ſame Concluſion.

26. Beſides, the Ideas are independant upon one another as well as the Things, and I can have the Idea of a Thinking Being without the Idea of Matter. The Idea of Matter, tho' of a great Comprehenſion, ſo as to be the Object and Foundation of a whole Science (that which is called, tho' I think not very properly, by the Name of *Geometry)* is yet however not neceſſary to Thought. For when I think I find (what every one may that will at all reflect) that there are abundance of things which I conceive after a manner ſo pure and ſo wholly Intellectual as not to have any corporeal Phantaſms, Images, or Repreſentations of them; and as I then have them not, ſo I want them not, being able to think of thoſe things as clearly, to underſtand them as perfectly, and to demonſtrate the Affections that belong to them with as much evidence and certainty as I can in the other Objects that are repreſented to me under thoſe corporeal appearances. I find then that the Idea of Matter, tho' a very large and filling, is not the only Object of my Thought, but that I conceive Things by way of pure *Intellect* as well as by *Imagination*, and that

that even while I have the Idea of Matter before me, and contemplate Things that have an intelligible Extenſion; for even thoſe very Things admit of a pure intellectual Conſideration, as *Des Cartes* has moſt happily obſerved and proved by the Inſtances of a *Triangle* and a *Chiliagone*. Of this diſtinction between pure Intellect and Imagination (one of the beſt Diſcoveries of the new Philoſophy) I ſhall have occaſion to ſay more hereafter. At preſent, ſuppoſing it, I thence infer that the Idea of Matter is not ſo neceſſary to Thought, but that I can think without it. And if I can think without it, then I can have an Idea of a Thinking Being, tho' I had no Idea of Matter; nay, (were ſuch a Suppoſition poſſible) tho' there were indeed no ſuch Idea at all. And if I can, then I would further propound it to be conſider'd, whether this does not prove that theſe are not abſtract but compleatly diſtinct Ideas, and conſequently that the things are as really diſtinct as the Ideas.

27. Further yet, if Thinking Being and Extended Being were diſtinct only by a modal Abſtraction, in like manner as figured Being and movable Being are conceived to be, then however by ſuch an Abſtraction one of them may not formally include the other, yet it would never poſitively and actually exclude it, even as figured Being never excludes moveable Being. Well then, if I can inſtance in a Thinking Being, from whoſe Idea all Extenſion is po-

positively and necessarily excluded, then I hope it will be granted me that Thinking Being and Extended Being are not distinct by a modal Abstraction. But now this I can do; for I have in me the Idea of a Being absolutely perfect, and so has every Body else, even those that deny the real Existence of such a Being, since otherwise they will deny what they do not conceive, and so will deny they know not what. But then as such an Idea must include *Thought*, as being a Perfection, so for the contrary Reason it must exclude *Extension*. Such a Being then must be a Thinking Being, and must not be an Extended Being. Here then is an Instance of a Thinking Being, that is not an Extended Being; nay, that cannot be, and that because his Idea positively excludes all Extension. But now give me such an Instance of a figured Being, that is not a moveable Being: You cannot. But then does not this plainly shew that these Things are not distinct by a modal Distinction, since if so 'tis reasonable to think that they would never be found to be exclusive of each other; but on the contrary, as every Extended Being would then be a Thinking Being, so every Thinking Being would also be an Extended Being, even as every figured Being is also a moveable Being. The Sum is, if these Ideas, Thinking Being and Extended Being were distinct only by a modal Abstraction, then 'tis reasonable to think they would be always

undivided, even as figured Being and moveable Being are, whoſe diſtinction is ſuch. But we are ſure at leaſt of one Inſtance wherein they are divided. And therefore 'tis reaſonable to think that they do not owe their diſtinction to any ſuch modal Abſtraction.

28. But there is an eaſy Suppoſition that will yet further clear and conclude the Point. I ſhall only beg leave to ſuppoſe (what even Geometrick ſtrictneſs will allow to be a reaſonable *Poſtulatum)* that God is able to create a pure Thinking Being, that is not at all Corporeal, as alſo on the other ſide that he is able to create a Being purely Corporeal that does not think. What I here ſuppoſe as poſſible, is no more than what is generally preſumed to be, *de facto*, actually done; but I ſhall content my ſelf with ſuppoſing only the Poſſibility of it: And that, I hope, is ſo fair a Demand, that even the Author of the Letters againſt the Biſhop of *Worceſter*, who is ſo liberal of Thought, as to beſtow a Capacity of it upon Matter, leſt he ſhould limit the Power of God, will not ſtick to grant it me. For ſure he that exalts the Power of God ſo far as to be able to endue Matter *with* Thought, (which in its Eſſence, by his own Confeſſion, it does not include) muſt needs allow me to ſuppoſe what is a great deal leſs, that by the ſame Omnipotence he is able to make Matter *without* it, that is, pure Matter that does not think, as alſo for the like reaſon that he is able to make a Thinking Being

ing that is not at all Material, but a pure Spirit. Or if he pleaſes, we will ſuppoſe that as God is able to make two ſuch Beings, ſo he is able to make them ſeparately by themſelves, a Thinking Being by it ſelf, and a Material Being by it ſelf, (notwithſtanding the preſent actual Union of theſe in Human Nature;) or that he can make one of them without making the other; or which comes to the ſame, that when he has made them both he can preſerve one of them in being, and annihilate the other.

29. Theſe two laſt Suppoſitions proceed upon the two-fold Separability of Things; for Things may be ſeparated either thus, as when one remains, the other periſhing or not being; or thus, as when both remain, but without any real Union with each other. Now in the firſt place, either of theſe Suppoſitions would immediately prove a reality of diſtinction in the Things, and that becauſe either of the Separalities does ſo, as is moſt clearly demonſtrable of each of them: For when one Thing can be when the other is not, then moſt certainly one is not the other; ſince if they were really the ſame, it would follow that the ſame Thing could be and not be at once. And ſo again, when Things can exiſt ſeparately from one another, tho' at the ſame time 'tis as neceſſary that one ſhould not be the other, ſince otherwiſe it would follow that the ſame Thing could be ſeparated from it ſelf, which is repugnant to the *Metaphyſical Unity* of any Being. This then

would clearly prove the diſtinction of theſe Things, ſince if one be produceable without the other in either of the Senſes ſuppoſed, it appears that one is not the other, which is all that we can underſtand by a real diſtinction.

30. Well, but to ſet by this Concluſion for a while, according to our preſent Method of reaſoning, we are to prove the diſtinction of the Ideas, and by that the diſtinction of the Things. Let us then to our Suppoſition again, and ſee whether it will do that too. The Things are ſeparately produceable, which ſuppoſes that they are ſimply ſo. Now as from their being ſimply *produceable*, we may conclude (according to the Principles eſtabliſh'd in the former part of this Theory) that there are Ideas according to which they are to be produced; ſo from their being *ſeparately produceable* we may as well argue, that thoſe Ideas whereby they are ſo produceable are complete and really diſtinct Ideas. For if a Thinking Being and an Extended Being are ſeparately produceable, then it ſeems plain that the Idea whereby one of theſe is produceable, is not the Idea whereby the other is produceable, ſince if it were, then the Production of the one would involve alſo the Production of the other, and ſo they could not be produced aſunder, which is againſt the Suppoſition. In other words, If a Thinking Being and an Extended Being be really but one Idea, that is, (for I would willingly be underſtood

derſtood if I could) if the very ſame Being be in Idea both Thinking and Extended, however by us conſidered ſometimes under one Formality, and ſometimes under another; then the Production of a Thinking Being would be alſo the Production of an Extended Being, and ſo they could not be produced apart. But we ſuppoſe them ſeparately produceable, and thence think we have reaſon to conclude that their Ideas are completely and intirely diſtinct Ideas, and not the ſame Idea incompletely conſidered.

31. But then if the Ideas of theſe Things are really diſtinct (as upon this fair and unrefuſable Suppoſition it appears that they are) this will give us a further right to conclude that the Things themſelves are ſo too. For as we may argue from the diſtinction of Things to the diſtinction of Ideas, ſo we may as juſtly argue from the diſtinction of Ideas to the diſtinction of Things. Only there is this difference between the one Method and the other, that in the former we argue *à Poſteriori*, but in the latter *à Priori*; for as diſtinction of Things is a *Sign* of diſtinction in Ideas, ſo the diſtinction of Ideas is the Ground of all the diſtinction that is, or can be in Things.

32. And in this we have touch'd upon the true reaſon why from the real diſtinction of their Ideas, we may juſtly infer the diſtinction of Things. This indeed is by ſome preſumed, and we have hitherto preſumed it as reaſonably we might, there being no other direct way to

know the diſtinction of Things but by the Ideas we have of them; but neither we nor they, as I know of, have as yet undertaken to reſolve this Conſequence into its true Ground, or to aſſign any Rational Account of it. Nor indeed do I know how it can be done but upon the Principles of the preſent Theory, and upon *them* the reaſon is ſo very obvious that we cannot well miſs of it. The real diſtinction of Ideas argues the like diſtinction in the Things, becauſe indeed as I but now hinted, it is the ground of it. Things were made according to their Ideas, and therefore if the Ideas are really diſtinct, 'tis impoſſible but that the Things muſt be ſo too. And hence it is that we can juſtly argue from the one to the other, from the diſtinction of Ideas to the diſtinction of Things, which yet would be no Conſequence if either there were no ſuch Ideas, or if we did not ſee Things by the ſame Ideas whereby they were made. For as for Ideas that are *Modalities* of our own Souls (as ſome are pleaſed to dream) I ſee no reaſon why any diſtinction in *them* ſhould argue any diſtinction in Things. For what Connexion is there between my being variouſly modify'd and made different from my ſelf, and other things being really different from one another. But if indeed I ſee Things by thoſe very Ideas whereby they were made, then indeed I have good reaſon to think them really diſtinct, if I find that their Ideas are ſo, and that becauſe they were made according to thoſe Ideas,

Ideas. Which by the way I commend to the Conſideration of my Reader as a good Argument to prove both the Exiſtence of our Ideal World, and our ſeeing things in it, ſince 'tis otherwiſe impoſſible to give an Account why the greateſt diſtinction in our Ideas ſhould argue any in things, unleſs our Ideas of things be alſo thoſe very Ideas whereby they were form'd, and from whence they receiv'd their ſpecifick difference. But upon this Hypotheſis the Queſtion is reſolved as ſoon as asked, ſo well do theſe things hang together.

33. But to return; there appears now upon the whole a great deal of reaſon to conclude that the Ideas of Thinking Being and Extended Being are complete and really diſtinct Ideas, and not one and the ſame Idea incompletely conſider'd. And if the Ideas of theſe things are really diſtinct, then the things conceiv'd by theſe Ideas are as really and verily diſtinct as the Ideas themſelves are. And therefore as we may, and muſt ſay of one of theſe *Ideas*, that it is not the other, ſo we may, and upon that very foundation, muſt ſay of one of theſe *Things*, that it is not the other, and conſequently that an Extended Being is not a Thinking Being. And if an Extended Being is not a Thinking Being (as ſeems now plain ſince the Idea of the one is not the Idea of the other) then 'tis as plain that an Extended Being cannot think. And to ask whether it can or no, will be as wiſe a Queſtion as to ask, whether a Circle can be a

Square? which cannot be affirm'd without the extremity of Confuſion and Contradiction.

34. Should any one now come in with ſuch an Objection as this, what tho' Extenſion be not Thought, yet why may not an Extended Being think? For tho' Extenſion be not Thought, yet it is not more diſtinct from it than Figure is from Motion. And yet theſe, as diſtinct as they are, can unite together in the ſame Subject. And if a figured Subſtance and a moveable Subſtance, notwithſtanding their being diſtinct in Conception, are yet the ſame in the thing, then why may not a thinking Subſtance and an extended Subſtance be in reality one and the ſame Subſtance, notwithſtanding the diſtinctneſs of the Ideas whereby they are conceiv'd? This Objection, how conſiderable ſoever it might have appear'd, and what trouble ſoever it might have given us, if it had been urged ſooner, comes now too late to do us any prejudice as being already prevented in what we have premiſed; for by that it may appear that the Caſe is not at all the ſame, and that there is no manner of Proportion between the things upon which the Objection proceeds. Figured Subſtance and moveable Subſtance are, as we have ſhewn, incomplete Ideas, as being only modally diſtinct from one another; which formality of diſtinction, as it is conſiſtent with a real Identity between the Ideas themſelves, ſo conſequently it can argue no real diverſity between the things conceiv'd by them, and that becauſe

Things

Things are not made according to incomplete, but according to complete and perfect Ideas; or in other Words, Things are not made by Ideas as they are abstractedly or imperfectly consider'd by us, but as they are in their own *Intelligible Natures*. But now thinking Substance and extended Substance, are, as has been shewn, complete and really distinct Ideas, and where there is such a distinction in the Ideas, there must be the like distinction in the Things, because Things are made according to their Ideas. And consequently an extended Substance will be as distinct from a thinking Substance, not as a figured Substance is from a moveable Substance, but as *Figure* it self is from Motion, or even as Extension is from Thought. And accordingly as we can never truly say that Figure is Motion, or that Extension is Thought, so we can never truly say that an extended Being is a thinking Being.

35. But to complete the Answer, I further add, That tho' perhaps Thought be not more distinct from Extension, than Figure is from Motion (not to dispute at present whether there may be *degrees* in real distinction,) yet there is not the same possibility that Thought should be in an *extended* Being, as that Figure should be in a *moveable* Being. For Figure and Motion are both *Modes* of extended Substance, and so if Figure be in a moveable Being, 'tis not as *moveable* but as *extended*, the same extended Substance being the Subject of both

both thoſe Modes, with which it carries a ſuitable proportion. But now Thought and Extenſion are not two *Modes*, as Figure and Subſtance are, Extenſion not being the *Mode* of any Subſtance, but the *Formal Reaſon* and eſſential Difference of that Subſtance which we call Matter; and therefore if Thought be in an extended Subſtance, it will not be after the ſame manner as Figure is in a moveable one, that is, that the ſame Subſtance only ſhould be the common Subject of both, but it muſt be in an extended Subſtance *as ſuch*, or as that ſignifies a Subſtance whoſe Eſſence is to be extended. Between which there appears no manner of proportion, which makes a great diſparity in the two Caſes. For indeed (as much alike as theſe two Queſtions may ſeem, and as apt as ſome may be to confound them) 'tis one thing whether a Subſtance that is extended can think, meaning a Subſtance which has extenſion belonging to it as a Mode. And another thing, whether an extended Subſtance can think, meaning a Subſtance whoſe Eſſence is to be extended. Now this latter is what we muſt be ſuppoſed to mean in the preſent Queſtion, which plainly ſhews it to be a very different Queſtion from the other, *viz.* Whether a moveable can be alſo a figured Subſtance? And accordingly, tho' the latter may be anſwered Affirmatively, yet there is great reaſon to think that the other cannot, ſince if an extended Subſtance can think, that is, a Subſtance whoſe

whoſe *Eſſence* is to be extended, then it will be neceſſary that Thought ſhould proceed from *Extenſion* (as every Property that is in a Thing muſt proceed mediately or immediately from the Nature or Eſſence of that thing) which we have good Reaſon to think cannot be, becauſe of the Ideal diſtinction between Thought and Extenſion, not to ſay a Thinking and an extended Being. For tho', for inſtance, a Subſtance that is Circular may alſo ſucceſſively at leaſt admit of a Triangular Form, yet if you could ſuppoſe a Subſtance whoſe Eſſence is to be Circular, you would not ſtick, I preſume, to ſay of ſuch a Subſtance that it could never be Triangular.

36. Well, but after all, ſhould we examine the Idea of Matter, and find Thought in it, that indeed would be a happy diſcovery, and ſuch as would deſerve a Sacrifice to the Muſes for the rarity of the Invention. But let us ſee: The Idea of Matter is an extended Subſtance, and ſo much is granted by the Author of the Letters, only he adds *ſolid* to it, wherein we will allow him to pleaſe his Fancy, ſince by it he makes no alteration as to the Iſſue of the Queſtion. Now this intelligibly extended Subſtance (for ſo we muſt further ſpecify it, to avoid confounding the Idea with the thing) having intelligible parts one without the other, 'tis plain in the firſt place that 'tis mentally diviſible, as having thoſe intelligible parts. And if there be an intelligible diviſibility in the Idea, there muſt be a real one in the Thing, be-

becauſe Matter is made according to its Idea, whereupon it follows that all Matter is diviſible as ſuch, it being not to be conceiv'd that a thing ſhould be extended and not diviſible, which by the way ſhews the Doctrine of *Democritus* concerning *Indiviſibles* to be impoſſible. And thus I ſee *Diviſibility* in the Idea of Matter. I ſee alſo in it *Impenetrability*, it being as impoſſible, or rather as inconceivable, that one of theſe Intelligible parts ſhould be contained in the other, as that one ſhould *be* the other; whence it further follows (from the conformity, that Matter muſt have to its Idea) that all Matter is really impenetrable, as accordingly we find it to be. For if to one Inch ſuppoſe of Matter, another be added, this neceſſarily makes two Inches, which plainly ſhews that one does not occupy the place of the other, ſince if it did it would ſtill be but one Inch, which is againſt the Suppoſition. Again as the Idea of Matter contains Diviſibility in it, for the ſame Reaſon it will contain *Intelligible Figure*, that ariſing from termination of Extenſion as the termination does from Diviſion. Now as for *Motion*, tho' this be not ſo formally contain'd in the Idea of Matter as the other Properties of it, yet there is that in it which will lay a Foundation for its poſſibility, which is ſufficient. For Matter in the Idea of it, having intelligible parts (which is the more explicit Notion of extenſion) this is a ſufficient reaſon why Matter in the Thing, ſhould

ſhould have real Parts one without another, ſince otherwiſe it will not be conformable to its Idea, if it has not that *really* which the other has *intelligibly*. But now if Matter or Body has ſuch real Parts, theſe parts muſt be really diſtant, more or leſs from one another, and ſo it will be poſſible for one Body to exiſt ſucceſſively upon or to the Parts of another Body, ſo as ſometimes to anſwer to this Part, and ſometimes to that, which ſeems to be all that we can underſtand by Motion, as it is a Mode of Body, which can ſignify only the Tranſlation of a Body, from one part of Matter to another, as when I move my Hand upon the Paper now I am writing. But as for Motion as it ſignifies that *Force* or *Power*, whereby a Body is ſo tranſlated, that I do not take to be any Mode or Property belonging to Matter, nor indeed do I in that Senſe find *Motion* in the Idea of Matter, any more than *Thought*.

37. Theſe are the Properties that are contain'd in the Idea of Matter, and you ſee how they all derive from that Idea, as indeed nothing can be ſaid to be contain'd in the Idea or intelligible Eſſence of a Thing but what is deducible from it as a conſequent from its Natural Principle. And truly, beſides theſe, it would be a pretty hard task to find out any other. For as for *Solidity* if that be taken *Mathematically*, 'tis the ſame with that Intelligible Extenſion which is the very Idea of Matter,

Matter, and ſo it neither adds any thing to it, nor can be properly ſaid to be contain'd in it. And if it be taken *Phyſically*, then either it ſignifies the Impervioufneſs of one Body to another, or that which hinders two Bodies from coming together (in which Senſe I find it uſed by the Author of the Eſſay of Human Underſtanding) and then 'tis the ſame with *Impenetrability*, or elſe it means the compactneſs of the whole, from there being a deal of Matter under a little Surface, in oppoſition to Rarity, and then it imports not any Property belonging to Extenſion, or that can be in the Idea of it, but only more Degrees of the ſame. But as for Solidity, according to the vulgar and popular Senſe of it, wherein it is uſed for *hardneſs*, as when they ſay a hard ſolid Body, meaning one and the ſame thing by thoſe two Terms, this is either no real Property belonging to the Nature of Body, but is only a Sentiment which we feel in our ſelves upon that reſiſtance, which it makes to our touch, or if it ſignifies any thing in Body, it can mean nothing but what is to be reſolv'd either into the compactneſs, or into the figuration of it.

Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, p. 48.

38. But we have not yet among theſe found out *Thought*. No, nor never ſhall while we look for it in the Idea of Matter. To ſeek for it here is to ſeek for the Living among the Dead. The depth (the whole Abyſs of Matter)

ter) ſays it is not in me; And upon inquiry we find that it is not, unleſs one of *theſe* ſhould be Thought, which would be equal Extravagance either to ſuppoſe or to confute. But moreover as our inquiry reports that it is not ſo (to prevent all loſs of Labour in a further ſearch) our Reaſon will aſſure us that it cannot poſſibly be in the Idea of Matter, becauſe of the real diſtinction and intire diverſity between the Ideas of a thinking, and of an extended Being. Since to ſuppoſe Thought to be contain'd in the Idea of Matter, notwithſtanding this Ideal diverſity between a thinking and an extended Being, would be all one as if you ſhould ſuppoſe that a Circle ſhould have the property of a Triangle. But now if Thought be not in the Idea of Matter, then 'tis plain that it cannot be in Matter itſelf, and conſequently that Matter cannot Think. And that becauſe Matter (as every thing elſe) is ſuppoſed to be made according to its Idea, and conſequently to have its *Real* Nature conformable to its *Ideal* Nature.

39. And ſo much is granted even by the Author of the Letters againſt the Biſhop of *Worceſter*, viz. that Thought is not included in the eſſence of Matter. But then he is pleaſed to betake himſelf to the Omnipotence of God, which he will have able to beſtow upon Matter a power of Thinking, tho' no ſuch Power be (by his

See his reply to the Biſhop of *Worceſter*'s Anſwer to his 2d Letter.

his own Confeſſion) included in the eſſence of it. 'Tis I acknowledge a little odious to diſpute the Power of God in any Caſe, and in ſome Caſes not very Philoſophically done to ingage one in it. And ſince this Gentleman expreſly owns that Thought is not included in the eſſence of Matter, it will concern him to conſider whether this be not one of thoſe Caſes. I have, I hope, a due reverence for the Power of God, and would be as far from ſetting any undue limits to it as he can be. And yet I muſt needs ſay that to aſſign the Power of God *inſtead* of a Natural Reaſon, or to fly to the Power of God *againſt* clear Reaſon, appear to me equally unphiloſophical. And indeed conſidering that we can take our Meaſure of Things, only by thoſe Ideas which we have of them, if after we have duly compared thoſe Ideas, and determined of the natures and differences of Things according to them, it ſhall be thought a ſufficient Anſwer to have recourſe to the Power of God, then we ſhall never be able to know how to judge of any thing, or when we have concluded any thing. And *Tranſubſtantiation* it ſelf may be good ſound Doctrine, notwithſtanding all that our Philoſophy ſhall remonſtrate to the contrary from the Idea which we have of Body.

40. But to apply our Anſwer a little more diſtinctly, there are two Senſes wherein God may be ſuppos'd able by his Almighty Power, to make Matter think. Either in a divided,

or

or in a compounded Senſe, that is (to give the meaning of this School-diſtinction in plain Engliſh) either in this Senſe, that that which before was an extended Being, may afterwards by tranſmutation become a thinking Being, or in this, that an extended Being, remaining an extending Being, may alſo have Thought imparted to it, and ſo at the ſame time be a Thinking as well as an Extended Being. Now tho' I am not able to comprehend *how*, yet I ſhall not pretend to deny but that it may be poſſible to an Almighty Power to make Matter think in the former way of underſtanding it. He that could make a thinking Being out of no Being, may, for ought I know, be as able to make the ſame out of an extended Being. And he who was able out of Stones (as the Scripture ſpeaks) to raiſe up Childen unto *Abraham*, may alſo for any aſſurance I have to the contrary be able to make a thinking Being of mere Matter. I ſay I know not but that the ſame Power that could do the one *may* alſo do the other, tho' I muſt withal obſerve that neither of the Inſtances proves that it *can*, as not being fully commenſurate to the Caſe. For when a thinking Being is ſaid to be made out of nothing, the Phraſe *out of nothing*, ſignifies not the Matter, but only the Term of its production. But when a thinking Being is ſaid to be made out of an extended Being, the meaning muſt be, that 'tis made out of it, as the Matter from whence, which is much hard-

er to conceive than the other, unleſs you will ſuppoſe one to be annihilated, and the other to be produced in its room, but then 'tis not making a thinking Being, out of an extended Being, but out of nothing, as in ordinary Creation. And ſo again, when God is ſaid to be able out of Stones, to raiſe up Children to *Abraham*, I ſuppoſe there is no neceſſity of Underſtanding the Text, as to the Souls of thoſe Children, but only as to their Bodily part, that which is intellectual Being, from elſewhere to be derived, as in ordinary Generation. In like manner as when God is ſaid to have form'd *Adam* from the Duſt of the Ground, we can underſtand it only of his Body, the Original of his Soul being otherwiſe accounted for even by the ſacred Hiſtory. But now there is a vaſt deal of difference between converting one ſort of Matter into another, as Stones into Fleſh, or Water into Wine, *&c.* (for the effecting of which perhaps there needs no more than a new arrangement and diſpoſition of Parts) and converting Matter into Spirit, or an extended Being, into a thinking Being, things intirely different in their whole Order and Kind from one another; which yet, tho' of the extremeſt difficulty of any thing that can fall under our Conception, I will not ſay is abſolutely impoſſible.

41. But now as for making Matter to think in a *compounded* Senſe, that is Matter, remaining Matter, this is a Thing of a very different conſi-

conſideration from the other, and that muſt be determin'd by other Meaſures. And yet even here I ſhall readily acknowledge that God is able to make Matter to do whatſoever can be done by the Power of Matter, becauſe he perfectly underſtands what the Power of Matter is, and knows alſo how to manage it to the beſt advantage. And if Men, by that little Skill which they have in the Mechanical Arts, and that little Power which they have to uſe and apply that Skill, can yet perform ſuch great and wonderful things, God, who comprehends all Mechaniſm in its utmoſt extent, and wants no Power to reduce his Theory to Practice, can, to be ſure, if he pleaſes, perform much greater, even all that the Power of Matter can poſſibly riſe to, or (which is the true Meaſure of that Power) all that the Idea of Matter can in any intelligible degree be ſaid to contain. But to go beyond that, or to give Matter a Power or a Perfection that is no way contain'd in the Idea or intelligible Eſſence of Matter, this would be to alter the Species, and inſtead of making *Matter* to do this or that, to make ſomething elſe to do it, which is not Matter; concerning which, there is no diſpute.

42. If then God can make Matter think, it muſt be by ſomething contain'd in the Idea or Eſſence of Matter; for as for any *ſuperinduced* Perfection that is not within the Comprehenſion of that Eſſence, that would make a change in

the Species. But now Thought is not in the Idea or Eſſence of Matter. We have ſeen by Examination that it is not; we have proved by Reaſon that is not; and our Author confeſſes that it is not. And to this I further add, that as Thought is not in the Idea of Matter, ſo neither can it reſult from any thing that is contain'd in that Idea, it being apparently impoſſible that any *Diviſion*, *Figure*, or *Motion* ſhould beget *Thought*, becauſe of the utter diſproportion and Ideal diverſity of theſe things. Beſides, that if they could, then Thought would ſtill be (at leaſt potentially) contain'd within the Idea of Matter, which is contrary to what we have before ſhewn, and now ſuppoſe. From hence then we may ſafely determine thus far at leaſt, that God cannot make Matter think by any thing that is in the Eſſence of Matter, there being nothing of Thought contain'd in that. And yet again, if he can make it think it muſt be by ſomething contain'd in the Eſſence of Matter, ſince to make it think by any adventitious or *ſuperinduced* Vertue that is no way contain'd in the Eſſence of Matter, would not be to make *Matter* think, but ſomething elſe. But we have our Author's leave to ſuppoſe it impoſſible that Matter ſhould be made think by any thing in the Eſſence of Matter, partly from his owning Thought not to be contain'd in its Eſſence, and partly from his flying to ſuperinduced Perfections; and I leave him from theſe Premiſes to draw the Concluſion.

43. The

43. The only thing in this way and form of arguing that can with any pretence of Reaſon be excepted againſt, is the Suppoſition upon which it proceeds, *viz.* That the Superinducement of any Perfection not contain'd in the Idea of Matter, ſhould of neceſſity alter the Species of it. But I think this is very plain, becauſe the Idea of a thing is the meaſure of its Species, as being that according to which it is form'd; and therefore if any thing be ſuperadded that is not in the Idea of a thing, it muſt neceſſarily vary the Species of it, as rendring it diſconformable to its Idea. And our Author muſt not have conſider'd the Nature of Ideas ſo well as might reaſonably be expected from one that has ſaid ſo much about them, if he is ignorant that the Idea of a thing does one way or other comprehend within its extent whatever belongs to that thing whoſe Idea it is; if not formally, yet at leaſt potentially; or if not directly, yet at leaſt by conſequence: For ſo tho' a Triangle in the moſt ſimple and preciſe Conception of it be only a Figure compriſed of three right Lines, yet theſe three Lines will neceſſarily make three Angles, and theſe three Angles will be equal to two right ones, *&c.* And ſo all the Properties that belong to, and are demonſtrable of a Triangle, do ſome way or other riſe from the Idea of it, in like manner as Motion, Figure, *&c.* do from the Idea of Matter. And indeed otherwiſe there would be no reaſon to hinder but a Triangle might

CHURCH DIVINITY SCHOOL of the PACIFIC

have the Properties that belong to a Square, Circle, or any other Figure. And therefore our Author makes no juſt Parallel, how *popular* ſoever it may ſeem, when from the Addition of Motion, Vegetation, Life, *&c.* to Matter without making any eſſential change in it, he carries the Gradation of his Argument to *Thought*: For theſe things (*Senſe* only excepted, if he means Perception by it, ortherwiſe not) are contain'd within the Idea of Matter, at leaſt by way of conſequential Reſult. Whereas Thought, even by his own Confeſſion, is not contain'd therein, and therefore cannot be added without a ſpecifick Variation; for what tho' it be as he ſpeaks, *but one ſtep higher*, yet if it be ſuch a ſtep as paſſes into another kind, 'tis plain that Matter cannot have it and remain what it is, any more than two right Lines can be made to incloſe ſpace while they remain right.

44. But once more, and all at once. Notwithſtanding the infinity of God's Power (from which far be it any thing here ſhould be intended as a Derogation) all the rational World knows that there are *Impoſſibilities*. And ſince our Author is pleaſed to allow, as of neceſſity he muſt, that Thought is not contain'd in the Eſſence of Matter; and ſince, as we have further ſhewn, the Ideas of a Thinking Being and of an Extended Being, are Ideas really and intirely diſtinct, as indeed his own Conceſſion would ſufficiently prove, there being no other Rea-

Reaſon why Thought ſhould not be contain'd in the Idea of Matter, but only becauſe of the Ideal diverſity of a Thinking and of an Extended Being; I ſay theſe things conſider'd, I would leave him to adviſe with his own better Thoughts, whether, for God, in this compounded Senſe, to make Matter think, be not the very ſame as to make a Circle to be a Square, and conſequently whether the former be not as impoſſible as the latter.

45. Well, then we may now at length not unreaſonably conclude upon Conſideration of what has been thus amply premiſed, that Matter cannot think. And yet I am conſcious of Thought (and that not a little upon this occaſion) and 'tis that indeed whereby I know that I am, and have a real Being in the World. That then that thinks in me is not Matter, becauſe Matter cannot think. And therefore I have in me a Principle diſtinct from Matter, really and wholly diſtinct, an immaterial and conſequently an immortal Soul; which indeed, as a Subſtance at large, would be immortal as that ſignifies unperiſhable, becauſe no Subſtance naturally periſhes, but only the Modalities of it. But as being alſo a Subſtance really diſtinct from Matter, muſt likewiſe of neceſſity be *Indiſſolvable*, that which does not conſiſt of any parts not being capable of any Diviſion or Diſſolution.

46. But beſides the Immortality of the Soul (a great Concluſion, and which alone ſhews the Principle from whence it is derived to have been worth the Conſideration we have beſtow'd upon it) there is yet ſome further improvement to be made of the foregoing Doctrine concerning Matter's being uncapable of Thought, and that in two Reflections, one relating to ſenſual and intellectual Pleaſure, and the other concerning the Souls of Brutes.

47. For in the firſt place, if Matter cannot think, then ſince all Senſation (as we ſhall further obſerve hereafter) is a kind of Thought, we may hence further conclude that 'tis the Soul and not the Body that is the true Subject of it. That 'tis the Soul that ſees and not the Eye, (according to that of St. *Auſtin*, *Oculi feneſtræ ſunt Mentis, Interior eſt qui per has videt, quando Cogitatione aliquâ abſens eſt, fruſtra patent*) the Soul that hears and not the Ear, the Soul that taſts, ſmells, and feels. And that tho' we talk of intellectual and ſenſual, ſpiritual or corporeal Pleaſures, yet that 'tis not the Body but the Soul only that is the proper Subject of them. And accordingly that the true difference between them does conſiſt, not in this that ſenſual or bodily Pleaſure is that which is perceiv'd by the Body, and intellectual that which is perceiv'd by the Soul. Nor yet (as I once thought) in this, that ſenſual Pleaſure is when the Body is primarily affected, and the Soul ſecundarily

In *Pſal.* 41.

or

or by participation, and that intellectual Pleasure is when the Soul is primarily affected, and the Body secundarily or by participation (the Soul being the only true percipient in both) but in this, that sensual Pleasure is that which the Soul perceives by the mediation of the Body, upon the occasion of some motion or alteration in it, whereas intellectual Pleasure is that which the Soul perceives immediately by it self without any such occasion from the Body.

48. But to carry our Principle one step further, if Matter cannot think, then we may securely determine thus far concerning the Souls of Brutes, that if they are Matter then they can have no Thought, not even the least Sensation properly so call'd; or if they have any Thought or Sensation, then they are not Matter. So then either they are not Matter, or if they are, then they do not think. Or thus, either they do not think, or if they do, then they are not Matter. Thus far in the general is clear, and consequently no room left for any middle Hypothesis that shall pretend to come between the two Extremes. But which of the Extremes themselves bids fairest for the Right, requires more particular Consideration, which for our own and the Reader's Refreshment, we shall adjourn to the following Chapter.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

A Digreſſion concerning the Souls of Brutes, whether they have any Thought or Senſation in them or no?

1. TO thoſe that have been accuſtom'd to judge of Things according to the Appearances of Senſe, this will ſeem a very ſtrange *Queſtion*; and ſhould it happen to be determin'd in the Negative, that perhaps would be thought yet a ſtranger *Anſwer*. But 'tis to be remember'd, that ſenſible Prepoſſeſſions are the greateſt Prejudice we have to contend with in our Search of Truth; and I am ſo far from addreſſing the enſuing Reflections to thoſe that are govern'd by them, that I think they are not fit to be conſulted with, much leſs to ſit Judges upon ſuch an Enquiry as this, in which nothing but the chaſt Anſwers of pure and uncorrupted Reaſon, is to be regarded. Theſe therefore I ſhall only attend, as the proper Meaſures by which this Matter is to be concluded; and if, following the Light of clear *Reaſon*, I ſhould happen to determine any thing againſt *Senſe*, I ſhall, I believe, find my ſelf inclined rather to deſpiſe that Objection, than to change my Meaſure, or renounce my Guide.

2. Not

2. Not that I pretend to give a poſitive and abſolute Determination upon this Queſtion. I do not think it poſſible to be done with any certainty on either ſide, unleſs we were better acquainted with the inward Natures and Eſſences of Things than we are; for upon this the Point will be found to turn, both as to the thing it ſelf, and as to our Knowledge of it. For as whether Brutes think or no, muſt depend upon their Natures, ſo our Knowledge of this muſt in like manner depend upon our Knowledge of thoſe Natures. And therefore ſince we do not preciſely know what kind of Natures or Eſſences God has beſtow'd upon theſe Creatures, 'tis impoſſible (without a Divine Revelation of that) we ſhould be able to tell with certainty whether they do think or no. Something indeed may be determin'd, *ex Hypotheſi*, according to what we have already intimated, as that if they are Matter then they cannot think, or, if they do think, then they are not Matter, becauſe Matter has been proved uncapable of Thought; but as to the abſolute iſſue of the Queſtion, that, I think, we can hardly make any definitive Judgment of; only there may be greater Probabilities on one ſide than on the other, and which of them it is that ſeems to carry the moſt rational Appearance, ſhall be our preſent Buſineſs briefly and impartially to conſider.

3. This is a Subject of a vaſt Latitude, and much may be ſaid upon it, but I think the whole *Area* of

of the Queſtion may be compriſed within three Suppoſitions: For either the Souls of Beaſts are Matter and ſo do not think; or elſe they do think, and ſo are not Matter; or elſe they are both material and thinking. Which Suppoſitions, becauſe they contain the full ſtate of the Queſtion, we will for more diſtinction's ſake conſider as ſo many different Opinions concerning it.

4. The two firſt Opinions agree in this common Principle, That Matter cannot think. And conſequently, that if the Souls of Beaſts are Matter, then they do not think, or if they do think then they are not Matter. They conſent in the general, that Matter and Thought cannot conſiſt together, and ſo that they cannot be both material and thinking, and divide only upon the particular ſide which they are to determine for, *viz.* whether they are Matter, and do not think, or, whether they do think, and are not Matter.

5. One of theſe Opinions ſuppoſes that the Souls of Beaſts do think; but then, conſiſtently with it ſelf, it ſuppoſes alſo that they are not Matter, but immaterial, and by conſequence immortal. Thoſe of the other way conceiving this will engage them in great Difficulties and Inconveniences, chuſe rather to ſuppoſe that they are mere Matter, but then they are alſo ſo ſelf-conſiſtent as in conſequence of their common Principle to hold that they do not think. Between which two comes in the third Hypotheſis,

ſis, endeavouring to unite theſe extremes in one, by ſuppoſing that the Souls of Beaſts do both think, and are alſo material.

6. Againſt the middle of theſe Suppoſitions (for ſo indeed it properly is, a Logical middle, tho' as here ſet down a Phyſical extreme) there lies a ſtrong Preſumption, and a very clear Argument. The *Preſumption* is this, that it tends to undermine the Foundation, upon which our own Immortality ſtands. For if the Souls of Brutes, notwithſtanding their being mere Matter do yet think, then our Souls notwithſtanding their Thinking, may be for ought we know material too, and ſo liable to Corruption. The *Argument* which lies ſo clear againſt it, is no leſs than the whole preceding Chapter, wherein it has been ſhewn that Matter is utterly uncapable of Thought. But now if Matter cannot think, then from this Principle we may ſecurely argue, that if the Souls of Brutes are Matter, they do not think, or if they do, then they are not Matter. Or if you will thus, that either they are not Matter, or if they are, they do not Think; or that either they do not Think, or if they do, then they are not Matter. From which two forms of arguing the one *Hypothetical*, and the other *Disjunctive*, it plainly appears that the Souls of Brutes cannot be Material, and Thinking too, ſince if they were, then Matter would Think, which would be a contradiction to the Principle ſuppoſed.

7. Re-

7. Rejecting therefore this middle way, which unites Matter and Thought together in Brutes, as utterly abſurd and unmaintainable, we ſhall now find the competition to lie wholly between the two extremes, that is, whether the Souls of Beaſts be Matter and don't Think, or whether they do Think, and are not Matter.

8. Theſe will be found to be the two *Rival* Suppoſitions ; but before we determine any thing in favour of either of them, I muſt do them both the Juſtice to ſay, that whether abſolutely right or wrong, they are however both in the general conſiſtent with themſelves, which the middle Opinion is not. When I ſay conſiſtent with themſelves, my meaning is, that they do not contradict in one Part, what they affirm in the other, which the middle Opinion upon the Principle ſuppoſed plainly does. Since by that Suppoſition, to ſay that the Souls of Brutes are Matter, is by conſequence to ſay that they do not think ; and to ſay that they do think, is by conſequence to ſay that they are not Matter, which in effect will be to ſay, that they are Matter, and not Matter, and that they think and do not think.

9. The two extremes then, are the only conſiſtent Opinions. But however 'tis one thing for an Opinion to be conſiſtent with itſelf, and another thing to be abſolutely true, ſince tho' one part of an Opinion may not over-

overthrow another, yet the whole may be overthrown, or ſhewn to be falſe, by ſome other Argument. And ſince, tho' both of theſe ſuppoſals are conſiſtent with themſelves, yet but one of them can be true, it will now be a proper enquiry to conſider which is moſt likely to be ſo.

10. Now as for that Hypotheſis which aſcribes Thought without Matter to Brutes, tho' it be not nigh ſo abſurd as that which ſuppoſes them to be Material, and yet to think, yet I muſt needs own that 'tis intangled with much difficulty and perplexity, is liable to ſeveral *rational* Arguments that may be urged againſt it, and has none to rely upon, but only ſuch as are drawn from a certain imaginary *Experience*, that is grounded upon the confuſe appearances of *Senſe*.

11. For in the firſt place (to give a Specimen of this charge) if we aſcribe Thought, or Perception to Brutes in any degree, tho' it be only in that of *Senſation*, where ſhall we ſtop, or what ſhall we deny them? If they are allow'd to have it in the degree of Senſation, why may they not be capable of it in the degree of *Reaſon?* That indeed is thought too much, even by thoſe who contend for Thought in Brutes, who as kind as they are pleaſed to be to them, are yet however willing to diſtinguiſh themſelves from them, by a peculiar Privilege which they reſerve to themſelves above them. And accordingly while Man glories in being

a reaſonable Creature, the poor Beaſts are fain to be contented with an Inferior kind of Knowledge, that which for diſtinction ſake, is call'd a *ſenſible* or *ſenſitive* Knowledge, or at moſt with ſome dark adumbrations of Reaſon (dark enough indeed, as being they know not what) ſomething that looks like it, but is not it. But why this Partiality? And why, ſince they are ſo liberal to them, as to allow them Thought, are they ſo ſcanty in the Proportion of it? Is it that they may not make them equal to themſelves? But tho' this may be a Reaſon of Inducement, yet this is no warrantable or juſtifying Reaſon. And I doubt it will be impoſſible to aſſign any that is. For if the Souls of Brutes are Matter, then they are not capable of the *loweſt* degree of Thought, and if they are not Matter, then they may be capable of a *higher* as well as of a lower. And if we give them any, how ſhall we know when we have gone high enough? For as for that diſtinction of a ſenſible Knowledge, as oppoſed to that which is of the rational Kind, either by ſenſible Knowledge is meant the Knowledge that is from a *Material* Principle, and in this Senſe there is no ſuch thing as a ſenſible Knowledge, becauſe Matter cannot think; or elſe that Knowledge which is from an immaterial Principle by the Mediation of the *Senſes*, or upon ſome impreſſions made upon certain parts of the Body. But now ſuch a ſenſible Knowledge or Perception (for we take Knowledge

ledge here in a large Senſe) tho' call'd ſenſible in a certain reſpect, is yet abſolutely Intellectual, tho' perhaps of the loweſt kind; and if Brutes are once allow'd to have an intellectual Perception in any degree, why they ſhould ſtint them juſt to the very loweſt, is what neither I, nor they, I believe, do well underſtand.

12. It will be ſaid perhaps that they deny them Reaſon, becauſe by their Actions, it appears that they have none. But in the firſt place, if they make this Plea, how are they conſiſtent with themſelves, ſince at another time, when another end is to be ſerved, they ſo highly magnify their great *Sagacity*, and the many wonderful Performances which they are obſerv'd to do? Beſides, this Argument from their *Actions*, concludes nothing againſt their being *capable* of Reaſon (upon the ſuppoſition of their Thinking) however it may be pretended againſt their *actual* having it. But neither will it prove that. For in the firſt place, how are they ſure that they underſtand their Conduct, and that the ſilly appearance which their Actions ſeem to carry, may not be owing to their not being acquainted with the ſecret Meaſures by which they proceed? But however ſuppoſing their Actions to be really as ſilly, and ill-conducted as they appear to them; yet how after all do they know but that this may be merely by ſome Organical Indiſpoſitions of their Bodies, and not thro' any defect in their

underſtanding Faculty, juſt as it is in the caſe of Fools and Changelings, whom yet theſe very Men will allow to be reaſonable Creatures, as to the Power and Faculty, tho' not as to the actual uſe and exerciſe of it. And how do they know but that Brutes (who certainly do not act more ſillily than ſome Men) may be ſo too, if they once allow them to have any Thought. Thoſe indeed that think they have none, muſt by conſequence deny them that of the ſuperior kind; but to grant them one degree of Thought, and to deny them another, ſeems at beſt very arbitrary, and without a ſufficient foundation in Reaſon. So that methinks they ſhould either deny them what they grant them, or not be ſo difficult to grant them what they are pleaſed to deny them.

13. But again, as we ſhall not well know where to ſtop as to *Thought*, if we allow any degree of it to Brute Creatures, ſo neither ſhall we know where to ſtop as to *Brutes*. For which of them will you exclude? If you will ſuppoſe a Horſe to think, or a Dog, or a Bird, then why not a Fly, or a Louſe, or a Worm, or a Snail, or even an Oyſter? And if ſuch things as theſe ſhould be allow'd capable of Thought (which I am apt to fancy the moſt liberal beſtowers of it, would not be extreme forward to grant, at leaſt as to the laſt of them, tho' upon the foundation they go, I ſee no reaſon why they ſhould make any exception)

ception) there will be a ſhrewd Temptation, to inlarge the Bounds of the thinking World, and to take in Vegetables into the honourable Society, ſo that a *ſenſitive Plant* may perhaps in due time, come to ſignifie ſomething beyond Figure or Metaphor.

14. Again, if the Souls of Beaſts have any Thought or Perception, then of neceſſity they muſt be *Immaterial*. Of which conſequence St. *Auſtin* ſeems to be ſenſible, when he tells the *Manichæans*, that the Soul of a Fly is better than the Sun. And ſo indeed the Opinion we are now conſidering ſuppoſes them to be, upon the general Principle which it has in common with the other, *viz. that Matter can't Think*. But however tho' the conſequence be undeniable, yet this (to go no further) will ſeem a very hard *Conſequent*, the Souls of Beaſts being generally ſuppoſed to be material, even by thoſe that allow them Thought. But then again what will the conſequence be of their being *Immaterial?* Even no leſs than that they are *Incorruptible*, and ſo naturally *Immortal*. Which again will ſtrike hard againſt the vulgar Opinion wherein the Souls of Beaſts are preſumed to be as Mortal as their Bodies, and accordingly to Periſh with them, as being no leſs material than they are, which ſeems alſo not a little favour'd by Holy Scripture, when it makes this difference between the Spirit of a Man, and that of a Beaſt, that the former goes upward, and the latter goes downwards to the Earth.

15. But as Paradoxical as it is, and as Anti-ſcriptural as it ſeems, to ſay that the Souls of Beaſts are Immortal, *ſo* however they muſt of neceſſity be upon this Suppoſition. For beſides that Immortality is the natural conſequence of immateriality, that which has no extenſion, not being capable of any diviſion, to ſay that they are immaterial and mortal would lead to ſtrange and intolerable abſurdities. For in the firſt place, if the Souls of Beaſts, tho' immaterial, are yet mortal, then nothing hinders, but that our Souls may be alſo mortal, notwithſtanding their being immaterial. And ſo there will be no proving, or knowing, by Reaſon that we have immortal Souls. Nor indeed by any thing elſe: For tho' Faith aſſures us of an everlaſting Life after this, yet if what is immaterial may be mortal, we know not but that Immortality Faith ſpeaks of, may be wholly of a *poſitive* Nature, ſuch as depends altogether upon the Will and Power of God; and that naturally, and in themſelves, our Souls may be as mortal as our Bodies. Which at leaſt would be a very Unphiloſophical, if not an Irreligious Conſequence.

16. But then again, the Souls of Beaſts are upon this ſuppoſition more Noble and Excellent than their Bodies. 1. As Immaterial. 2. As Thinking. And yet if theſe immaterial Thinking Subſtances, are at the ſame time *Mortal*, and having theſe high Privileges above the Body, do yet Periſh with it, then 'tis plain,

plain that they are made for the Body, and have no other end than the enjoyment of it. But then it ſeems a more excellent Being can be made for, and ſubjected to that which is leſs excellent, which is againſt the Rules of all Order and Proportion. Whence will follow thoſe ſtrange conſequences reckon'd up by * Mr. *Malebranche*, viz. That *God wills Diſorder*; *that human Nature is not corrupted*; *that God might make Man for the enjoyment of Bodies, and ſubject him to the motions of Concupiſcence* (which upon this Suppoſition cannot be proved to be a Diſorder or Depravation of Nature, ſince it might have been the firſt Inſtitution of it) *which deſtroys Original Sin, and conſequently overthrows Religion, by taking away the neceſſity of a Mediator.*

* See his Defence againſt the Accuſation of M. *de la Ville*.

17. Theſe are dreadful Conſequences, and therefore for the avoiding of them it will be neceſſary, ſuppoſing the Immateriality of the Souls of Beaſts, to ſay that they are *Immortal*. But then this will turn us upon other Difficulties. For if the Souls of Beaſts are Immortal, then before we make a Step further, what a Horror muſt it ſtrike upon our more reflecting Thoughts to conſider what liberty we take with theſe immortal Lives, and how many of them we daily ſacrifice, not only to what we call our Neceſſity, but even to our Fancy and our Humour, to our Pleaſure and our Diverſion, as alſo to conſider how cruelly and abuſively

ſively we treat them; which Practices neither conſiſt with the Dignity of their Souls, nor yet with that Senſe and Perception which is aſcribed to them? For as ſuppoſing the Souls of Beaſts immaterial and mortal, it would be a ſtrange Thought to conſider that every time I kill their Body, I deſtroy alſo a Soul; ſo ſuppoſing them Immortal (as indeed they muſt be ſuppoſed) it would be a very hard thing to digeſt, that a Creature that has an immortal Spirit ſhould be ſlaughter'd to nouriſh and keep alive my mortal Body, when there are ſo many other natural Proviſions for its Suſtenance. Eſpecially conſidering that the Creature I kill and feed on is *Innocent*, and I a *Sinner*.

18. But what ſhall we do with theſe immaterial and immortal Souls of Beaſts, or how ſhall we diſpoſe of them after they are parted from their Bodies? We muſt ſuppoſe them either in a ſtate of Miſery, or in a ſtate of Happineſs, or in a ſtate of Neutrality. Miſerable they cannot be, becauſe innocent. Nor would it be very reaſonable to aſſign them a ſtate of Neutrality. For tho' ſome Philoſophers talk of a ſtate of *Silence* and Inactivity that belongs to humane Souls before their entering into theſe Bodies, and others that are for the ſleep of the Soul between Death and the Reſurrection, aſſign the like ſtate to them during that Interval (which perhaps may be the *real* caſe of an Infant in the Womb) yet 'tis to be conſider'd that this is only for a certain time in the ſuppoſed Inſtan-

Inſtances. But to ſuppoſe ſo many thinking Creatures to be for ever preſerv'd in a ſtate of Being, that is, neither happy nor miſerable, ſeems in effect the ſame as to ſuppoſe them continued for continuing's ſake, without any further end or purpoſe; which would be too ridiculous a Suppoſition to be in earneſt maintain'd.

19. We muſt then ſuppoſe them in a ſtate of *Happineſs*. But what kind of Happineſs ſhall it be? What will you have a *Mahometan* Paradice for them, conſiſting of ſenſual Delights? Such indeed would beſt become *Brutes*; but however that cannot well be, while theſe immaterial Spirits of theirs are ſeparate from their Bodies. For ſenſual pleaſure being (as was noted before) that Pleaſure which the Soul perceives by the mediation of the Body, the natural poſſibility of it muſt depend upon its vital union with it. The Souls of Beaſts therefore are not naturally capable of enjoying this kind of Happineſs while in a ſtate of Separation. And ſhould they be ever united to Bodies again, tho' they would, 'tis true, recover that Capacity, yet to ſuppoſe that God ſhould make ſo many immaterial, immortal, thinking Beings, only for the bodily Life and the enjoyment of its ſenſual Pleaſures, is a Thought not very becoming either of him or of them.

20. Shall then their Happineſs be intellectual? That would be great indeed, and another valuation would then be due to Rats and Mice than

is usually set upon them, even by those who suppose them to have Thought. Well, but shall this Happiness be by way of Reward, or by way of a pure and inconditionate Bounty? If by way of Reward, then you must suppose them moral Agents, capable of Good and Evil, and of Laws and Obligations. But if by way of pure inconditionate Bounty, this indeed would be very kind, and Men perhaps might be inclined to envy the Privilege of these happy Spirits who are so securely lodged in a Haven of Rest and Felicity, which they with so much difficulty, hazard and uncertainty are making their way to, through the Waves of a troublesome and a tempting World. But this seems not to be either so congruous in it self, or so sutable to the method of God's proceeding, who as kind and bountiful as he is to his Creatures, does not use to bestow such happiness as this upon them, but after some trial and probation of them, and as a Recompence of their good Behaviour.

21. Besides, shall these immortal Souls be always in a separate state after Death, or shall they be again embody'd? To be always in a separate state would be violent and unnatural to Spirits made apt for the information of Bodies, to which therefore they would naturally require to be united. But to what Bodies shall it be? To the same that they lived in. Then the Brutes also will have a *Resurrection*. But if to other Bodies, then either to the Bodies of other

other Animals naturally generated (as in the way of *Tranſmigration*) or to Bodies that ſhall be made on purpoſe for them. As for the way of *Tranſmigration*, beſides that this ſhifting and ſhuffling of Souls out of one Body into another looks a little untoward, it carries alſo an appearance that is not very Philoſophick, it being not reaſonable to ſuppoſe that there is ſo little Congruity and Proportion between the Soul and the Body of an Animal, that any Soul ſhould be fit to inhabit and inform any Body, as the Soul of an Elephant, ſuppoſe the Body of a Fly, or *vice versâ*. But after all, the Hypotheſis of Tranſmigration is calculated only for the time of natural Generation, and when that ſhall ceaſe, as it will when all the Animals in the World are dead, there will be an end of the other too. But if inſtead of Bodies naturally generated (becauſe they will not hold out always) you will have new Bodies made on purpoſe for them, that would be a very great thing, and (that it might not be done in vain) ſuch as ought to be done for ſome very great end and purpoſe, which I believe it will not be very eaſy to aſſign.

22. And thus you ſee upon the preſent Hypotheſis, whether we make the Souls of Beaſts to be mortal, or whether we make them to be immortal, we run into great Difficulties both ways. Which if any one ſhall think to avoid by ſuppoſing that tho' they are naturally immortal as being immaterial, yet that they are

anni-

annihilated by God immediately upon their quitting their Bodies, I am afraid that this will prove but a ſorry Expedient, and ſuch as, inſtead of helping him out of the Mire, will but plunge him further in. In the firſt place this would be a Suppoſition *therefore* only made, becauſe they that make it have occaſion for it, which renders it *precarious* in the higheſt degree. Again, this is to be very free with the Power of God to ingage it at our pleaſure to ſerve an *Hypotheſis*. But then again what a dreadful Thought would it be that every time I kill a Gnat or a Flea, I procure the annihilation of an immortal Soul? And what a profuſeneſs of Luxury and Epicuriſm would it be for us to live upon Animals, whoſe *Souls* muſt be annihilated that we may feed upon their *Bodies*. But are ours worth the preſerving at that expenſive Rate?

23. But before we make ſuch haſte to deſtroy ſuch precious Lives (as thoſe of immaterial and immortal Spirits muſt needs be) what Example is there of *Annihilation* in any place or part of the Creation, that any one ſhould ſuppoſe it here? No Subſtance can fall to nothing of it ſelf, much leſs thoſe that are Immaterial; nor can we find that *God* annihilates any. Even Matter, tho' it undergoes an infinite variety of changes, yet it never periſhes ſo much as in one Atom of it. And ſhall God create ſo many Myriads of immaterial and immortal Subſtances, and then annihilate them? Does God make

make to unmake again? But he *may* annihilate the Souls of Beaſts, if he pleaſes. No doubt of it, and ours too; and there are not wanting thoſe that will tell you that the Souls of wicked Men ſhall be ſo diſpoſed of: But as we have no Example that God ever did annihilate any of his Works, ſo we have no reaſon to think that he ever will, tho' perhaps the *Hypotheſis* of ſome Men, and the *Lives* of others may make it convenient that he ſhould.

24. It may further deſerve to be conſider'd, whether that Argument of St. *Auſtin* (taken notice of by Mr. *Malebranche* in his Apology againſt Mr. *de la Ville)* which he makes uſe of againſt the *Pelagians* to prove Original Sin, be not equally concluſive againſt Brutes having any Thought or Perception. St. *Auſtin*, in the former of his two latter Books againſt *Julian* the *Pelagian*, lays down this Principle, That under a juſt God no Innocent can be miſerable. *Neque enim ſub juſto Deo, miſer eſſe quiſquam, niſi mereatur, poteſt.* And then from the Miſeries and Afflictions of Infants concludes, upon that Principle, that they can't be innocent. But now if this be a good conſequence, Infants are miſerable; therefore they are not innocent, becauſe the juſtice of God will not permit that Innocence ſhould be afflicted; then it ſeems a reaſonable Queſtion to demand, why the conſequence on the other ſide ſhould not be full as good; Brutes are innocent, therefore

Page 9.

fore they are not miſerable, ſince 'tis plain that in both Arguments the conſequence proceeds upon the ſame common Principle. But then they muſt have no Senſe or Perception, ſince if they have, 'tis plain that they are often miſerable or in pain.

25. The Holy Scripture does not much concern it ſelf about natural and philoſophical Matters, and when it has occaſion to touch upon thoſe Points, it does not always expreſs Things according to the very exactneſs of Philoſophick Truth, but according to the outward appearances of things to our Senſes, and the common apprehenſions that the generality of Men (who judge by ſuch appearances) have about them. For which reaſon we cannot always draw an Argument from Scripture for the deciſion of *natural Queſtions:* And for the ſame reaſon ſhould the Scripture, at any time, ſeem to attribute Thought or Perception to Brutes, as when the righteous Man is ſaid to regard the Life of his Beaſt, and the Ox is ſaid to know his Owner, and the Aſs his Maſter's Crib, and the like, this would be of no manner of force to ground any Argument upon, any more than the 16th of the Firſt of *Geneſis* would prove the Moon to be bigger than the Stars, becauſe in Expreſſions of this kind that ſtrike in with the vulgar apprehenſion, the ſacred Style (unleſs other Circumſtances determine us to a ſtricter Interpretation) may well be preſumed to ſpeak *Popularly* and by way of Accommodation. But

ſhould

ſhould it at any time ſeem to deny Thought or Knowledge to Brutes, as ſuppoſe when it ſays, *Be ye not as the Horſe, or as the Mule, which have no underſtanding*; that being ſo point blank againſt the common Sentiment and Appearance, would be of more conſiderable weight, and deſerve the greater regard.

26. But I have two Things to obſerve from Scripture, in relation to the Point in hand. One is that the Scripture ſeems to repreſent the Souls of Beaſts as *Material*, and the other is, that it ſeems to repreſent them as *Mortal*. Firſt, as Material, as when this is aſſign'd as the reaſon of the Prohibition of eating Blood, becauſe it is the Life. *Be ſure that thou eat not the Blood, for the Blood is the Life, and thou may'ſt not eat the Life with the Fleſh.* Deut. 12. And ſo again to the ſame purpoſe, *whatſoever Man*, &c. *eateth any manner of Blood, I will even ſet my Face againſt that Soul*, &c. Levit. 17. *For the Life of the Fleſh, is in the Blood, and I have given it to you upon the Altar, to make an atonement for your Souls. For it is the Blood that maketh an atonement for the Soul.* 'Tis remarkable that in theſe Words, another Reaſon is given for the not eating of Blood, beſides what was mention'd in the former, *viz.* becauſe 'tis given to make an atonement upon the Altar, as much as to ſay, I have ſet it apart for a higher uſe, to be a Ranſom for your Souls, as a Type of the Blood of Chriſt,

and

and therefore it must not be eaten. Now this Reason join'd to the other, seems to be a good comment upon it, and to intimate that when the Blood is said to be the Life, that should signify as much as that 'tis the very *Soul* of the Beast. For as 'tis the Soul that Sins, so it seems it should be the Soul that principally and properly makes the atonement. And accordingly tho' the whole Beast be offer'd in Sacrifice, yet the atonement is here ascribed to the *Blood.* As indeed it seems but reasonable that the best Thing in the Beast, should be that which atones for the best Thing in the Man, which will still make it carry a greater Proportion to the great Sacrifice of Christ, whose *Soul* is said to be *made an Offering for Sin.*

Isa. 53. 10.

27. And as the Scripture seems to intimate the Souls of Beasts to be Material, so also (which is a natural Consequence of the other) to be *Mortal.* This it does when it distinguishes the Soul of a Beast, from that of a Man by this characteristick difference, that the one goes downwards to the Earth, and the other upwards. And more plainly, when it compares a Man that is in Honour, and without understanding, to the Beasts that *perish.* As much as to say, let a Man be never so considerable for Worldly greatness, yet if he understands not the true ends of living, nor what

Psal. 49.

is

is his right Buſineſs and Intereſt in this World, he will live as much like a Beaſt, as if his Soul were to die with his Body, as the others *does*. But now if the Souls of Beaſts are Matter, then by the next conſequence they do not Think, becauſe Matter, as we have before ſhewn, is not capable of Thought. And ſo alſo if they are mortal, then by the next conſequence they are Matter, and ſo again do not think, becauſe if they did, they would not be Matter, and conſequently not Mortal.

28. He muſt want Eyes, that does not now ſee what a Wood of Difficulties and Objection this ſide of the Queſtion is incompaſs'd with, where tho' there are variety of Paths, a Man can yet hardly make a Step in any one of them, without being intangled in the Briers, and arreſted in his way! And yet in the midſt of all this Perplexity could there be but one clear and rationally convincing Argument produced, to prove that Brutes have Thought, or Perception in any degree (as ſometimes a concluſion that labours under great and unanſwerable difficulties may yet as to the Truth of it be ſufficiently *Evident)* the darkneſs ſhould not hinder me from ſeeing the Light, nor ſhould I for the ſake of what is obſcure and unaccountable, reject what is otherwiſe clear and manifeſt, as having made St. *Auſtin*'s Rule a Maxim in my Metaphyſicks, *Non negandum eſſe quod apertum eſt, quia comprehendi non poteſt quod occultum eſt.* But indeed

De dono Perſeverantiæ. cap. 14.

as

as far as I can discern, as there are a great many rational Objections that lie against the Supposition of Thought or Perception in Brutes, so the chief, if not the only Argument that can be brought for it, is that which is taken from what passes (as I may say) in their *Exterior*, as appears to our Senses. Which I doubt will be found to be a *Prejudice*, rather than a *Reason*.

29. 'Tis observ'd that Brutes have several Movements resembling those which in us are accompanied with, and proceed from Sensation, and that they do a great many things resembling those which we do by Thought, and which by the Beauty, Order, and Contrivance of them betray a thoughtful Principle. And hence, without any more ado, 'tis concluded that they feel, think, and understand. And this we are apt to look upon as a sort of experimental Evidence, as a sensible Proof and Demonstration of the Thing in question, and are ready to say, That we find by *Experience* that they think and feel; and all that is offer'd to the contrary (tho' with never so much Reason) is talking against *Sense*, and against *Experience*.

30. I deny not but that *Experience* is a very good Argument as far as it goes, and so is *Sense* too. And 'tis to no purpose to argue against them. But that we may not think they go farther than indeed they do, 'tis to be observed here, (and the careful observing of it will prevent

vent a great deal of confuſion) that what we have a ſenſe and an experience of in the preſent Caſe, is not that brute Creatures have Thought. We do not properly ſenſe or experience *that*. All that we ſenſe or experience, are the outward Actions and Motions which proceed from them, and the Effects that are done by them. Theſe indeed we ſee. But as to the internal Principle from which they come, that we do not ſee, but *conclude* from what we ſee. But whether rightly or no, belongs to Reaſon to conſider.

31. The Queſtion then will turn upon this Point, whether this be a good Concluſion, or a neceſſary Conſequence, that becauſe Brutes expreſs themſelves (as I may ſay) in ſeveral Geſtures and Motions reſembling thoſe which in our ſelves are accompanied with Senſation, therefore they *feel*; or becauſe they do a great many Actions reſembling thoſe which we do by Thought, therefore they *think?* Or laſtly, whether becauſe they leave behind them ſeveral Effects or Works, which, by the Artifice and Contrivance of them, diſcover a thoughtful Principle, therefore that thoughtful Principle is in *them?* To theſe three plain Queſtions the final upſhot of the Buſineſs will now come, the Suppoſitions upon which they proceed comprizing within their compaſs the whole *flouriſh* that is uſually made upon the ſtrange things that appear in Brutes, in order to the proving that they have Thought. 'Tis all re-

ducible (to avoid the tediouſneſs of particular Inſtances) to the Motions that they uſe upon impreſſions made upon their Bodies; as crying, ſuppoſe, when ſtruck, to the Actions that they do; as running away, ſuppoſe, when threatned or perſued, and to the Effects which they leave behind them, as the building of Neſts by Birds, or the making Honey by Bees, *&c.* Theſe are the *Appearances*; and becauſe theſe Things reſemble ſuch as we do by Thought, therefore 'tis pleaded that they which do them do alſo think. But the Queſtion is, whether this be a neceſſary Conſequence? To which, if I anſwer at all, I muſt anſwer, *No.* And that becauſe theſe Appearances may be otherwiſe accounted for, without having recourſe to any Principle of Thought in Brutes for the Solution of them.

32. For tho' Matter be not capable of Thought (as exceeding the whole Ideal *Scale* and *Compaſs* of it) yet nothing hinders but that it may be capable of ſuch outward Movements as reſemble thoſe which in us proceed from that Principle. And when the Matter ſhall be ſuppoſed to be in the Hands of an omniſcient and omnipotent Artiſt, that knows how to diſpoſe its Parts, and to order its Motion to the beſt advantage, this its Capacity cannot then fail of receiving its utmoſt improvement. God has an infinite Wiſdom to direct his Power, and as infinite a Power to execute the Dictates of his Wiſdom; and when two

two ſuch Qualifications concur, we cannot reaſonably doubt of the Poſſibility of effecting as much as this comes to, that a pure material Being may without thinking, by the mere Mechaniſm of its compoſure, exert the ſame ſort of outward Motions which in us take their riſe from a Principle of Thought. And ſurely thoſe who exalt the Power of God ſo far as to be able to make Matter think (which thoſe of the middle way, who ſuppoſe the Souls of Brutes to be material, and yet to have Thought, by conſequence do) cannot without as great inconſiſtence as irreverence, I will not ſay deny, but ſo much as queſtion the Poſſibility of this.

33. Nor ſure can any Body elſe that ſhall duly conſider how far the poſſibility of this Suppoſition is promiſed, nay, even exemplify'd in the Works of Art, and of *Nature*. Tho' the Power of Matter be ſo imperfectly comprehended by us, and we have ſo little force, and ſuch unweildy Inſtruments to reduce that little Theory which we have to Practice; yet what ſtrange things in the way of Mechaniſm have been done by the Art of Man, and what ſtranger things yet may? And who can tell to what pitch of Perfection that continually growing Art will, by the conſtant Improvements of the Mechanical Sciences, in future Ages actually arrive? He that ſhould have been told in ſome of the paſt ones, before the Invention of *Watches*, that there might be ſuch an Inſtrument contrived, which by the bare mechanick

Structure and Diſpoſition of its Parts ſhould do what we ſee done by ſome of theſe Machines in the ſtate of Perfection they are in at preſent, would have thought it incredible, perhaps impoſſible. And ſhould one of the beſt of theſe Pieces of Art be now ſhewn to a Stranger of a barbarous Country, where nothing of this kind had been ſeen or heard of before, he would go near to think it *alive*. And perhaps the main Reaſon why 'tis not thought ſo by more, is becauſe we ſee its inward Structure, the Springs and Wheels whereby its Motions are cauſed and regulated. Tho' after all, whether that be a good Reaſon why we ſhould not think it alive, as truly as a Plant is alive (tho' not in ſo perfect a degree) I know not, as not being able to conceive any thing by what we call the *Life* of a Plant, but only a more perfect Mechaniſm, ſuch a Structure or Diſpoſition of its Parts, as inables it to receive in the Juices of the Earth, and to work them into its proper Subſtance, ſo as to grow or be nouriſhed by them. And when that Structure is ſo diſordered that it cannot do this, then the *vegetable Watch* ceaſes to go, or the *Plant* dies. This is as much as our Reaſon can conceive, tho' our Imagination may be apt to ſuggeſt ſomewhat more. I know not what *vital Principle*, but but could we ſee the Interior of a Plant as diſtinctly as we do that of a Watch, (but that indeed cannot be, the Works of Nature being ſo incomparably finer than thoſe of Art) we ſhould

ſhould ſee by what Springs and Wheels its vital Operations, as we call them, are carried on, and ſo ſhould no more think of Life in a *Plant* than in a *Watch*.

34. But among the many ſtrange and ſtupendous Things done by the artful management of Matter and Motion, I chiefly mean and appeal to thoſe which are near Imitations of Life and Senſe, and where there is a ground laid for ſuch a Train and Suit of Movements as reſemble thoſe which Thought ordinarily produces. The Grotto's and Water-works * M. *Regis* talks of in ſome great Mens Gardens, are a fit Illuſtration of what I mean, where when Strangers enter they cannot help treading upon certain Springs ſo diſpoſed, that if they approach to a *Diana* that is bathing her ſelf, they will make her run away and hide in the Reeds or Ruſhes; and if they offer to go further in purſuit of her, they will make come towards them a *Neptune*, who ſhall menace them with his Trident, and forbid their curious Progreſs. Here you ſee are Movements that uſe to accompany the Paſſions of Shame and Anger, and the occaſions upon which they are done makes it ſeem as if they proceeded from them here, and you may eaſily carry on the Train a great deal further if you pleaſe. But now if Mechaniſm can riſe to ſuch things under the Conduct of Human Art, what will it not be

* *See* the Preface to the 7th Book of his Phyſicks, Tom. 2. p. 504.

able to do under the Direction of a Divine Hand? And accordingly M. *Regis* in the ſame place applies this Inſtance of the *Grotto's* (and that indeed very ingeniouſly) to illuſtrate the Movements of Brute-Animals, telling us, that as ſoon as the Animal Spirits enter into the Cavities of the Brain, they paſs from thence into the Pores of its Subſtance, and from thoſe Pores into the Nerves, where, according as they enter more or leſs in ſome than in others, they are able to change the figure of the Muſcles in which thoſe Nerves are inſerted, and by that means to give Motion to all the Members, as we may ſee in the Grotto's and Fountains of great Mens Gardens, that the ſole Force with which the Water moves, as it iſſues from its Source is ſufficient for the moving of divers Machines there, according to the various diſpoſition of the Pipes which conduct it: For, ſays he, one may well compare the Nerves of the Bodies of Animals to the Pipes of the Machines of thoſe Fountains; their Muſcles and their Tendons to other Springs which ſerve to move them, their Animal Spirits to the Water which moves them, whereof the Heart is the Source, and the Cavities of the Brain are the Heads of the Conduit. In fine, we may conſider the external Objects which, by their preſence, act upon the Organs of Senſe of Beaſts, as thoſe Strangers who entring into ſome of the Grotto's of theſe Fountains cauſe, without thinking of it, the Movements which are there done at their preſence.

35. But

35. But to pass from Art to Nature, or from the Art of Man to the Art of God. The Works of Art are not so strange, but that those of Nature are much stranger; and that in the way of *Mechanism*, tho' partly our Ignorance of them, and partly our familiarity with them, makes us less sensible of it. The Works of Nature are so admirable, that 'tis one of our great Studies to contemplate them, and our Philosophy to understand them. And yet these Works, as excellent and as admirable as they are, must be confess'd, at least in great part, to be mechanically perform'd. The World is a great *Machine*, and goes like a Watch, and the several Bodies that compose its System are, as to their constituent Principles (for I speak not of their efficient Cause) mechanically made and laid together, and must be in like manner resolv'd and accounted for. And so as to the Operations of Nature, as great and as strange as they are, they proceed ordinarily from Mechanism, the wise disposition of Matter and Motion, and then do we understand them most perfectly, and philosophize upon them with best Satisfaction, when we can resolve them into their *Natural*, that is, their *Mechanick* Causes. For tho' other Principles (fit rather to amuse than instruct) have been pretended, yet I doubt not but that the true Reason after all why the Load-stone draws Iron, or why Salt preserves Bodies from Corruption, or why the Air dissolves them, why Rubarb purges,

or why the Fruit of the Quince-tree binds, why Opiates ſtill and quiet the Spirits, or why Coffee diſperſes them, *&c.* I ſay, the true and only intelligible Reaſon of theſe Appearances (tho' not always very eaſy to find) muſt be ſuch as is taken from the ſpecifick Contexture of theſe Bodies, and the different Figure and Motion of thoſe Parts whereof they conſiſt. This you may call, if you pleaſe, *New Philoſophy*, but 'tis what ſhould have been the *Old*; and if any one ſhould go about to reprehend it as injurious to Piety, and ſhould gravely ſay, That mechanick Principles will not ſerve alone to account for the Phænomena's of Nature, but that we muſt needs have recourſe to the Being of a God for the Explanation of them, he will be found to be one of thoſe impertinent Objectors that are ſo far from confuting the Hypotheſis they pretend to cenſure, that they do not ſo much as *contradict* it. For when the Moderns contend that there are no other Principles but Matter and Motion, *&c.* to be ſought for in explaining the Phænomena's of Nature, they ſpeak of the conſtituent or inherent Principles of Bodies, that there is nothing in the Bodies themſelves but the Diſpoſition, Figure, or Motion of their Parts that is the cauſe of their Operations, in oppoſition to thoſe imaginary Principles of ſubſtantial Forms and Qualities introduced by the School of *Ariſtotle*, not in the leaſt intending to exclude a God, neither from Being, nor from Operation, whom they

they ſuppoſe to have laid things thus mechanically together, and to conduct and direct them according to thoſe general Laws of Motion which he has eſtabliſh'd, whereby the courſe of Nature proceeds, ſo that the Earth it ſelf may be ſaid to bring forth Fruit mechanically, or as a great *Automaton*. And whether the Holy Text may not intimate ſomething to that purpoſe by Αὐτομάτη ἡ γῆ καρποφορεῖ, *Mark* 4. 28. I leave to be conſider'd.

36. The very Structure of the Bodies of Animals plainly diſcovers a mechanical Intention, ſince otherwiſe to what purpoſe ſuch a variety of Parts, and ſuch an apt Arrangement of them, for the better dependance that is to be between them, and the eaſier Correſpondence and Communication that one Part is to have with another. But as Man is the moſt perfect Animal, ſo his Body is the moſt perfect *Machine*, *fearfully* indeed and *wonderfully* made. And tho' 'tis moſt certain that we have in us a higher Principle than Matter and Motion, yet again 'tis alſo certain that there are ſeveral Movements in our Bodies, over which our Souls have at preſent no power (however it might be in the firſt Inſtitution of Nature) and which are no more ſubject to our Wills than the ebbing and flowing of the Sea. And tho' it be true that there are other Movements of ours over which we *have* power, and which we do by the direction of Thought; yet 'tis as true too that we often do them without it, meerly by a mechanical

chanical direction of the Spirits into the Nerves and Muſcles, as when we are in danger of falling, in which caſe we uſe ſuch Movements for our Security as the ſevereſt Reaſon muſt approve, but whereof it cannot be the Cauſe; partly becauſe there is not then any time for Thought or Deliberation, and alſo becauſe the moſt that uſe them are utterly ignorant of the Laws of Mechaniſm, and yet order their Footing as artificially as the moſt skilful, placing their Bodies in the apteſt Poſtures for their preſervation ſuch as the wiſeſt Mechaniſt cannot correct.

37. But the moſt unexceptionable Inſtance that Nature gives us of her Mechanick Performances, is in *Plants*. Some *Animals* really have a Principle of Thought, and all pretend to it, and where there are two poſſible Springs of Action, it may be a little diſputable from which it proceeds. But now (as was before obſerv'd) the very Life of a *Plant* can be nothing elſe but a certain Mechaniſm of its parts, and whatever is done either in it, or by it, muſt be done mechanically, ſince to ſuppoſe any thinking Principle in it would be to tranſcend the Order of *Vegetation*, and to paſs into that of *Senſe* at leaſt, if not into that of *Reaſon*. Which even the limits which the common Philoſophy has ſet to theſe degrees of Being, will not allow. All therefore that Plants do, they muſt do by pure Mechaniſm, and that even upon the very Suppoſition of the School-Philoſophers. For there being

being but two conceivable Principles of operation, Thought and that, ſince they allow them no Thought (tho' I know not upon their Principles why they ſhould not) they muſt acknowledge that they do what they do by the other. And yet what ſtrange things do they do? I ſpeak not of their Medicinal Operations, thoſe alterative or ſanative Effects which they have upon our Bodies (of which the Tree of Life in Paradiſe was a wonderful inſtance) which are ſo many and various as to require a particular *Art* for the Conſideration of them, but of thoſe which they perform within themſelves. And theſe perhaps will appear, if compared upon equal Ground, not to yield to the moſt ſurprizing performances of Brutes.

38. The Hony which the Bees by a natural Chymiſtry extract from Flowers, the Geometrical Structure of the Comb wherein they lodge it, together with the regular Oeconomy and Adminiſtration of their Government, is as ſtrange a Scene, perhaps, as mere *Animal*-Nature has to ſhew. And yet whoever ſhall attentively conſider how a Plant draws the Juices of the Earth to it ſelf, works and elaborates thoſe Juices till it converts them into its own Juice, then of that Juice (to ſay nothing of the Circulation of it, and its regular diſtribution through all the parts) turns ſome into Wood, ſome into Leaves, ſome into Bloſſoms, ſome into Fruit, ſome into beautiful Flowers, *&c.* He, I ſay, that ſhall dwell a while upon this Conſideration

deration, and ſhall read thoſe who have given us the Anatomy of Plants, and deſcribed the manner of their Growth, and in particular thoſe nice and curious Obſervations which M. *Regis* has made of this kind, will perhaps by that time he has done, begin to think it no ſuch unequal Collation if we ſhould ſet the Plantal Operation againſt that of Bees; nor perhaps charge us with Partiality, if we ſhould prefer it before it. And yet 'tis plain that all this is here done mechanically; and why not then as well in the other Inſtance? Or if you will have *Bees* to do what they do by Thought, then why not *Plants* too? And then what a wiſe World ſhould we have, and what great reaſon for the Expreſſion of *Common Senſe*, when only Stocks and Stones would be deprived of it.

39. And thus whether we regard the Infinite Wiſdom and Power of God, or the wonderful Examples of things done by way of *Machine* in the Works of Art, or of Nature, but eſpecially if we conſider altogether, we cannot I think with Reaſon or Modeſty deny, but that 'tis poſſible thoſe Actions or Movements which are obſerv'd in Brutes to reſemble ſuch as we do by Thought, may in them be the reſult of pure Mechaniſm, that God, if he pleaſes ſo far to exert his Power, may make a Company of Machines that ſhall do juſt as they do, and have the ſame appearances of Thought which they have. In one Word, that mere Matter ſo, and ſo diſpoſed, ſo and ſo figured, and ſo and

and ſo moved (which comprehends all that Mechaniſm imports) may under the Conduct and Direction of an omniſcient and omnipotent Agent, be able to produce ſuch movements in Brutes, as come from Thought in us, and accordingly ſeem to argue it in them. This whoever can doubt of, will ſhew himſelf to have but a ſcanty notion of the Power of God, and as little to have conſider'd thoſe magnificent Proofs of it, which he has every where diſplay'd in the Works of Nature, and that tho' he be not able by the Principles of Matter and Motion, to explain the Actions of Brutes in the particular which yet may be Mechanically perform'd, tho' our ſhort and ſhallow Underſtandings may not always ſerve us to render a preciſe Account of the manner how. And yet I muſt not omit to remark that great Attempts have been offer'd in this kind, and greater yet no doubt may. But I ſhall not enter ſo far into the detail of the thing, referring thoſe, who have that Curioſity, to what the new Philoſophy has produced upon that Occaſion.

40. Well but Brutes do not only do ſuch things as reſemble what we do by Thought, but ſuch as by the Order, Proportion and Contrivance of the Work betray a Thoughtful Principle. True, they do ſo. And I do no more believe, that ſo Geometrical a Work as a Hony-Comb is made by chance, than I do believe that the World was made by chance. No,

No, without doubt it is a thoughtful Work, and ſuch as comes from a Principle of Thought, *Somewhere*. But why muſt this Principle of Thought be in the Bees? For is not the Vegetation of a Plant, alſo a Thoughtful Work, and yet will they ſay that a Plant does it by Thought? No, here 'tis confeſs'd that the Principle of Thought is *without*, and by conſequence that the Author of Nature does it in the Plant, by the Mechanical diſpoſition of its Parts. And why not ſo in the other Inſtance, eſpecially, conſidering that the Work itſelf does not more diſcover a Principle of Thought, than the manner of their doing it does that this Thought is not in them? And that becauſe they do it always alike, after one conſtant uniform manner; without either Variety, or Improvement: which indeed is a general conſideration that runs through all the Actions of Brutes, and is a ſtrong Preſumption, that Thought is not the Principle by which they act, but rather ſome natural Impreſſion or *Inſtinct*, as 'tis call'd, which diſtinctly reſolv'd can ſignify nothing intelligible, but a certain ſpecifick contexture of Parts, determining Animals of the ſame kind to the like Actions upon the like occaſions. Beſides that after all, this Argument that would prove from the excellent contrivance of their Works, that they do them by Thought, will be found to prove a great deal too much, ſince if they do them by that Principle, they will not only Think; but out-think us,

us, it being impoſſible for the Art of Man, with all his Philoſophy, to build a Neſt like a Bird, or to extract Hony from a Flower like the Bee, which indeed is not at all ſtrange, if you conſider theſe Creatures as ſo many *Machines* ſet on Work for thoſe purpoſes, by the great Artiſt (the whole wonder of the Matter then coming to no more than that the Works of Nature ſhould exceed thoſe of Art, which is no wonder at all) but utterly unaccountable if they do theſe things by Thought, unleſs you will ſuppoſe them to have better *Head-pieces* than our ſelves. But if they have ſo much Thought, or indeed any at all, 'tis much again that they do not give ſome Proof of it, in other Inſtances, but if they act in the way of Machine (as indeed this determination to one thing ſeems to intimate that they do) there will be nothing ſtrange in this neither. For Watches muſt go as they are ſet.

41. But admit it poſſible that the actions of Brutes may be purely Mechanical, it does not hence however follow, you'll ſay, that they actually are ſo. No, it does not. Neither do I ſo argue. I know very well, that tho' we may argue from the exiſtence of a Thing, to the poſſibility of it, becauſe we then proceed from the greater to the leſs, yet we cannot argue from the poſſibility of a Thing, to the actual exiſtence of it, as proceeding then from the leſs to the greater. I do not therefore conclude from the bare poſſibility, that the Actions of

of Brutes may be Mechanically done, that therefore they actually are so. I would only hence infer, that to say that they think because they do such Things as we do by Thought, is no good Argument, and that because the consequence is not necessary, because these sensible appearances may be otherwise accounted, *viz.* by the way of Mechanism. And this I think is a plain Consequence, for sure that which may be resolv'd into another Principle than Thought, cannot be said to argue Thought by him that has any. And this is as much as I intend in this part of the Argument concerning the possibility of the Mechanick way. But then when 'tis further consider'd what great Difficulties and Objections lie against their Thinking, and that the main Argument for it does not conclude, it may deserve Consideration (if the common Prejudice of the World can admit any such Thing) whether this put together, may not suffice to make it highly presumable that they do not think, at least to render it exceeding doubtful whether they do or no. Which will be enough to repress the Confidence of those supercilious Judges, who upon a few sensible appearances have so possess'd their Minds with the Supposition of Brutes having Thought and Perception, as to think there needs only the Assertion of a *Smile*, to confute those that shall offer to make any Question of it, tho' there is so much from Reason to be urged against it, and so little besides

the

the confuſe repreſentations of Imagination and Senſe, to be produced for it. But this ſhews what *Prejudice* can do, when an Opinion ſo common (as the Affirmative ſide of the Queſtion is) ſhall have ſo little ground in Reaſon to ſupport it, and when Men ſhall decide with Precipitation, and at ſight upon a Queſtion, than which I know none, within the whole Circle of Philoſophy that requires a more ſtrict Examination.

42. Such indeed I do not pretend to have made in this Diſcourſe, which is not deſigned as a juſt Treatiſe upon the Subject, but only by way of *Eſſay*, to touch upon the chief Things, and to lay them into ſuch a Scheme, as to open a View into the right State of the Queſtion, that ſo it may appear which ſide of it bids fareſt for our Approbation. And truly I think that by the Light wherein we have placed it, (as imperfect as it is) any one whoſe Eyes are free from the Tincture of Prejudice may now ſee, that that Opinion which ſuppoſes Brutes not to have any Thought or Perception, nor any Principle in them diſtinct from Matter, but to be purely Material, and to do what they do, by the advantageous diſpoſition of Matter and Motion (which is the *Carteſian* Hypotheſis) is by much the more ſimple, eaſy, ſafe and probable. For the *poſſibility* of it being but once admitted, which upon the foregoing Conſiderations, I ſee not how any reaſonable Perſon can deny, the difficulties that lie on

the other ſides, ſeem ſufficient inducements to incline one to think it *true*, for indeed the way is perfectly blockt up with impaſſable difficulties on both the other ſides, the final reſult of which among others, will be either to make us as Mortal as the Brutes, as in the mid-way that unites Matter and Thought in thoſe Creatures, or elſe to make them as immortal as our ſelves, as in the other way that ſuppoſes them to think, and to have immaterial Souls, neither of which I preſume can ſit very eaſy upon the Mind of any Man, that can obtain leave of his Prejudices to make a free uſe of his Thoughts.

43. Should it now at laſt be objected againſt the ſide we have moſt favour'd, that if Matter can perform ſuch ſtrange Operations, then for ought we know, we our ſelves may be no more than *Machines*. To this I anſwer, that if indeed Matter did Think, then we our ſelves, notwithſtanding our Thinking, might be no more than *Machines*. Which abſurd conſequence as was remark'd before, falls upon thoſe of the middle way, who unite Matter and Thought in Brutes, by ſuppoſing them to have material Souls and yet to Think. But this does no way concern the *Carteſian* Hypotheſis, which only holds that ſuch Operations are done by Matter in Brutes, as reſemble thoſe which proceed from a Principle of Thought in us. For tho' it follows that if Matter did Think, then we who think may poſſibly have no

no other Principle in us but what is material, yet it does by no means follow from Matters being able to exert ſuch Movements (without Thinking) as Thought produces in us, that therefore we who think may be no more than Matter; that is, in other Words, it does not follow, that becauſe God can ſo Mechanize Matter, as to make it capable of doing ſome things that correſpond to what we do by Thought, that therefore he can ſo Mechanize it as to make it *Think*. So that we who do Think, and are conſcious to our ſelves that we do, ſhould be concluded to be no more than Matter, only becauſe ſome other Creatures, who do not think, but only imitate what we do by Thought, are ſuppoſed to be no more. 'Tis plain, I ſay that there is no ground for this conſequence, and conſequently no force in the Objection, which, tho' ſtrong againſt thoſe of the *middle* way, that unite Matter and Thought, does not at all affect the *Carteſians*, who do not uſe to link together ſuch inconſiſtent and unſociable Ideas.

44. To conclude now with a Word or two, concerning the *Treatment* of Beaſts. Tho' it is my Opinion, or if you will, my Fancy, that Reaſon does moſt favour that ſide which denies all Thought and Perception to Brutes, and reſolves thoſe Movements of theirs which ſeem to carry an appearance of it (becauſe *like* thoſe which we exert by Thought) into mechanical Principles, yet, after all, leſt in the Re-

ſolution of ſo abſtruſe a Queſtion, our Reaſon ſhould happen to deceive us, as 'tis eaſy to err in the Dark, I am ſo far from incouraging any practices of Cruelty, upon the Bodies of theſe Creatures, which the Lord of the Creation has (as to the moderate and neceſſary uſe of them) ſubjected to our Power, that on the contrary, I would have them uſed and treated with us much tenderneſs and pitiful regard, as if they had all that Senſe and Perception, which is commonly (tho' I think without ſufficient Reaſon) attributed to them. Which equitable Meaſure, they that think they really have that Perception, ought in perſuance of their own Principle, ſo much the more *Conſcientiouſly* to Obſerve.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of THOUGHT.

1. HAving ſhewn at large what it is that thinks in us, I ſhould now proceed to inquire *How* we think; but that I conceive it of ſome importance in order to the fuller diſplay of the Nature of that Underſtanding, whoſe Account is here undertaken, to premiſe ſome Conſiderations concerning *THOUGHT* it ſelf. For as the intireneſs of the Subject makes it neceſſary to be ſpoken to, ſo the order of the thing ſeems to require that we ſhould firſt conſider what Thought or Underſtanding is, before we conſider how we Think, or after what manner we Underſtand. The whole Theory of Human Underſtanding being, as I conceive, reduceable to thoſe two general Queſtions.

2. From what we have diſcours'd concerning the Principle of Thought, and the utter incapacity of Matter to think, it appears plain in the general that Thought is an Act of the *Mind*. But what that Act of the Mind is, which we call *Thought*, I ſhall not pretend exactly to tell, not becauſe, as it happens in ſome Caſes, I cannot explain it ſo well as I conceive it, and ſo ſhould rather obſcure than define it, but becauſe indeed I do not

know. Only there are ſome things that may be obſerv'd concerning Thought, partly that relate to the Act of it, and partly that affect the Object of it, which may be neither unworthy of our Conſideration, nor beſides the Limits of our preſent Deſign.

SECT. I.

Of formal and objective Thought. With ſome Reflections upon the ſcholaſtick Uſe of that Diſtinction.

1. CLearneſs of Thought depending upon the ſtrictneſs and ſeverity, that is, the determinate ſignification of Words, when ever it happens, as it but two often does, that the ſignification of Words is not determinate, we muſt endeavour to make it ſo by diſtinguiſhing their Ambiguity. And this is what we are concern'd to do in the preſent Caſe. For by Thought we ſometimes underſtand, which indeed is the moſt proper acceptation of it, that Act or Operation of the Mind which we are conſcious of when we think, abſtracted from the Object of it. As when 'tis inquired, whether Brutes are capable of Thought? we are ſuppoſed by Thought here to mean the ſame as the Act of Thinking. Sometimes again by Thought we underſtand the Act of Thinking, not abſtractly, but concretely, as it terminates upon its Object, or rather perhaps the very Object it ſelf.

ſelf. As ſuppoſe when 'tis ſaid that a Thinking Being and an Extended Being, or a Circle and a Square, are diſtinct Thoughts or Conceptions, or when we ſpeak of ſuch a Thought, or ſuch a Notion, or when God is ſaid to know our Thoughts, then by Thought we at leaſt include the Object, if we do not ſolely intend and denote it.

2. Thought then, it ſeems, may be taken either for the Act of Thought, or for the Object of Thought, in like manner as the Term (Faith) is uſed in Theology. But when I ſay the *Object*, I would be underſtood not of the ſecondary or ultimate Object, the thing ſaid to be thought upon, as a Man or a Horſe, but the primary and immediate Object, that whereby we think upon it. That is, as a School-Philoſopher would expreſs it, not the *Objectum quod*, but the *Objectum quo*; or to word it more agreeably to the Language of the preſent Syſtem, not of the Real, but of the Ideal Object. For ſo when 'tis ſaid that a Thinking Being and an Extended Being are diſtinct Thoughts or Conceptions, and that therefore the Things themſelves are diſtinct; by Thoughts in this way of reaſoning muſt be meant, not the Things themſelves, for that theſe are diſtinct is the Concluſion to be proved, but the Ideas of thoſe Things, from the diſtinction of which it is argued to the diſtinction of the other. And therefore unleſs the ſame thing could prove it ſelf, or be at once the Principle and the Concluſion, by

Thoughts, we cannot ſuppoſe the Real, but the Ideal Object to be intended. For if the Real, then the Senſe would run thus, Thinking Being and Extended Being are diſtinct Things, therefore they are diſtinct Things. Which is to make the Concluſion the Reaſon of it ſelf. Whereas the true Senſe of the Argument is, That becauſe the Ideas of theſe Things are diſtinct, therefore the Things themſelves are no leſs ſo. Which plainly ſhews that as Thoughts here muſt be taken *objectively*, and not barely for the Act of Thinking, (ſince no conſequence can be juſtly drawn as to the Natures or Differences of Things from any *mental Acts* of ours about them) ſo the Object that they refer to muſt of neceſſity be not the Real, but the Ideal Object.

3. Thought of the Act, or as it ſignifies the very Act of Thinking, I would for diſtinction ſake, call *formal* Thought, as that of the immediate Object, *objective* Thought. For tho' in the reality of the thing there can be no thinking without thinking upon ſomething; (any more than there can be ſeeing without ſomething ſeen) yet the Act of Thinking may be conſider'd without the Object thought upon, (even as the Act of Viſion may be abſtracted from the Thing beheld) that not belonging to the formality of Thought, which is complete without it, however it may to the *Exerciſe* of it, juſt again as it is in *Viſion*. So then Thought has a complete Form or Eſſence of

of its own, as 'tis a certain mental Operation, independent on its Object, tho' as it *exists* it cannot but be accompanied with it, because of the inseparable Relation that is between the Act and the Object that it is conversant about. But there is no necessity that that should be taken into its formality; and when 'tis consider'd without it, in its pure intellectual Act, then I call it *formal* Thought, that is, Thought consider'd according to that metaphysical Form or Essence which it has as such a certain Operation of the Mind. So that in short, by formal Thought here is intended no more nor no less than the very formal Act of Thinking.

4. This distinction of formal and objective Thought or Conception is used by the Philosophers of the School, tho' in a Sense very different from what we have here assign'd to it. By *formal Thought*, if I apprehend them right they mean that Similitude or Representation by which the Mind conceives any thing. Which Similitude they seem to call *Conception*, upon the supposition that these Similitudes or Ideal Representations are the proper Product, and, as it were, natural *Off-spring* of the Mind. And they seem also to give it the name of *Formal*, partly as being the intrinsical and formal Term of Thought, and so as it were a kind of Form of the Mind that thinks, and partly as it formally represents to the Mind the Thing which is thought upon. That is in short, either as it terminates the Act, or as it represents,

ſents the Object. Tho' I think this may be a better Reaſon why it ſhould be call'd the Form of Thought, rather than formal Thought. But neither Men nor Things are always named with Reaſon. By *objective* Thought they mean no other than the Thing it ſelf that is repreſented to the Mind by formal Thought, or by that intelligible Form or Similitude under which it is conceiv'd. By which it appears that their formal Thought is the ſame with our objective Thought, and that their objective Thought is no other than the outward Object or Thing ſaid to be thought upon. But upon what account this ſhould be call'd *Thought*, I find it not very eaſy to apprehend.

5. I ſhall not much contend with any that ſhall think fit to pay that deference to the Authority of the Schools as to call the immediate Ideal Object of the Mind (that which ſome call *Verbum Mentis)* by the name of formal Thought, tho' I think 'tis plain it cannot be ſo call'd without ſome Impropriety, it being as was before noted, rather the Form of Thought, or of the Thing thought upon, and ſo objective rather than formal Thought. And tho' we do often uſe this way of Expreſſion, as when we ſay, the *formal Conception of a Thing*; yet 'tis plain we muſt mean not the very Conception it ſelf, but the Form of the Thing conceiv'd, or the Form which we conceive of a Thing, which is indeed the Idea not the Conception. And therefore partly for this Reaſon, and partly

ly becauſe there is no other Term left for the Act of Thought (which the Schools take no notice of in this diſtinction) and this moſt properly agreeing to that, and but improperly to the other, I think it beſt to expreſs the Act of Thought by the Term of formal Thought, and to expreſs what they call formal Thought by the Term of objective, or if you will, *Ideal* Thought. Which deſigns the ſame thing which they intend, only expreſſes it with leſs ambiguity; formal Thought being moſt apparently proper to be underſtood of, and ſo more apt to ſignify the very Act of Thinking, than that inward Term of it which they mark out by that name. And therefore I chuſe rather to diſtinguiſh the former by the title of formal, and the latter by that of objective Thought.

6. But as to what the Schools are pleaſed to call objective Thought, meaning not the Ideal, but *Real* Object or Thing ſaid to be thought upon, it ſeems not very obvious to underſtand why they ſhould ſo call it; for ſure nothing can have any juſt pretence to be call'd *Thought*, but what is either the Act of it, or what does at leaſt intrinſically terminate that Act. And 'tis for this latter Reaſon that the Ideal Object, tho' we do not with the Schools call it formal Thought, becauſe that name more properly belongs to the Act of Thought than to any Object of it; yet it may by reaſon of the Analogy which it has to the other in an allowable ſenſe be call'd *Thought*, as being in the Mind when it thinks,

thinks, and as being the formal Term of its Conception: Whereas their objective Thought, as they call it, is neither the one nor the other of theſe; not the Act to be ſure, nor yet the intrinſick Term of it, as being without the Mind. For which Reaſon indeed it is not ſo much as the Object of it, ſtrictly and exactly ſpeaking; for nothing can be the Object of Thought but what the Mind thinks upon, and the Mind thinks upon nothing but what is in the Mind when it thinks, and is the formal and intrinſick Term of its Thought. For this Reaſon I ſay it is not ſo much as the Object of Thought, unleſs in a remote and ſecondary Conſideration, becauſe that Ideal Object which truly is ſo, does formally expreſs and repreſent it. And in this ſenſe indeed it may be call'd the Object of Thought, as uſually it is, as when we ſay we think upon a Man or a Horſe, becauſe the Ideas that terminate our Thoughts (and which therefore are the only true Objects of them) do formally repreſent ſuch Things. But how it can ſo conveniently be call'd *objective Thought*, ſince it is out of the Mind that thinks, a Man had need wipe his Spectacles to ſee. Or if they will call it objective Thought, becauſe it is in *ſome* ſenſe the Object of Thought (for I know no other ground that can be pretended) then for the ſame and much greater Reaſon ought they to call the Species or Idea objective Thought, as being in the Mind that thinks as well as the immediate Object of it.

And

And yet this they call formal Thought, which ſeems very odd and untoward.

7. Formal Thought then in our way of conſidering theſe things, is the very Act of Thinking, and objective Thought is the immediate and intrinſick Term of that Act; which Act has a great Latitude, if taken at large, and ſuch as will extend to more things than belong to our preſent Conſideration. For under the name of formal Thought we may underſtand whatſoever we are conſcious of as done in our ſelves, and ſo it will comprehend not only Underſtanding or Perception, but willing, deſiring, loving, hating, hoping, fearing, and all the Paſſions, nay, even *Senſation* it ſelf; for 'tis all formal Thought in one kind or degree or other. But as Thought in general is chiefly to be underſtood of formal Thought, ſo formal Thought is chiefly to be underſtood of Perception, that being the principal Act of it, and indeed the only formal Thought that we are directly concern'd with in the preſent Theory, which having Human Underſtanding for its Subject, is properly concern'd with that Thought which is the Operation of it.

8. What this formal Thought or Perception is, as to the reality of the thing, you will ask me in vain, becauſe 'tis in vain that I ask my ſelf. I know, or rather feel by inward Sentiment that I think, and I make a ſhift in a rational Method to find out what it is that thinks in me; but what that Act of mine which I call

call *Thinking* is, I want, I will not ſay words to expreſs, but penetration of Thought to comprehend. Sometimes my Fancy whiſpers me that 'tis a kind of application of the Mind to its Ideal or Intelligible Object; but then I reject that again as a figurative way of ſpeaking, borrow'd from the Poſition or Converſion of one Body to another. What that is indeed I know, but becauſe I do ſo, I know alſo that it cannot belong to ſpiritual Beings, unleſs improperly and by way of metaphorical Alluſion; which is as much as to ſay, that the thing it ſelf does not really belong to them, but that ſomething elſe does, which correſponds to it. But what that is, remains as much a Queſtion as before. Then again I ſay to my ſelf, that ſure 'tis an intellectual Sight, a kind of Viſion of the Mind. But here I correct my ſelf again, as ſoon as I conſider the meaning of what I ſay: For either Viſion here is taken materially for that impreſſion which is made upon the Viſive Organs by the Rays of Light, and then there is nothing but a dark and confuſe Metaphor in the Expreſſion; or elſe Viſion is here taken formally for that Senſe or Perception which we are conſcious of upon that luminous impreſſion, and in this Senſe viſion is indeed the ſame with Thought, and ſo can give no Illuſtration to it. But what then ſhall I ſay it is? Or without offering at any thing further, ſhall I own my Ignorance? That I find I muſt do, ſince there is no ſeeing without Light. I enter into my ſelf

ſelf again and again, I conſult my ſelf over and over, but can have no anſwer. Nor can I reaſonably expect any, till I have an Idea of my Soul. But that I know only by Sentiment, not by Idea, and having no Ideal Knowledge of my Soul, how can I have any of its Operations? And what I have no Idea of, how can I explain, tho' the inward Senſe and Conſciouſneſs of it be never ſo quick, vigorous and lively in me? I muſt ſay then of Thought what St. *Auſtin* does of the Word of the Mind, *Quæris a me quid ſit verbum Dei? Si tibi vellem dicere quid ſit verbum Hominis, non explico, fatigor, hæſito, ſuccumbo, non poſſum explicare vim verbi Humani.* A Conſideration certainly that ought to humble us in the height of our intellectual Attainments, to think that in the midſt of our moſt elevated Thoughts and towering Contemplations we are yet ſo ignorant of our ſelves, and of what paſſes within us, as not to be able to tell what *Thought* is. And yet proud Man, that knows ſo little of himſelf, will be ſo vain as to pretend to things that are far above himſelf, as the Knowledge of *Angels*; nay, can hardly be beat off from fancying that he comprehends the *Divine Nature*, tho' he be ſo little acquainted with his own. Or elſe ſure the Myſtery of the Trinity would never have been ſo curiouſly pried into, nor ſo boldly diſputed. Which gave occaſion to St. *Auſtin* for this

Sermo de Temp. 145. cap. 4.

Re-

Reflection, *Lutum & vas figuli de Creatore disputat, & ad naturæ suæ rationem non potest pervenire, & curiose quærit scire de mysterio Trinitatis, quod Angeli in cælo scire non possunt.*

De temp. Sermo. 188.

9. And yet as unknown as I am to my self, methinks I have a confuse Interview of this involv'd Secret, like the glimmering Light, that trims the edges of a dark Cloud. For I can distinguish between some acts of Thinking, and others. I know very well not only when I think, and when I do not Think (if any such time there be) I say I do not only know this, which reaches no further than the existence of the Thing, and lets me into no view of its Nature, but I can discern Perception from Will, I know when I simply perceive, and I know when I desire. And tho' I perceive whatsoever I desire (it being impossible I should Will what my understanding has no Notion of) yet I do not desire whatever I perceive, but sometimes I perceive only, there being nothing desirable in what I perceive. This actual Separation, shews a difference between these ways of Thinking, which is further confirm'd to me, by observing that I have certain Bodily motions which follow upon my Will, which do not follow upon my bare Perception. For let me Think (in the Perceptive way) of moving my Finger, never so intensly or never so long, and it continues as unmoved as the Center, but if I *will* the mov-

moving of it, in that very Inſtant it moves, which convinces me again of a difference between Thinking by way of mere Perception, and Thinking by way of deſire. And this difference I ſee even before any ſuch ſenſible Conviction of it, at leaſt ſo far as to know that they do indeed thus differ. Tho' even this would be difficult to explain to another, as a great many Things are that are very evident, as well as that are very obſcure.

10. Concerning this formal Thought, or Perception, 'tis further obſervable that the acts of it are always of a like and uniform Nature, ſo that all the diverſity that is in Thought is from the *Objective* part of it. For whether I think of a Circle, or whether I think of a Square, whether I think of the Sun that ſhines in the Firmament, or upon the Candle that lights me in my Study now I write, my act of Thinking or formal Thought is the ſame. But 'tis my objective Thought that makes all the difference, variety and inequality that is here to be obſerv'd. And 'tis in this reſpect only that one Thought does at any time differ from another. The act is ſimilar and uniform, having no other difference but that of a greater or leſſer Intenſneſs or Application (which is only a gradual, not a ſpecifick difference) but the Ideal Object is various and multiform, and 'tis the diverſity of this Ideal Object that makes all the diverſity and diſtinction that is to be found in our Thoughts, whether Natural or Moral.

This is hinted at by *Des Cartes* in his 3d Meditation, but for want of thus diſtinguiſhing between formal and objective Thought, not ſo clearly expreſſed by him as his other Notions generally are. *So far*, ſays he, *as theſe Ideas are only certain Modes of Thinking, I perceive no inequality between them, and they all ſeem to proceed from me after the ſame manner, but as one of them repreſents one Thing, and another another, 'tis plain that they are very different from one another. For without doubt thoſe which repreſent to me Subſtances are ſomething greater, and as I may ſay, contain in them more objective Reality, than thoſe which repreſent only Modes or Accidents. And ſo again that Idea by which I conceive a Supreme, Eternal, Infinite, Omniſcient, Omnipotent God, the Creator of all Things that are beſides himſelf, has certainly more objective Reality in it, than thoſe by which I conceive finite Subſtances.* The ſum of this is, that there is no inequality in Ideas as Modes of Thinking, but only as one repreſents one Thing, and another repreſents another. And that ſo conſider'd they are very different. True indeed they are ſo, but Ideas cannot be conſider'd any otherwiſe than ſo, *viz.* than as thus diverſly repreſentative. They cannot be conſider'd as *Modes* of Thinking, but only as the objects of Thought. 'Tis plain then that he confounds objective with formal Thought, both when he conſiders Ideas, as Modes of Thinking, and when he talks of their proceeding from us after the ſame manner,

ner, this being not applicable to the object, but only to the *Act* of Thought. For neither are Ideas Modes of Thinking, nor do they proceed from us after that uniform Manner he ſpeaks of. So far from that, that they do not proceed from us at all, nothing belonging to Thought proceeding from us, or being properly ours, but only that very *mental Act* whereby we formally Think. As for the Ideal Object which we think upon, and which immediately terminates that Act, that we do not make, but find. Inſtead therefore of ſaying that there is no inequality in Ideas, as Modes of Thinking, but only as repreſentative, he ſhould have ſaid (if I may aſſume the Liberty to correct the Writings of ſo great a Man) that there is no inequality of difference, in formal Thought, but only in objective Thought, which had been both clear and true. But as to Ideas (which are the Object) they are always different, and 'tis all the difference that *is* in Thought, which is ſpecified and diſtinguiſh'd not from the Act, but from the term. Upon which conſideration that compariſon which a * Modern Philoſopher uſes is not unapt, when he compares Thought to Motion, and the Ideal Object of it to the determination of it. For as Motion as to the formal Nature of it is always the ſame, and differs only as to the determination of it, ſo Thought as to the formal Act of it is always uniform and indiſtinct, and receives all its va-

* *Du Hamel de mente humana.*

riety and distinction from the Ideal Object which it contemplates, but can neither make nor diversify.

11. And for this very Reason it is that we are less sensible of the formal, than we are of the Objective part of Thought. When we think upon the several intelligible Things that upon all Occasions present themselves to our Minds, we do not usually regard the formal Act of Thinking, but most of our attention and application is upon the Object, which is almost the only thing that is generally minded in Thought. But this comes to pass not only because the Act is common and ordinary, and this or that Object but now and then occurs, but also and chiefly, because the Act is always the same without variety or diversity, whereas the Ideal Object is continually presenting us with a new *Scene*. For which reason the Object, tho' foreign to us, does yet affect us more than the Thought itself, which having no change in it, cannot so well awaken our Notice and Observation, so that we must be beholden to some *Reflection* to make us sensible of it. Concerning which in the following Section.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Of Direct and Reflex Thought.

1. HAD we as clear a Notion of *Thought* as we have of ſome other Things, 'tis not likely that ſo many thinking and philoſophical Men would have agreed to expreſs the Properties that belong to it by ſuch *Terms*, and that becauſe they are *Figurative*, that is, in their ſtrict ſimplicity belonging to ſomething elſe, and only by a proportional Accommodation applied to this. For ſure that clearneſs which is ſo highly valuable elſewhere, is more eſpecially to be affected and endeavour'd after here (when we ſpeak of Thought) and to this purpoſe nothing can be more unſerviceable than *Metaphor*. For however it may have its uſe in the perſwaſive way of Speaking, as working upon the Imagination, and ſtirring the Paſſions by thoſe lively Scenes of Corporeal Imagery which it ſets before us, yet certainly it is not ſo well fitted to inlighten and inſtruct the Mind as the more chaſt and ſimple way is, and that becauſe it does not expreſs things according to their exact Natures which they have in themſelves, but only according to ſome general and confuſe Reſemblances which they have as to other things. For which reaſon this Figurative way is not to be uſed when we deſign clearneſs, and our Buſineſs is only to Inſtruct, and therefore when-

ever in ſuch Caſes we do uſe it (as ſometimes we are forced to do) 'tis either becauſe we want Judgment in the manner of wording our Diſcourſe, or becauſe we have not a clear Idea of the Subject we would diſcourſe of, and ſo not being able to diſcourſe of it exactly as it is, we are fain to expreſs our ſelves of it as we can. The latter of theſe may be preſumed to be the preſent Caſe, when we ſay of Thought that 'tis *Direct*, or *Reflex*. For it being not preſumable that ſo many Philoſophical Men ſhould be ſo injudicious as not to prefer a ſimple way of Speaking here before a figurative one, if it could be had, we may ſuppoſe that they uſed the latter becauſe they had not an Idea of Thought clear enough to ſupport the former.

2. 'Tis ſuppoſed here that theſe Terms, Direct and Reflex, are figurative when applied to Thought. And 'tis certain that they are ſo, and that becauſe they properly belong to *Motion*, between which (as being a Mode of Matter) and Thought, there is no leſs than an intire and ideal Diverſity. And whatever is proper to one thing, muſt be Figurative if applied to another. Then we ſay a Motion is Direct when a Body moves on without changing its determination, and then Reflex when there is a change of its determination upon the Rencontre of another Body which it cannot move or diſplace. For it being impoſſible that a Body ſhould loſe its Motion any otherwiſe than as it communicates it, if it meets with one to whom

whom by reaſon of its reſiſtance it cannot communicate it, it muſt needs continue its Motion in the ſame *Quantity*, and only take a new *Determination*, quite contrary to what it had before, which is what I conceive we are properly to underſtand by *Reflexion*. By which it appears that Motion is one thing, and the Determination of it another thing, becauſe the Motion continuing the ſame the Determination of it is changed, and that in a Direct and Reflex Motion the contrariety does not ſo properly lie in the *Motions* (for Motion is not contrary to Motion, but Reſt) as in their *Determinations*, which are the only Things that are here truly oppoſite, and in reſpect of which all Motion muſt be ſaid to be either Direct or Reflex.

3. Theſe Terms then when applied to Thought are *Figurative*, and the Figure is taken from Motion, or rather the Determination of it, where indeed they are *proper*. All the Buſineſs will be to reduce this Figure to a Simplicity: Direct and Reflex as it is in Motion cannot be in Thought, becauſe Thought is ideally diſtinct from Motion, and ſo cannot be capable of its Properties. But there is ſomething in Thought, or at leaſt this Form of Expreſſion ſuppoſes that there is, that carries ſome reſemblance to theſe determinations of Motion. But to expreſs this reſemblance in its naked ſimplicity, is perhaps no more poſſible than to tell what Thought it ſelf is, and that for the ſame common reaſon, becauſe we have no clear Idea

of our Souls. All that can be done here is to design what that Thought is which we call Direct, and what that Thought is which we call Reflex, that so we may not be supposed to talk like Parrots, by using these Terms altogether without any meaning under them. Now as to this, I conceive that then Thought is said to be Direct when the Act of Thought terminates upon its ideal Object; and then Reflex, when the same Act of Thought terminates upon it self, or is its own Object. As when a Man thinks that he thinks: In which Act there seems to be a kind of a return of the Mind upon it self as in that determination of Motion which we call Reflex, but how or what it is I do not well understand, and therefore shall not go about to explain.

4. We may take occasion here to remark by the way, that tho', as was said, there is no thinking without thinking upon something, yet that 'tis not necessary that that something should be always an *Idea*, since as you see it may sometimes be the very Act of Thought, which may be an Object to it self. And 'tis further observable that *Object* is of a larger extent than *Idea*. For tho' every Idea is an Object, yet every Object is not an Idea, since the very formal Act of Thinking which is most apparently distinct from Idea, may also be consider'd as having the express formality of an Object, as it is in that reflex way of thinking we are now speaking of, wherein the Mind retiring

as

as it were from all Ideas turns its view as I may say inwards, and in a very wonderful manner considers what passes there. In which Act of hers 'tis hard to tell which is the most great and noble, whether the Spectacle beheld, or the View.

5. 'Tis this reflex Thought that chiefly distinguishes the Character of what we call a *Thinking* Man. Direct *Thought* is more easy (the Mind seeing better a little from it, than so very near at hand) and for that reason more common: Men ordinarily use this in considering the several Ideal Objects that occur to their Minds, and there is also something in those Objects upon the account of the novelty and variety of them, as well as the greater brightness of the Light wherein we behold them, which draws off the Mind from it self to the Contemplation of them, wherein finding more Light and more Pleasure, no wonder that it chuses to be out of it self, and converse abroad rather than at home, upon a Principle not much unlike that whereby we generally love the company of Strangers better than our own. For this reason it is that all the World thinks *directly*, at one rate or another. But there is but here and there a Man that *reflects*, that turns himself to himself, and carefully and attentively observes what's doing in his own Mind, and considers the various workings of that intellectual Principle which is the Dignity and Excellency of his Nature, that sets him above

bove the Beaſts, and but little lower than the Angels. This is but dry Entertainment to the generality even of ſtudious and curious Men, they would rather ſtudy Books than Things, and any thing rather than their own Minds, by which means it comes to paſs that when they know almoſt every thing beſides, they live in a deep ignorance of themſelves, like thoſe that have travell'd moſt parts of the World, and yet are Strangers to their own Country.

6. For I muſt further remark that 'tis this reflex Thought that teaches us the knowledge of our ſelves, that Knowledge of our ſelves which both *Pagan* and *Chriſtian* Philoſophy ſo earneſtly recommend, and inculcate as the moſt uſeful and important Leſſon, that Man has to ſtudy. As indeed it truly is, tho' few value it, and moſt induſtriouſly fly from it. But while Philoſophers exhort to the Study of it, 'tis Reflection only that teaches it, and that in the School of Solitude and Retirement, which is as little liked as either the Leſſon, or the Miſtreſs. 'Tis by Reflection that we come to know the true State of Human Nature. We enter into our ſelves, and taking a quiet view of our own intellectual Frame, we learn how 'tis with other Men, as having diſcover'd in our own Breaſts the Springs by which they act, and conſequently know how to deal with them. 'Tis by Reflection alſo upon the Operations of our Minds, that we come to find out the way how to direct them in the reſearch of

of Truth, *Logick* being the result of Reflection and of those Observations that are made by it, upon the due or undue use of our rational Faculties. But Reflection has also a very friendly Influence upon good Manners, as being that faithful Mirror that shews a Man himself, and returns to him the Moral State of his Soul, and so helps him to correct what is amiss there, as also to govern his Thoughts, and to keep a guard over his Passions. So that in fine when we have used our Thoughts in the *direct* way, never so long to make us *Learned* and *Knowing*, we must be beholden at last to *Reflexion* to make us *Wise* and *Good*.

SECT. III.

Of Thought of Perception, and Thought of Volition, wherein also of Idea and Sentiment.

1. WE were speaking last of reflex Thought. And when we do indeed reflect upon our Thoughts (which we but seldom have the leisure or the Inclination to do) one of the first Things we shall discover concerning them perhaps will be, that some of them are in the way of mere *Perception*, and some in the way of *Volition*. Which I take, next to that of formal and objective, to be the most general division of Thought. Only I was willing to premise that of direct and reflex before it, because 'tis by Reflexion that we come to learn what

what the ſeveral Acts of Thought are which we are conſcious of in our ſelves.

2. How to make theſe Terms (*Perception* and *Volition*) any clearer than they already are, I do not well know, as not pretending to know much more of the things ſignified by them, than only to diſtinguiſh one from the other. And that I can plainly and eaſily do. Whether I perceive only, or whether I will alſo what I perceive, I plainly diſcern that willing is one thing, and perceiving is another. But eſpecially when I only perceive without willing (as I may do, tho' I cannot Will without perceiving) becauſe then the actual ſeparation ſhews the diſtinction, which is alſo further confirm'd *a Poſteriori* from thoſe bodily Movements which follow upon a Thought of *Volition*, but pay no manner of Obedience to our Perceptions.

3. Perception is either in the way of Idea, or in the way of Sentiment. For even our very *Feeling* is a ſort of Perception, and is uſually ſo call'd. Perception in the way of *Idea*, is when we perceive ſomething that is without us, and diſtinct from us, even that Idea which is the immediate Object of our Thought. Perception in the way of *Sentiment* is that inward feeling which we have of our ſelves, and of the different Manner of our Being, as when we are in Pleaſure or in Pain. The former of theſe for diſtinction's ſake I would call Intellectual or Ideal Perception, and the latter ſenſible Perception

ception, or in one Word, *Senſation*. The difference between which may already in great Meaſure appear, and ſhall be more fully laid open hereafter.

4. At preſent I ſhall only further remark that Perception, and that in the Ideal way is the only Act of Thought that properly belongs to the *Underſtanding*. And becauſe this is one of thoſe Points, upon which the new Philoſophy has adventured to divide from the old, it may be worth our while, and not beſides the Buſineſs of a Theory, that undertakes to inquire into the manner of Human Underſtanding, to touch upon it in a few Reflexions.

5. The old Philoſophy has been ſo liberal to the Underſtanding as to beſtow a theefold Act upon it, *viz. Apprehenſion*, *Judgment*, and *Diſcourſe*, By Apprehenſion meaning the Simple view or Perception of a Thing. By Judgment the Union or Separation of Things by Affirmation or Negation. And by Diſcourſe the deduction of one Thing from another; which threefold Diviſion of the intellectual Operation, has furniſh'd the Logicians with ſo many capital Grounds to proceed upon in their ordinary Syſtems.

6. But neither the Matter, nor yet the Form of this diviſion (as authentick as time and conſent have made it) are unobnoxious to juſt exception. For firſt allowing for the preſent the Matter of it to be right, that is, that

thoſe

thoſe three Acts did really belong to the Underſtanding, yet the Form ſeems not to proceed according to Art. And that becauſe the third Member in the diviſion is contain'd under the ſecond, that which they call Diſcourſe being only a mediate Judgment, and differing from Judgment at large no otherwiſe than as a Concluſion differs from a Propoſition, as being only the judging a Thing to be ſo, or ſo, for ſuch a Reaſon. And I hope judging will be never the leſs, judging for having a Reaſon for it.

7. But the Matter of this Diviſion, will perhaps be found to be as faulty as the Form. For Judgment and Diſcourſe, or to ſpeak more collectively, Judgment (the latter being only a Species of the former) ſeems rather to belong to the Will, than to the Underſtanding, as being nothing elſe but that aſſent or diſſent which the Will gives to what the Underſtanding perceives, or ſeems to perceive, by affirming or denying, that is, embracing or refuſing what is propoſed, according to the apparent Evidence wherewith it comes. For why may there not be a willing and a nilling that belongs to Truth as well as that which reſpects good? And what is Judgment but that Act of the Will which reſpects Truth, not as deſiring ſuch a Thing to be true (for ſo it muſt be conſider'd as *good*) but as acquieſcing or conſenting that it is ſo. And indeed if the Will be the ſubject of Error, as it ſeems reaſonable

ſonable to think, becauſe 'tis ſo of *Sin*, the greateſt of all Errors, 'tis plain that Judgment muſt belong to it too, ſince Error is no other than a wrong Judgment.

8. And this we have always in our Power, to avoid by aſſenting to no more than what we clearly perceive. For as Error in the formality of it, is the aſſenting to what is falſe, ſo the cauſe of Error is the aſſenting to more than we perceive, for by this means we come to aſſent to what is falſe, or to *err*. But now tho' by reaſon of our not only finite, but very limited capacity, we are neceſſarily ignorant of many Things, yet it is always in our Power to avoid Error, by ſuſpending our aſſent, till the light and evidence of Truth demands it of us. We have then it ſeems a free Command over that aſſent. And tho' we are not preſently to conclude that the Will is the ſubject of Error (and conſequently of Judgment) becauſe we can avoid it if we Will, ſince the cauſe of Error may not always be the Thing that errs, yet if we conſider how it is that we can avoid it, and find that it is by that Empire which we have over our Act of aſſent, in being able to ſuſpend it at Pleaſure, we may more reaſonably argue, that that Aſſent or Judgment, which we have ſo much Power over, is an act that properly belongs to the Will.

9. But what then will be the Work of the Underſtanding? Why to *Perceive*. And is not that Work enough? Methinks I find it ſo, but if

if I did not, I know not how inlarge it. For ſure the buſineſs of the Underſtanding can be no other than to *Underſtand*; and what can we poſſibly mean by Underſtanding, but only *Perceiving?* and beſides the Object of the Underſtanding, being in the whole compaſs of it, nothing elſe but Ideas and their Relations, I ſee not what the Underſtanding has to do, but only to perceive thoſe Ideas, and the Relations that are between them. And when this is done, then is a thing ſufficiently Underſtood, and if it be thoroughly done, then 'tis underſtood as much as it poſſibly can be. For ſure he that in any Science has a thorough Perception of the Ideas that belong to that Science, and of the Relations that belong to thoſe Ideas, underſtands as much of that Science as is to be underſtood, and I know not what Inſtructions you can further add to make him underſtand it better. Whereby it appears, that Perception is the only Operation that properly belongs to the Underſtanding, and tho' there may be ſome variety in that, yet that it can have no other.

10. All *Judgment* then belongs to Thought of Volition, and is an act of the Will repoſing it ſelf, and acquieſcing in what the Underſtanding perceives, and rejoycing as it were in its Light.

For there is a twofold act of the Will, one that reſpects *Good*, and another that reſpects *Truth*. Between which, two general Objects of

of the Mind, there ſeems to be this difference, that Truth is that *abſolute* Relation which things have among themſelves, whereas Good is that Relation of Agreement, or as the Schools call it, *Convenience*, which they have to us.

Now that act of the Will which reſpects *Good* is either its bare acquieſcence in its being ſo, that is, its aſſenting to that Relation of convenience which it has as to us, which ſeems not at all to differ from that aſſent which is given to *Truth*. Or that movement of Love, whereby it is carried towards it as ſuch.

That act of the Will which reſpects *Truth*, is more ſingle, as being in the general but one, and that is what we call *aſſent*, which is its acquieſcence in that abſolute Relation, which appears to be between things in themſelves.

But then this aſſent is of ſeveral kinds, according to the degree of the Perception, or the different quality of its own proper Motive or Ground.

There are indeed three Aſſents. Not *Faith*, *Opinion* and *Science*. For 'tis plain that Science is no aſſent, but rather one of the Grounds upon which it proceeds. For I aſſent to what I know. Science then is not Aſſent, but Perception, and as ſuch belongs not to the Will, but to the Underſtanding. But however there is a threefold Aſſent, and the ground of it is this.

All assent is either upon the evidence of the Thing, or upon Authority or Testimony. If upon Authority, then 'tis what we call *Faith*. If upon Evidence, then this Evidence is either complete or incomplete. If incomplete, then the Assent, which is given to it is what we call *Opinion*, which is an imperfect Assent, or Judgment. But if the Evidence be complete, then 'tis another kind of Assent that is given to it, and what should be call'd by another Name, that may contradistinguish it to *Opinion*. But I know no particular Name for it at present, and therefore must be contented with the general one of a *full* or *perfect Assent*.

This full Assent I think passes in the Schools for *Knowledge*. But 'tis plain, that Knowledge is not Assent, but Perception. Neither again is Knowledge opposed to Opinion, but to Ignorance. That which is opposed to Opinion must be contain'd under the same common *Genus* with it, and so must be an Assent as Opinion is. But what particular Name (since *Knowledge* is not a proper one) to give this Assent, which answers to Opinion, I know not; nor is it for me to impose any. 'Tis enough for me to understand the Things, and till a more particular Term be assign'd, to distinguish them by the Names of a perfect and imperfect Assent.

But then concerning Assent 'tis further observable, that 'tis either immediate or mediate. For as there is an immediate or mediate Perception,

ception or Knowledge (concerning which more hereafter) ſo alſo is there an immediate or mediate Judgment or Aſſent. If the Aſſent be immediate, as when the Relations of Ideas are judged of, or aſſented to, upon an immediate collation of the very Ideas themſelves, then 'tis ſimple Judgment, or Judgment and no more. If the Aſſent be mediate, as when they are aſſented to by the mediation of ſome other Idea, then 'tis Reaſoning or Diſcourſe, which is an illative Judgment, or judging a Thing to be ſo, or ſo, not ſimply as before, but for ſuch a Reaſon.

For all Reaſoning is Judgment, tho' all Judgment be not Reaſoning. And all Judgment and Reaſoning properly ſo call'd, belongs to the Will. The Underſtanding, as ſuch, does nothing but Perceive. But ſtill Truth is the Object of both, of the Underſtanding as perceiving it, and of the Will as aſſenting to, or acquieſcing in what the Underſtanding perceives.

11. Hence then we gather, that the proper defect of the Underſtanding is *Ignorance* or *Non-perception*, as that of the Will is Error or a wrong Aſſent. And that tho' we rightly may, as we uſually do, diſtinguiſh between an affected and not affected *Ignorance*, yet we cannot in like manner diſtinguiſh between an affected and not affected *Error*, ſince by the Premiſes, it appears that all Error is in ſome degree affected. For tho' from an Errors being wil-

ful, we cannot ſtrictly conclude, that therefore Error is in the Will as the Subject of it, (for then we might alſo conclude Ignorance to be in the Will, ſince that alſo may be Wilful) yet from Errors being in the Will, we may on the other ſide conclude that 'tis always Wilful. As indeed it is, it being always in our Power to avoid it, by not judging if we do not Perceive, or by not Judging any farther than we Perceive. Which I take to be the true Reaſon why tho' Ignorance may be ſometimes excuſable, yet Error is always a Fault.

SECT. IV.

Of Active and Paſſive Thought, with a Reflection upon the Scholaſtick Diſtinction of agent and patient Underſtanding.

1. THought in the Latitude of it, comprehending Volition as well as Perception, and Perception being Senſible as well as Ideal, we have from hence, an Occaſion given us to conſider another Diſtinction that may be made of Thought into Active and Paſſive. Which denomination, tho' attributed to Thought, may yet perhaps more primarily and properly belong to the Mind that *Thinks*, there being ſome Thoughts wherein the Mind is active, or does ſomething, and other Thoughts, wherein the Mind is Paſſive, and receives as it were the

the Action of ſomething elſe. I ſay the *Mind*, that ſignifying as I apprehend the whole Thinking Power of the Soul, or the Soul as it Thinks at large. For as by the *Underſtanding* here is intended that Power in us which Perceives, ſo by *Mind* I think (as that Term is diſtinguiſh'd from the other) we are properly to mean that Power which both Perceives and Wills, the latter being attributed to the Mind as well as the former, which is therefore eſteem'd the Subject of Moral, as well as of Rational Perfection, According to which is the Language of Scripture, when it ſpeaks of our being *renew'd in the Spirit of our Mind.* Epheſ. 4. 23.

2. Now to diſtinguiſh what Thought in us is Active, and what Paſſive (meaning in which it is that the Mind is one or the other reſpectively) we have no other way, but to reflect upon what we are conſcious of in our ſelves, and when we do ſo, we ſhall find in the firſt Place, that all Volition is Active, and purely Active. For tho' *Love*, which is a ſort of Willing, is often call'd a *Paſſion* (a general Name for the ſeveral Acts of the Will, as they are accompanied with certain bodily Movements) yet this I think ought to be underſtood, only with reſpect to that certain Mechanical Commotion of the Body, which attends that Thought of the Mind, and not with reſpect to the Thought it ſelf, wherein, whatever affections or alterations the Body may ſuffer, the

Mind is truly active, as indeed it is in all the Operations of the Will. Which as I conceive is the Reason why the Soul is accountable for these sort of Thoughts, and of that moral distinction, as to Good and Evil, whereof they are capable.

3. And as Thought of Volition is purely active, so sensible Perception or Sensation is as purely passive. The Soul has no immediate Power over her Sensations, as not being able to modify her self. And accordingly we find by experience that we cannot give our selves Pleasure or Pain, any otherwise than by making use of such impressions of Bodies, as by the Law of Union, between our Soul and Body, have an ordinary connexion with such Sentiments, nor then neither, if the mechanical Texture of our own Bodies happen to be so disturb'd or indispos'd that the Motion impress'd upon the Nerves be hinder'd from being communicated to the Brain. And as the Soul has no immediate Power over her Sensations, so as to produce them by any Act of hers, so neither is Sensation it self an Act of the Soul, but rather the Reception of the Act of some other Being, which has Power over her. Indeed when we have any Sensation, as Pleasure or Pain, 'tis hardly possible but that some Act of the Mind will be consequent upon it, as of intellectual Perception in reflecting upon what we feel, or of Volition in willing or refusing it as grateful or ungrateful, but still the *Sensation* it

it ſelf is no Act, but only a different ſtate or manner of Being in the Soul, which as it comes from the Cauſe that produces it, however it may be call'd an Act, yet as it is in the Soul, it is no Act but a Paſſion, as not being any thing that the Soul does, but ſomething which it ſuffers or receives.

4. But now as to that other Perception which (to diſtinguiſh it from Senſation, which is alſo a kind of Perception) we call *Intellectual*, that is partly active and partly paſſive. Some will tell you that 'tis only the latter. And I confeſs they have ſo far reaſon for what they ſay, as it is a kind of Reception of the intelligible Object or Idea, which indeed may import no more than a *Paſſivity*, but ſure methinks to *perceive* ſhould alſo imply ſome Act of the Mind about that intelligible Object, or elſe how is it *perceiv'd?* And our own Experience and Reflection will teach us that the Soul is not idle in this any more than in any other way of Thinking, but imploys her ſelf with a great deal of Activity, eſpecially in the Contemplation of ſome Objects, where the Ideas are very abſtract, or where their Relations are very compounded. Nor is this Activity of Perception only the Will which the Soul has to perceive. This indeed it has, but then beſides this (for every one that is willing to perceive, does not preſently perceive, as a Man may be willing to ſee, and yet be in the dark) there is alſo a certain Effort or Exertion of Mind in in-

tellectual Perception, that which is uſually expreſs'd by *Attention*, and in this conſiſts that labour of Thought which we call *Study*. And if we reflect, we ſhall find that this Attention in perceiving is a very diſtinct thing from the being barely willing to perceive, ſince there is a cauſal connexion or dependence between them, our willingneſs to perceive being the reaſon why we attend. But beſides the Soul finds difficulty in Thinking, eſpecially upon ſome things, which would not be if the Underſtanding were only paſſive, or receptive of Ideas, and had nothing to do in the *Contemplation* of them, which very word ſeems to imply Action as well, if not rather than Paſſion. And this is ſo natural a Suppoſition that our common Language runs upon it, wherein 'tis ordinary to ſay, an Act of Thought, or an Act of Perception. And accordingly the Schools themſelves, tho' they expreſly make the Underſtanding to be a paſſive Power; yet 'tis obvious to obſerve that they call (let them ſee with what conſiſtence) the ſeveral Thoughts of it by the name of *Operations*. And ſo Knowledge which belongs to the Underſtanding, and is a ſort of Perception, is by them ſaid to be a *Habit*; tho' again, by their own Doctrine, a Habit reſults from a frequency of *Acts*. And ſo likewiſe *Happineſs* is ſaid to be an *Operation*, and that not of the ſenſitive, but of the intellective part only, and that too more minutely yet (according to the School of *Aquinas*) of the

Un-

Underſtanding and not of the Will. In which Expreſſions they ſeem to forget that the Underſtanding is a paſſive Power, ſince that which is purely ſo cannot act, or have any Operation. But now we ſpeak of *Happineſs*, I would further offer it to be conſider'd, whether it does not ſeem a lazy Suppoſition, and an unworthy Notion of that *Reſt* which Heaven means, to ſuppoſe that it conſiſts in a State of Inactivity, and that in the beatifick Viſion of God, and the Contemplation of all thoſe intelligible Truths which ſhine forth from his glorious Eſſence, the beatified Soul ſhould have nothing to do, but be as purely paſſive in her Underſtanding, as ſome fancy ſhe is now in her Will, as paſſive to the Light of *Truth*, as they fanſie ſhe is now to the Influences of *Grace*. And if ſuch a paſſive inactive State as this is to be our future Happineſs, whether it be ſo conveniently expreſs'd by the name of *Life*, which imports ſo much of Activeneſs in the ordinary Conception we have of it. Upon which Conſiderations it ſeems reaſonable to conclude, if not that Perception it ſelf is an Act, yet at leaſt that the Soul is active as well as paſſive in her intellectual Perceptions, which is as much as the preſent purpoſe requires.

5. This diſtinction of ours, of active and paſſive Thought, carries a ſound, much reſembling that of the Schools, concerning *Agent* and *Patient* Underſtanding, but is in ſenſe and intention very different from it. For in our

di-

diſtinction the meaning is, that there are ſome Thoughts wherein the Mind acts, and ſome again wherein it only receives the Action of another, ſo that ſtill 'tis the ſame thinking Principle, and as thinking, that is, both active and paſſive. Whereas tho' they diſtinguiſh of an *Agent* and *Patient* Underſtanding, and ſo ſeem to aſcribe Thought to each, yet when they come to explain their Senſe, we find that with them 'tis the *Patient* Underſtanding only that truly thinks, underſtands, or perceives. The Buſineſs of that which they call Agent, being not to *underſtand*, but to form intelligible Species for the Contemplation of the other. Which indeed is to make it active with a witneſs, tho' not in the way of Underſtanding. It being certainly a Work of more difficulty to form Ideas, than it is to perceive them, or underſtand by them. But the Schools, if they had ſo pleas'd, might have ſpared this Impoſition upon poor *Intellectus Agens*. For Thanks be to God, we want not Ideas, nor could any Faculty of ours pretend to make them if we did. Nor indeed is it the Buſineſs of Human Underſtanding to make Ideas, but only to contemplate them, which alone (without working at that intellectual *Forge* which the Schools have ſet up) will ſufficiently employ all its Activity as well as Capacity. But concerning this Matter, we ſhall have occaſion for further Reflections hereafter. In the mean time let us proceed to ſome other Conſiderations of *Thought*.

SECT.

SECT. V.

Of simple and complex Thought, with some Remarks concerning Knowledge.

1. THis Conſideration of Thought will be found perhaps to carry a double Aſpect, one reſpecting the Act of Thought, as it is in it ſelf, and the other as it relates to its Object. In *Thought of Volition* it reſpects the Act purely as in it ſelf, which is ſometimes ſaid to be complex, not as if the Act it ſelf were *compounded* (for I know not whether any Act of Thought be complex in that ſenſe) but becauſe it *compounds* or puts together ſomething elſe. For ſo, for inſtance, that Act of the Mind which we call *Judgment*, which has been ſhewn to belong to the Will, as being an Aſſent or Diſſent to what the Underſtanding propoſes to it, this Judgment, I ſay, whether immediate or mediate, whether Judgment by way of Propoſition, or Judgment by way of Concluſion; whether enunciative or illative Judgment, is a *complex* Thought, as uniting and compounding one thing with another, in oppoſition to that Apprehenſion or Perception which is rightly ſaid to be *ſimple*, becauſe it reſts in the pure view of things as they are, without affirming or denying any thing concerning them, and is indeed the firſt Act or Operation of the *Mind at large* (which perceives in

in ſome degree or other before it wills or judges) but not the firſt, but rather only Act of the *Underſtanding*.

2. But now in Thought of Perception, this diſtinction of Simple and Complex reſpects the Act partly as in it ſelf, and partly as it relates to the Object: Firſt, as it is in it ſelf; for as Thought of Volition is in that reſpect ſaid to be ſometimes complex, becauſe of the Compoſition, or rather Componency, which is in that its Operation, which we call Judgment, ſo in the ſame reſpect, but for a contrary reaſon, Thought of Perception is ſimple. As indeed it always is as to the Act, even when it is complex as to the Object, as having no Compoſition or Diviſion in it. But then as it relates to its Object, it is partly ſimple and partly complex, according as the Nature of the Object is. Then is Perception, in the preſent way of conſidering it, ſaid to be ſimple, when the Object of it is ſimple, and then complex when the Object of it is complex. And ſince the intire and adequate Object of Thought (as will hereafter appear) is compriſed within the compaſs of Ideas and of their Relations, we may more explicitly ſay that then is Perception ſimple when it is the Contemplation of Ideas only, and then complex when with the Ideas it takes in alſo the Conſideration of their Relations and eſſential Habitudes. It is ſimple, when it has for its Object the ſingle and ſolitary Ideas, and 'tis complex when it conſiders thoſe *Truths* which reſult from thoſe Ideas. 3. Per-

3. Perception then is either ſimple or complex; but whether one or the other, 'tis always ſimple as to the Act, as not compounding or dividing, tho' partly ſimple and partly complex as to the Object. And ſince it is ſo, this Perception, according to the whole Latitude of it, is what the Schools either do or ſhould mean by their *ſimple Apprehenſion*; for when they call it *ſimple*, they muſt in reaſon be preſumed to mean as to the *Act*, partly in oppoſition to the Acts of Compoſition that follow, and partly becauſe if they meant ſimple as to the *Object*, they ſhould alſo have put a complex Apprehenſion to anſwer to it in the ſame kind, which, meaning it as to the Act, they could not do, becauſe indeed there is no complex Perception as to the Act, and accordingly they were forced to go immediately off to Judgment and Diſcourſe. But now even complex Perception. as to the Object, is ſimple as to the Act, and is therefore to be concluded within the compaſs of their ſimple Apprehenſion, which ſhould not, rightly comparing Things, be underſtood as to the ſimplicity of the Ideas *apprehended*, but as to the ſimplicity of the Act *apprehending*, which is found as much in a complex as in a ſimple Perception. And conſequently their ſimple *Apprehenſion* ought to have that reach as to include one as well as the other, or elſe (which is further conſiderable) there will, I think, be no place allow'd for, nor notice taken of *complex Perception* in their whole Sy-

Syſtem, which is not to be ſuppoſed, the Perception of the Relations of Ideas being plainly as much a Perception as that of the ſingle Ideas themſelves, and conſequently as much to be conſider'd: Which therefore 'tis the kindeſt Interpretation to ſuppoſe them to do under their *ſimple Apprehenſion*, tho' I muſt confeſs their way of expreſſing themſelves, ſeems ſo looſe and indetermin'd, that ſometimes one would think that by their ſimple Apprehenſion they meant the Perception of ſingle Ideas only, and ſometimes that of their Relations. As when a certain Scholaſtick Writer ſays, *When we hear the name of a Man, we form in our Minds a certain ſimple Conception. And ſo when we hear the name of Animal, we form alſo a ſimple Conception conformable to it. Which is the work of the firſt Operation. Then apprehending the Nature of an Animal and a Man, we animadvert that there is ſome Agreement between them. Whereupon we attribute Animal to Man, by affirming thus, Man is an Animal*, &c. Obſerve here that having ſpoken of the Conception of ſimple Ideas, and aſcrib'd it to the firſt Operation (by which one would think he made the firſt Operation to conſiſt in the Conception of ſimple Ideas) he talks afterwards of our *Animadverting* an Agreement between them, and upon that, of our Attributing one to the other. But now what can this *Animadverting* be which he places between the Conception

Euſtachius, ſumma Philoſophiæ, p. 12.

ception and the Attribution, but the *Perceiving* that agreement? And what can our attributing upon this Animadverſion ſignify, but our judging ſo and ſo, becauſe we perceive ſo and ſo? Which as it plainly implies, that there may be a perception of Relations, as well as of Ideas, ſo it ſeems to imply further, that that apprehenſion which he had made, the firſt Operation ſhould take in the former as well as the latter, becauſe of that *Attribution* or Judgment which is here made to follow upon Animadverſion or Perception. So then their ſimple Apprehenſion has or ſhould have the ſame latitude with our Perception, which whether of ſingle Ideas, or of their Relations is always ſimple as to the Act, tho' as to the Object, as was ſaid before, it be partly ſimple and partly complex.

4. This complex Thought, or Perception of the relations of Ideas, which we may otherwiſe call the perception of *Truth*, is as, I conceive, that very Thing which we term *Knowledge*, by which in the general Notion of it, I can underſtand nothing elſe but the Perception of *Truth*, or of thoſe Ideal Relations, wherein Truth conſiſts, which whoever is Maſter of in any Thing will, I preſume, be allow'd to want no further Qualification to intitle him to a juſt Knowledge of that Thing. As in Geometry, ſuppoſe he that only *Perceives* the Truth of ſuch a Propoſition, muſt needs be allow'd to know that Propoſition to be true, and

all

all the Demonſtration in the World, will not make him know it better. There is then no need of an *evident Aſſent*, nor can Knowledge without great confuſion as well as falſhood, be ſaid to conſiſt in it. For beſides that Knowledge is preſuppoſed to aſſent as the ground and reaſon of it, and therefore is eſſentially complete without it, and conſequently cannot poſſibly owe its metaphyſical Form to it; 'tis further conſiderable, that an *evident Aſſent*, is in the reſolution of it, no other than an aſſent to what is evident to us, that is, again an aſſent to what we perceive or know. Which plainly includes two acts, and that of two diſtinct Faculties, perceiving or knowing belonging to the Underſtanding, and aſſenting belonging to the Will. And therefore unleſs two acts could be one, or an act that belongs to one faculty could formally conſtitute an act that belongs to another, it is impoſſible that Knowledge ſhould conſiſt in an *evident Aſſent*, wherefore we conclude that it does not, but in the *perception* only which we have of Truth; only there will be a diverſity in our Knowledge, according as the manner of this Perception is.

5. Perception then is either immediate or mediate. *Immediate*, as when we perceive the relations between Ideas (that is, that they agree, or diſagree) by the very Ideas themſelves whoſe relations they are, without the help or *mediation* of any other. As when we per-

perceive the line A, ſuppoſe, to be equal to the line B, only by comparing theſe two lines with themſelves. Or elſe *mediate*, as when we perceive how they are related to each other by comparing them both to a third. Which we are ſometimes forc'd to do, becauſe we cannot always compare or ſet together any two Ideas, ſo as to perceive whether they agree or diſagree by their immediate collation. For A perhaps may be an *inacceſſible Line*, to which no immediate approach is to be made. And then if we would know whether A be equal to B, we muſt do it by their being both equal to C, or in other Words, by A's being equal to that which is equal to B, that is, to C. The method of which perception is formally this, C is equal to B, A is equal to C, therefore A is equal to B. In which Proceſs 'tis plain that the line A is perceiv'd to be equal to B, not immediately, but by the mediation of C, which therefore is as a common meaſure between A and B.

6. This diſtinction of Perception will give us occaſion to remark a like difference in *Knowledge*, which conſiſting as was ſhewn in Perception, muſt needs be either immediate or mediate as the other is. For indeed whatever we know, we may be ſaid to know it either as a *Principle*, or as a *Concluſion*. As a Principle that has an internal Evidence, and ſhines as we ſay by its own light, and ſo needs no Illuſtration from without; or as a concluſion, which being not evident of it ſelf, muſt be render'd

ſo by the help of an external Light let in upon it. Not that there is perhaps always a difference between a Principle and a Concluſion in the nature of the things themſelves, taking Concluſion *materially* for the Propoſition concluded (for that which is a Concluſion to us may perhaps be a Principle to a ſuperior Underſtanding) but only in relation to us, according to the immediateneſs or mediateneſs of our Conception, who call thoſe Truths *Principles* which we diſcern to be ſo by the immediate Collation of their Ideas, that is, thoſe Ideas whereof the Truth or Propoſition conſiſts, that which the Schools call *Subject* and *Prædicate*; and thoſe *Concluſions*, which we know or perceive, not by their own Ideas, but by the mediation of ſome other Idea that is not contain'd in the Propoſition. For which reaſon, by the way, it is, that that other Idea, call'd by the Schools the *middle Term*, becauſe of its uniting the Extremes, or ſerving to ſhew their Agreement, ought never to enter into the Concluſion.

7. Immediate Knowledge, or Knowledge of the Principle we may call *Intuitive*, becauſe the Mind then in one and the ſame view that it perceives the Ideas, perceives alſo their Relations. Mediate Knowledge, or Knowledge of the Concluſion we may contradiſtinguiſh to the other by the Name of *Demonſtrative* or Diſcourſive, becauſe in this latter knowledge the Mind perceives the Relations of Ideas not in that view which it has of the Ideas, themſelves, but in

in the view of ſome other Idea applied as a common Meaſure to both. The difference between which two ways of knowing the Relations of Ideas, I cannot more briefly and ſenſibly illuſtrate than by *Lines*, which we find to be equal, either by comparing them with themſelves, or, in caſe one of them be inacceſſible to the other, with a *Third*, by their agreement to which it appears that they agree among themſelves. According to that well known Rule, *Que conveniunt eidem tertio, conveniunt inter ſe.* Which Rule ſeems to have the clearneſs of a Principle, tho' that which is known by it to be conſider'd as a concluſion, and may ſerve to let us ſee that all Demonſtration reſolves at laſt into Intuition.

8. This Diſcourſive or Demonſtrative Knowledge is that which the Schools have been pleaſed to ſignalize and dignify with the Name of *Science*, which they peculiarly apply to that knowledge which is acquired by Demonſtration, according to that ſaying of theirs, *Demonſtration begets Science*, which accordingly is conſider'd as the effect of it. And indeed it is ſo, and for that reaſon demonſtrative Knowledge is truly and properly Science. But why it ſhould be call'd *Emphatically* by that Name, and the word *Science* appropriated to it, is not very obvious to my Underſtanding. For Science is but the *Latin* word for Knowledge, and Knowledge in the formality of it, can mean only the Perception of Truth, or of thoſe Relations of agree-

ment or disagreement that are between Ideas, which whoever clearly and rightly perceives, is truly said to *know*. But that this be done mediately or immediately seems not to be of the general reason of Knowledge, but to belong rather to the difference and distinction of it, as that which divides the Genus, and constitutes the Species that are under it. If then there be a Perception of Truth, whether it be mediate or immediate, whether it be perceiv'd as a Conclusion or as a Principle, whether in the Intuitive, or in the Discoursive way, there is Science or Knowledge. Intuition then is as truly Science, as that which is acquired by Demonstration, and what I know as a Principle without any labour or formality of Proofs, I know as properly and as well as the best demonstrated Conclusion. Indeed I know it better, as seeing it in a more clear, because more immediate Light. For which reason let a conclusion be never so well demonstrated, it never shines with the Brightness of a Principle. As indeed 'tis impossible it should, since its Evidence is derived from it, and does at length resolve into it. Besides when all's done, that Demonstrative Knowledge, which the Schools have honour'd with the Name of *Science*, notwithstanding the great Things that are said of it, and the ambitious pretences that are every where made to it, will at length appear to be an imperfect kind of Knowledge, and to be founded upon the imperfection of our Understandings,

ings, which by reaſon of their narrow capacity not being always able to perceive the Relations of Ideas by themſelves, are forced to have recourſe to ſome other common Meaſure, as a weak or dim Eye is fain to uſe the aſſiſtance of a *Glaſs*, which tho' a great help to the Eye, is yet no great Commendation of its Sight. And accordingly the Schools themſelves have thought fit to remove this diſcourſive kind of Knowledge, as an Imperfection from the more perfect Beings, as well as from him that is abſolutely ſo, and in lieu of it to ſubſtitute (as better becoming the dignity of their Natures) that which is *Intuitive*, which by this they ſeem to ſuppoſe to be, what indeed it is, the moſt perfect and excellent way of Knowing, as aſcribing it to *God* and *Angels*. But then why a particular Species, and that too the leaſt perfect, ſhould carry away the Name of the whole kind, as if it were the only Knowledge, or at leaſt the more excellent of the two, when indeed it is neither, I leave to the conſideration of the Men of Art, as a thing that ſeems to want a better Account than I can preſently give of it.

9. The Sum is, Knowledge conſiſts in the ſole view and perception of Truth, and the clearer that view is, ſtill the more perfect is the Knowledge. And conſequently if any Knowledge ſhould be call'd by way of Eminence by the Name of *Science*, methinks it ought to have been that of *Intuition*. But to prevent Confu-

ſion and Miſtake, perhaps 'twere better if the School would conſent to have them both enjoy the Name of Science in common, and to be diſtinguiſh'd from each other by the mediateneſs or immediateneſs of it. It being moſt reaſonable that things ſhould be diſtinguiſh'd by that wherein they differ, and not by that wherein they agree. As indeed they both do in this. For whether mediate or immediate 'tis all Knowledge whatever we clearly perceive, the mediateneſs or immediateneſs not belonging to the Eſſence, but to the ſpecification and diſtinction of it. 'Tis true indeed all Knowledge muſt be immediate or mediate *indeterminately*, ſo that whatever a Man knows, he muſt know in the one or the other of theſe two ways; but that it ſhould be *determinately* one or the other ſeems no way neceſſary, the Notion of Knowledge being fully completed in the perception of Truth, always provided that it be a *clear* and *diſtinct* perception; which gives us occaſion to enter upon another Conſideration of Thought, that will open to us the next Section.

SECT. VI.

Of clear and confuſe Thought, with ſome incidental Strictures upon the Criterium of Truth.

1. CLearneſs of Thought, tho' not in ſuch popular Eſtimation as ſome other things, becauſe of the exceeding fewneſs of them that are

are either *Maſters* or *Judges* of it, and ſo not ſo well anſwering the ends of thoſe liberal Students who court Popularity more than Truth, is yet certainly the greateſt Excellency and Perfection of the Underſtanding. For the greateſt Perfection of any Faculty muſt be to operate in the moſt perfect manner, as that Sight is moſt perfect that ſees beſt. And the moſt perfect manner of Underſtanding muſt be to have the moſt clear conception of things, as again, that Sight ſees beſt that ſees moſt clearly. For the clearer the Perception is, ſtill the more there is of Perception, and conſequently of Knowledge, that conſiſting, as was ſhewn, in the Perception of Truth.

2. The goods of the Mind are of all others the moſt unduly valued. Intellectual Accompliſhments are generally ſet at a higher rate than Moral, and of Intellectual thoſe that conſiſt in the Extenſiveneſs of Thought carry it in the publick Vogue before thoſe that conſiſt in the Intenſiveneſs of it. To have an inſight into a great deal, tho' but confuſe and ſuperficial (ſo fond are Men even of the ſhadow of Univerſal Knowledge) is reckon'd a great Atchievement by ſome, and for that reaſon as ambitiouſly affected by others, who are for skimming over the Surfaces of a great many things, without going to the bottom of any thing, like thoſe who prefer a general Acquaintance before an intimate Friendſhip. But would theſe Men think it a Commendation of their Eye-ſight to

ſee a great many thinks confuſely, *Men as Trees walking*, or to ſee a few things diſtinctly and well? But Number makes a Shew and a Noiſe, and for this Reaſon Wit, Fancy, Memory, Strength of Imagination, Richneſs of Invention, Fluency of Expreſſion, great Reading, Languages, *&c.* are cry'd up and admir'd. And yet when a Man has follow'd the publick Cry never ſo long, and improved and cultivated theſe Talents never ſo much, he underſtands after all juſt ſo much as he clearly perceives, and no more, and one Science throughly underſtood is worth a thouſand half-views and ſuperficial glimpſes of things, fit only to amuſe others, and to puff up one's ſelf with the empty ſwellings of imaginary Indowments with a clearneſs of Thought would ſoon diſperſe, as diſcovering to us, among other things, our own *Ignorance*. For which reaſon alone, next to the Divine Grace, and a Heart inwardly ſanctify'd and rightly diſpoſed by it to God and Goodneſs, I ſhould think the greateſt Bleſſing that Heaven can here beſtow upon any Man, is a clear Underſtanding.

Princip. Philoſ. Page. 12.

3. M. *Deſcartes* makes a difference between *clear* and *diſtinct*, and that very fine and ſubtile, tho' I think in one part of it more ſubtile than juſt. He calls that a clear Perception, which is preſent and open to the Mind attending to it, even as we ſay, we ſee thoſe things clearly, which being preſent to the Eye, ſtrike it with a ſtrong impreſſion.

preſſion. He calls that Diſtinct, which being clear, is withal ſo ſever'd and disjoyn'd from all others, that it contains nothing in it but what is clear. And ſo much of his Account may perhaps have a right to our Allowance. But then to confirm this, he inſtances in *Pain*, the Perception of which he ſays is very clear, but not always diſtinct, becauſe generally confounded with that obſure Judgment which Men have of its Nature, thinking there is ſomething in the Part affected like the ſenſe of Pain, the only thing that is clearly perceived. Whence he concludes that there may be a clear Perception that is not diſtinct, tho' there can be no diſtinct Perception but what is alſo clear.

4. Now I confeſs indeed there may be ſome Confuſion in the Caſe, not that the very ſenſe of Pain it ſelf is *Confounded* with any thing, but that the Senſe or Perception of Pain is *accompanied* with a Judgment, that this Pain is in a bodily Part, whereas it is truly in the Soul only, becauſe Matter can have no Thought or Perception; ſo that the Confuſion properly lies, not in the ſenſe of Pain, which I *diſtinctly* feel, and can eaſily diſtinguiſh from all other Sentiments, but in the *Judgment* which naturally follows upon it, whereby I confound that real Pain which I have in my Soul, with a certain imaginary Pain which I think I have in a certain part of my Body, or rather whereby I confound Body and Spirit; attributing that to the former, which is a real modification of the latter, and ſo by conſequence, making my Body to be indeed Spirit. But then 'tis to be conſider'd, that the Perception or Sentment of Pain is one thing, and the Judgment as to its being in ſuch a particular part of the Body, is another thing. Now that which is here confuſe, or not diſtinct, is not the Sentiment, but the Judgment. And that which is clear, is not the Judgment, but the Sentiment. That then which is Clear and that which is Confuſe, or not Diſtinct, are plainly too different Things; were the ſame thing

clear

clear and not distinct, this indeed would well prove a difference between Clear and Distinct, because if there were none, then for a thing to be Clear and not Distinct, would be all one as to be Clear and not Clear, which is impossible: But if that which is Clear be one thing, and that which is not Distinct be another thing, this proves no difference between Clear and Distinct, because 'tis no repugnance for *different* things to be at once Clear and not Clear. Now this is the case. 'Tis the Judgment only that is here Confuse, or not Distinct. As for the Sentiment that is Clear, and as Clear, 'tis also Distinct; but the Judgment which is not Distinct, is also not Clear. That then which is Clear is also Distinct so far as it is Clear, tho' it may be Confuse in another respect, or rather tho' something else may be joyned with it that is Confuse. And consequently this Argument, from the instance of Pain, does not prove that there is any difference between Clear and Distinct.

5. But however we may allow a *formal* difference between them, tho' the Argument do not prove so much. A thing being said to be clear in regard of the fulness of Light, wherein it is viewed in itself, and distinct in regard of the separation wherein it stands as to other things. So that clearness seems more directly opposed to Obscurity and Distinctness, to Confusion or Mixture of one thing with another. But yet still as to the *Reality* of the thing, that which is Clear, will, I believe, be found to be also Distinct. For since every thing differs from another thing by what it is in itself, by the very same Conception whereby I conceive a thing as it is in itself, I must needs discern it from what is not itself. That then which is Clear is Distinct as well as Clear. Nor does the fore-alledged Instance prove any thing to the contrary, the supposed Confusion being not in the sense of Pain, but in that Judgment which is naturally consequent upon it. There is a twofold Clearness; a

Clearness

Clearneſs of Thought, and a Clearneſs of Expreſſion. That Thought is clear, or then I think clearly, when the Object of my Thought is clear to me, the Idea when 'tis ſimple, and the Relations of Ideas when 'tis complex Thought, and then the Object of my Thought is clear to me, not when I think upon a *determin'd* or *determinate* Object, whether Ideas or their Relations (for 'tis impoſſible but that I muſt think upon a *determin'd* Object, that is, ſuch certain Ideas, or ſuch certain Relations, if I think at all) but when I have that *determin'd* Object in a full and perfect view. For as we are then ſaid to ſee ſuch a thing clearly or diſtinctly, when we ſee it in a full Light, ſo as to diſcern every Part of it, together with the Figure, Order and Situation of thoſe Parts; ſo we may be then ſaid to think clearly, when we perceive plainly, perfectly and fully thoſe Ideas, or thoſe Relations of Ideas which are the Objects of our Thought. So that to *apprehend* clearly, will be the ſame as to *comprehend*, if not the whole Object which our Thought is employed about, yet at leaſt ſo much of it, and ſo far, as we are ſaid clearly to apprehend. For once more to illuſtrate this by Viſion, which carries the greateſt Proportion of any thing that I know of to Thought. When I look upon the *Moon*, and ſee only an Orb guilded with Light, with ſome little variety of Features and Signatures, which by reaſon of ſome fantaſtick reſemblance of the appearance, I am apt to compare to thoſe of a *Human Face*, then I may be ſaid to have but a confuſe and indiſtinct view of that Planet. But when renewing my Proſpect with the aſſiſtance of a *Teleſcope*, I ſhall deſcry (ſuppoſe) Rocks and Hills, and Vallies, and Plains, and Seas, and Woods, or any other Marks and Characters of an habitable World, you will then ſay that I have a more clear view of it. And the more Diſcoveries I ſhall make ſtill the clearer my View will be. And were my Glaſs ſo good as to help me to ſurvey it minutely in all the

Parts

Parts of it, as I do the Table or Desk upon which I write, you will then, I ſuppoſe, allow that I ſee it *clearly*. The Application of this to Thought, and the intelligible Object of it, is very obvious; only I ſhall here further remark, That whatſoever I conceive or apprehend thus *clearly*, I do alſo apprehend *diſtinctly*; between which I can perceive no difference, unleſs it be this, that *clearly* relates to the Object of my Thought, as it is in itſelf, and *diſtinctly* to the ſame Object of Thought as it differs from other things. Which ſeems rather a diverſity of Conſideration than of the thing, ſince one thing differs from another only by what it is in itſelf, and by the ſame real Act whereby I diſcern a thing as it is in itſelf, I alſo diſcern it from any thing elſe. Even as by the ſame Act of Thought whereby I perceive a Circle, I diſcern it from every Figure that is not a Circle, ſo that if I underſtand a Circle clearly, I do alſo underſtand it diſtinctly. The Sum then is, That tho' there may be a formal difference between Clear and Diſtinct, grounded upon the abſolute or relative Conſideration of things, whereby Clear may reſpect the ſtate of the Object as in itſelf, and ſo may be oppoſed to what we call Obſcure, and Diſtinct may reſpect the ſame thing as it is ſeparate from other things, and ſo may be oppoſed to what we call Confuſe; yet there is not that difference between them, but that in the thing they are, if not the ſame, yet at leaſt always inſeparable: So that there will be no clear Perception but what is alſo Diſtinct as well as Clear, contrary to what *Deſcartes* pretends.

6. So much for Clearneſs of Thought. Now for that which is the Conſequence of it, Clearneſs of Expreſſion, the greateſt Perfection of Diſcourſe, as the other is of Thought. And here indeed that *Determinateneſs* will come in which a * certain Author ſpeaks of, and would ſubſtitute in the room of Clear and Diſtinct as a more in-

lightning

* See the Epiſtle to the Reader prefix'd to the fourth Edition of the Eſſay of *Humane Underſtanding*.

inlightning Term; tho' I think it will be found not to be the formal Reaſon of this clearneſs, but rather the Cauſe of it. Clearneſs of Expreſſion ſeems to import nothing ſo properly as the *Intelligibility* of it, or its aptneſs to be underſtood; for as a Glaſs is then ſaid to be clear, when we can ſee well through it thoſe Objects which lie beyond it, ſo Diſcourſe is then clear (for the Expreſſion ſeems to be Metaphorical) when we may eaſily and commodiouſly ſee through it as I may ſay, that is, take or apprehend it, either as to the meaning of him that ſpeaks, or as to the Thing which is ſpoken. For it is here worthy of remark, that Clearneſs of Expreſſion may admit of a double Reſpect, one as to the Thought or Meaning of the Speaker, and another as to the Thing it ſelf, or Matter whereof he diſcourſes. Then is Expreſſion clear as to the former, when it has an aptneſs to diſcover the *meaning* of him that uſes it, and then as to the latter, when it has an aptneſs to explain the *Thing* meant, or to render it intelligible as far as the Nature of it will admit. I ſay, as far as the Nature of it will admit; for it may ſometimes happen that I may know well enough what a Man means, when I do not ſo well underſtand the Things themſelves which are the Matter of his Diſcourſe; not through any defect in the Expreſſion, but by reaſon of the great nicety and abſtractedneſs of their Natures. And yet however let the Subject-Matter of a Man's Diſcourſe be what it will

will for eaſineſs or difficulty of Comprehenſion, then I think he may be ſaid to ſpeak or write clearly, when by the manner of his Expreſſion 'tis plain what he means, and when alſo the Thing it ſelf is ſet in a fair Light, and render'd as intelligible as the Nature of it will bear; and if it be not actually underſtood, 'tis not for want of due advantagiouſneſs in the Expreſſion, but meerly through the intrinſick Nature of the Thing whoſe proper difficulty would not admit of a clearer Repreſentation, and which 'tis not to be expected that the Speaker or Writer ſhould be able to alter, who has no Power over the Nature of intelligible Objects, tho' the difference of the Light or View wherein he places them may fall under his choice and diſpoſal.

7. For I think we ought to diſtinguiſh between the Obſcurity that ariſes from the Nature of the Thing, and that which ariſes from the manner of the Expreſſion, as alſo between the clearneſs that is from the Thing, and that which is from the Expreſſion. Sometimes the Expreſſion is dark, and the Thing clear. Sometimes the Thing dark, and the Expreſſion clear. And as ſome are thought to write clearly merely through the eaſineſs and obviouſneſs of their Matter, tho' they expreſs themſelves never ſo obſcurely, ſo 'tis the unhappy Lot of ſome to be thought to write obſcurely merely becauſe of the niceneſs of their Matter, tho' they expreſs themſelves never ſo clearly. But this

is

is unfair; for tho' the Thing, after all that is ſaid of it, continue obſcure, yet if the obſcurity does not proceed from the way of expreſſing it, but purely from the Nature of the Thing diſcours'd of, the Expreſſion may notwithſtanding be ſufficiently *clear*. From which all that can juſtly and reaſonably be expected is, that the Meaning of him that ſpeaks be repreſented plainly and intelligibly; and the Thing it ſelf as plainly and intelligibly as a Thing of that Nature may well be. From whence we may gather that a Thing's being hard to be underſtood, is not always an Argument of want of clearneſs in the Expreſſion (ſince that may proceed from other Cauſes, and 'tis not poſſible with all the clearneſs of Expreſſion in the World that a metaphyſical Diſſertation ſhould be made as intelligible as an Hiſtorical Narrative, or a piece of Practical Morality) but indeed if there be any reaſonable difficulty about a Man's *Meaning*, that ſeems to be a good Preſumption that his Expreſſion has not all that clearneſs which it ſhould have, nor perhaps his *Thought* neither; and I believe generally ſpeaking, when upon competent Conſideration, we do not in this reſpect underſtand others, there may be great reaſon to queſtion whether they do well underſtand themſelves.

8. The clearneſs of Expreſſion is then the intelligibility of it, in each of the reſpects beforemention'd. But now that which ſerves to make

make it thus intelligible, is indeed the *Determinateneſs* of it, when words are always uſed in a certain determinate ſenſe, that is, when they are uſed as ſigns of the ſame determinate Ideas. As Expreſſion is formally clear by its Intelligibility, ſo that which makes it effectively ſo is the Determinateneſs of it, becauſe then it may be clearly known what Ideas ſuch words do ſtand for, and conſequently what is meant or intended by them; which cannot ſo well be when words are uſed looſely and indetermin'dly, ſometimes in one ſenſe and ſometimes in another, which, like the *Trumpet that gives an uncertain ſound*, will occaſion great Confuſion in the Minds of the Hearers, and oftentimes of the Speakers too. For the prevention of which, the moſt effectual Remedy perhaps would be that which is uſed by *Geometricians*, in predefining the Signification of thoſe Terms which they employ in their ſucceeding Demonſtrations, which then proceed with all clearneſs, as having no Obſcurity but what ariſes from the abſtractedneſs of their Matter. But thoſe who think this Method a little too formal (as perhaps it may in the ordinary way of ſpeaking or writing) always to define their Terms, ſhould however if they would either underſtand themſelves, or be underſtood by others, think themſelves obliged to be the more ſtrict and uniform in the uſe of them. By which means they will cut off all occaſion, or at leaſt *give* none, for any verbal Contention. And when all

all that difficulty and diſpute is removed which ariſes from the uſe of words, there will but little remain in the Nature of Things, which will not bear long diſpute, when we are once agreed about the Terms that expreſs them.

9. As, to ſpecify and illuſtrate this by an inſtance; ſuppoſe the Queſtion were put, Whether Fire be Hot? So long as the ſenſe of the word (Hot) remains indeterminate, this will always be a Queſtion, and Men will divide upon it. *A.* will ſay that it is Hot, and *B.* will ſay that it is not Hot, tho' perhaps without oppoſing one another any further than by a verbal Contradiction, as meaning it in different reſpects. However, this ſhew of Contradiction will be enough to keep up a *Wrangle*, and while the Queſtion continues thus *unſtated*, it will be impoſſible to accommodate it. But 'tis but to define the ſenſe of the Term *Hot*, and the Diſpute will quickly be at an end. For if by *Hot* be meant that inward Feeling or Sentiment which we are conſcious of, when we approach the Fire; then 'tis plain that Fire is not Hot, becauſe Matter cannot think, nor in that ſenſe perhaps did *A.* contend that it was. But if by Fire's being Hot, be meant that there is ſomething in the figuration and motion of its Parts that occaſions the Sentiment of Heat in us when we approach it, then 'tis plain by experience that it is Hot, nor perhaps in this ſenſe did *B.* contend that it was not; or to come a little nearer to the Matter, we were but now

conſidering, ſuppoſe the Queſtion were, whether the *Determinateneſs* of Expreſſion be the thing that makes it clear? While the Term *(Makes)* retains its ambiguity, and carries an uncertain meaning, this will be diſputable, and one will ſay it does, and another will ſay it does not, according to the different Ideas which they apply to that *Term*. But the definition of that would have prevented any diſpute, and when interpoſed will quickly end it. For if *Makes* be meant *formally*, as if Determinateneſs were the formal Reaſon of Clearneſs, or that wherein the Eſſence of it does conſiſt; 'tis plain that in this ſenſe Determinateneſs does not make clearneſs, but that it conſiſts in the Intelligibility of Expreſſion. But if the Term *Makes* be taken *effectively*, as that which cauſes or produces, in this ſenſe indeed the Determinateneſs of Expreſſion does *make* it clear, and that becauſe it ſerves to make it intelligible, which is the formal Reaſon of clearneſs. By which it may appear how the uncertain and unſteady Application of Terms to Ideas darkens the Nature of Things, as well as our Diſcourſes about them, and of what conſequence it is for the *unclouding* of both, to obſerve a definitive ſtrictneſs in the uſe of our Words.

10. Happy indeed were it if we could think, and commmunicate our Thoughts without them, as Angels are ſaid to do, either by ordering their Conceptions by their bare Will, ſo

ſo as to be manifeſt to the Intuition of another, according to *Aquinas*, or as the Rival School of * *Scotus* will have it, by impreſſing upon the Mind of another Angel, a Conception that is like unto their own. That Angels do ſpeak, there can be no reaſonable doubt, as that ſignifies at large their having a way to reveal their Thoughts; and accordingly the Apoſtle who had been in the third Heaven, tells us of the *Tongues of Men and of Angels*. And 'tis moſt probable that they do it, not by ſenſible Signs, but after ſome ſuch intellectual manner as the Schools ſuppoſe. And perhaps when we come to be like Angels, we may be able to do ſo too; for who knows what may be the Privilege of a Reſurrection-Body join'd to a beatified and glorified Soul; and whether that of the Apoſtle may not be even literally verify'd, *Tongues ſhall ceaſe?* Whether we ſhall not then all ſpeak the Tongue of Angels only, converſe intellectually, darting pure and immediate Thoughts into each other without the *Vehicle* of Words? And what a happineſs and advantage would it be if we could do ſo now! what a calm, quiet, and ſerene way of converſing would this be, and how clearly and intelligibly, and withal with what expedition would it expreſs our Minds! other's Thoughts would then be as clear to us as our own, and ours again would ſhine out to *them*

* *Dico quod Angelus loquitur Angelo cauſando in eo conceptum immediate illius Objecti de quo loquitur.* Lib. 2. Diſtinct. 9. Q. 2.

with as unqueſtionable a brightneſs. And how ſecure then ſhould we be of each other's Meanings, and that we rightly took one another's Thoughts? How free from Miſunderſtandings, and thoſe infinite *Chicanes*, and wrangling Diſputes which ariſe from the equivocation of words, whereby we darken Knowledge, and impoſe both upon our ſelves and others? But this Angelical Converſation is too ſublime for Mortality. As our Souls are incarnate, ſo muſt our Thoughts too, as not being diſcernable in this thick Region, till we cloath them with words, or with ſome other ſenſible ſign. We have not at preſent (whatever we may have hereafter) any other way of communicating our Thoughts; and ſince it tends ſo much to the pleaſure and real advantage of Life to have them communicated, we have reaſon to thank Nature for giving us the Power of Speech, that is of *articulating* Sounds, which of all ſenſible Signs is the readieſt and moſt expedite Method of expreſſing to others what we would have them know of our Minds. But then if we would have them know it indeed, and not amuſe inſtead of informing, we ſhould take care (at leaſt while we are in the ſearch or diſcovery of Truth, if not in common Converſation) to ſpeak ſo as to be rightly underſtood, and accordingly to join the ſame word always with the ſame Idea, that ſo if poſſible, there may be as little queſtion about the Senſe which we think, as there is about the Words which

we

we pronounce or write. And if once the ſenſe of what we ſay be *clear*, it will be eaſy to an attentive Mind to diſcern if it be *true*.

11. This gives me occaſion to ſay ſomething of *diſtinction*, which is the expedient that *others* have to clear our meaning, as the determinate uſe of Words was obſerv'd to be our *own*. For if we will not prevent Ambiguity by the ſtrictneſs of our expreſſion, the only remedy that others have, is to remove it by *diſtinction*. All diſtinction ſuppoſes ambiguity, and if there were no ambiguity, there would be no occaſion for diſtinction. But as Men generally ſpeak and write, there is but too much neceſſity for it. For as there are a great many ſeemingly plain Queſtions, which a Man cannot anſwer to till their meaning be diſtinguiſh'd, ſo there are a great many Propoſitions which tho' ſeemingly determinate enough, have yet more Senſes than one, and are true or falſe, according as the Senſe is wherein they are taken, and it muſt be diſtinction that muſt point out what that Senſe is, and till that be done there is no affirming or denying them; which ſhews diſtinction to be a conſiderable part of Logick, and to be of great uſe and neceſſity in all argument, or diſputation. As for inſtance, ſuppoſe any one ſhould advance this Poſition, that *Moral good is willing natural good*, this looks like a plain aſſertion, and would perhaps paſs for ſuch among moſt People, to whom it ſhould be propoſed. But if we attend to it, we ſhall find

that it is of too looſe and indetermin'd a Senſe, as it ſtands, to be either determinately true or falſe, and that to judge rightly of it, we muſt diſtinguiſh both the parts of it, *viz.* Natural Good, and Moral Good.

Natural Good is either Formal, or Effective; either Happineſs, or the means of Happineſs. Now I think Moral Good is not willing Natural Good formal, but effective, that is, not Happineſs, but that which naturally cauſes it.

Then again as to *Moral Good*, that is to be unſtood, either materially, for the Thing or Action ſaid to be morally Good, as 'tis the proper ſubject for a Law, and fit to be commanded: Or formally, as it is a certain habit in the Agent, diſpoſing him to ſuch an action, and ſo denominating him good or vertuous. The former you may call if you pleaſe Moral Good objective, and the latter Moral Good ſubjective.

Now if we ſpeak of Moral Good in the firſt Senſe, then Moral Good is not *willing* Natural Good, but is rather that action which naturally cauſes natural Good or Happineſs.

But if we ſpeak of moral Good in the ſecond Senſe, as it denotes a moral Habit in the Agent, then indeed and then only, moral Good is willing natural Good, that being the thing that makes a Man good or vertuous, or wherein his vertue formally conſiſts, to Will the doing of ſuch Actions as have a neceſſary connexion with his Happineſs, or a natural tendency to procure it, which is willing natural Good in the

ſecond

ſecond Senſe of natural Good, as it ſignifies the good of the means, and not of the end. For whoever was thought vertuous for deſiring to be Happy. So that in ſhort, the right State of the Propoſition is this, that moral Good ſubjective, is willing natural Good effective. And thus diſtinguiſhing (and not otherwiſe) it is very clear, and very true, that moral Good is willing natural Good.

12. But to return once more to clearneſs of Thought, or Perception, into this I think muſt be reſolv'd that *Criterium* of *Truth*, ſo much talk'd of both by the old and new Philoſophers; which we may diſtinguiſh two ways, as Underſtanding by it, either the Power or Faculty *by* which, or the Rule or Meaſure *according* to which Truth is diſcern'd. The former we may call *Criterium per quod*, and the latter *Criterium ſecundum quod*. The Criterium by *which* is no other than our Reaſon or Underſtanding, which is the only Faculty which we have in us both for the perceiving Truth, and the diſcerning what is True or Falſe, our *Senſes* being no further concern'd, than only to ſerve for the deriving certain Impreſſions of other Bodies upon our Bodies, and thereby for the awakening certain Ideas in our Minds, which it may be we ſhould not have had without thoſe Impreſſions. The Criterium, *according to which*, is that very clear and diſtinct Perception which we have been diſcourſing of. But when we ſay that clear and diſtinct Thought is the *Criterium* of

Truth, our meaning is, that it is the rule or meaſure whereby Truth is to be known and judged of; not in this Senſe that whatever is true, we do clearly perceive, and conſequently that whatever we do not clearly perceive, we may therefore conclude not to be True (for as we have elſewhere ſhewn at large, human Reaſon is not in this extent the Meaſure of Truth, there being a great many Natural, as well as Divine Truths that tranſcend the reach of our Comprehenſion) but in this Senſe, that we may ſafely conclude all that to be true, whereof we have a clear and diſtinct Perception. That is, in ſhort, tho' all that is True is not clearly perceiv'd by us, yet all that is clearly perceiv'd by us is neceſſarily true.

13. 'Tis ſuppoſed here, and I think very reaſonably, that there muſt be ſome Meaſure, or Criterium of Truth. And indeed the ſeveral excellent Laws and Methods which rational and contemplative Men have left us, for our direction in the ſearch of Truth, would loſe much of their uſefulneſs and ſatisfaction, if we have no Mark whereby to diſcern when we have found it. But now that humane Reaſon cannot be the meaſure of Truth in the firſt Senſe, is plain from the infiniteneſs of Truth, and the limitation of our intellectual Capacities. And yet that it muſt be ſo in the ſecond Senſe, will upon a little conſideration of the Matter appear neceſſary to be granted. For firſt, whatever we clearly perceive, we perceive it as

as it is, for if we perceive it otherwiſe than it is, then we do not clearly perceive it. But if we perceive it as it is, then 'tis plain that it is as we perceive it; and if it is as we perceive it, then I ſee nothing further wanting to make it true, and conſequently whatever we clearly perceive is true. And indeed it ſeems a contradiction that it ſhould be otherwiſe, as reſolving into this, That our Perception of a Thing, is at once clear and not clear.

14. But beſides, what we clearly perceive we may and muſt aſſent to, and judge to be true, as having no Power to doubt of it, or ſo much as to ſuſpend our aſſent. And when we do aſſent to it, it cannot be denied but that we uſe our judging faculty rightly, and as we ought. And indeed we never uſe it rightly, but then however we may accidentally happen to be *in* the *Right*. But then if what we clearly perceive may not be true, then we may err in the right uſe of our Judgment, which is manifeſtly abſurd. Nay we *muſt* err, and are under a *neceſſity* of being deceiv'd, and that while we make a due and proper uſe of our faculties, which is yet more abſurd. Beſides, whether this will not intitle the Author of our Natures to our errors, as ſuppoſing him to have given us ſuch fallacious faculties as lead us into error, even in the right uſe of them, and ſo without any poſſibility of avoiding it. For the moſt that can be done by *us*, for the preventing our falling into error, is to hold our Judgment

ments in ſuch a ſuſpenſe, as not to give our aſſent, but when we cannot ſuſpend it any longer, that is, to what we clearly and diſtinctly perceive. But if we may ſtill be miſtaken even then, there will be no poſſibility of avoiding it. And it is not ſuppoſable that the wiſe and good Author of our Beings, ſhould give us ſuch Faculties as will neceſſarily deceive us, and decoy us into errors, and that whether we uſe them right or wrong.

15. We may then conclude, that whatever we clearly and diſtinctly perceive is true, and that as long as we have Light before us, and aſſent to nothing but what we have a clear view and perception of, 'tis impoſſible we ſhould err, or judge amiſs. And conſequently that we may then judge ſecurely, and ſafely acquieſce and repoſe our ſelves in ſuch Judgments, as true and certain, and as it were the undeceiving anſwers of Truth it ſelf, even that interior Truth, whoſe *School* and *Oracle* is within our Breaſt, whoſe Inſtructions are faithful and unerring, and who ſeldom fails to anſwer us by them if we conſult her aright. And indeed after all, we have no other reaſon to think any Propoſition true in any of the Sciences, but only becauſe we clearly perceive that it is ſo, and it ſhines out upon our Minds with an unqueſtionable and irreſiſtable Light, and if that Reaſon be not a good one, then we are not ſure of our knowing any Thing, but muſt quit all pretences to Science, and after the

Efforts

Efforts of Contemplation ſink down into a *ſceptical* uncertainty. But if this Suppoſition be too abſurd to be granted (as all Philoſophy and Religion too is concern'd to maintain) then we muſt ſay, that whatever we clearly perceive is undoubtedly ſo as we perceive it. Evidence then is the Mark and diſtinguiſhing Character of Truth, ſhe dwells in Light, and we may know her *Divinity* among a thouſand probable Appearances, by the *Glory* that ſurrounds her.

16. From this Doctrine me may gather two very important Inferences, with reſpect to Divine Revelation, and that Entertainment which is due to things *above* Reaſon, and things *contrary* to Reaſon. For hence it will follow, firſt, that we ought not to reject any thing as incredible meerly for its being above our Reaſon, ſince tho' whatever we clearly perceive is true, yet whatever is true we do not clearly perceive, and conſequently cannot juſtly conclude from our not having a clear Comprehenſion of a thing that therefore it is not true. Secondly, That we may and ought to reject whatever is plainly contrary to our Reaſon, tho' the Authority it pretends to be never ſo great. Since tho' we do not perceive all that is true, and ſo cannot rightly argue from our inability to perceive a thing to the falſhood of it, yet 'tis moſt certain that all is true which we do clearly perceive, and ſo if we clearly perceive that ſuch a thing cannot be

(which

(which is that we mean by *contrary* to Reaſon) we may ſafely conclude that it cannot be. And as 'tis impoſſible that God ſhould reveal any ſuch thing to us, as the Object of our Faith, ſo if any ſuch thing ſhould be propoſed to us as reveal'd by God, we ought rather to reject the Revelation, than to admit the thing, it being more poſſible that the Revelation ſhould be falſe, that is, that ſuch a thing ſhould not be reveal'd by God, than that what we evidently perceive by thoſe Faculties which he has given us, as falſe and impoſſible, ſhould be true. Which equally concludes againſt the *Socinian* on the one hand, and againſt the *Papiſt* on the other.

SECT. VII.

Of abſtract and concrete Thought, with ſome Remarks upon the uſefulneſs of Abſtraction for the greater clearneſs and extent of Thought.

1. ABſtraction being an Affection belonging to Thought, 'tis fit it ſhould have a place among the Diviſions of it. And ſince it has ſuch an advantageous ſubſerviency to its *clearneſs* (as in the ſequel will be ſhewn) it may be very proper to annex the conſideration of it to the foregoing. We have occaſionally touch'd upon this already, and therefore ſhall be the ſhorter in our ſtay upon it, intending only a few Reflections of more important and leſs obvious

vious conſideration, and for the reſt referring thoſe who would be more particularly inform'd to the common Syſtems, for their fuller Satisfaction.

2. That *Abſtraction* is not the denying one thing of another, or the mental ſeparating one thing from another, any otherwiſe than by the conſidering or thinking upon one thing without conſidering or thinking upon another; I need not adviſe thoſe who are acquainted with the Scholaſtick uſe of this word. But then for the exacter underſtanding of this, it may be convenient further to note, that this ſeparate conſideration wherein the Nature of Abſtraction is made to conſiſt, is to be underſtood, not of different Beings, but of the parts of the ſame Being, that is, Abſtraction is not the conſidering one intire and complete Being without another (for they being *numerically*, at leaſt diſtinct, cannot be conſider'd otherwiſe, ſince one Idea will not include them) but the conſidering one *part* of ſuch a Being without another.

3. But further, Abſtraction is not of ſuch parts neither as are *really* and *phyſically* diſtinct, ſuch as we commonly call *Integral* Parts (for I ſuppoſe I ſhould not properly be ſaid to abſtract in conſidering one part of a Human Body, or one part of a Number without conſidering another, ſince theſe, tho' phyſical parts, are yet logical wholes, and ſo the ſeparate conſideration of them would be no proper Abſtraction)

ction) but of parts that are *intelligibly* distinct, and have a real sameness in the Nature of the thing. When one of these really same, but intelligibly distinct parts is consider'd without the other, or without that real whole whose intelligible part it is, then is my Thought *abstract*; but when there is no such separate consideration, but all is included together in one Idea, and consider'd as really it is, then is my Thought *concrete*. So that in short, Abstraction, as 'tis a logical Affection of Thought, is the considering one thing without another, not *absolutely*, but in things that are not really one without the other, nor yet really deniable one of the other. For Abstraction is, as it were, the drawing of a thing away from it self. But where things are really separate or distinct, the considering them apart is not *Abstraction*, but only a mere divided Consideration; nor would the joining them in one be *Concretion*, but Confusion.

4. Abstraction then is the separate consideration of things intelligibly distinct, really indistinct. And of this there are, as I conceive, two sorts, one in the way of *Modality*, and another in the way of *Habitude*, according to the different Intelligibility that one and the same thing has, either as 'tis consider'd according to the different manners of Being which it has in it self, or according to the different Respects which it carries to other things. In the way of *Modality*, as when a Substance is consider'd

der'd without its Mode, or ſometimes according to one Mode only, and ſometimes according to another. In the way of *Habitude*, as when a thing is conſider'd not throughout as it is in it ſelf, but only ſo far as it agrees, or according to what it has in common with other things. As to give an inſtance of each, which will ſerve to illuſtrate the Doctrine of Abſtraction in general, as well as theſe particular kinds of it. A Mathematician conſiders Body ſometimes according to the Dimenſion of length only without attending to any breadth, and then he calls it a *Line*; ſometimes according to length and breadth without attending to Profundity, and then he calls it a *Surface*; and ſometimes again according to all three Dimenſions, and then he calls it a *Solid*. This is Abſtraction in the way of *Modality* or *Manner*. Again, the ſame Mathematician having before him a Figure terminated with three right Lines, conſiders it ſometimes throughout, according to the full ſpecifick extent of it, as 'tis diſtinct from all other Figures, and then he calls it a *Triangle*. But ſometimes again he conſiders it no further than according to what it has in common with the reſt, and then he calls it a *Figure*. This is Abſtraction in the way of *Habitude*. And it may here deſerve to be remarked, that this Abſtraction is the ground of thoſe common and more extenſive Conceptions which we call *Generals* or *Univerſals*. Concerning which I ſhould have here a proper occaſion to

ſpeak,

ſpeak, were I not too much prevented by our common Logick, which my deſign is not to repeat, but to ſupply.

5. The *Foundation* of Abſtraction (as I noted before) is the various Intelligibility of the ſame thing, according to the ſeveral Faces or Appearances of it to the View of the Mind that contemplates it. This lays a ground for Abſtraction, and you may call it, if you pleaſe, for that reaſon, the *Abſtrahibility* of a thing, as being that which makes it capable of being abſtractly conſider'd. But the *occaſion* of Abſtraction is the Infirmity of our Minds, which not being able, by reaſon of the narrowneſs of their capacity, to comprehend things that have this various Intelligibility, or *intelligible Compoſition*, as I might have call'd it, in one intire View, is forced to conſider them inadequately or partially, ſometimes in one intelligible part, and ſometimes in another, till at length it comes to have as clear a Perception of the whole, as this *metaphyſical Anatomy* can give.

6. For it is here further to be obſerv'd, that this abſtract and ſeparate way of Conſideration, or, as I may ſay, *Diſſection* of things, tho' it be occaſion'd by the Infirmity of the Underſtanding (for which reaſon a perfect intelligence can have no need of it) is yet a great help to it in Contemplation, as ſerving to make its View of things more clear and diſtinct. As Spectacles, tho' in him that uſes them they argue weakneſs

neſs of Sight, yet when uſed they do very much aſſiſt the Act of Viſion.

7. For beſides that our Underſtandings (as great an Opinion as we may have of them) are beſt ſuited to the Contemplation of little Objects, and we can be more curious and exact in the ſurvey of a little at a time, than of a great deal; eſpecially in things of a very compounded Nature, and that have a great Latitude of Intelligibility, as a Man can more eaſily count and multiply great Numbers by their parts than by their wholes; I ſay, beſides this advantage of Abſtraction in leſſening and contracting the Object, and ſo making it more proportionate to our Capacities, 'tis further to be conſider'd that by that ſeparate conſideration of one intelligible part from another, which we call Abſtraction, ſeveral diſtinctions of things do ariſe which are very neceſſary to the improvement of Knowledge; for we are led to look upon thoſe things as *(intelligibly* at leaſt) diſtinct from one another, which we can conſider one without the other. And thoſe diſtinctions ſerve us not only for the clearer Explanation of the thing it ſelf, whoſe diſtinctions they are, but alſo as Principles whereon to erect other Concluſions of great importance to be known, and otherwiſe perhaps indiſcoverable. As may be gather'd from the inſtance of *Reflection* and *Refraction*, the clear Reaſon and Doctrine of which is founded upon the abſtract and diſtinct conſideration of *Motion* in

general from the particular *determination* of it, and was never rightly underſtood in the World, till that diſtinction was made.

8. Beſides, as Abſtraction ſerves to the greater clearneſs and diſtinctneſs of Thought, ſo alſo the greater *inlargement* of it, as rendring our Ideas more general and *extenſive*. Which is a great help to us in thinking; for things as they are being all ſingular, and ſingulars being in a manner infinite, we ſhould find our narrow Faculties ſtrangely incumber'd, nay even oppreſs'd in the conſideration of them, if we did not abbreviate and contract them by ranging them into certain general Orders or Sorts; that is, if we had not certain abſtract Ideas, in which a great many of them agree, and ſo may be ſaid to be contain'd under them. As for inſtance, when we conſider an equilateral Triangle, only as a Triangle, or a Triangle as a Figure, *&c.* In all which kind of Abſtractions this is to be obſerv'd, that tho' the inferiour degree contains the ſuperior *in* it, with ſome further determination of its own, yet the ſuperior contains the inferior *under* it; ſo that tho' the inferior contains actually more, yet the ſuperior, as being leſs determin'd, *repreſents* more, and ſo contributes to the greater inlargement and extenſiveneſs of Thought; the further conſideration of which Matter I leave to the *Logicians*.

SECT.

SECT. VIII.

Of pure and impure Thought, with ſome Account of the difference between pure Intellect and Imagination.

1. THis diſtinction of Thought into pure and impure, is not here of a *Moral*, as by the ſound it may ſeem, but of a *Metaphyſical* importance. And according to this conſideration of it, the *Schools* have applied it to the *Will*, and ſome of the *modern* Philoſophers to the *Underſtanding*. That Act of the Will in the ſenſe of the School, is ſaid to be *pure* which is perfectly voluntary, without any mixture of nilling, when a Man *only* Wills, as in the love of that which is ſimply good, ſuppoſe *Health*. And that may be ſaid to be impure or mixt, which is partly voluntary, and partly involuntary; voluntary abſolutely or upon the whole, but *ſecundum quid*, or in a certain reſpect involuntary, or againſt the inclination of the Will. When a Man wills and nills the ſame at once, tho' in different reſpects, willing it from without or upon an extrinſick conſideration, and nilling it from within or from the intrinſick nature of the thing, as in the chuſing of a leſſer Evil for the avoiding of a greater, ſuppoſe *Phyſick* for the avoiding of *Sickneſs*. This may be ſaid to be pure and impure Thought, with reſpect to the *Will*.

2. But I shall here consider it chiefly with respect to the *Understanding*. And in this regard, I call that a pure Thought or Perception whose Object is immaterial or spiritual; and that an impure Thought, whose Object is material or corporeal. This, as understood of the *ultimate* Object of Thought, *viz.* the things thought upon, is sufficiently plain without any further Explanation, the distinction of things into material and immaterial being both clear and confess'd. All the difficulty will be how to accommodate this to the *immediate* Object of Thought, that is, to *Ideas*, they being all immaterial. Now here 'tis to be consider'd (what has been formerly noted) that we may distinguish of a twofold Being in Ideas, the Real Being, and the Ideal Being, or that we may distinguish them either as essentially, or as representatively consider'd. The reason of which distinction is because there is something in God, and consequently of the divine Nature (because every thing that is in God, is really no other than He himself) that does not represent God, but something that is not God, and that indeed is out of him. By which means it comes to pass that what it represents is different from what it really is, and consequently that the same Idea as *essentially* differs from it self as *representatively* consider'd.

3. Now as Ideas, though they are all *Divine essentially*, and as to the reality of the thing, as being of the Essence of God, yet they are not all

all ſo *repreſentatively* conſider'd, as not repreſenting him but Creatures. And accordingly they are Ideas of Creatures, and not Ideas of God; and God ſees Creatures, not himſelf in them. So in like manner, and for the ſame reaſon, tho' all Ideas are *ſpiritual* and immaterial, really and eſſentially, yet they are not all ſo repreſentatively, as not all of them repreſenting Spirit, but ſome of them Extenſion or Matter. Some Ideas indeed are ſpiritual and immaterial, not only according to their real Being (for ſo they are all) but alſo according to their ideal or repreſentative Being. But others are ſo only according to their real Being, being indeed eſſentially ſpiritual, becauſe they are of the Eſſence of God, who is a Spirit, and the Father of Spirits; but not repreſenting Spirit, but Matter, and ſo are ſpiritual in the ſame ſenſe only as the Idea of a Creature is *Divine*, that is, eſſentially only, not repreſentatively. Notwithſtanding then the real ſpirituality of our Ideas as to their abſolute Eſſence, they may however relatively be conſider'd; and as to their repreſentative Being, be ſaid to be ſome material, and ſome immaterial, according to the different Nature or Quality of that thing (Body or Spirit) which they repreſent. That Idea then which repreſents a ſpiritual Being to our Minds, is with us a ſpiritual Idea, and ſo that Idea which repreſents any thing material, how ſpiritual ſoever it may otherwiſe be as to the reality of its abſolute Eſſence, is yet in our

preſent account a material Idea, becauſe we are now conſidering Ideas, (when they are ſaid to be the Objects of Thought) not according to what they are in the reality of their abſolute *Natures*, wherein they agree, but according to what they are in their *Repreſentations*, wherein they differ.

4. Now then when the Idea that is the immediate object of my Thought, is in this ſenſe ſpiritual, as repreſenting a ſpiritual Being to me, then my Thought may be ſaid to be *pure*, not only becauſe Spirit is a purer Entity than Body, but becauſe the Object of my Thought is then intirely ſpiritual, repreſentatively as well as eſſentially, without any the leaſt *mixture* or alloy of Corporeity. And ſo again, when the Idea that is the Object of my Thought is thus material, as repreſenting Matter or any material Affection to me, then my Thought may be ſaid to be *impure*, not only becauſe Body is leſs pure than Spirit, or a very groſs Being in compariſon of it, but alſo becauſe then the ideal Object of my Thought has a ſort of *mixture* in it, as being eſſentially indeed ſpiritual, but repreſentatively material. So then the metaphyſical Purity or Impurity of Thought is the Immateriality or Materiality of its Object.

5. This way of conſidering Thought, as to the repreſentative Materiality or Immateriality of thoſe Ideas which are the immediate Objects of it, will lead us to the conſideration of Intellect and Imagination (things very *much*, I wiſh

I could ſay as *diſtinctly* talkt of) and help to lay us a Ground whereon to erect a very clear and intelligible diſtinction between them. That theſe things are really diſtinct is abundantly clear from that famous Remark of * *Des Cartes* upon the different Conception of a *Pentagone* and a *Chiliagone*; the main thing will be to ſtate the true reaſon and manner of their difference. They have been lookt upon as diſtinct Faculties of the Soul, but I ſee no neceſſity of conceiving them any otherwiſe than as different Operations of the ſame Faculty, or the ſame Faculty operating divers ways. Not to multiply Things or Words without cauſe, I ſuppoſe they may both be ſaid to belong to the *perceptive* Faculty, Intellection and Imagination being plainly both of them *Perceptions* (for we perceive when we imagin, no leſs than when we underſtand) and differing from each other only with reſpect to the different manner or quality of it.

* See his ſixth Meditation.

6. They who explain the manner of Human Underſtanding by material Effluvia's and Emanations from Bodies, ſeem to leave no room for any diſtinction between *Intellection* and *Imagination*, for with them all will reſolve into the latter. But leaving that Hypotheſis to be examin'd in its place, let us conſider how theſe things, which, with the joint Conſent of both old and new Philoſophy we ſuppoſe to be diſtinct, are really diſtinguiſh'd. Both Philoſo-

phies ſeem to conſent in explaining Imagination with relation to *Body*; and that account in the new Philoſophy ſeems moſt diſtinct (for what in the old is deliver'd concerning this matter, is hardly worth our conſideration) which reſolves Imagination into certain Images or Traces in the Brain, imprinted on it, as is ſuppoſed, by the different Motion and Diſpoſition of the Animal Spirits. Which Prints or Images, when the Soul attends or applies it ſelf to, then ſhe is ſaid to *imagin*, as on the contrary, when ſhe thinks or perceives without any ſuch corporeal Images, then ſhe is properly ſaid to *underſtand*.

7. But againſt this way of ſtating the difference of Imagination from pure Intellect, I have two Exceptions. In the firſt place I cannot well conceive how the various and rapid Motion of the Spirits ſhould either by their own courſe, or by the impreſſion of external Objects be ſo regularly and uniformly determin'd as to make ſuch fine *Ingravings* and artificial *Images* of things, and ſuch laſting ones too, upon the fluid Brain. Such Pictures ſure had need be drawn, if not upon a better Table, yet at leaſt by a more regular and ſteady *Pencil*, than the tumultuous Agitation of a Croud of ſubtile and volatile Spirits. But then, ſecondly, ſuppoſing ſuch Images and Delineations of things to be drawn upon the Brain, and that even to the very *Life* as we ſay, with all the Art and Exactneſs of Imitation; ſo

ſo that the Head of a Man ſhall be like a *Gallery* all hung round with Pictures, one repreſenting one thing, and another another (pretty metaphyſical Furniture) yet I want to be inform'd, and without the aſſiſtance of a very good Maſter, ſhall I doubt never underſtand, how a corporeal Image conſiſting of material Lineaments ſhould be the immediate Object of Thought, or be any way by it ſelf intelligible to the Mind, or how Body ſhould be able to inlighten Spirit. And indeed if I could conceive it poſſible that the Soul ſhould have one Thought or Perception, by turning it ſelf to the traces or prints of things in the Brain, as the *Objects* of its View, I ſhould be tempted to think, if not that all Underſtanding might be accounted for this way, or in the way of Effluvia's, yet that the Hypotheſis of Ideas, was not of that Importance for the ſolving of it, as I now think I have reaſon to ſuppoſe.

8. Not but that I can readily admit that the Spirits may, and actually do make ſome ſort of Impreſſion upon the Brain (and 'tis by that whereby I would explain *Senſation)* but not ſuch exact pieces of Peinture, or Sculpture as to reſemble or repreſent things without. And I can admit again that the Underſtanding may in great Meaſure depend (as we ſee indeed that it does) upon the texture and diſpoſition of the Brain (which may be a ſufficient ground for the common and proverbial uſe of the word *Brains*, inſtead of Wit and Senſe) and that

theſe

theſe Impreſſions made by the animal Spirits, upon the Brain may be concern'd in the buſineſs of Thought, and have their real uſe and ſervice in it, but not as *Objects*, but only as *Occaſions* of it. That is, they may by the Inſtitution of Nature and that Law of Union, that is between Soul and Body, ſerve to excite and awaken ſome Ideas which are the Objects of Thought; but they are not the real Objects of Thought themſelves, nor do they bear any reſemblance to thoſe Ideas which are. No, we underſtand only by *Ideas*, and the moſt that ſuch traces in the Brain can be allow'd to ſerve for, will be only to excite them. And *that* indeed may be an Order and Inſtitution proper enough for a Spirit, that is in a ſtate of Union and Conjunction with Body, *viz.* that while it is in that ſtate (for the caſe of a ſeparate Spirit is very different) ſome of its Thoughts ſhould depend upon, and be occaſion'd by certain bodily Impreſſions, but that thoſe Impreſſions ſhould be the true *Objects* of Thought, ſo that the Soul by converting it ſelf to them, ſhould be able to think or perceive (as ſeems to be ſuppoſed in that Hypotheſis which calls this *Imagination)* is extremely groſs and unmetaphyſical. And therefore I muſt own my ſelf not a little ſurprized, to find this notion of Imagination ſo much favour'd as it ſeems to be, by Mr. *Malebranche*, as not ſeeing how it can conſiſt with his Principles.

9. It

9. It ſeems then more reaſonable in it ſelf, as well as conſiſtent with the Principles of this Theory; to ſay, that as Ideas are the immediate Objects of our Thoughts, and we underſtand all things by them, ſo all the diverſity that is between the kinds of our Perception muſt be ſtated upon, and derived from the diverſity of thoſe Ideas. And ſince theſe Ideas tho' all of them eſſentially Spiritual, are yet as to their repreſentative Being, ſome of them material, and ſome of them immaterial, I would therefore aſſign this for the difference between imagination, and intellect ſtrictly and properly ſo call'd, that in the former, the immediate Object of Thought is an Idea that is repreſentatively material, and that in the latter the immediate Object of Thought is an Idea that is repreſentatively immaterial. And therefore it is that it may with juſt propriety be call'd *pure Intellect*, as being a Perception purely Spiritual, or as we ſay *Intellectual*, becauſe without any corporeal Image. Not in the Senſe of the foremention'd Hypotheſis, that is, that the immediate Object of it, is not Matter (for ſo Imagination is pure too, as having for its Object an Idea eſſentially Spiritual) but that 'tis without any ſuch Idea as *repreſents* Matter. And herein indeed conſiſts that purity of it, which diſtinguiſhes it from that *Counter-Perception* which we call Imagination, whoſe Object, tho' eſſentially Spiritual, as well as that of the other, is yet repreſentatively material.

SECT.

SECT. IX.

Thought and Viſion compared with a fuller illuſtration of the difference between Thought, in the way of Idea, and Thought in the way of Sentiment, with ſome Philoſophical Remarks upon the latter.

1. VIſion is generally apprehended as a different thing from Thought (for we are not ſaid to ſee whatever we think of) and yet at the ſame time as ſo reſembling it, that Thought is oftentimes expreſs'd by Viſion. As when we talk of our intellectual Sight or View, or ſay that we plainly ſee ſuch a Thing to be true or falſe, *&c.* meaning that we clearly perceive it. And indeed Viſion does in ſome reſpects differ from Thought (or elſe whatever we think of, we ſhould be ſaid alſo to ſee, and he that did not ſee would alſo not Think, whereas none think ſo ſtrongly as the *Blind)* and yet in ſome reſpects again 'tis as true that Viſion is really Thought, and does not only reſemble it. But now to adjuſt this rightly, and to ſhew in what reſpect Viſion differs from Thought, and in what reſpect it is really the ſame with it, is a pretty nice Point, in order to the clearing of which we had need conſider *Viſion* as diſtinctly as Anatomiſts do the *Eye.*

2. Viſion then will admit of a twofold Conſideration, and that ſo utterly different one from

from the other, as to have nothing in common but the Name. For firſt, Viſion may be conſider'd *materially* and with reſpect to the Body, as it ſignifies the paſſing or Trajection of the Rays of Light, with all their refractions thro' the ſeveral coats and humors of the Eye, and the Impreſſion which they make in the bottom of it upon the Optick Nerve, or if you will that inner Tunicle or Membrane, compoſed by the little filaments or extremities of it, which Phyſicians call the *Retina*. And in this Senſe Viſion is, or ought to be conſider'd in that Branch of the Mathematicks which profeſſes to treat of it, and is accordingly call'd *Opticks*. Which I think we ought not to define (as a certain * Philoſopher does) as *a Science of Seeing well*. For Opticks do not teach us to ſee, nor do we need any Science for that purpoſe, as being ſufficiently inſtructed by Nature. Nor yet perhaps (with * another) as a Science of the appearance of things which we perceive with our Eyes. For beſides that the appearance of things and our Perception of them belongs properly to the Mind, and not to the Eyes. Our Perception of Things, or of their Appearances, is purely of a Phyſical Conſideration, with which Opticks as being a Mathematical Science ſeems not to be concern'd, unleſs it be ſo far as it may conſider that which is the occaſion of thoſe appearances.

* *Scheibler.*

* *Keckerman* in his Mathematical Syſtem.

ces. For indeed that I take to be the proper buſineſs of Opticks, namely to conſider the *Radiature* of Light, and to ſhew according to what lines it paſſes through, and with what different Movements or Impreſſions it affects the viſive Organs. So that when 'tis ſaid to treat of *Viſion*, it ought to be underſtood only according to this firſt Senſe of it.

3. But then there is another, and a nobler ſenſe of Viſion. For as it may be taken materially for that luminous Impreſſion which affects the Eye or the Brain, ſo it may alſo be conſider'd *formally*, as it ſignifies that inward Senſe or Perception which, according to the Law of Union eſtabliſh'd by the Author of Nature between Soul and Body, follows upon, and is occaſion'd by that Impreſſion, and which we are conſcious of to our ſelves whenever that Impreſſion is duly made, and without which, notwithſtanding any Impreſſion of Light upon our Eyes we could not be ſaid properly (that is formally) to *ſee*, any more than if we were altogether in the dark.

4. The Senſe of the Word Viſion being thus diſtinguiſh'd out of its ambiguity, we may now hope (what before would have been impoſſible) to ſtate the reſpects of difference or of agreement which it has with Thought. For it is plain even at ſight that Viſion, if you go no further than the firſt Senſe of it, is not Thought, but a mere mechanical Movement or Impulſe, which tho' made upon a thinking Crea-

Creature, and that will alſo take occaſion to think from it, has yet more of Thought in it, than if the ſame Impreſſion were made upon *Water* or upon a *Looking-glaſs*. But then again if Viſion be taken in the ſecond, and indeed more proper as well as eminent Senſe of it, then 'tis as plain that Viſion is Thought, and that 'tis not the Eye that thus ſees, but the Mind. Viſion in this Senſe belongs as much to the Soul, as in the other to the Body, and is indeed as much a Thought of it, as any other Senſe or Perception that it has.

5. But do we ſee then whatever we think of? That indeed would be happy for thoſe who lament their abſent or dead Friends, and live almoſt upon the dear Remembrance of them, if by Thinking upon them, they could as it were conjure up their appearance, and ſet them before their view. Or again on the other ſide when we ſhut our Eyes, or otherwiſe do not ſee, do we then alſo ceaſe to *Think?* That would be full as miſerable for thoſe that are Blind, if with the loſs of their Sight, they muſt loſe the uſe of their Underſtanding too. And yet thus it muſt be, if Viſion and Thought be really and abſolutely the ſame thing.

6. To diſintricate our ſelves then from this ſeeming intanglement, I further conſider, that tho' Viſion according to the formal Senſe of it, be really Thought, as much as any that paſſes in our Minds, yet even thus conſider'd it is a *peculiar* Thought, as having ſomething in the man-

manner and circumſtance of it ſo peculiarly qualifying and diſtinguiſhing from what is in our other Thoughts, that tho' Viſion be really Thought, yet all Thought is not Viſion. Which makes that we neither can be ſaid to ſee whatever we think of, nor yet not to think whenever we do not ſee. But to make this more exactly comprehended, it will be neceſſary to lay out the Nature of Viſion a little more diſtinctly yet, and accordingly I ſhall briefly *anatomize* not the *Eye*, but the *Sight*.

7. There are two things in this formal Viſion (and we ſhall by and by add a third) which tho' for the moſt part confounded with each other, are yet of a very diſtinct conſideration. There is a *Senſation*, and there is an *Ideal* Perception, ſomething that we feel within us, and ſome Object that we contemplate without us. To inſtance in one of the moſt beautiful Appearances in Nature, when I look upon the *Rain-bow*, I have in the firſt place an Idea which is the immediate Object of my Viſion, that which I *truly* ſee, and which repreſents to me that which I am *ſaid* to ſee; that is, I have an Idea of a certain *Figure*, viz. an Arch of a Circle, and accordingly I ſay I ſee a *Bow*, which indeed I may properly be ſaid to do, tho' that material one in the Clouds ſhould not be the immediate Object of my Viſion, becauſe I ſee that Idea or intelligible *Arch* which repreſents it.

8. But then beſides that pure Idea which is the Object of my View; I have alſo at the ſame inſtant

inſtant very lively and agreeable *Senſations* of certain Colours (as they are call'd) *viz.* Red, Green, *&c.* which affect me with ſo very charming a Delight, that I thence take a particular occaſion to pity the blind.

9. It is here ſuppoſed (what ſhall be ſhewn in its place) that there is a real difference and diſtinction between Senſation and Ideal Perception, as alſo that thoſe Appearances which we call *Colours*, and in the vulgar Philoſophy are taught to look upon as certain Phyſical realities inherent (and therefore call'd *Accidents*) in the Bodies that are without us, are yet more exactly philoſophizing no other than certain Senſations within our ſelves, however through the Confuſion and Prejudice of Senſe (which with moſt Men has more Authority than the cleareſt Reaſon) we are apt to transfer them from our ſelves to the things without, and accordingly imagine that we ſee the one as much as we do the other. But of this more hereafter. At preſent I ſhall only further remark, that Viſion has this *peculiar* in it, not from *Thought*, (for its diſtinction from Thought does not depend upon that) but from our other *Senſes*, that it includes Idea as well as Sentiment, that is, that there is in it an outward Perception, or Perception of ſomething without us, as well as an inward feeling. Our other Senſes have only the latter. There is nothing in them but only *Senſation*, ſome inward feeling or different ſtate or manner of Being as to

Pleaſure or Pain, that we are conſcious of to our ſelves, and accordingly they may properly be ſaid to be *pure Senſes*. Whereas in Viſion, beſides that Feeling or Senſation which it has in common with the reſt, there is alſo a true Ideal Perception which the others have not, for which reaſon it is not a *pure Senſe*, but has ſomething intellectnal as well as ſenſible in it. Which, by the way, I take to be the only competent Ground of that Preference which is given to Viſion above the other Senſes.

10. Now thus far Viſion has nothing *peculiar* in it; nothing, I mean as to *Thought*, tho' it has as to the other *Senſes*, which as it equals by having a ſenſible, ſo it excels by having an Ideal Perception in it. But this makes no difference as to *Thought*; nay, upon this very account it is that it comes under the ſame common Notion and Conſideration with it, its Senſation being as much a Thought of Senſation, as any other Senſation is, and its Ideal Perception being alſo as much a Thought of that kind as any other ſuch Perception is. Concerning the former there can be no diſpute, and he will ſhew himſelf to love Argument rather than to underſtand it, that ſhall ſeriouſly raiſe any againſt the latter. For whatever difference there may be in the Idea it ſelf, yet certainly there is none in the Perception of it, nor yet in the *Subject* of that Perception: For tho' it be the Eye that is ſaid to ſee, and indeed really does ſo in that *material* ſenſe before ſpoken of, yet

yet that which *formally* ſees (as ſeeing is taken for perceiving) muſt needs be the Mind, unleſs you will ſuppoſe Matter to think, which there is neither poſſibility of, nor yet occaſion for, ſince if there be any Perception in viſion (as I preſume none will deny that has the uſe of either his Underſtanding or his Eyes) there will be no reaſon to vary the Subject of it, by ſuppoſing that what perceives in all other caſes ſhould not alſo perceive here. And as that which formally ſees or perceives is the Mind, as in the other inſtances of Perception, ſo that Idea (whatever it be) which is thus formally ſeen or perceiv'd, is as truly and really perceiv'd as any other Object of Thought. And indeed 'tis by the *Perception* of the Idea that the outward Object is ſaid to be *ſeen*, which (as we ſhall ſhew hereafter) is no otherwiſe *viſible*, than as the Idea of it is *intelligible*.

11. But what is that *Idea?* That indeed is a great Queſtion, if the meaning be as to the very preciſe and particular Nature or Eſſence of it, and ſuch, as Things are hardly yet ripe enough to anſwer. But in general I may ſay, what will give us the firſt and leading Inſtance of that *peculiarity* of Thought which is in Viſion and whereby it is ſpecializ'd and diſtinguiſh'd from Thought at large; that that Idea which is then the immediate object of Perception, or which the Mind formally ſees, is according to our premiſed diſtinction, an Idea that is *repreſentatively Material*, or that repre-

ſents Extenſion with the ſeveral Modes of it. This I take to be that Idea (whatever it be as to the Nature or Subſtance of it, which I do not now conſider) which the Mind perceives in Viſion, which makes it to be what we call'd an *impure Thought*, and ſo immediately diſtinguiſhes it from *pure* Intellect, whoſe Object is an Idea repreſentatively Spiritual, and indeed ſhews it to be (thus far) the very ſame with *Imagination*.

12. But then that which diſtinguiſhes it from this alſo, will be the peculiarity of the *Impreſſion* whereby this Idea, and the ſenſation that always accompanies it, are rais'd, join'd with the greater and more intenſe degree of the Perception occaſion'd by that peculiarity of Impreſſion. The Idea it ſelf is the ſame in Viſion as in Imagination, *viz.* that which is repreſentatively material, and what we do Imagin, we do alſo ſee as to the immediate Object of our Perception. But the Perception it ſelf is much ſtronger in Viſion than in Imagination, and the manner of the Impreſſion whereby it is excited is alſo very different in the one from what it is in the other. And in theſe two things the whole ground of that diſtinction which we make between them, will I ſuppoſe be found to conſiſt.

13. Should I ſay that in Viſion that which makes the Impreſſion are the fine and delicate touches or puſhings of a certain ſubtle Matter, either as endeavouring to recede from the

Cen-

Center of its vortex, by Tangent lines, as *Des Cartes*, or as in actual agitation and movement as M. *Regis* rather chuſes to ſuppoſe, I ſay ſhould I make either the preſſure or the impulſion of thoſe ſubtile Particles upon the Eye, to be that which excites in us, both the Idea, and the Sentiment (whether of Light or of Colour) which we have in Viſion, I ſhould follow an Hypotheſis which there is great reaſon to think right, if not in the preciſe ſpecialty of it, yet at leaſt as to its general Foundation. For ſince in all our other Senſes the Perception is occaſion'd by certain material Impreſſions, ſome of one ſort, and ſome of another, but all *material*, why ſhould it not be ſo here too? And I would fain know what thoſe *Rays* of Light, which even the vulgar Philoſophy ſpeaks of, can be intelligibly ſuppoſed to mean, if not certain Chains or Lines of thoſe little Bowls whereof *Des Cartes* makes his 2d Element to conſiſt (and therefore fitly call'd *Rays*, as being ſo many *Semidiameters* of that Circle or Vortex, from whoſe Center they Iſſue) or at leaſt of ſome other Matter.

Tom. 3. p. 158.

14. But tho' this may be a right account of Viſion as to the occaſion of it, yet it ſeems not to diſtinguiſh it from *Imagination* ſo much, as from the other Senſes, as from *Hearing* ſuppoſe, which is from the Impreſſion made by a certain movement of the Air, upon the Tympanum of the *Ear*, if not rather upon the audi-

tory Nerve, or from *Taſte*, which is from the Impreſſion made by the Particles of the ſapid Body upon the Nervous parts of the Tongue, and ſo for the reſt. The difference between all which is (beſides that of the ſenſations themſelves) that the Impreſſion is made upon different Organs, and by different ſorts of Bodies. But now Viſion ſeems to be diſtinguiſh'd from Imagination not by that which makes it *ſuch* a Senſe (that more properly belonging to its diſtinction from the other *Senſes*) but by that whereby it is ſimply a Senſe. And therefore for the better diſtinction of theſe things I ſhall chuſe rather to ſay that in Viſion the Impreſſion from which the Perception ariſes, is from *without*, whereas in Imagination 'tis from *within*.

15. But to make this more diſtinctly Intelligible, I ſuppoſe with the new Philoſophy that all ſenſation is in the Brain, yea and all Ideal Perception too, as far as the Operations of the Mind may be allow'd to depend upon the Body. Not as if the Brain had any Senſe or Perception, or that the Soul which is the only Subject of it, had any thing in the Brain for its intelligible Object, that is I mean did contemplate any of thoſe fine Pictures which are imagin'd to be hung up in that *Phantaſtick Gallery*. But what I mean is this, that tho' the Brain does not perceive it ſelf, nor is yet the immediate Object of that which does, yet by vertue of that Law of Union which is between

tween Soul and Body, certain Impreſſions upon ſome part of the Brain (which I ſhall not be ſo curious as to aſſign) are connected with certain Perceptions in the Mind, and accordingly ſerve to excite them. I ſuppoſe again that thoſe Movements or Impreſſions to which our Perceptions are annex'd, are communicated to the Brain by the Mediation of the *Nerves*. I ſuppoſe again that the Fibres of the Nerves may be ſtruck or agitated two ways, either as when the Movement begins at thoſe ends of them which terminate in the extreme parts of the Body, or in thoſe which terminate in the Brain. The former by the Impreſſion of outward Objects, and the latter by the Courſe or Flux of the Animal Spirits. Now when the Impreſſion upon the Brain, is from the Impreſſion of outward Objects upon the *extremities* of the Nerves, then it is that we *Senſe*, but when the impreſs is merely from the courſe of the Spirits ſtriking againſt the *inner* Fibres of the Nerves, then it is (according to the Principles of the beſt Philoſophy) that we *Imagin*; which character of Imagination, is I think right enough ſo far as concerns its difference from *Senſe*, tho' as to *pure Intellect* its diſtinction will be better ſtated upon the *materiality* of its Idea, as was diſcours'd before.

16. And indeed I much doubt whether the other will make any part of that difference, as not knowing but that pure Intellection may depend upon the internal motion of the Spi-

rits, as the exciting occaſion, as well as the groſſeſt Imagination. And therefore inſtead of ſaying that when the Impreſſion is from within, then 'tis Imagination, I ſhould think it an exacter and leſs obnoxious way of ſpeaking, to ſay that in Imagination the Impreſſion is from within. That perhaps being equally common to both Intellect and Imagination, and diſtinguiſhing only as to Imagination and Senſe, which yet is as much as the preſent purpoſe requires.

17. Now to apply this to *Viſion*. Here the Perception ariſes from the Impreſſion of outward Objects upon the outer parts of the Nerves. For tho' whenever there is ſuch an outward Impreſſion 'tis not neceſſary the Perception that follows upon it ſhould be *Viſion* (ſince it may be as well ſome other Senſe, ſuppoſe *Hearing*) yet in all Viſion properly ſo call'd the Impreſſion is outward, from an outward Cauſe, and upon an outward Part, I mean as to the firſt Incidence of it. Whereas in Imagination the Impreſſion begins from within, as taking its riſe from the courſe of the animal Spirits, which makes the difference between them (as much as it is) to be very clear and diſtinct.

18. I ſay as *much as it is*. For indeed according to this account, Viſion ſeems not to differ from Imagination ſo much as Imagination does from pure Intellect. For Intellect and Imagination, tho' agreeing perhaps in the way of excite-

ment,

ment, yet differ as to the *Idea*, one being Material and the other Spiritual, which is very conſiderable, whereas Viſion and Imagination agree in the Idea, and differ only in the way of *excitement*, which ſeems to make the difference between them to be (as indeed thus far it is) rather modal and gradual than ſpecifick. Modal in regard of the different manner of the Impreſſion, and gradual upon the account of the greater vehemency of it in one caſe, than in the other, for that very reaſon, ſince we may reaſonably ſuppoſe that the Fibres of the Brain will be more briskly ſtruck, by the Impreſſion of outward Objects, than by the ſole afflux of the Spirits. Which is the reaſon why what we ſee appears more ſtrong and lively to us, than what we only imagin; ſo that in this reſpect Viſion ſeems to be but a ſtronger ſort of Imagination, as Imagination but a weaker and fainter kind of Viſion, the Spirits not moving ſo impetuouſly by themſelves, and in their ſolitary Courſe (unleſs in *Fevers* and ſome other extraordinary Caſes, when Imagination is ſo like Viſion, that we can hardly diſtinguiſh them) as when quicken'd by the Impulſe of outward Objects, as a Wind added to their own natural Tide.

19. From hence we may now diſtinctly gather two things. 1. What Viſion is in it ſelf. 2. What it is in relation to Thought. Viſion in it ſelf is the having or perceiving an Idea repreſen-

preſentatively material in conſequence of a certain impreſſion made by Light upon that Expanſion of the Optick Nerve which is at the bottom of the Eye. As to Thought, Viſion is a ſort of thinking, or a *ſpecial* Thought; it is thinking and ſomething more, or thinking with a peculiar circumſtance attending it, as its ſpecifick difference. It agrees with Thought as 'tis a Perception of an Idea, for 'tis the Idea and not the Thing that is the immediate Object of Perception in both, and that which it adds to it, and whereby it differs from it, is partly the peculiarity of the Idea, being always that which repreſents Matter, and partly the organical impreſſion whereby it comes to be perceiv'd. As to the *Idea*, therein it agrees with Imagination, but in this reſpect differs from it again, that in Imagination the impreſſion upon which we have the Idea is from within, and in Viſion 'tis from without. So that upon the whole, Viſion and Thought differ not as one Species differs from another Species, but as a Species differs from a Genus, *ſeeing* being a certain determinate way of *Thinking* or Perceiving, and there being no other difference between ſeeing a Man and thinking upon a Man, than the peculiar manner or occaſion whereby the Idea of a Man, which both have in common, is preſented to the *Mind*, which after all is the only true Principle that both *thinks* and *ſees* But what does it ſee? why nothing but

Idea

Idea immediately. But then ſince that Idea is repreſentatively material, it may be ſaid in a mediate or ſecundary ſenſe to ſee Body, as ſeeing that which repreſents it, as will be better underſtood hereafter.

20. And thus having compared Thought and Viſion, and ſhewn the difference between them, whereby it appears that Viſion is only Thought under ſome peculiar Modalities and Circumſtances, we may now upon theſe Principles, before we proceed any further, offer at a Solution to two very great Queſtions, which without them whoever ſhould attempt to explain, would, I doubt, make ſtrange work of it. One is, *Whether a pure ſeparate Spirit*, or Intelligence, *may ſee?* To which I anſwer, That I do not underſtand how ſuch a Being, how intelligent ſoever, ſhould be able to *ſee*, as Viſion is here taken in the peculiar ſtrictneſs of it for a certain Perception upon certain bodily Impreſſions as above explain'd; ſuch a Spirit not being ſuppoſed, as *ſeparate*, to have any Organs proper for that purpoſe, nor yet, as *Spirit*, to be immediately and without them impreſſible by Body, which can act only by impulſe, whereof Spirit is not capable; which, by the way, may ſuffice to ſhew that Bodies cannot be the true and proper Cauſes of our Senſations.

21. The other is, Whether a pure Spirit, ſuch as God, ſuppoſe, may be *ſeen?* This is that Queſtion which appear'd ſo difficult to

St.

St. *Auſtin*, and about which he beſtow'd ſo much * Pains. A great deal of which might have been ſpared (as difficult as the Queſtion is) if he had firſt well ſtated what is preciſely meant by Viſion. For ſince, according to the foregoing account of it, Viſion agrees ſo far with *Imagination*, as to have the ſame Idea with it, *viz.* ſuch as is repreſentatively *material*, and differs only as to the manner of exciting that Idea, *viz.* by the Impreſſion of Bodies as above explain'd, I ſee not how we can avoid concluding that the moſt purely ſpiritual God is abſolutely inviſible, it being impoſſible that an Idea which is repreſentative of Matter ſhould repreſent God; and that becauſe God is not Matter. And accordingly that all thoſe things which are ſaid concerning the beatifick *Viſion* and of our *ſeeing* of God, whether in Divine or Human Writers, ought to be underſtood not of ſenſible Viſion, ſuch as we have been hitherto conſidering, but of that which is intellectual. Which indeed is no other than the clear Knowledge of God, according to that ſaying of our Saviour, (which is that great Text upon which the † Doctor of the Schools grounds his Notion of Happineſs, as conſiſting in the Act of the Underſtanding) *This is Life eternal that they might know thee*

* See his Epiſtles *de Videndo Deo*, compar'd with the 29th Chapter of his 22d Book, *De Civ. Dei.*

† *Prima ſecundæ.* Quæſt. 3. Art. 4.

thee the only true God, &c. For the enjoyment of which glorious and moſt bliſsful Theory, at the Light of which all that is here call'd Knowledge ſhall vaniſh away; may it be the ſerious Prayer and conſtant Endeavour of us all to *purify our ſelves even as He*, whom we hope thus for ever to contemplate, *is pure*. To which King eternal, immortal, inviſible, and only wiſe God, who dwelleth in the Light which no Man can approach unto, whom no Man hath ſeen, nor can ſee, be Honour and Glory for ever. *Amen.*

1 Tim. 1. 17.
1 Tim. 6. 16.

22. But to ſtep again into the Track before it cloſes. By this account of Viſion, ſo far as was neceſſary to our preſent purpoſe, (for my Buſineſs is not here to deliver the Doctrine of *Opticks*) it may now clearly appear how much there is of *Mechaniſm* in it, and how much of *Thought*, how much of it belongs to the Body and how much to the Mind, how far it agrees with Thought, and how far it differs from it. The Sum of which amounts to this, that it agrees with it as to the Ideal Perception, and as to the Senſation which it includes (both of which are true and proper Thoughts in their reſpective kinds) but that it differs from it partly as to the Idea which in Viſion is always that which is repreſentatively material, which is not the Idea of Thought at large, but of that particular Species of it which we call *Imagination*, and partly as to the peculiar way and man-

manner of exciting both the Idea and the Sentiment, which in Viſion (for Reaſons hereafter to be ſpecify'd) does always accompany that Idea.

23. It is all along ſuppoſed in this account that Idea is a diſtinct thing from Sentiment or Senſation, and we have once already touch'd upon their diſtinction. But for the better underſtanding of theſe things, as well as for the fuller diſplay of that Thought whoſe Nature (as 'tis fit in a Theory of this undertaking) we are now laying open, and one of whoſe prime Diviſions is into Perception in the way of Idea, and Perception in the way of Sentiment, it may be very proper upon the occaſion of this Diſcourſe concerning Viſion, wherein theſe two things have been obſerv'd to meet, to beſtow ſome further Reflections upon the difference that is between them, eſpecially conſidering how indiſtinctly they ſeem to be conceiv'd, I might ſay confounded, even by Philoſophical Men, who in other caſes are ſo apt to multiply diſtinctions without neceſſity.

24. That Idea and Sentiment ſhould be confounded in *Viſion* is not ſo ſtrange, becauſe of their conſtant and undivided Concomitancy therein, which tho' no real Argument of Identity, muſt yet be allow'd to carry ſome appearance of it. And ſo again, that thoſe particular things which in reality will, I ſuppoſe, be found to be no other than Sentiments in us, ſuch as *Light*, ſuppoſe, or *Colour*, ſhould yet be ſo con-

confounded as they generally are with Idea, ſo as to make up one *intelligible* Object with it, or be thence transferr'd, as we ſhall anon further remark, to the things without us, ſuppoſe the Sun, ſo as to make up, as we imagin, one *viſible* Object with it; I ſay, neither is this ſo very ſtrange, conſidering the Precipitancy and Confuſion of moſt Mens Thoughts, and withall that theſe Sentiments are cauſed in us at the preſence of outward Objects. We *feel* the one at the ſame time that we *ſee* the other, and that is apt to make us imagin that we *ſee* both. Hitherto therefore there is no great occaſion for wonder. But ſhould Idea abſolutely and in the general be confounded with Sentiment, or thoſe be lookt upon as over-ſubtile that diſtinguiſh them, this, I think, might deſervedly be thought ſtrange, ſince to any one that can and will conſider, 'tis very apparent that hardly any two things are more diſtinguiſhable, tho' M. *Malebranch* be the firſt Philoſopher that I know of that ever formally made this diſtinction.

25. That there is a neceſſity of diſtinguiſhing theſe things may ſufficiently be made appear, before it be ſhewn wherein the antecedent Reaſon and Ground of the diſtinction lies. And becauſe to ſhew that a thing is, is a leſs artificial way of *arguing*, (as proceeding upon Premiſes that have no *natural* Priority to the concluſion) than to ſhew why and for what Reaſon it is, we will begin with the former as the leſs perfect, tho' not always leſs convincing way

way of Probation. And to this purpose that Consideration which * Monsieur *Malebranche* uses, taken from God's having the Knowledge of Pain without having the Sentiment, is, in my judgment, very strong and cogent. I will give it you in his own excellent words, and in the form of Dialogue wherein it stands.

* *Entretiens sur la Metaphysique.* p. 66.

Theodore. Think you that God feels the Pain which we suffer?

Ariste. No, without doubt, for the Sentiment of Pain makes unhappy.

Theodore. Very well. But do you believe that he knows it?

Ariste. Yes, I believe he does; for he knows whatever happens to his Creatures. The Knowledge of God has no Bounds, and to know my Pain does not render him either miserable or imperfect. On the contrary------

Theodore. Oh, oh, *Ariste!* God knows Pain, Pleasure, Heat, and the rest, and he does not feel these things. He knows Pain, because he knows what that Modification of the Soul is in which Pain consists. He knows it, because 'tis He alone that causes it in us, as I shall prove to you hereafter, and because he knows that which he does. In one word, he knows it, because that his Knowledge has no Bounds. But he does not feel it, since he would then be miserable. To know Pain therefore is not the same as to feel it.

Ariste.

Ariſte. It is true. But to feel Pain, is not the ſame as to know it.

Theodore. No doubtleſs, ſince God does not feel it at all, and yet he knows it moſt perfectly. But not to intricate our ſelves with ambiguity of Terms, if you would have feeling of Pain to be knowing it, yet at leaſt you muſt grant that it is not to know it *clearly*, that it is not to know it by light and evidence, in one Word, that it is not to know the *Nature* of it, and that ſo, exactly ſpeaking, 'tis not to know it at all. To feel Pain, for inſtance, is to feel ones ſelf miſerable, without well knowing either what one is, nor what is that Modality of our Being which renders us miſerable. But to know is to have a clear Idea of the Nature of one's Object, and to diſcover ſuch and ſuch Relations of it, by light and evideuce, *&c.*

26. This Conſideration is, I think, abundantly ſufficient to ſatisfy any one that can with due Penetration enter into it, of the abſolute neceſſity of diſtinguiſhing theſe Things, tho' not ſufficient it may be to inform us wherein the preciſe Point of their diſtinction lies. It plainly and fully proves, and will force us to acknowledge that Idea and Sentiment do, and muſt differ, tho' it does not ſo plainly ſhew us the reaſon or the manner, either *why*, or *how*. But as for that matter, it need only be further conſider'd that the different ſtate or manner of our own Being is plainly one thing, and that an Object that is really diſtinct from us is ano-

ther thing. For if our Being, and another Being are distinct, then the Mode of our Being, and that other Being are also distinct. And tho' the Mode of our Being be distinct from our Being only as a Mode from a Thing, whose Mode it is, yet the Mode of our Being is distinct from another Being, as Thing from Thing, really not modally distinct; that is, it is as really distinct, as our Being is from that other Being; and that because it is *really* one with our Being, tho' modally distinct from it. Whoever understands the Doctrin of distinction, which is of great consequence, for our having a just discernment of Things, will, I suppose, allow this to be very *metaphysically* clear. But now *Idea* is an Object distinct from our Being; something which the Mind contemplates as distinct from it self: Whereas *Sentiment* is a certain state or manner, or if you will, *Modification* of our own Being (it being that to the Mind which *Contexture* is to Body) and consequently is as different from Idea, as our Being, is from another Being, which is as much as any one thing can be from another. And for a further confirmation of this difference between Idea and Sentiment, it may be of some Importance to reflect upon a thing of common experience, but whose reason is not perhaps accountable, but upon the present Supposition, and that is, the *disturbance* we find in our severer Meditations from any Sensation, not only from great Pleasure, or Pain, but even a little *Noise*.

This

This is what all thinking Men find, and complain of, and accordingly for that reaſon, thoſe that apply themſelves to the ſerious contemplation of Truth, do all ſeek for Retirement and Silence (tho' all have not the happineſs, or advantage, to enjoy it) and avoid as much as they can all Noiſe, as troubleſome and diſturbing. But why ſhould Noiſe diſturb, or how is it that it diſturbs us? It diſturbs us, as it hinders our *Attention*. For our infirm and limited Capacities cannot perceive the Truth, which we contemplate without attention, nor yet attend without quietneſs. But why ſo? How does Noiſe hinder our attention? Why it hinders our attention as it divides it by drawing off ſome degrees of it from the Object of our contemplation to itſelf, and we accordingly call it *Diſtraction*. Well, but that's a ſtrange Thing, I am contemplating ſome abſtract Truth of the greateſt difficulty, of the greateſt Curioſity, and of the greateſt Importance too, it may be, to be known. And accordingly I apply my ſelf to the ſpeculation of it, with the greateſt force, and moſt awaken'd recollection of Mind. And is it not then a very ſtrange Thing that in ſpite of all the intenſeneſs of Application I can uſe, a little Noiſe, as the buzzing of a Fly, ſhall be able to divert me from it? I know no reaſonable account that can be given of this experience but this, that the Noiſe which I I hear, is a *Sentiment*, whereas that which I contemplate is *Idea*. But now the Sentiment being a proper Modification of my Soul, I am

more affected with it, and my attention is more awaken'd by it, than by Idea which is ſomething different from my ſelf, which by the way may ſerve as a ſenſible Argument to convince us of the falſeneſs of Mr. *Arnauld*'s notion of Ideas being *Modalities* of the Soul, ſince if they were, they would then affect us as ſtrongly as our Senſations do. But that we find they do not; on the contrary we find our ſelves much otherwiſe touch'd by our Senſations than by our Ideas, and that becauſe our Senſations are certain Modifications of the very Soul it ſelf, whereas our Ideas are really diſtinct from us, by which means it comes to paſs (or elſe it will be hardly poſſible, to reſolve it into a diſtinct Cauſe) that a ſlight Sentiment, tho' it be only that of a little *Noiſe*, will be ſufficient to draw off our attention from the contemplation of the moſt filling and ingaging Ideas, that the moſt thoughtful Mind can employ it ſelf about. Which ſeems to be a very convincing Argument of the diſtinction of theſe Things.

27. What is here ſaid of *Idea* and *Sentiment*, may with due proportion and accommodation be applied to Perception in the way of Idea, and Perception in the way of Sentiment, or, as we may call it, Ideal or Senſible Perception. The former being the Perception of ſome Intelligible Object, diſtinct from us, and the latter the inward feeling we have how 'tis with our ſelves, or of that particular ſtate, or man-

manner of Being, which we are at any time in, ſenſible Perception being not Sentiment itſelf, but that inward conſciouſneſs which we have of a Sentiment. As to give an inſtance in each kind, when I contemplate a Triangle, or any of its Properties, then I have an Ideal Perception, but when I feel Pleaſure, or Pain, then I have a ſenſible Perception, or the Perception of a Sentiment. Than which nothing can be more diſtinct.

28. But the diſtinction will be yet more apparent when it is further remark'd that in Ideal Perception there is a great deal of Light and Evidence. When we contemplate Ideas we ſee both them and the Relations that are between them in a clear Light, and becauſe we do ſo we are accordingly ſaid to *know* and underſtand the Natures and Reaſons of Things. But now in ſenſible Perception (as alſo in Sentiment itſelf) there is nothing but Darkneſs and Obſcurity, there being hardly any thing clear to us in Sentiment beſides the *exiſtence* of it. And that indeed is moſt evident, for we are as certain of what we feel, as of any Ideal Truth that we know, and can as little doubt of it. But what the Nature of that Pleaſure or Pain is which we feel, or what that Modality of Soul is (as M. *Malebranche* ſpeaks) which makes the one or the other, that we know no more of, than if we had never felt either of them. Not but that this is an intelligible Thing, becauſe God knows it, and we our

ſelves may poſſibly know it hereafter, when we come to have a Sight (a great and ingaging Sight indeed) of that *Archetypal Idea*, upon which our Souls were form'd, the intellectual Mould, in which we were caſt, and which at preſent, for wiſe Reaſons, is hid from us. But that which I mean is that it is not intelligible by *Sentiment*, and that if ever we know it, it muſt be by Idea, and not by Sentiment that we can do ſo, *that* as ſuch, going no further than a certain Modality of our Being, without including any Knowledge, or Ideal Perception of it.

29. And becauſe there is ſuch clearneſs of Light and Evidence in Ideal Perception, and ſo much Darkneſs in Sentiment, therefore I conceive it is (which may be conſider'd as another Argument *a Poſteriori* for the diſtinguiſhing theſe Things) that I can make what I really perceive intelligible to another, only by directing him to thoſe Ideas which I contemplate, by ſome common Signs whereby we have agreed to expreſs or characterize them. For the Ideas themſelves being placed, as I may ſay, *in medio*, and viſible by a common Light to every intellectual Eye, he can contemplate them when directed to them as well as my ſelf; and therefore all that I have to do here to make what I conceive intelligible, is only by the uſe of certain outward Signs to ſet ſuch Ideas before him, or rather to turn his Attention to the Contemplation of them. But now in *Sentiment* the Caſe

Caſe is much otherwiſe. Here I cannot make what I *feel* intelligible to another by any Expreſſion I can uſe, were I never ſo great a Maſter of it. My Oratory may perhaps *pleaſe* him (if it be poſſible for me to be eloquent upon what I do not underſtand) but it cannot tell him what *Pleaſure* is. No verbal deſcription will reach this, but every Man muſt be left to *feel* it for himſelf, this being moſt truly and emphatically one of thoſe Things.

Dicere quæ nequeo verbis, & ſentio tantum.

And when he does feel it, he can know no more of it but what he feels, that is, that he is in Pleaſure, or in Pain, or at moſt, that Pleaſure is one Thing, and Pain another, becauſe he finds himſelf otherwiſe affected or modified in one of thoſe States of Being, than he does in the other; but what that modality of Being, is wherein either of theſe does conſiſt, (wherein lies the proper knowledge of Pleaſure or Pain) that Sentiment can never inform him, but after infinitely repeated Experiments will leave him as ignorant of, as he was before he ever made any. So that in this reſpect perhaps I need not ſcruple to ſay, That he that can *ſee*, knows no more of Light or Colour, than he that is *blind*.

30. Let me here remarque by the way, leſt I ſhould forget it, or not find a more proper place for it, that tho' I have hitherto uſed Sen-

timent and Senſation promiſcuouſly, yet if we will more nicely diſtinguiſh them, we may do it by ſaying that *Senſation* is a Perception upon ſome Impreſſion of outward Objects made upon the Body. For as the Power of receiving ſuch a Perception, by means of a certain Organical Texture of ſome parts of the Body, is what I would call *Senſe* (for ſure Senſe, as when we ſpeak of the Senſe of ſeeing, or the Senſe of hearing, cannot in the propriety of it be ſuppoſed to mean either the Perception itſelf, or the organical Texture, but the Power of having ſuch a Perception, by the mediation of ſuch a Texture) ſo the Perception itſelf which ariſes in the Mind, upon the Impreſſion of outward Objects on certain parts of the Body, whoſe Texture is aptly diſpoſed for it, is what I ſhould properly call *Senſation*. Whereas by *Sentiment* in the more ſtrict acceptation of it, I would rather underſtand the modal Being of the Soul at large, or any inward feeling, whereof it is conſcious to itſelf, whether occaſion'd by Impreſſions from without, or from within, or indeed without any Impreſſion upon the Body at all. For as, tho' all outward Impreſſions ſhould ceaſe, we might yet have certain *feelings* from the inward motion of the Spirits, ſo if both outward and inward ſhould ceaſe too, or if we had no *Bodies* at all, there is no doubt but that (if God pleaſe) our Souls might be modified as they are upon theſe Occaſions, and we might have the ſame inward

ward feelings of Pleasure or Pain, *&c.* as we have now. Which tho' we could not so properly call *Sensations*, as not proceeding from the occasion of the Body, yet we may call them *Sentiments* at large, as we now absolutely consider them, as certain Modalities of the Soul, distinct from our Ideal Perceptions.

31. But to proceed. To what we have said concerning the distinction of these Things, we may add this further consideration, that in Ideal Perception we are *active*. Not that I think we make or produce our Ideas any more than we do our Sentiments (I leave that Privilege to the *Intellectus Agens* of the Schools, to *inlighten* or to *modify* our selves, being as I conceive equally above us) but that as we have a Power of contemplating them, so in our Ideal Perception we do actually exert, and employ that Power. I do not deny but that there may be Passion in this, as well as Action. All that I do or need here affirm, is, that we are truly active in our Ideal Perceptions, which is no more than what our Experience will inform us whenever we please to reflect upon those two ways of Thinking, which we may observe in our selves. For sometimes the *Tone* of the Mind, as I may say, is so loose and unbent, that we think carelesly and at random, not preferring one intelligible Object before another, or regarding the Nature or Distinction of what we think of, but taking Ideas as they come in our way, or as the Spirits open-

ing

ing their Courſe thro' their beaten Tracks in the Brain happen to excite them, without conſidering what they are, or in what Order they ſucceed, or in what Relation they ſtand one to another. This indeed is *Thinking*, but ſo like that Thinking which we call *Dreaming*, that is, the Thinking in our Sleep, that were not the diſcovery more obvious to be made from the State of our Bodies, than of our Minds, it would not be very eaſy to diſtinguiſh, whether we were aſleep, or awake. And without doubt he that in convenient time and place, ſhould talk out ſuch Thoughts as theſe would be ſuppos'd to talk in his Sleep. But that which is more to my preſent purpoſe to obſerve, is, that tho' this be Thinking, yet there is ſo little application of the Mind in it, as to leave ſome room for doubting, whether in this way of Thinking, ſhe be active or no. But then again at other times, and upon more ingaging Occaſions, we find that we ſhake off this liſtleſneſs, *gird up* (even in this Senſe) *the loyns of our Minds*, and *ſet* our ſelves to Thinking, and are more earneſt and intenſe in our view of Things, as in that ſort of Thinking which we call *Study* or *Meditation*, which is known to employ the Soul, as much as the moſt toilſome labour does the Body, 'till the happy diſcovery of Truth, at once rewards and concludes the painful Enquiry. So that in this way of Ideal Perception, at leaſt I think 'tis hardly to be diſputed but that we are *active*. But now in

Sen-

Sentiment, that implying only a different ſtate or manner of our Being, and ſuch as we have no immediate Power to produce in our ſelves at Pleaſure, it ſeems to be very plain, both in the *Notion* and in the *Experience* of the Thing, that we are purely *Paſſive*.

32. *Paſſive*, but from what? This leads to the great Queſtion about the true efficient cauſe of our Sentiments, or Senſations (for I think we need not here diſtinguiſh them) concerning which, much might be ſaid, were I to handle it at large, but having done that already * elſewhere, and the more Philoſophical Minds beginning now to break through the prejudices of Senſe, into a clearer light and ſatisfaction concerning this matter, I ſhall touch upon it with the lighter Hand. That we are paſſive in our Senſations I here ſuppoſe, and I preſume, with allowance. The Queſtion is from what? To which I make no Scruple in the firſt place to anſwer, not from *our ſelves*, ſince *then* we ſhould be Active and not Paſſive. Beſides that we find we have no Power over our Senſations, either to cauſe them or to ſtop them when we will, and do frequently ſuffer ſome of them againſt our Will. That we have no immediate Power, is plain, that is, I mean to give or to remove from our ſelves, any Senſation by the bare act of either Willing, or Nilling it. All that we can do of this kind, is by the Mediation of Bo-

* See the 1ſt Diſcourſe of the 3d Vol.

Bodies, and their Impreſſions upon our Body. But then this ſhews that we have no true Power over our Souls to modify them as we pleaſe, and conſequently are not the proper cauſes of their Senſations (ſince if we were, we might produce them without the impreſſions of Bodies as well as with them) and will withal ſerve as a Clue, to direct us to that which is the true and real Cauſe of them. That is I mean, it will do it within the compaſs of a *Disjunction*. For ſince we cannot procure to our ſelves any Senſations, otherwiſe than by the application of bodily Motions and Impreſſions, this naturally ſuggeſts to us one of theſe two Thoughts, either that thoſe Bodies upon whoſe Impreſſions we have theſe Senſations, are indeed the true Cauſes that produce them, or that theſe Senſations are only poſitively annex'd to theſe Impreſſions, by the ſettled Will and Order of ſome other Being, who is the true Cauſe of them, as producing them upon thoſe Occaſions.

33. It has been generally taken for granted, even by thoſe from whom one would expect a better Reaſon for what they believe, than becauſe they have ever believ'd it, that Bodies are the real cauſes of thoſe Senſations which follow at their Preſence, and upon their Impreſſions. To ſupport which Opinion, I know no aſſignable Reaſon, but that they do ſo, according to that ſenſible Maxim, *Poſt hoc, ergo propter hoc*, which indeed is good Logick with the

the Vulgar, who have ſcarce any other notion of Cauſe and Effect, than one Things following upon another; but methinks ſhould not paſs for ſuch with the Learned, as indeed it does not in other caſes, in which they are ready enough to tell you that Concomitancy is no Argument for a cauſal Dependence of one thing upon another. As indeed a very little Logick will ſerve to ſatisfy any one that it is not.

34. But then as the Reaſon for this general Preſumption is not good, ſo there is plain Reaſon againſt it. Bodies have nothing in them but Figure, Motion, *&c.* and as this ſhews that they can have nothing in them like thoſe Sentiments which we feel at their Preſence, ſo it proves alſo that they cannot properly, and as efficient Cauſes, produce them in us. Since if they do produce them, it muſt be by Figure, and Motion, *&c.* But Figure, and Motion, *&c.* as they cannot riſe up to Thought in the Bodies themſelves, ſo neither is it poſſible they ſhould be able to produce it in us, unleſs we could ſuppoſe that a Cauſe might produce an effect of a more noble Order than itſelf, which is impoſſible. I leave my Reader to ſupply what is wanting to the form of the Argument, which when he does, he will ſee there is nothing wanting to the force of it.

35. Again

35. Again, let it be consider'd, that as there is no Proportion between Motion and Thought in general, between an Affection of Body, and a Sentiment of the Soul; so there is none between such a particular Motion, and such a particular Sentiment, between the Motion that is follow'd with Pleasure, suppose, and Pleasure, or between the Motion that is follow'd with Pain and Pain: For if there were, then the Motion that is follow'd with Pleasure should differ as much from the Motion which is follow'd with Pain, as one of these Sentiments differs from the other. But now these Sentiments differ *Essentially*; nay, even as Contraries; whereas the Motion that is follow'd with Pleasure, differs but in *Degree* from that which is follow'd with Pain. So that for any thing that is in the Motions themselves, that which is attended with one Sentiment, might as well be attended with its contrary, as having no peculiar aptness in its own Nature to produce one rather than the other. Whereby it plainly appears, that there is no Proportion between these Motions and their presum'd Effects, and consequently, that they are not the true Causes of them.

36. But to satisfie us at once that they are not, let it be further consider'd, that if Bodies be the efficient Causes of those Sensations, which we feel in the use of them, then Body must act upon Spirit. The Consequence, I presume, will not be denied, as depending upon

on these two plain Propositions, 1. That our Sensations are in our Spirits, Matter not being capable of any Thought. 2. That they cannot be produced there, but by that which acts upon them, it being obviously impossible that any Alteration or Effect should be wrought in any Being by that which does not act upon that Being. Whoever grants these two Propositions, as I conceive every one will that well considers them, cannot stand with me about the Consequences of our Argument. It remains then only to prove the Minor Proposition of it, that Body cannot act upon Spirit, which allowing the Notions we have of these two Beings (without which 'tis to no purpose to talk of them either one way or other) may, I think, be done with great Ease, Brevity and Clearness. Body can act only by Impulse, it can make an impulse only upon that which resists it. Spirit cannot resist Body, as being capable of Coexisting in the same *Ubi* with it; therefore Body cannot act upon Spirit. And if it cannot act upon it, then by vertue of the first Consequence it cannot cause any Sensation in it; since if it did, it must act upon it. Besides, Body can act only upon Body; for it can act only upon what it *touches*, and it can touch nothing but Body, according to that of *Lucretius*, *Tangere enim & tangi nisi Corpus nulla potest res.*

37. More I might add, but these few Considerations, among many others that crowd for admittanec

mittance in so copious an Argument, may be sufficient to shew, that Bodies are not the Causes of our Sensations. And yet, that we regularly have them upon their Impressions, is as plain, by *Experience*, as the other is by *Reason*. It follows then, that they are only positively annex'd to them by the settled Will and establish'd Order of some other Being. That is, in other Words, that Bodies are only the *Conditions* or *Occasions* of our Sensations, but that some other Being is the true Efficient *Cause* of them.

38. Who that Being is, we need not either go far to seek, or seek far to find. He must be a Spiritual Being in the first place; this being an Effect, as we have shewn beyond the Order and Proportion of Body to produce. He must again be a Being that fully and thoroughly understands our Frame, and that has an efficacious Power to work upon it, and change the State and Manner of it. Besides he must know all the Motions of Bodies, and the very Critical Moment, when they make any Impressions upon ours; the precise Degree of the Impression, and the very Instant when it ceases. The Moment, that he may know exactly when to give us a Sensation. The *Degree*, that he may know both how to *Specify* it, and how to *Proportion* it. The *Ceasing* of it, that he may know when to withdraw his Hand, and suspend the Operation, that so the Impression and the Sensation may begin and end together. All this he must have a perfect Knowledge of, and that at all

Times

Times, and in all Places of the World, and throughout the vaſt number of Rational Creatures that are in it, that ſo they may all Communicate in the ſame Senſations upon the like Impreſſions. But now what Being can we ſuppoſe duly qualify'd for all this; but a Being of infinite Knowledge and of an Almighty Power, and whoſe Will is infallibly effective, of whatſoever his Wiſdom approves and preſcribes? And indeed who ſo fit to modify our Beings, or change the State or Manner of their Exiſtence, as the great Author of them, the Divine Artiſt that made them, and who ſees in thoſe intelligible Reaſons, thoſe Ideal Meaſures whereby he made them, of what Modifications they are capable?

39. Whatever then the inveterate prejudice of Senſe, or thoſe forward Judgments which Men from their Infancy (when their Senſations are ſtrong and their Reaſon weak) are wont to make upon it, may ſuggeſt to the contrary, our Reaſon and Philoſophy muſt conclude, tho' it be call'd *New* for ſo doing, that God only is the cauſe of our Senſations, and that the Movements of the Body do not act upon the Soul any otherwiſe than by his Will; that is, I mean, any otherwiſe than as he has Eſtabliſhed into a ſettled Law, to touch the Soul with certain Sentiments or Feelings, as often as exteriour Objects ſhall make certain Impreſſions upon the Body. And as the Movements of the Body are only occaſions of certain Thoughts in the

Soul; ſo whether the Thoughts of the Soul are not alſo in the like Proportion, only occaſions of the Movements of the Body, according to that Law of Reciprocation which the *Carteſians* ſuppoſe between theſe two Principles of our Compoſition, and wherein they make their *Union* to conſiſt, I leave to be conſidered. It ſeems very ſtrange, that the Soul, which has no immediate Power over the leaſt Body in the Univerſe, ſhould yet be able, by a bare act of her Will, ſo freely and readily to move her *own*: For if ſhe does really move her own, why is it that ſhe cannot move others, that are equally moveable, as well? You'll ſay, becauſe ſhe is not ſo *united* to others, as to her own. Yes, every whit as much united to others as to her own, if by Union you mean any real Contact, or Coheſion of Subſtances, ſince ſhe is ſo United to neither. But if by *United* you mean, which ſeems to be the only intelligible Notion of the Union of Soul and Body, that there is a poſitive Connexion eſtabliſhed by the Author of Nature, between the Thoughts of the one, and the Motions of the other, then I confeſs ſhe is not ſo United to other Bodies as to her own; but then muſt not you confeſs again in your turn, that according to this her Thoughts, are not the proper *Cauſes*, but only the Occaſions of thoſe Motions, ſince if they were, the Queſtion will ſtill return, Why can't ſhe move other Bodies as well?

40. But

40. But ſuppoſe the Soul's Ability to move that Portion of Matter, which is call'd her Body, were in any Senſe accountable by her *Union* with it; yet what ſhall we ſay as to the particular *Kinds* of thoſe Motions, and the *Determination* of them? That what I Eat and Drink cannot digeſt, and that what is digeſted cannot be turn'd into Blood, Spirits, and Fleſh without certain inteſtine Motions, this I well know: But what kind of Motions thoſe are by which this great Work of the Animal Oeconomy is carried on, that I know not; and were it to ſtay for the orders of my Will before it were perform'd, it would never be done. And ſo again, to the Motion of any one of my Fingers, 'tis neceſſary that the Spirits be directed preciſely to that Finger which I would have moved. But can the Soul, which is ignorant of the interiour Mechaniſm of her own Body among ſuch a multitude of Pipes and Chanels, determine the Spirits ſo exactly and ſo inſtantaneouſly through that very Nerve, and to that very Muſcle which ſerves for that purpoſe? And is it not then neceſſary, that this ſhould be done by a more skilful and infallible Conduct, that ſo I may not will the Motion of ſuch a Finger in vain? And is it not hence reaſonable to conclude, that tho' the motion of my Finger does indeed follow upon my willing, that it ſhould be moved; yet that my Will is not the true and proper *Cauſe*, but only the Occaſion or Condition of that Motion? But my Subject re-

calls me from going on any further with this. I only Occasionally hint these few things, leaving the Pursuance of them to those who have Leisure and Inclination to enter upon a Speculation, which would afford no ordinary Entertainment to a Philosophical Mind, nor advantage to the most useful of all Sciences, that I mean, of *Knowing ones self.*

41. But whatever Power the Soul may be allow'd to have over her Body, yet I can by no means think it consistent either with the Spiritual Nature of our Souls, or that Natural Immortality which is founded upon it, that Bodies should be able to act upon *them.* And I would desire those who are so forward to ascribe our Sensations to Bodies, as the real efficient Causes of them, heedfully to consider, whether the distinction of Soul and Body, can be preserv'd, or the Immortality of the former can be maintain'd upon that Supposition. For my part, I think 'tis but too evident that it cannot. Body can act only upon Body, and therefore if Body can act upon my Soul, is it not then plain that my Soul is Corporeal? I know not how to separate the consequence from the Principle, and must accordingly look upon it not only as absurd, but as Impious, and as little reconcileable to the Interests of *Religion*, as to *Philosophical* Truth. And I cannot but wonder that since the consequence is so generally and justly disclaim'd, the Principle from whence it so clearly, necessarily, and immediately follows,

lows, ſhould be in ſuch Credit and Allowance. But, *Tanta eſt vis veternoſarum Opinionum, & diu defenſæ atq; Creditæ falſitatis*, as St. *Auſtin* ſpeaks.

42. Perhaps my Admiration may proceed from my Ignorance. But however give me leave to wonder again, that Men, who in other Reſpects, ſeem to want no due Senſe of the Excellency of humane Nature, and are indeed ſo jealous of the Dignity of their Souls, as not to allow Beaſts to ſhare with them in that *Reaſon* which is made their Character and Privilege, (tho' they will not deny them ſome degrees of Thought) ſhould yet ſo far degrade them at the ſame time, as to ſubject them, and, as it were, *Proſtitute* them to *Bodies*, and make them depend upon them for their well or ill Being. I ſay, to make Bodies ſo far above them, as to have it in their power to do them Good or Hurt, to give them Pleaſure or Pain, to make the ſtate of their Being better or worſe; in one word, to be the Authors of their Happineſs, or of their Miſery. There are Conſequences of no very friendly Aſpect to Religion, that may be drawn from this part alſo: But leaving them, as obvious to the Conſideration of my Reader, that which I reflect upon at preſent, is only that Men ſhould ſo ſtrangely degrade themſelves of their Natural Eminence, as to ſubmit their Souls to the Power and Operation of Bodies. But what is it that the Pride of human Nature will not do? Or to what low Degrees of *Voluntary Humility*

will it not condescend, rather than acknowledge our dependance upon God in the whole State and Manner of our Being, as well as in Being it self?

43. Not but that some have ventured very far in questioning the *latter*. For tho' they could not but own (because indeed the very Infirmity of their Nature confesses it) that they depend upon God as to the first derivation or receiving of their Being from him, yet they can dispute whether they do or no, and think it too much that they should, as to the continual upholding and preservation of that Being; and as to the Divine Co-operation and Concourse with them in all their Actions, tho' perhaps it be demonstrable upon Metaphysical Grounds, that the very Notion of a Creature includes both. But however there is something peculiar in this Case, that lessens the strangeness of it. Men question or deny their dependance upon God *here*, because they fansie, that if once made, and indued with such and such Powers, they are then sufficient of *themselves* to set up for Being and Operation, and so dismiss their Maker from any further attendance upon them, as having no occasion for him. But now in the other Case that concerns our *manner* of Being, I know none that pretend (as indeed there is no Foundation for it) to be the *Authors* of their own *Sensations*. Here 'tis plain they must own themselves to be *Passive*, and to owe a Dependance somewhere. But alas (such is the Corruption

of

of humane Nature) we are generally too far from God to be willing that he ſhould be ſo near unto us, that in him we ſhould Live, Move, and have our whole Being. And therefore rather than acknowledge our ſelves dependent upon *Him* for our Senſations, we take hold, as Men in Diſtreſs, of *Primum Obvium*, what firſt comes in our way, and aſcribe them to Bodies, without conſidering how much we debaſe our ſelves by ſo doing, or the no Proportion between ſuch *Cauſes* and ſuch *Effects*. The ſum then of the whole Matter will come to this: If the Soul be Body, it can have no ſuch thing as Senſation, becauſe Matter is not capable of Thought. But if (what on both ſides is ſuppoſed) it be a Spiritual Subſtance, then it cannot receive it from Body. Tho' then Bodies may be the Cauſes of thoſe Impreſſions which are made upon our Bodies; and thoſe Impreſſions may be occaſions of thoſe Sentiments which we feel in our Souls, yet 'tis God only who is the true Cauſe that produces them upon thoſe occaſions.

44. And that with a Conduct that carries in it the Marks and Expreſſes of infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs, as well as of Power. For it being neceſſary for the Natural Preſervation of that Body to which my Soul is United, and in whoſe welfare ſhe is concerned, that ſhe ſhould not be wholly ignorant of what is done to it by thoſe various impreſſions which other Bodies, according to the Laws of Motion, eſta-

bliſhed in the World make upon it; and that becauſe theſe different impreſſions of other Bodies have different Effects upon hers; ſome of them tending to its Good, and ſome to its Hurt; by *Hurt*, meaning not the Sentiment of Hurt, but only the Diſſolution of its Structure, or the Diſorder of the *Machine*, ſo as to indiſpoſe it either wholly, or in part, for the Functions of Life: I ſay, upon theſe Conſiderations it being neceſſary that I ſhould know, if not what Bodies are in themſelves; yet what they are to me, or what Relation they have to my Body, as to the Mechanical Good or Evil of it, that ſo I may either joyn my ſelf to them, or avoid them, as there ſhall be occaſion. And there being again but two poſſible ways of knowing this, either by Ideal Perception, or by Sentiment; that is, either by examining and conſidering the Nature or Internal Conſtitution of other Bodies, the Contexture of their Parts, Bulk, Figure, Degree of Motion, *&c.* together with the Relation or Proportion that all theſe bear to the Make and Temper of my own Body, or by having a different *Feeling* within, as the Impreſſion is which is made without, my Soul receiving a new Modification as that of her Body is alter'd by the incurſion of other Bodies. And the firſt of theſe Ways, beſides its being too anxious and ingaging, and apt to detain the Soul (which was made for higher Imployments) too much in the Contemplation of things beneath her, being alſo too ſlow and tedious,

(ſince

(since if I were not to quit the Fire till I had gone through the Philosophy of it, I should be burnt) and by reason of the invincible Difficulties of it, and the numerous returns of the occasions no way united to the Proportion of our narrow Faculties; and indeed, to say all at once, utterly *impracticable*, it was necessary I should be advertized of the Relations other Bodies bear to mine, and of the Congruity and Discongruity of their Impressions, by a quicker and more compendious Method. And accordly the Wise and Good Author of my Being has not left it to my Reason to explore the Nature of sensible Objects, and thence to conclude what Effects they would have upon a Body so disposed as mine is (which if *possible* could not be done without infinite trouble) but has established some general Laws, whereby upon certain Impressions, I find my self touch'd with certain Sentiments, preventing all use of Thought or Consideration about the occasions of them: Which Sentiments, because Pleasure and Pain are the Natural Marks of Good and Evil, are either Easy or Uneasy, Pleasing or Displeasing, according as the difference of the Impression requires.

45. I say, as the Difference of the Impression requires. For tho' there be no Proportion in general between Motion and Sensation, and tho' there be nothing in the particular Impressions themselves resembling those particular Sensations, which we have in Consequence of them

them; the Impreſſion which is follow'd with Pleaſure, differing only in Degree from that which is follow'd with Pain; yet foraſmuch as in reference to the good or bad State of the Body they differ *Eſſentially*, as putting the parts of the Machine into divers Configurations, naturally tending to the Preſervation or Diſſolution of it: It is fit that theſe Impreſſions, tho' only gradually different in themſelves, and ſo of themſelves indifferent to any Sentiment, or none at all, ſhould yet be attended with Senſations Eſſentially, or Specifically different, ſuch as Pleaſure and Pain, as much as if there were all that Natural Correſpondence or Connexion between them that is commonly imagin'd.

46. This ſuggeſts to us at once an occaſion to move a Queſtion, and a Meaſure whereby to reſolve it. It may here be demanded, Are then the Impreſſions of Bodies merely Poſitive and Arbitrary Conditions of our Senſations; or is there not rather a kind of ſenſible *Congruity* between the one and the other? To which, according to the premiſed Account, I Anſwer, That they are only *Conditions* in oppoſition to a proper Cauſal Efficency, is, I think, what may abſolutely be affirm'd. But whether purely Poſitive and Arbitrary or no, muſt be anſwer'd by a Diſtinction. If by purely Poſitive and Arbitrary Conditions be meant, that there is no real Analogy, or (abſtracting from the Divine Order and Conſtitution about it) neceſſary Connexion between ſuch Impreſſions, and ſuch

ſuch Senſations; ſo they are purely Poſitive and Arbitrary Conditions. For moſt aſſuredly there is nothing in thoſe Impreſſions that either reſembles the following Senſations, or that Naturally and Neceſſarily infers them. But if by their being purely Poſitive and Arbitrary Conditions be meant, that there is no greater *Reaſon* why God in Conſideration of the good of the Body, ſhould touch the Soul with ſuch a Sentiment upon ſuch an Impreſſion, rather than with another, or with its contrary; in this reſpect as I do not, ſo I need not ſay, that they are purely Poſitive and Arbitrary Conditions, ſince that *greater Reaſon* is taken, not from the Relation which the Impreſſion has to the Sentiment (which is none at all), but only from the Relation which ſuch a Sentiment has to ſuch a State or Diſpoſition of the Body, which ſuppoſing it is the Will of God to have preſerved, it is neceſſary he ſhould give me ſuch a Sentiment as ſhall naturally admoniſh me to avoid whatever Impreſſion is injurious to it, tho' there be *otherwiſe* no manner of *Congruity* between that Sentiment and that Impreſſion.

47. And thus we have ſeen what Senſation is, how it differs from Idea, and whence it proceeds; but before we diſmiſs the Conſideration of it, I think it would be a great Omiſſion here not to remark that the *Errors* of the *Senſes* (as they are more commonly than properly called) are indeed nothing elſe but thoſe wrong Judgments which we make upon our Senſations

ons or ſenſible Perceptions, or elſe truely I know not what to underſtand by them, but muſt reckon it among ſome other forms of ſpeaking, which tho' cuſtomarily uſed, or for that reaſon preſumed to be well underſtood, are yet without any diſtinct or intelligible meaning. For Error being no more nor no leſs than a wrong Judgment, 'tis impoſſible that Senſe ſhould be ſtrictly capable of erring, as having no Capacity of Judgment belonging to it. That therefore which is call'd an Error of Senſe, is really an Error of the Mind, giving a falſe Judgment upon the occaſion of what is truely perceiv'd. For as Error in the general is a wrong Judgment, ſo then 'tis an *Error* of *Senſe* (to ſpeak as the World does) when this wrong Judgment proceeds in Conſequence of a Senſation, of which ſenſible Errors we may conſider two ſorts, ſome that reſpect the Objects without us, and ſome that reſpect the Senſation it ſelf. The former are they that are the Subjects of Common Diſcourſe, and 'tis what People generally mean when they talk of the Errors of the Senſes. But tho' the former ſort of ſenſible Errors be moſt *talkt* of, yet the latter is that which Men are moſt guilty of, and which I take to be of the moſt conſiderable Conſequence. Not that there is any room for Error, or poſſibility of erring as to Senſation, abſolutely and in it ſelf conſider'd. For what I feel, or am conſcious of to my ſelf that I feel, that I do certainly feel, and conſequently cannot err in judging

judging that I feel it; as neither can I in judging that I feel Pleaſure, when indeed I feel Pain, or that I feel Heat, when indeed I feel Cold, not becauſe ſuch a Judgment would not be an Error, but becauſe 'tis impoſſible I ſhould ſo *judge*, and that becauſe theſe Sentiments wherewith my Soul is modify'd, are as diſtinct from one another, as are any of the Modalities of Matter; as a Circle ſuppoſe is from a Square, and therefore I cannot miſtake one for the other. So that in this reſpect *Sentiment* is every whit as clear as *Idea*; when therefore I ſpeak of thoſe Errors of Senſe that reſpect the Senſation it ſelf, I would be underſtood of Senſation *Relatively* conſider'd, or with Relation to external Objects. The firſt of which Errors is (that which we have been already Confuting) to ſuppoſe that our Senſations do proceed from thoſe Objects, as the real Effects of them, becauſe 'tis at their Preſence, and in conſequence of their Impreſſions that we have them, which is an Error of much greater Abſurdity (beſides the badneſs of its Conſequences) than to fancy a Body that is Cubical to be round, becauſe it is in ſome degrees of diſtance, an occaſion of that appearance; or than when one thing by the tranſpoſition of one's Fingers ſhall ſeem two, *&c.* This latter being only an Error in *Fact*, or concerning a *Contingent* Truth, in thinking that to be which really is not, whereas the other is an Error in *Theory* or concerning a *Neceſſary* Truth, in thinking that to be which is *Ideally* impoſſible.

48. But

48. But there is another Error with reſpect to the Senſation it ſelf, of no leſs Abſurdity, nor better Conſequence, than the former, and that is when we attribute our Senſations to Bodies, not I mean as the *Cauſes*, but as the *Subjects* of them, by ſuppoſing that there are certain Qualities in Bodies, reſembling thoſe Sentiments which we have by their occaſion; ſo making that which in reality is only a Sentiment in our ſelves to become a ſenſible Quality in *them*, and ſo transferring, as it were, our Sentiments from our ſelves to *them*. A ſtrange Confuſion, and yet ſo very ordinary, that the generality of Mankind never think otherwiſe, and are withal ſo uncapable of having other apprehenſions, that inſtead of being better inform'd by your Philoſophy, they ſhall be ready to think you mad if you tell them that there is no heat in Fire, no ſweetneſs in Sugar, no taſte in Salt, no ſmell in a Roſe, no light in the Air, no colour in the Rain-bow, *&c.* And yet not a Man of theſe will ſay, if he conſiders what he ſays, that there is any *Pain* in a Needle or a Knife. But why ſo? Do they not feel Pain when a Knife cuts them, as well as Heat when they approach the Fire? Yes, all a-like; but they ſee the Bulk and Figure of the Knife, and how it pierces and enters into their Fleſh, they ſee the preſumed Cauſe of the Sentiment which affects their Souls, and the real Cauſe of the Impreſſion which is made upon their Bodies, and accordingly dream of nothing beyond what appears

appears; whereas the Particles of the Fire being too minute to be ſenſibly diſcern'd, and ſo the manner of the Impreſſion (tho' really as mechanical as the other) being here indiſcoverable, they preſently have recourſe (as 'tis Natural to do in all Caſes, where we are ignorant of the true Cauſe of any effect) to a certain *Occult Quality* in the Fire, call'd *Heat*, reſembling, as they imagine, the ſentiment of Heat, whereof they are conſcious in themſelves. And accordingly 'tis obſervable, that this imagination, as common as it is, obtains only as to *Inſenſible* Bodies, and never where the parts that make the Impreſſion, and the Motion whereby they make it ſenſibly appear. For who ever thought of any thing like Pleaſure in a *Feather* that tickles his Hand? The Ruſtick here is as far from any ſuch Imagination as the fineſt *Carteſian* of 'em all. And yet every body almoſt imagines a ſweet Smell, as ſomething inherent in a *Roſe*. And why? but only becauſe the parts that make the impreſſion upon the Hand are viſibly perceiv'd; whereas thoſe that ſtrike the Nerves and Fibres of the Noſe are not. And ſo here our Ignorance takes Refuge in a *Quality*, which in the other caſe the moſt fanciful Head never thought of. But then this ſerves to lay open the whole Fallacy of the Matter; as alſo to diſcover how inconſiſtent Men are with themſelves, ſince they cannot attribute Heat to Fire, or Sweetneſs to a Roſe, upon any Principle that will not equally oblige them

to

to aſcribe Pain to a Knife, or Pleaſure to a Feather, there being the ſame Reaſon for the one that is for the other.

49. But indeed there is Reaſon for neither; for if we examine the Nature of Bodies either by our Senſes, or by our Underſtandings, we ſhall find there none of thoſe things which upon their impreſſion we *feel* in our *ſelves*, and by a falſe and confuſe Judgment upon that Senſation aſcribe to *them*, there being nothing either Viſible or Conceivable in *them* but only Magnitude, Figure, Motion, Contexture of Parts, *&c.* And therefore, tho' partly for Brevity and Diſpatch-ſake, and partly to comply with the uſe of Converſation, we call one Hot, and another Sweet, *&c.* becauſe we ſhould not be underſtood by the World if we did not ſpeak its Language; yet 'tis plain, that theſe and the like Denominations can ſignify nothing really in Bodies: I will not ſay, with the Author of Humane Underſtanding, but a *Power* to produce theſe Senſations in us, it being as clear and evident as any thing can well be in Philoſophy, that they have no ſuch Power: But this I ſay, that they can ſignify nothing intelligibly in Bodies, but only ſuch a Contexture of Parts as is naturally apt to make ſuch an Impreſſion, not as has any Likeneſs or Congruity with ſuch a Sentiment, but with which, according to the poſitive eſtabliſhment of that Almighty Being at whoſe diſpoſal we ſtand, ſuch a Sentiment is annex'd. Thus Heat as it

is

is in the Fire, is not such a Heat as we feel (for then we must suppose it to have Sense and Perception) but only that which occasions that Heat which we feel. And so Light in the Sun is not the sentiment of Light, but that which occasions that Sentiment. And what that is, is the business of Philosophy to consider. But as to the *Sentiment* of Light that cannot be defined or described, but must be felt only; which plainly shews, that these are two things. But then tho' this argues a great Defect in our Knowledge, that we cannot make intelligible by a Definition, what we feel, as well as what we Ideally perceive; yet there is this to comfort our Ignorance, that our Philosophy of *Bodies* may be compleat without it, since these things as they are in *Sentiment* do not belong to *Bodies*.

49. This is easily conceivable in all those sensible Qualities which are usually ascribed to them, and lookt upon as inherent in them, except only in *Colour*. And here indeed in those that are not far advanced in Speculation and as far removed from Prejudice, Imagination will be apt to stand out against the Answers of the purest Reason, and to revolt from her Authority, representing *Colour*, at least as something really inherent in Bodies, as being unwilling to divest them of what is so charming and agreeable. The Ground of the illusion is, because Colour belongs to *Vision*; wherein, as was before observed, there is a Concomitancy of Idea

with Sentiment, whereas in our other Senſes there is only the latter. Now the never failing Concomitancy of theſe two things in Viſion, makes us apt to confound one with the other, what we feel with what we ſee, or Ideally perceive, and ſo to make our Sentiment enter into the formality of our Idea, and to conſider it as an Eſſential part of it. And ſince we Naturally refer our Ideas to the Objects that are without us, thinking that we ſee the Objects when indeed we ſee only the Ideas that repreſent them, this makes that we refer our Sentiments with them; and accordingly the Object, beſides its proper Nature or Eſſence, becomes inveſted with a ſenſible Quality, and we think we ſee this or that *Colour* in it, as plainly as we do the Object it ſelf.

50. And thus our Imagination has dreſs'd up a fine notional Being (for indeed I look upon theſe ſenſible Qualities, as ſubjected in Bodies, to be as much *Entia Rationis*, as any of thoſe which paſs for ſuch in the account of the Schools) and we cannot well blame her if ſhe grow fond of, and loth to part with a *Creature* of her own, and that ſo beautiful a one too. But if we can but obtain leave of our Prejudices (with which perhaps we have no Conteſt ſo great as in the preſent inſtance) to conſider things rationally and freely, we ſhall find that what we call *Colour* in Bodies; and for the ſake of which we are ſo paſſionately affected to ſome of them, is indeed no natural Reality of theirs, but

but only an artificial Paint or Varnish of our own Fancies: For however things may appear to us, by reason of our mixing our Sentiments with our Ideas, we have no reason to think that there is any thing in Bodies besides Bulk, Motion, Figure, Texture of Parts, *&c.* Nor consequently that there is any such thing as *Colour* in them, as that signifies any *Modification* of Matter distinct from the other.

51. Colour then in Bodies can mean nothing else but the Texture of their Parts; nor can that Texture be said to be Colour any otherwise than *Fundamentally* speaking, in as much as by reason of that Texture they have an aptness; I do not say to make an Impression themselves, but so to return a certain fine Matter to our Eyes, as shall make such an Impression upon them, as by the Institution of Nature, or rather Will of its Author, shall serve to excite in us the sense of Colour. For I must note something peculiar again in this Sentiment that is not in the rest. The sense of Heat, Sweetness, *&c.* is occasioned by the immediate impression of those Bodies, which are denominated Hot, Sweet, *&c.* but the sense of Colour is not occasioned immediately by the Bodies said to be Colour'd, but 'tis by the immediate Impression of some other Matter of a much finer Consistence, that this Sense is excited, to which the Bodies said to be Colour'd, contribute no otherwise than as they are, by reason of their Texture, the Ground of that Impression;

which Remark is the more worthy to be obſerved, becauſe, when it is ſo, it will ſerve to ſet two Propoſitions in an intelligible View, which otherwiſe appear not only very Confuſe, but Inconſiſtent. As ſuppoſe, when we ſay, That Colour is the Texture of Bodies, and that Colour is the Reflection of Light. Theſe accounts of Colour ſeem too different to be both true, and yet the difference is not ſo great, but what a diſtinction will reconcile. If we ſpeak of the remote and mediate Occaſion, then Colour is the Texture of Bodies; that is, 'tis the Texture of Bodies into which the Senſe or Sentiment of Colour is to be reſolv'd, as its ultimate Ground and Foundation. But if we ſpeak of the next and immediate Occaſion, then 'tis as true to ſay that Colour is the Reflection of Light, ſince it is that which, in its return from the reflecting Bodies, makes that immediate Impreſſion, upon which the ſenſe of *Colour* ariſes in us, and which we ſhould have, tho' there were no ſuch Bodies in the World (which ſhews that Colour is not in *them*) ſuppoſing that fine Matter could be ſo objected to our Eyes, as it is now. But ſince it cannot, 'tis neceſſary there ſhould be ſuch Bodies, without which we ſhould have the ſenſe of *Light* only, and not of *Colour*.

52. For Colour ſeems to be the ſame with Light, only with ſome Addition or Improvement, and to differ no otherwiſe than *Modally* from it. For as a certain ſubtile Matter in its direct

direct Incidency, is Light; that is, I mean, *Materially* considered, as serving to excite in us the Sentiment of Light, which, in contradistinction to the other, may be call'd Light *Formal*, so the very same subtile Matter in its return, as it rebounds to the Eye from some other Matter, that will not transmit it (therefore call'd *Opake*) is *Colour*, as serving by the difference of the impression, to affect us with a different Sensation, and as the Texture of the Body is that returns it, it is *such* or *such* a Colour. So that Colour seems to be only a Modification of Light, resulting from the change of its direct Incidence, into a Reflex one; and as the Modification differs, so is the difference of the Colour. And accordingly we find, that as when there is no *Light*, or no *Body* to reflect it, or which comes to the same, such a one as by the *right* Situation of its Pores, transmits instead of reflecting it (therefore call'd *Transparent*) there is no Colour at all; so when the Texture of the Body that reflects it is changed, it thereby assumes a *different* Colour, which seems even sensibly to demonstrate that Colour, with the whole difference of it is to be resolved into the Texture of Bodies, as its ultimate Ground. And indeed 'tis not conceivable according to the Ideas we have of Bodies, how a piece of Red Cloth should differ from one that is Blue, as such, any otherwise than in that its minute Parts lie in a different Position, whereby the Light being return'd after a different manner,

makes a different Impreſſion, and by that occaſions a different Sentiment, which perhaps may be almoſt as intelligible an account of Colour, as to ſay, either that 'tis *Id quod Movet Perſpicuum Actu*, or that 'tis *Terminus Perſpicui in Corpore Terminato.*

53. But to ſtrike a through Light into this whole matter at once: There are three things in Colour, which tho' few conſider as diſtinct, are yet very carefully to be diſtinguiſhed by every one that will have a right Conception of it. There is *1ſt.* of all the Impreſſion: There is *2dly.* the Sentiment that follows the Impreſſion: And there is *3dly.* a certain Texture of Parts in the Body, ſaid to be coloured, which is the ground of the Impreſſion, and whereby it is Modified. Now the Impreſſion is *from* Body, and the Texture is *in* it; but as for the *Sentiment* of Colour, or Colours, as we ſenſe it, that is neither from Body nor in Body, but in the Mind. And this account of Colour (allowing only for the diſadvantage of my Expreſſion, which upon few occaſions I have found ſo difficult to make clear, as upon the preſent) I think to be very right as to the general notion of it; and if we could but go ſo far into the *Detail*, as to define in particular what *kind* of *Texture* or *Impreſſion* that is upon which the diverſity of Colours depends (towards which *Deſcartes* has made great openings in that Mechanical and truly admirable Explication which he gives us of the *Rain-bow*) there would be

be nothing further wanting to make the Doctrine of Colour perfect, that is, I mean as it relates to the *Object*, which is as far as our Philosophy is concern'd, or at least can with modesty pretend to go. For as for Colour, consider'd as a *Sentiment*, so it is to be felt only, and not disputed, and that an Idiot can do as well as a Philosopher.

54. But which of these two was he, if one may be so bold as to ask, that first found out that memorable division of Colours into *Real* and *Apparent*? I know which perhaps I should be tempted most to suspect, if I did not meet with it in some otherwise considerable Philosophers, according to whom that Colour is apparent, only which arises from the various Reflection of Light, as suppose in the Clouds, or in the Rain-bow. And that Real which is in the Subject, and remains there even when the Light is taken away, tho' it cannot be seen without it, as suppose in Gold, or any other mixt Body. What strange distinctions do some Men make only for want of *Distinguishing*? For if Colour be taken *formally*, as it is in Sentiment, then 'tis plain, that all Colours in all Bodies, of what kind soever, are only Apparent, Fictitious or Imaginary, there being, as we have shown, no such thing really in them. But if Colour be taken materially, only for a certain Contexture of Parts, which so modifies that Reflection of Light, which an Opake Body makes (for 'tis not the Texture, but the Body that makes the

Reflection (the Texture only modifies it) as to be an occaſion of ſuch a Sentiment; in this ſenſe all Colours are real, even thoſe which they call apparent, or elſe how come they to *appear?* For that they could not do without ſuch a certain Reflection of Light, as there could be no ſuch Reflection, unleſs the Body that returned it had ſuch a Texture. So that in this reſpect (which is the only one wherein we can allow any ſuch thing as Colours in Bodies) there is no difference, as to *reality*, between the colour of the *Rain-bow* and that of a *Diamond*, tho', as to *duration*, it be more permanent in the one than in the other, or having parts that will hold longer in the ſame poſture for the reflection of Light after the ſame manner. For indeed the Colour of the Diamond is as much owing to the reflection of *Light* as that of the Rain-bow.

55. But are there then no Colours in the *Dark?* Yes, the Philoſophers of the School will tell you that there are, tho' we do not ſee them. And indeed having preſumed Colours to be ſomething really exiſting in Bodies, 'tis but a purſuance of their Principle to ſay that they are in the Dark, ſince it would be a ſtrange kind of Reality that is extinct with every ſetting, and revives again with every riſing Sun. But if one ſhould aſſume the boldneſs to ask them, how they come to know that there are any Colours in the Dark, ſince they do not then ſee them? They can give no other An-

ſwer

ſwer but what depends upon the thing in diſpute, *viz.* The *Reality* of thoſe Colours, which ſince we have ſhewn to be a mere Imagination, 'tis plain that the other can be no better. But to anſwer this Queſtion a little more diſtinctly, 'tis certain we cannot have the *Senſation* of Colour in the Dark, ſince the having this Senſation depends upon an Impreſſion which *Light* only can make. But as for Colour in *Bodies*, I ſuppoſe they have juſt as much in the Dark as they have in the Light, and no more. For if Colour be taken formally according to that appearance which it has in our Sentiment of it, ſo it is not in Bodies in the Dark: Not as if the Darkneſs did deprive them of it, as ſome may be apt to interpret that of the Poet.-----*Nox abſtulit atra Colores*, which is better Poetry than Philoſophy, if underſtood of any thing but our *Senſations)* but becauſe they never had it. For Colour, in the formality of it, is not in Bodies in the Dark, nor in the Light neither, nor indeed at all. But if by Colour in Bodies be meant no more than ſuch a Texture or Diſpoſition of their Parts, 'tis true, we may ſuppoſe them to retain the ſame *Texture* in the Dark, or elſe we ſhould not, by their occaſion, have the Senſation of the ſame Colours upon the return of Light. But then this will ſignifie no more than that ſuch Colours are in them only *Fundamentally*; that is, that there is that in them in the Dark, which will occaſion in us the ſenſe of ſuch or ſuch Colours in the Light. And

they

they have my leave to multiply as many of these Colours in Bodies as they please, whether in the Light or in the Dark, since diversity of Colours, as it relates to Bodies, can signifie no other than diversity of Texture. And if by these Principles that part of Beauty which is made to consist in *Complexion*, as they call it, be more fatally ruin'd than by the unkindest Disease, and all that is real in it be reduced to *Feature* or *Proportion*, I hope the Sex that is no less distinguish'd by Goodness than Beauty, will pardon the rudeness of a Philosopher, whose severe Obligations to Truth will not allow him to be so complaisant in his Representations, as the *Painter* or the *Looking-glass*.

56. I conclude therefore that none of those sensible Qualities which the Philosophy of the School, as well as the Imagination of the Vulgar is pleased to attribute to Bodies, such as Heat, Cold, Sweetness, Bitterness, Smells, Tasts, *&c.* nor even *Colour* among the rest (tho' that seems to shew the fairest pretence of any of them all) have any real existence in Bodies. And yet 'tis as certain on the other hand, that they are not self-subsistent Beings, but must be conceiv'd to depend upon something else as their Subject; that is, they are not Substances, but modes or manners of Being. And since they are not Modifications of Bodies (which if our Ideas of them are true, are capable of no other than Figure and Motion) it follows, that

that they are indeed Modifications of our Minds or *Sentiments*.

57. Indeed we need not argue after this manner, if we had as clear an Idea of our Souls as we have of Body. For then, as we only conſult the Idea of Body to know what Modifications it is capable of, and do not argue thus, Figure is not a Modification of Spirit, therefore it is a Modification of Body: So to know what are the Modifications of our Spirit, or of what it is capable, we need only directly conſult its Idea, and not uſe ſuch an indirect way of proceeding as to reaſon thus. The ſenſible Qualities which Philoſophers ſpeak of, are not Modifications of Body, and therefore they are Modifications of our Spirit, or Sentiments. *Deſcartes* indeed contends, that the Mind is more evidently known or knowable than the Body, which I ſhall not ſtick to grant him as to the *Exiſtence* of it, ſince whatever Argument I can make uſe of to aſſure my ſelf of the exiſtence of any *Body*; that very Argument will more immediately and more ſtrongly prove the exiſtence of my own *Mind*; but if he means (as he ſeems to do) as to the *Eſſence* or Nature of it; that I think is very falſe, and appears plainly to be ſo by this very conſideration. For otherwiſe, if the Eſſence of the Mind were more evident than that of the Body, to what purpoſe ſhould we take ſuch a compaſs, as to conſult the Idea of Body, to know what are the Modifications of the Mind?

And

And yet thus we are fain to do, which sufficiently convinces that we have not so clear an Idea of our Souls as we have of Bodies; and indeed that we have no clear Idea of our Souls at all, since if we had, we might barely, by attending to that Idea, know (and that even without *Experience*) what Modifications they are capable of, as well as by consulting the Idea of Matter, what are the Modes which are incident to that. * 'Tis clear then, that we have no clear Idea of our Souls, and because we have not, we are fain to argue thus indirectly from these sensible Qualities not being Modifications of Body, to their being Modifications of our Minds. But however, tho' this Argument be not so direct as if we had proved it from the Idea of our own Souls immediately; yet it is no less, or at least sufficiently concluding, it being a plain consequence, that if they are not Modifications of Body, they must be Modifications of our Souls, or Sentiments in our Minds. And therefore to attribute these sensible Qualities to Bodies as the subjects of them, is to confound the Modalities of Matter and Spirit, by transferring that to Bodies which is a Sentiment in our Souls, one of the worst errors of Sense we can be guilty of, and whereby we plainly shew, that we understand neither our *selves* nor *Bodies*.

* See this more at large discours'd by *M. Malebranche* in his Illustration to the 7th. Chap. of the 2d Part of the 3d. Book of his *Recherche de la Verite*.

58. There

58. There now two Reflections that may be made upon the occasion of the Premises, and perhaps 'tis of some consequence to Morality, that they should not be omitted. And therefore (as much haste as we are in to proceed to other thing) we'll just touch upon them, leaving their further improvement to the Contemplative Reader. Reflect then first of all, what a dead unactive thing Matter is, and withal, how poor and empty the Material is in comparison of the * intellectual World. And accordingly, whether such an unactive empty Being, that is so without Power or Force, and without Form and Void, can be a fit or reasonable Object of thy Love? What Power or Efficacy may be attributed to *Second Causes*, as they are called, or what force one Body may have to move another, I shall not now dispute; but 'tis plain that Bodies cannot act upon our Souls, nor cause in them the least Pleasure or the least Pain, the lowest Taste, or the faintest Smell, or any other Sensation. 'Tis not the Fire that gives thee Heat, nor the Sun that gives thee either Heat or Light; nor yet the Sun against a watry Cloud, or as he brings back the Day from the Rosy East, that entertains thee with delightsome Colours. The Fruits of *Eden*, tho' not one

* By intellectual World here is not meant the same as the inteligible World, which are very different from each other, tho' perhaps every one may not heed it: For intellectual World signifies the World of *Spirits*; whereas by intelligible World we mean the World of *Ideas*.

one of them had been *forbidden*, could not have obliged thee with one Taſte; nor can all the Spices of *Arabia* now beſtow upon thee one Smell. Theſe are but imaginary Cauſes of real Effects, phantaſtick Powers, mere Idols of our Imagination, as very Idols as any of the Heathen Deities, that were preſum'd to preſide over ſuch and ſuch things, and to have them in their Gift and Diſpoſal, as a God of Wiſdom, or a God of Love. Idols that are kept up by the fanſies of the Vulgar, as the other were by the Fictions of the Poets; in one word, Idols that, as St. *Paul* expreſſes it, *are nothing in the World.*

Beſides they are Poor and Empty, as well as Impotent and Unactive; and as they cannot cauſe any Sentiment in *us*, ſo neither have they any thing reſembling our Sentiments in *themſelves*. They have none of thoſe ſenſible Qualities, which the prejudice of the common People has ſo liberally indued them with, and which, by the Authority of the Schools, have been ſo long confirm'd upon them. Thoſe Odours, thoſe Savours, nay, even that *Light* and thoſe *Colours* which are imagin'd to be in Bodies, are really not in them, but in our ſelves. And yet we Court them and Commend them, and ſay that one ſhines, and another has a fine Perfume, *&c.* But they, poor Creatures, have none of thoſe Fineneſſes, Excellencies, or Beauties (*Figure* only excepted) which we think we ſee in them, and for which we admire them, but

but are, as it were, a mere *Caput Mortuum*, or *Terra Damnata* in the Language of the Sons of *Hermes*, utterly void and deſtitute of all thoſe agreeable Prettineſſes, thoſe charming Graces which the Poetical imagination of Philoſophers, like the Paſſion of Lovers, has confer'd upon them, and the *Bluſhes* of the Morning are as much a Fiction as *Aurora* it ſelf. Indeed 'tis all Fiction, Complement, Fallacy, Dream, Impoſture, and Man walks in a *vain ſhew*, among Cheats and Deluſions, empty Repreſentations, and falſe Appearances, and the World is to him as ſome *inchanted* Place, where he is abuſed by reſemblances of things that are not, and is impoſed upon by all his Senſes. For in ſhort, the Perfections of material Beings are the mere Creatures of his Fanſie; thoſe Beauties which he thinks he perceives without, are really in himſelf, and he carries about him the World that he admires. So that in this reſpect that of the wiſe Preacher will be found to contain a philoſophical as well as a moral Truth; *Vanity of Vanities, all is Vanity.*

But now whether Beings that are ſo utterly impotent as not being able to affect our Souls with the leaſt pleaſure, and withal ſo poor, empty and unfurniſhed of all that is pleaſant or agreeable, can be worthy of our Love, or proper Objects for it (that is I mean of Love ſtrictly taken as it imports not the bare deſiring a thing for *uſe*, but the deſiring it for it *ſelf* as a true Good, according to St. *Auſtin*'s Noti-

on

on of Love, *Quod non propter se amatur non amatur.* And again, *Nihil aliud eſt amare quam propter ſeipſam rem aliquam appetere*; I think may deſerve to be conſidered.

Soliloq. lib. 2. c. 13. lib. *Octogint Quæſt.* Q. 35.

'Tis not pretended to be denied, but that theſe things, as inſignificant as they are, either to us, or in themſelves, may yet be loved in a large and popular way of ſpeaking, as that ſignifies the willing or deſiring them for their *uſe*, as being occaſions of good to us, in which ſenſe I ſhould not ſcruple to ſay, that I love a good Room, or a good Fire in it: But that which I would have conſider'd is, whether theſe things can be fit Objects of our Love in the ſtricter ſenſe of Love, as it means the deſiring a thing for it ſelf, or its own intrinſick Goodneſs or Excellency, ſince if our Philoſophy be right, it appears plainly that they are not our true Goods, or Objects, that are really perfective of our Beings, in any kind or degree whatſoever.

I muſt needs own my ſelf to be of St. *Auſtin*'s mind, that nothing can properly be ſaid to be loved, but what is loved for it ſelf. And it ſeems clear again, that nothing can juſtly be loved for it ſelf, but either *Pleaſure*, or the *cauſe* of Pleaſure. Pleaſure, as perfecting our Natures *formally*, and the cauſe of it as perfecting them *efficiently*. But as for that which is only the *occaſion* of my having that Sentiment, that indeed I may *uſe*, and deſire for its uſe; but how

how ſuch a thing can be ſaid to be a due and proper Object of my Love, notwithſtanding the late Inſtructions I have had upon this point, I ſtill want to be inform'd. But whatever be determin'd concerning this Matter; this however may be offer'd more ſecurely, that could we but unmask Nature, and ſtrip it of all thoſe falſe Ornaments wherewith our prejudic'd Imagination has cloathed it, and preſent Bodies to our view, as they are in their naked ſelves; if we could take them, as I may ſay, in their *Undreſs*, and ſee them as they are in their *pure Naturals*, without Light, without Colour, without Heat, without Taſte, without Smell, or any of thoſe agreeable Qualities which recommend them to us, and withal, as altogether deſtitute of any real Power to cauſe any ſuch Sentiments in us, ſure thoſe that contend moſt for the love of theſe things, and are moſt enamour'd of them, would find themſelves much otherwiſe affected to them than they are, if affected at all. And ſure the moſt paſſionate Amoriſt, could he have ſuch a ſight as this of the Face he ſo Idolizes (which yet is the true Philoſophick view of it) he would think it no more like that Image which he had dreſt up of it in his own Fancy, than a coarſe Cloath is like the fine Picture which is drawn upon it. And how would he wonder what was become of thoſe engaging Charms that had ſo captivated his Heart? And how would ſuch a faithful and unflattering repreſentation of his beloved Object

abate and deaden, if not wholly annihilate his Paſſion?

59. Reflect again in the ſecond place, what a great and excellent Being the Soul of Man is, and how large and diffuſive are its Capacities. Not ſo great indeed as to have in it ſelf, that is, in its own *Eſſence*, the Ideas of all things, ſo as to be able to ſee all things, by conſulting the Perfections of its own Nature, and to be, as it were, an *Intelligible* World to its ſelf. No, let not the Pride or Ambition of our Nature make us ſo vain as to pretend to what is ſo much above the Capacity of it. This is the incommunicable Prerogative of the univerſal Being, whoſe Name is *I am*, and whoſe infinite Eſſence comprehends all that is, and who when as yet there was not any thing but himſelf, ſaw all things in the Boſom of his own Ideality, and *Called thoſe things that were not as tho' they were.* But thus far we may, without Arrogance, pretend, that all thoſe pleaſing and entertaining Appearances of external Nature, for which we ſo admire it, are really in our ſelves, and indeed no other than the ſeveral Modalities of our own Souls, or the different manners of Being wherein they exiſt. That that *Light* which the Wiſe Man thought ſo ſweet, and thoſe *Colours* which the ſame Perſon found ſo unhappily charming in his ſight; that thoſe Savours which ſo pleaſe, and too often inſlave the Taſte, and thoſe Odours which ſo refreſh the Smell, and that Muſick which ſo engages and even raviſhes

raviſhes the Ear, that all theſe are in the very Soul it ſelf, and ſpring up from the fruitful and rich Fund of her own Being, whereby ſhe becomes all things by *Feeling*, in a much better ſenſe than the Philoſopher ſays ſhe does by * *Underſtanding*, ſo that ſhe may be ſaid to be, tho' not an *Intelligible*, yet a kind of *ſenſible* World to her ſelf.

* *Intellectus intelligendo fit Omnia.*

We are commonly preſumed indeed to have but *Five Senſes*, as they call them, that is, as I underſtand it, ſo many general ways of receiving certain Perceptions in Conſequence of certain Impreſſions made by outward Objects upon the Body. But how many more we may be capable of, if the Power of the Soul were wholly reduced to act, who can ſay? We ſee 'tis but a *Touch* upon certain parts of the Body that have an Organical Texture fit for that purpoſe, that awakens thoſe Senſes which we have. And if God pleaſe to enlarge the *Machine* by adding a Spring or Wheel more, that is, I mean by adding other Organs fitted for other Impreſſions; what Imagination can conceive what new *Senſes* might riſe up in us? This however muſt be allow'd even as the Frame of Humane Nature ſtands at preſent, that tho' our Senſes are but few in the general, yet the Particulars under thoſe Generals are innumerable. For what Arithmetick can reckon up the ſeveral ſorts of Taſts, or Smells, or Colours, *&c.*? We feel new and new Sentiments con-

tinually ariſing in us upon new Impreſſions; the Fruits and Productions of the Earth are not more numerous or various than are thoſe Savours and Odours which we experience, and what more we might if God ſhould create, not new Organs of Senſe in us, but only new Bodies to make different Impreſſions upon thoſe we have already, is a vaſt Abyſs which no line of Thought can ever fathom. But then conſider what a great and noble Being this Soul of ours is, and how large is its Capacity, that carries incloſed in its ſingle ſelf the beauties of a whole World; thoſe I mean which we aſcribe to it, and diſtribute among the ſeveral parts of it, and withal think a ſufficient Furniture for the adorning of that immenſe Fabrick. Conſider alſo of what great Happineſs or Miſery ſhe is capable, that can be ſo variouſly affected; ſo many ways pleaſed or diſpleaſed, and that without going out of her ſelf, or exceeding the Circle of her own Eſſence. For it is not reaſonably to be doubted, but that God who cauſes theſe Sentiments in her by the Impreſſions of Bodies, can, if he pleaſe, cauſe the ſame and more without them, ſince, according to the foregoing Account, there is no connexion, but what is *Poſitive*, between the one and the other. In fine, from what we actually feel, and from what we may further conceive as poſſible, it ſeems reaſonable to think that the capacity of Spirit is as large or larger than that of Body, and its Modifications rather more

more numerous, and consequently that the Soul is capable of as many or more Sentiments than Matter is of *Figures*; and if we had but as clear an Idea of our Souls, as we have of Matter, and so could see what those Modifications of it were in themselves, which make this or that Sentiment; and what Relation and Proportion they carry to one another (as we do in *Figures*) there would hence arise a new *Science*, which, tho' I know not as yet by what Name to call, would yet perhaps deserve the Honour of the principal School, as being in its Principles no less certain, but in its Compass it may be more Extensive, and in its Entertainment much more ingaging than even *Mathematicks* it self.

60. But 'tis for this very Reason, perhaps, that we have no such Idea. This is the Conjecture of a Person most highly to be respected for the greatness and clearness of his Thoughts, which he expresses with a sublimity of Style, not easily to match'd, when he brings in the Eternal Wisdom thus informing her Disciple of the Reasons why she hides the Idea of our Souls at present from us. "Be-
"cause the Idea of a Soul is an Object so great, and so apt to ravish Spirits with its Beauty, that if thou hadst an Idea of thy Soul, thou would'st be able no longer to think of any thing else. For if the Idea of Extension, which represents only Bodies, does

Meditat. Chrestien. Page 152.

" does ſo ſtrongly affect Naturaliſts and Ma-
" thematicians, that they oftentimes forget all
" their Duties to contemplate it. If a Ma-
" thematician has ſo much delight when he
" compares bigneſſes among themſelves there-
" by to diſcover their Relations, that he often
" ſacrifices his Pleaſures and his Health to find
" out the properties of a Line: What applica-
" tion would not Men beſtow upon the Re-
" ſearch of the properties of their own Being,
" and a Being infinitely more noble than Bodies?
" What Pleaſure would they not take in com-
" paring among themſelves by a clear view of
" the Underſtanding ſo many different Modi-
" fications, whereof the bare ſentiment, how-
" ever feeble and confuſe, does ſo ſtrange-
" ly buſie and imploy them? For thou muſt
" know that the Soul contains in her ſelf all
" that thou ſeeſt fine or beautiful in the World,
" and which thou art wont to attribute to the
" Objects that environ thee. Thoſe Colours,
" thoſe Odours, thoſe Savours, with an infi-
" nity of other Sentiments wherewith thou
" haſt not yet been touch'd, are no other than
" Modifications of thy own Subſtance. That
" Harmony which ſo raiſes thee, is not in the
" Air which ſtrikes the Ear; and thoſe infi-
" nite Pleaſures (whereof the greateſt Volup-
" tuaries have but a feeble Sentiment) are all
" included in the capacity of thy Soul. But
" now if thou hadſt a clear Idea of thy ſelf,
" if thou didſt ſee in me that Archetypal

" Spirit

" Spirit, upon which thou waſt form'd, thou " would'ſt diſcover ſo many Beauties, and ſo " many Truths in contemplating it, that thou " would'ſt neglect all thy Devoirs. Thou " would'ſt diſcover with an extream Joy, that " thou would'ſt be capable of enjoying an " infinity of Pleaſures. Thou woud'ſt have a " clear knowledge of their Nature; thou " would'ſt be inceſſantly comparing them a- " mong themſelves, and thou would'ſt diſcover " Truths which would appear to thee ſo wor- " thy of thy Application, that wholly wrapt " up and abſorpt in the Contemplation of they " own Being; full of thy ſelf, of thy Gran- " dure, of thy Excellency, and of thy Beau- " ty, thou would'ſt be no longer able to think " of any thing beſides. But my Son, God has " not made thee to think of nothing but thy ſelf. " He has made thee for *Himſelf*. Wherefore I " ſhall not diſcover to thee the Idea of thy " Being, till that happy time when the view " of the Eſſence of thy God himſelf ſhall de- " face and eclipſe all thy Beauties, and make " thee deſpiſe all that thou art, that thou " may'ſt think only of contemplating *Him*.

Happy Time indeed, when we ſhall know both God and our ſelves, and our ſelves in God, whoſe ſuperlative Beauty will not ſuffer us to grow proud of our own. Then may we be truſted with the Knowledge of our ſelves, without any danger of being puffed up by it, when that glorious Eſſence, wherein we ſhall

take a view of our ſelves, is ſo infinitely tranſcending all that we have, or are in our ſelves: Now our feeble Eyes would be dazzled with our own Light, and we ſhould fall in Love with the dear Image of our own Being; but when the Looking-glaſs ſhall be ſo much more charmingly beautiful than the Face, we may then ſecurely behold our ſelves in it. In the mean time let us eſteem that the beſt Knowledge of our ſelves to have a deep ſenſe of our Infirmities, and not be aſham'd of that *Ignorance* which is the Guardian of our Humility. *Confitear ergo quid de me Sciam, Confitear & quid de me Neſciam. Quoniam & quod de me Scio, te mihi lucente Scio, & quod de me Neſcio, tam diu Neſcio, donec fiant tenebræ meæ ſicut Meridies in Vultu tuo.*

St. *Auguſt. Confeſ.* Lib. 10. Cap. 5.

CHAP. IV.

An Entrance upon the Explication of the manner of our Thinking, containing a General Diſtribution of Intelligible Objects into their ſeveral kinds.

1. THE whole Theory of Humane Underſtanding, as Extenſive as it is, ſeems commodiouſly reducible to theſe two general Queſtions. What Thought is, and how, or

or after what manner we think or underſtand. Of the former of theſe we have by God's Aſſiſtance already given a large and particular Account; ſo particular, that I think I may ſay, we have, as it were, ſeparated the parts of Thought by *Section*, and read a Metaphyſical, ſhall I call it, or Anatomical Lecture upon every part, in order to a more accurate Comprehenſion of the whole. Let us advance now by the favourable Aid, and, as we humbly hope, under the propitious Conduct of him who has brought us hitherto, to the conſideration of what remains, *viz.* to inquire into the manner how we think or underſtand, and ſee whether we can render a true, or at leaſt, an intelligible Account of that great *Arcanum* in Philoſophy, which is ſo very neceſſary, and has been ſo long wanting, to the knowledge of our ſelves, which indeed is the beſt Knowledge; and ſuch, as in this reſpect, has the advantage of all other Sciences, in that while they elevate us above Men, this ſerves to humble us before God.

2. But now when I pretend to explain, or rather to make inquiry how we think, my meaning is not how we perform that Intellectual Operation, which we call Thought. Not but that this is very proper to be conſider'd in this Theory, which indeed is not abſolutely Perfect and Intire without it. But I profeſs my ſelf at preſent utterly uncapable of giving any account of this Matter; and find-

ing

ing no improvement upon any Application of my Mind to it, have reaſon to think I ſhall always ſo continue, which obliges me to intreat my Reader to accept of our Theory without it; and either to excuſe this unavoidable Defect, or to ſupply it. For my own part I cannot do it, and therefore in pretending to inquire *how* we Think, my meaning preciſely and determinately is, what it is which by it ſelf terminates our Underſtanding, or is the *immediate Object* of our Thought. For tho' every thing that truly is, be ſome way or other Intelligible, and ſo the Object of Thought, (intelligibility being an Affection belonging to Being as ſuch) yet every Being does not terminate our Thought by it ſelf, and ſo is not the immediate Object of it; which implies again that there are ſome things which are ſo, which indeed will be found to be true, ſome things being intelligible immediately by themſelves. For which reaſon in attempting to explain the manner of Humane Underſtanding, I chuſe rather to inquire what is the immediate Object of our Thought, than whence we have our Ideas, or what thoſe Ideas are whereby we underſtand, or the like: For tho' all our Ideas are immediate Objects of Thought, yet all the immediate Objects of our Thought are not Ideas, there being ſome things which, as we ſhall ſee, are Intelligible without them. So that immediate Object of Thought is ſomething larger than Idea; and I am willing here to expreſs the manner of Underſtanding,

ing, by that which is moſt general, and has the greateſt Latitude, that ſo our account of it may be the more comprehenſive, and extend to every thing that our underſtanding is concern'd with. In order to which, ſince there is ſo much difference in things, and different things are differently Intelligible, we muſt firſt prepare the way by conſidering the diverſity of *Intelligible Objects*, and by ranging them into their reſpective Orders.

3. But here to make our way open and clear, and to prevent all Confuſion and Intanglement, we muſt carefully diſtinguiſh between Objects that are abſolutely Intelligible in themſelves, which are of the ſame extent as *Things* (becauſe all things are ſo Intelligible) and accordingly muſt be divided as things are, and ſuch Objects as are at preſent Intelligible by us, or which *we* perceive. Becauſe there are ſeveral things Intelligible in themſelves, which yet are not ſo to us, and whereof we have no Perception, nor perhaps are in this State capable of having any. As Angels, ſuppoſe, and our own and other Mens Souls, not to ſay any thing of the inward Eſſences of Bodies, or of ſome Mathematical Truths, (as ſuppoſe the exact Proportion between a Circle and a Square) betwixt which and us there ſeems to be a great Gulph fix'd, whereby they are too remote from the Sphere of her Capacity to be ever acceſſible by us; however the vain affection of univerſal Knowledge may make Men unwilling

ling either to confeſs their Ignorance, or to give over their ſucceſsleſs Inquiries.

4. Now if we take Intelligible Objects in the latter Senſe, for ſuch as are Intelligible by *us* or at preſent fall under our Perception, then I think the moſt general diviſion of them will be into thoſe that are *in* the Mind, and thoſe that are *out* of the Mind, it being certain that whatever we now perceive is either one or other of theſe. I ſay, whatever we perceive, not whatever is in its ſelf Intelligible. For 'tis evident, that the Mind it ſelf is Intelligible, as well as what is in the Mind, however at preſent we have no clear Idea of it. And therefore this is not here offer'd as a diviſion of whatever is Intelligible in it ſelf, becauſe indeed it is not adequate to it, but only of what is Intelligible to us. For tho' it be large enough to comprize whatever we perceive; yet it is not large enough for whatever is Intelligible, and that becauſe what is Intelligible, is larger than what we perceive.

5. Whatever then is Intelligible to *us*, is either in the Mind, or out of the Mind; for of the Mind it ſelf we have no clear Perception, tho' in it ſelf no leſs Intelligible than any of thoſe things which we do perceive. The Things that are in the Mind are not our *Ideas*; for they, as will hereafter appear, are really diſtinct from it, and can no otherwiſe than *Objectively* be ſaid to be in it; but our *Thoughts* (as Thought is taken formally, abſtracting from the Object)

of

of what kind ſoever they be, whether in the way of Volition, or in the way of Perception, and that either Intellectual or Senſible, and ſo on, according to the foregoing Diviſions we have given of Thought. The things that are *out* of the Mind, are all thoſe things that are really diſtinct from it, and ſo even our *Ideas* muſt be conſider'd in the number of thoſe things which are out of the Mind; which things are either Material, or Immaterial, or Spiritual, tho' as to the latter we have no Notion or Perception but only of abſtract Ideas, and thoſe Intellectual Truths which reſult from them, and of God the Fountain of all, of whom our Perception is in many reſpects clear, tho' in more dark, and in all Inadequate and imperfect. But as for other immaterial Beings, ſuch as Angels or Spirits, we know no more of *them*, than we do of our own Souls (that is, I mean, as to any Ideal Perception of their Eſſence) which is hardly any thing at all. So that there is this difference between the things that are in the Mind, and thoſe that are out of the Mind; that the former are all perceived by us, it being impoſſible that any thing ſhould be in the Mind without our being conſcious of it; whereas many of the things that are out of the Mind, as well as the Mind it ſelf, are by an impenetrable Veil drawn between us and them, intercepted from our view.

6. Now

6. Now as for thoſe Objects which are Intelligible in themſelves, there are ſeveral ways of dividing theſe, which yet perhaps will be found ſome of them to concenter in the reality of the thing, and to differ only formally, and as to the manner of Conception. As when we divide them ſuppoſe into God and Creature, or things create and increate, or into Material, or Immaterial, or Spiritual; which Spiritual again may be conſidered as compleat Beings, as God, Angels, and Humane Souls, under which our own is comprehended, or as certain Perfections of the ſupreme Being, and immutable Relations that neceſſarily reſult from them, that is, in other Words, *Ideas* and *Eternal Truths*. To which may be reduced all abſtract and intellectual Objects whatſoever, which ſo imploy our Thoughts, and fill our Diſcourſes, ſuch as, *Virtue*, *Juſtice*, *Goodneſs*, *Truth*, &c. It being moſt certain that theſe are Intelligible Objects, ſince both our Thoughts and our Words are converſant about them, and ſo many Propoſitions are made concerning them, and withal as certain that they are Objects of a *Spiritual* Nature, ſince we find nothing material in the Conception of them, tho' they are not compleat Spiritual Beings.

7. We may alſo conſider the Objects of our Underſtanding as diviſible into *Senſible* and *Intellectual*; a Diviſion, which in this ſeems to differ from the former, in that it regards Objects not purely as they are in their own abſolute Natures,

Natures, but alſo with relation to the Underſtanding, and the manner whereby they are perceived, which is ſufficiently different to be a Foundation for ſuch a Diſtinction. I ſhall not be ſo far influenced by the ſound of Words, as to ſay, that by ſenſible Objects here I intend the *Objects* of *Senſe*, as they are call'd, becauſe indeed I do not well know what that means: But by ſenſible Objects, I mean thoſe Objects which the Underſtanding has a Perception of by the Mediation of the Senſes, that is more diſtinctly thoſe Objects which the Underſtanding perceives in Conſequence of certain Impreſſions which other Bodies make upon certain parts of our Body, whoſe Organical Texture is fitted for the reception of ſuch Impreſſions. By Intellectual Objects I mean thoſe Objects which the Mind perceives, without having any ſuch Impreſſions made upon the Body. For all Objects are Intellectual in a large Senſe, as that ſignifies Objects of the *Underſtanding*, there being nothing elſe in us whereby they are perceivable by us; and therefore as by ſenſible Objects, we muſt mean thoſe which the Underſtanding perceives by the occaſion of certain bodily Impreſſions, ſo by Intellectual Objects here as contradiſtinctly oppoſed to ſenſible, 'tis reaſonable we ſhould mean thoſe Objects which the Underſtanding perceives without the Mediation of ſuch Impreſſions. Of which ſort I know not but that there may be ſeveral, and that notwithſtanding

ing the Authority of that vulgar Axiom, that there is nothing in the Understanding but what was first in the Sense; of which I hope hereafter to give a particular and distinct account.

8. To this may be reduced that remarkable division of Intelligible Objects which is proposed by St. *Austin*, when he tells us that there are two sorts of things that are known, one of those things which the Mind perceives by the Senses of the Body, and another of those which the Mind perceives by it self. *Cum enim duo sint genera rerum quæ sciuntur, unum earum quæ per sensus Corporis percipit Animus, alterum earum quæ per seipsum*, &c. Which Division seems to differ from ours no otherwise than by the manner of the Expression, since those things, which, according to him, the Mind perceives by the Senses of the Body, may be presumed to import the same with our *Sensible Objects*; and those, which the Mind, according to him, perceives by it self, the same with our *Intellectual*. For to distinguish a little upon the latter Phrase *per seipsum*, which is the only Expression that is at all doubtful: If by the Minds perceiving certain Objects *by it self* be meant, that it perceives them without making any the least use of the Service or Ministery of the Body; I question very much whether the Soul, while in Conjunction with the Body, does at any time act so independently from it, even in its

De Trin. Lib. 15. Cap. 12.

its pureſt and moſt abſtract Contemplations, as in this ſenſe to perceive any thing *by it ſelf*. For on the contrary, that the Spirits at leaſt, or finer and more active parts of the Blood, are imploy'd in all kinds of Thinking, let the Object of it be what it will, ſeems to me very apparent, both from the ſenſible diminution and expence of them upon much thinking; as alſo from the great diſadvantage and confuſion our Thoughts are under, either when the Spirits are bound up, as in *Sleep*, or irregularly moved, as in a *Fever*. But if by the Minds perceiving certain things *by it ſelf* be meant, that it perceives them without any antecedent Impreſſions made upon the Organs of the Body, I ſee not what hinders, but that there may be Objects which the Mind may in this ſenſe perceive *by it ſelf*; which therefore, as being the moſt reaſonable, we may preſume to be that which St. *Auſtin* intended, eſpecially conſidering that perceiving *by it ſelf* is here oppoſed by him to perceiving by the ſenſes of the Body. And as that can reaſonably ſignifie nothing but perceiving upon certain Impreſſions which the Body receives in certain of its Organs: So the perceiving *by it ſelf* muſt ſignifie the ſame as perceiving without any ſuch Impreſſions, or elſe one part of the diſtinction will not be *Antithetical* to the other. In ſum then, to run theſe Diſtinctions into one, tho' all Objects be perceiv'd by the Mind only, and in that large ſenſe are Intellectual, yet we may ſuppoſe ſome

which the Mind perceives upon certain bodily Impreſſions; or as St. *Auſtin*, *by the ſenſes of the Body*, and thoſe we call ſenſible Objects; and others again which the Mind perceives without ſuch Impreſſions, or as St. *Auſtin*, *by it ſelf*, and theſe latter may be call'd Intellectual, which difference in the way and manner of Perception is ſufficient to found the diſtinction of ſenſible and intellectual Objects, tho' it be the Mind only that truly perceives in both.

9. St. *Auſtin* has made an improvement of this twofold diſtinction of intelligible Objects, which is of ſome concernment to the intereſt of Philoſophick *Science* in oppoſition to the pretences of *Septiciſm*, when he very curiouſly raiſes this further Remark upon it, That our Intellectual Perceptions are not liable to thoſe Diſputes to which our ſenſible ones, or rather the Objects of them ſtand expoſed. For he tells us of certain Philoſophers that have made many Objections againſt the ſenſes of the Body; whereas there are ſome moſt firm Perceptions that the Mind has by it ſelf, ſuch as this ſuppoſe, I know that I Live, which they were never able to make any doubt of. 'Tis worth the Reader's pains to take a view of the whole in the Author's own words. *Cum enim duo ſint genera Rerum quæ ſciuntur, unum earum quæ per ſenſus Corporis percipit Animus, alterum earum quæ per Seipſum, Multa illi Philoſophi garrierunt, contra Corporis Senſus, Animi autem quaſdam Firmiſſimas per Seipſum Perceptiones quaſdam*

quasdam verarum, quale illud est quod dixi, Scio me vivere, nequaquam in dubium vocare potuerunt. Amidst all the Errors then and Illusions of Sense, and the doubts and uncertainties thereby occasion'd, which furnish the Sceptics with Objections against *Science*, there are still, according to St. *Austin*, some things of whose Truth and Certainty there can be no doubt, and those indubitable things are Intellectual Objects, such as the Mind perceives immediately *by it self*, without being beholden to the Senses, or those Corporal Impressions which are made upon them.

10. Not that certainty is so to be confin'd to Intellectual Objects, but that there are some of those which here pass for sensible Objects that do truly partake of it. For to clear this Matter a little further, it is to be noted, That when those corporeal Impressions are made upon the Sense, upon the occasion of which the Mind sees or understands, there is then a twofold Object that may be said to be perceived. The Immediate and the Mediate. The Idea, and that which the Idea represents. As for the Idea, tho' that may, in this respect, be consider'd as a sensible Object, because we are supposed to have the Perception of it upon a sensible Impression; yet this is a certain indubitable, and immutable Nature, a true Object of Science, and consequently not liable to any sceptical Doubt. But now as to the thing represented by this Idea, *viz.* Body (which is

what is generally underſtood by ſenſible Object, and what St. *Auſtin* himſelf was moſt likely to underſtand by it) this indeed being of a contingent, uncertain flux and mutable Nature, is not at all qualified to be the Object of Science, which is of Neceſſaries, and requires an immovable Foundation: And they are ſuch ſenſible Objects as theſe, that the doubts of Scepticiſm only concern, and upon which they may be preſumed chiefly to have proceeded. And indeed, if there were no other but ſuch ſenſible Objects, I do not ſee how Science can be a maintainable Fort againſt a Sceptical Siege. But Wiſdom has built her Houſe upon ſtronger Pillars than theſe, and they that, upon this ſuppoſition, go to pull it down, will ſee nothing *ruin'd* but their own Endeavours.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

That ſome Intelligible Objects, viz. *of the immaterial Kind, are ſeen or underſtood immediately, or by themſelves; with an occaſional Argument for the exiſtence of a God, and ſome devotional Reflections upon the beatifick Viſion.*

1. HAving taken a view of the ſeveral ſorts of intelligible Objects, as far as was requiſite to the purpoſe of our Theory; let us now, in the next place, proceed to conſider more definitely the preciſe manner, according to which we may with the greateſt appearance of Reaſon, ſuppoſe them to be underſtood by us. In order to which it is to be remarked, that there are two ways, and but two that can poſſibly be conceiv'd of underſtanding things, *viz.* either by themſelves, *per ἀυλοπαρέσιαν τῶ πράγματος*, as I may ſay, the things themſelves being immediately preſent to the Mind that is ſuppoſed to behold them, or by their Repreſentatives or Ideas. Which diſtinction St. *Auſtin* (whoſe comprehenſive Capacity few things could eſcape) takes notice of, and expreſſes by *per Præſentiam*, and *per Imagines*, when he tells us, that his Memory was full of innumerable things, either by their *Images*, as of

Confeſſ. lib. 10. Cap. 17. all Bodies, or by their *Preſence*, as of the *Arts*, &c. *Ecce in Memoriæ meæ Campis & Antris & Cavernis innumerabilibus, atq; innumerabiliter plenis innumerabilium rerum generibus, ſive per Imagines, ſicut Omnium Corporum, ſive per Præſentiam, ſicut Artium*, &c. So then according to this Metaphyſical Father, there are two ways of things being in the Mind, and conſequently of being underſtood, either by themſelves, or by their Ideas. Now it ſeems reaſonable to think that ſome of them are underſtood by themſelves, that is, I mean (to be as diſtinct as is poſſible in expreſſing what I would have diſtinctly apprehended) that in the Perception of ſome things the immediate Object of our Thought are the very things themſelves.

2. As firſt of all, to begin at home, Thoſe things that are in the Mind, as our Thoughts, whether they are pure Intellections, or Imaginations, or Senſations, or Deſires, Affections, Inclinations, or whatever they be; theſe things, I conceive, are immediately perceiv'd by themſelves, and that becauſe they are in the Mind, and ſo moſt intimate to it, and indeed more intimate than any Ideas can be. There is therefore no need of any Ideas in the Perception of theſe things, beſides that it is not very conceivable how Ideas ſhould be able to repreſent them. But not to inſiſt upon this, ſince it is not yet apparent what thoſe Ideas are which are the Objects of our Thoughts, it may ſuffice for

for the preſent, that there is here no need or occaſion of them. For tho' the Soul turns her dark ſide, as I may ſay, to her ſelf, as having no clear view of her own Eſſence, that dear Self, whereof ſhe is ſo blindly fond, yet ſhe can reflect upon her own Actings, and upon her own Senſations, and need not go out of her ſelf, for the Perception of any of theſe, becauſe they are in her ſelf. How ignorant ſoever ſhe may be of her ſelf, or of things that are without her, ſhe cannot but be conſcious of what paſſes within, of what ſhe does, or of what ſhe feels done to her, of Thoughts and Sentiments, tho' as not having an Ideal view of her ſelf, ſhe may not be able to know, perhaps, what that Modification of her Eſſence is wherein this or that Sentiment does conſiſt.

3. Now as to the things that are without the Mind, no ſooner do we ſtep out of our ſelves, but we launch out into a vaſt Sea of intelligible Objects, where we ſee no Shore, and can ſound no bottom. Theſe are either Spiritual, or Corporeal, Intellectual, or Senſible. As for thoſe of them which are Spiritual and Intellectual, as great a Friend as I am to Ideas, and of as much importance as I think them to be, not only to Humane Underſtanding, but even to the Sciences themſelves, yet I find it moſt reaſonable, if not neceſſary, to hold, That ſome of theſe things are by themſelves immediately Intelligible, and alſo ſo underſtood by us, that they are not ſeen by any intelligible Species, or

Idea repreſenting them to our Minds, but that the very things themſelves, by a *Real Preſence*, as I may ſay, are the immediate Objects of our Perception, whenever we have any Perception of them. *In Memoriâ recondimus non Imagines earum, ſed ipſas*, as St. *Auſtin* ſpeaks. *Confeſ.* Lib. 10. Cap. 10.

4. In the Head of theſe *Self-intelligible* Objects let us with all Reverence place the Great and ever Bleſſed *God*, who is the beſt and moſt perfective Object of our Underſtandings, whoſe Viſion is in every degree Beatifick, and whom to know fully is *Eternal Life*, and that becauſe he is known by *Himſelf*. Indeed we commonly talk of the *Idea* of God, and of our having an Idea of him; and a Philoſopher of great Name, tho' in my poor Opinion not ſo great as he deſerves, has offer'd a Demonſtration of his exiſtence from his Idea. And 'tis true indeed we may be ſaid in a looſer and more popular Senſe, to have an Idea of God, as that means only on Objective Conception of him at large, or ſo much of his infinite Nature, or Eſſence, as we can rightly conceive. But then when 'tis ſaid we have an Idea of God, the Term Idea, as I conceive with Submiſſion to better Judgments, muſt not be here taken as when applied to created Beings; as ſuppoſe when I ſay I have an Idea of a Man, or of a Horſe, becauſe then 'twou'd import that as ſuch Creatures are underſtood by ſomething, that is diſtinct

ſtinct from them, and we are ſaid to perceive *them*, in as much as we perceive what is intelligibly repreſentative of them, ſo in like manner that God is alſo underſtood by ſomething that is really diſtinct from him, ſomething that is not God, and that we perceive his Divine Eſſence no otherwiſe than as we perceive that which Ideally repreſents it, which I can by no means admit. God as he is the moſt Intelligible Object, ſo is he Intelligible in the moſt perfect manner, and as he underſtands all things immediately in himſelf, ſo alſo is he immediately Intelligible by himſelf, and 'tis by himſelf as the immediate Object of our Thought, that we perceive all that we do, or ſhall ever perceive of him. For which Opinion, as novel or ſtrange as it may appear to thoſe who have been uſed to another way of Thinking, or of Speaking in Divine Matters, I ſeem not to want moſt convincing Reaſons.

5. In the firſt place, let it be conſider'd what was but now laſt hinted. God is the moſt Intelligible Object, as being the greateſt Reality. So far I reaſon with *Aquinas*, and have the Warrant of his Authority both for my Satisfaction, and for my Protection. *Cum unumquodq; ſit Cognoſcibile ſecundum quod eſt in actu, Deus qui eſt Actus Purus, abſq; omni permixtione Potentiæ, quantum in ſe, Maxime Cognoſcibilis eſt.* Part. 10. Quæſt. 12. Art. 1. Well, but then upon this ground I further argue, If God as being a pure Act be the moſt Intelligible Object

Object, then he must be intelligible in the most perfect manner, or else he will not be, what we suppose, the most Intelligible Object. But now it seems plain that for a thing to be Intelligible by another, is not to be Intelligible after so perfect a manner as to be immediately Intelligible in and by it self. And therefore whatever necessity there may be of Ideas for the Understanding of other things, we have reason to conclude that God is by himself immediately Intelligible, and to be seen by his own Light, as being himself that pure and perfect Light, in which there is no Darkness at all. To which I add, that since (as is shewn in the former part of this * Theory) God knows the *Creatures* in himself, as knowing them when they were only possible and had no Existence but in the Bosom of his own Ideality, there can be no question but that he understands *Himself* by *himself*. And indeed, if he did not, he must then not only borrow his Light and Knowledge from something else, because something else would then be the immediate Object of his Thought, but *that* something else must also be supposed able to represent God fully and perfectly to himself (since the knowledge which he has of himself is full and perfect;) both which are extreamly absurd and misbecoming the Perfection of the Divine Nature to suppose. It is therefore necessary to say that God

* *Page* 155.

God underſtands himſelf by himſelf, and conſequently that he is by himſelf immediately intelligible.

6. Well, but you'll ſay, tho' God be intelligible by himſelf, yet it does not thence follow, that we ſo underſtand him, becauſe it is not neceſſary that we ſhould underſtand him in the moſt perfect manner. I grant, it is not neceſſary we ſhould underſtand him after the moſt perfect manner *Abſolutely* ſpeaking, as that takes in the degrees and extent of our Knowledge; nay indeed 'tis impoſſible that we ſhould, becauſe we ſhould then *comprehend* him, which a finite Capacity as ours is can never do. But whether or no, as finite as we are, we may not underſtand him after the moſt perfect manner in a *certain Reſpect*, viz. as to the *Immediateneſs* of the Perception, is another Queſtion. And tho' it does not follow that we underſtand him after this manner, becauſe he is ſo intelligible in himſelf; yet 'tis a great Point gain'd, that this way of underſtanding him is abſolutely Poſſible, and that we do actually ſo underſtand and perceive him, I have other Reaſons to evince, ſuch as are taken not from the Perfection of our intellectual Faculties, but from the peculiar Nature of the intelligible Object, which *need* not, and which *cannot* be any otherwiſe underſtood.

7. Firſt there is no need of any Idea, as in other things, to repreſent God to our Minds: For God is Eſſentially, and therefore moſt intimately

timately present to our Souls, more intimately indeed than any intelligible Species or Idea that is distinct from him can be, as being above all, through all, and in all. The Union we have with God is far more strict than what we have with Bodies, or with Spirits either, for in him we Live, Move and have our Being. We indeed are often absent from him, but he is always present with us, and in our Union with him, consists our Life, our Light, and our whole Felicity. As much as we endeavour to shun and avoid him, we can never fly from him, and as willing as we may be that he should depart from us, we can never be wholly quit of him; and 'tis well we cannot, since, if he were never so little distant from us, we should instantly cease to be. But then what occasion we should have of any *Idea* to represent a Being to our Minds that is so essentially present to them, I do not perceive; and as for the reasonableness of assigning any without occasion, that I perceive as little, as not understanding why Ideas, any more than other Beings, should be multiplied without necessity.

8. But then 2*dly*, as there is no need of any Idea for the representation of the Divine Essence to our Minds; so 'tis absolutely impossible that any Idea should be able to represent it, and therefore God must be perceiv'd immediately by himself, or not at all. *To whom will ye liken me, says the holy one?* is as truly applicable to *Ideas* of all sorts, even the most Spiritual

or

or Intellectual, as to Corporeal *Images* or Repreſentations; and accordingly all ſuch Ideas of God are as much Idols of the Imagination, as the other are of the Senſe. We may beat the Field of Nature over and over for Ideas, or imploy *Intellectus Agens* to forge them for us; but ſtill we ſhall find that there is nothing in the ſenſible, nor yet in the intellectual World that can repreſent God. He indeed, by reaſon of the infinity and univerſality of his Eſſence cannot but repreſent other things, but for the ſame reaſon nothing elſe can repreſent him, there being no proportion between Finite and Infinite. He cannot therefore be known by the mediation of any Similitude or Reſemblance diſtinct from himſelf, as other things are, becauſe not repreſentable by any Image; but by him who is the *Image* of the inviſible God, his own Eternal, Coequal and Conſubſtantial Word, which is the ſame as to be known by *himſelf*.

9. That he ſhall be ſo known by us hereafter: This ſingle Conſideration may be ſufficient even to demonſtrate, becauſe our Happineſs does conſiſt in the Knowledge of him. For our Happineſs muſt conſiſt in the higheſt operation of the Mind about the beſt Object, and therefore in the Knowledge of God, which is accordingly call'd the *Beatifick Viſion*. And ſo much that ſaying of our Divine Maſter, is, by the Angel of the Schools, ſuppoſed to import, *This is Life Eternal, that they might know* *John* 17. 3.

thee

thee the only true God, &c. But now if our Happineſs does conſiſt in the Knowledge or Viſion of God (which I take for one and the ſame, ſince by Viſion, whenever applied to God, muſt be meant that which is *Intellectual*) then it neceſſarily follows, that God muſt be known immediately by himſelf, ſince if we do not know him by himſelf, but by the Mediation of ſome intelligible Species or Idea, then either we ſhall not be happy at all, or our happineſs will conſiſt in ſomething that is not God, even that intelligible Species whereby God is repreſented to the Mind, and which (upon that Suppoſition) is the immediate Object of it. Both which being Errors in *Faith* as well as in Philoſophy, we are obliged to conclude that our knowledge of God ſhall be immediate, or *per Eſſentiam*, as the Schools ſpeak. And does not the Scripture intimate the ſame? St *John* tells us that we ſhall ſee him as he is. But now we do not ſee him as he is, unleſs we ſee him by himſelf; becauſe, as we have ſhewn, no Image or Idea of him, that is diſtinct from him, can repreſent him as he is. And St. *Paul* tells us, That we ſhall know hereafter as we are known. But neither do we know him as we are known, unleſs we know him by himſelf, and that becauſe 'tis in and by himſelf, even in his own Ideal Reaſons, that God knows us and all his Creatures, as has been.

1 *John* 3. 2.

1 *Cor.* 13. 12.

been abundantly proved in the former part. But now, if this ſhall be the manner of our knowing God hereafter, to know him immediately by himſelf; I ſee not why it ſhould be ſuppoſed, that we know him any otherwiſe now, there being no reaſon to make our preſent knowledge of God to differ from our future, but only in *Degree*, as imperfect differs from perfect, which alſo is the difference which St. *Paul* aſſigns, when he deſcribes our preſent Knowledge by *knowing in part*, and by *ſeeing darkly*.

10. It may, perhaps, be pretended, that he aſſigns a greater difference, becauſe he ſays, not only that we ſee *darkly*, but that we ſee *through a glaſs* darkly. He does ſo, and this has given occaſion to the Schools to diſtinguiſh of a certain *Ænigmatical* or *Specular* Viſion, in oppoſition to that Viſion of God which is by his *Eſſence*, of which more by and by. In the mean while it may be material to obſerve, that the Schools themſelves, tho' they talk of a certain *Light* call'd the *Light* of *Glory*, which they ſuppoſe neceſſary to ſtrengthen and fortifie the Mind for that Viſion of God which is eminently Beatifick (grounding this their Opinion upon thoſe words of the Pſalmiſt, *In thy light ſhall we ſee light*); yet they will not allow that the Divine Eſſence either is, or can be ſeen or known by the Mediation of any Similitude, as their great Doctor maintains expreſly, and proves at large. *Pſal.* 36. 9.

Only

Sum. Theol. Part 1. a. Q. 12. Art. 2.

Only they ſuppoſe, at the ſame time, a ſort of Ænigmatical or Specular Viſion, as I ſaid before, which they contradiſtinguiſh to that Viſion of God, which is by the Eſſence, as if that Ænigmatical Viſion were by *Similitude*. But in the firſt place I ſee not how they are herein conſiſtent with themſelves: For either we do not know God at all (which even their ſuppoſition of an *Ænigmatick Viſion* will not permit them to ſay, or if we have any knowledge of him, then 'tis his Eſſence that we know, how imperfectly ſoever it be, becauſe God and his Eſſence, are the ſame. And if we know his Eſſence then by their own Doctrine and Argument we muſt know it *per Eſſentiam*, becauſe they ſay that the *Eſſence* of God is not knowable by any Similitude. So that to know the Eſſence of God, and to know it *per Eſſentiam*, will, by their own Principles, reſolve into the ſame. But if they will ſay, that we have no knowledge of the Divine Eſſence in any degree, then I ſee not how it can be ſaid, that we know God at all, and then what becomes of their *Ænigmatical Viſion* that way? To be ſhort, if we have no knowledge of God at all, then we do not know him ſo much as Specularly or Ænigmatically; but if we do know him in ſome meaſure (as that very diſtinction of theirs ſuppoſes) then we muſt know him by himſelf, becauſe 'tis his Eſſence that we know, which, by their own expreſs Doctrine,

Doctrine is not otherwiſe intelligible than by it ſelf. And conſequently this Scholaſtick Hypotheſis of an *Ænigmatical* Viſion of God as contradiſtinguiſh'd to that Viſion of him which is immediate or by his Eſſence, is neither ſolid nor ſelf-conſiſtent. I ſay, as *Contradiſtinguiſh'd*; for I pretend not to deny, but that our preſent knowledge of God may be ſaid to be Specular or Ænigmatical, as that ſignifies only the general imperfection or obſcurity of it at large, in oppoſition to that clear beatifick Sight of him which we ſhall have hereafter (which is all I ſuppoſe that the Apoſtle means by that figurative Expreſſion of his, upon which this diſtinction is grounded, of our *ſeeing now through a Glaſs darkly*) but as for any Ænigmatical knowledge of God, as it ſtands in contradiviſion againſt the knowing of him by himſelf, or his own Eſſence, and ſo implies the knowing him by ſome Similitude or Reſemblance that is diſtinct from him, ſuch an Ænigmatical Knowledge I can by no means admit of. No, as imperfect as our Notions and Conceptions are of that glorious Being, and as dark as the Glaſs is through which we ſee him, yet, if we have any true knowledge of him, as I ſuppoſe we have (or elſe all Diſcourſe of him will be impertinent, and *Theology* as Science falſly ſo call'd) it muſt be by himſelf, that is, he himſelf muſt be the immediate Object of that knowledge, all knowledge of him by the Mediation of any repreſenting Image or Similitude, be-

ing, as we have ſhewn, both *needleſs* and *impoſſible.*

11. I conclude therefore, that there is no *Specular* or *Ænigmatical* Viſion of God in oppoſition to ſeeing him by himſelf; and that however different our preſent knowledge of him may be from our future in other reſpects, and particularly as to the degrees of clearneſs; yet that 'tis God himſelf, and not any Idea of him, diſtinct from him that is the immediate Object of our Minds in both. 'Tis true our knowledge of God is in this Life but very dark and obſcure (as indeed it is fit it ſhould be, ſince otherwiſe we ſhould antedate our Felicity, and enjoy our Reward even while we were doing our Work;) but then the reaſon of that Darkneſs, as I conceive, is not that we ſee any other but him, but becauſe we ſee him ſo imperfectly as we do. Hereafter our Faculties will be ſtronger, and God's Manifeſtations of himſelf more open and liberal, and ſo our Darkneſs will be turned into Light, and our Viſion of him will be ſo clear as to be truly *Beatifick*; but ſtill whether we ſee in the Dark or in the Light, we ſee *Him* only, and not him in his *like*, or in that which is intelligibly repreſentative of him. By this I preſume it is ſufficiently clear what I mean, and that what I have here propoſed concerning the manner of our knowing God is moſt reaſonable in it ſelf, as well as moſt worthy of him; and if this ſhould ruin one of thoſe Demonſtrations which

Deſcartes

Deſcartes has offered for his Exiſtence, I cannot help it, and that it does ſo according to the Form and Poſture wherein it ſtands, I ſhall here by the way take occaſion briefly to ſhew.

12. The Argument that I mean, is that which is placed firſt in his *Meditations*, and laſt in his *Principles*; and whereof, as well as I can Collect, and as briefly as I can Comprize the force of it, this is the ſum. All that is in the Idea Objectively or Repreſentatively, muſt be in the Cauſe really, either in the way of Formality, or in the way of Eminence. And conſequently the greater the Objective Perfection of any of our Ideas is, its Cauſe muſt ſtill be ſo much the greater. And that becauſe there muſt be at leaſt as much in the total efficient Cauſe as there is in the Effect, ſince the Effect cannot have any of its reallity but from the Cauſe, nor the Cauſe give it unleſs it has it itſelf. And therefore ſince we have in us an Idea of an Immenſe Objective Reality, we muſt conclude that there is ſome Archetypal Being anſwerable to that Idea, that is, which has really all that Perfection which the Idea has Objectively, it being otherwiſe impoſſible that we ſhould have any ſuch Idea, which is the ſame as to conclude that there is a God. And all by virtue of this general Principle, that whatever is in the Effect, muſt be ſome way or other in its total efficient Cauſe. This is the ſubſtance of his Argument, if I underſtand it; and I wiſh

it were as concluſive as the great *Author* of it (for I know not any juſt ground I had to ſay, as I do in my Metaphyſical Eſſay, that he was beholden for it to St. *Auſtin* and the *Platoniſts*) ſuppoſed it to be. And indeed as for the general Principle upon which he argues, *viz.* That whatever is in the Effect muſt be one way or other in the Cauſe, I acknowledge the Truth and Neceſſity of it, and he has herein the whole Logick and Metaphyſicks of the School concuring with him. But the fundamental Fault of this Demonſtration; and that which indeed makes it none, is that it all proceeds upon this falſe, tho' common, Suppoſition, that we perceive God, as we do other things, by an Idea that is really diſtinct from him, and indeed that the Idea of God is one of his *Effects*. So he plainly ſuppoſes when he argues from our having ſuch a certain Idea that therefore there muſt be a Being anſwerable to that Idea, and that becauſe the Cauſe muſt needs be equal to the Effect. For tho' in this he may not perhaps imply *formally*, that this Idea is the Effect of God (ſince then he would ſuppoſe the Exiſtence of that God which he was to prove) yet he implies as formally as is poſſible, that this Idea is an Effect of ſome Cauſe, and that that Cauſe, whatever it be, muſt be adequately equal to it; and ſince it cannot be equal to it unleſs it be God; the Reſolution of this, in the reality of the thing, will be that this Idea is the Effect of God, becauſe an Effect of that Cauſe which

which is commenſurate to the Objective Reality of it, which *God* only is. And this he more openly acknowledges in the winding up of the Argument as 'tis manag'd in his 3d Meditation, where he ſuppoſes God in the Creation of Man, to have put this Idea of himſelf into him, that it might be as a Mark of the Artificer impreſs'd upon his Work, and that this Mark does not really differ from the Work itſelf, as being part of that Similitude of God wherein Man was made. So that the Idea of God in Man, according to this great Author, is a thing really diſtinct from God, and as much his Effect as *Man* himſelf is.

13. Now I confeſs were the Caſe as he ſuppoſes, if God were to be perceived by us as other things are, by a proper Idea; that is, by ſomething that is really diſtinct from him, and intelligibly repreſentative of him, or if that Idea, whereby God is perceived, were the effect of any Cauſe, then indeed his Argument, from the Exiſtence of a God, from ſuch an Idea might, for ought I know, hold good, and that in virtue of the Principle upon which it is grounded, *viz.* That the Cauſe muſt be equal to the Effect. But now this Suppoſition appears by the Premiſes to be falſe, ſince we have therein ſhewn that God, as he is a ſelf-intelligible Object, ſo is he ſeen and known by us, not by any *Idea* that is diſtinct from him, but immediately by *Himſelf*. And therefore the Suppoſition of the Argument failing, I ſee not

how to ſave the Argument from falling with it, at leaſt in the form and poſture in which it ſtands, wherein I think the beſt part of it is the *Concluſion.*

14. I ſay, according to the Form wherein it ſtands. For tho' *ſo* it appears not to conclude, yet after all, it is not perhaps ſo deſperate, but that with a little amendment, it may be improvable into a Demonſtration. The Argument I take to be right enough in the main, that is, as to the general intention of it, and to need only to be ſomewhat rectified in the Form and Manner of it, to make it Concluſive. For if inſtead of ſuppoſing us to have ſuch an *Idea* of God as he talks of, *viz.* ſuch a Repreſentative of him as is really diſtinct from him, and effected by him, he had only ſuppoſed us in the general to have a Notion or Perception of God, this would have been a certain and evident Suppoſition. We find it true in Fact and by Experience, that we have a Notion or Perception of ſuch a Being, or that ſuch a Being is Objectively in our Minds. And his own, not to ſay the common, Suppoſition includes it; ſince to perceive God by the Mediation of an Idea, is certainly to have a Notion or Perception of him. Beſides that, all Diſcourſe concerning God, yea the very Queſtion concerning his Exiſtence, ſuppoſes this. We may then lay down this for a certain Suppoſition, that we have a Notion or Perception of ſuch a Being as we call God. But then if to this

this be farther added what we have before ſhewn, that we perceive him inmediately by himſelf, or that himſelf is the immediate Object of our Thought, it muſt neceſſarily follow that *He is*, ſince otherwiſe he could not poſſibly be perceived by us. For tho' it does not follow from our having a Notion or Perception of *Creatures*, that therefore *they* are, becauſe 'tis poſſible we may ſee *them* in ſome other ſuperiour and more perfect Being that eminently and ideally contains them; yet if (which is here ſuppoſed) we have any Notion or Perception of *God*, it muſt neceſſarily and immediately follow that he is, it being impoſſible we ſhould ſee him in any other Being that is either ſuperiour to him, or really different from him. If we have any intellectual Sight of him, 'tis by himſelf that we ſee him; and if ſo, then the immediate Concluſion is that he muſt neceſſarily be, and that not by virtue of his Principle, that the Cauſe muſt be equal to the Effect (which, tho' true in it ſelf, would be here impertinently applied) but by another no leſs evident, *viz.* That that which is not cannot be perceived; or, if you will, that more general one, That of nothing there can be no Affection. And now I hope I have done the Cauſe maintain'd by this great Philoſopher, no Injury by taking away one of the Pillars whereby he endeavour'd to ſupport it, ſince I have ſubſtituted another in the place of it, and I ſubmit it to the Conſideration and Judgment of the ra-

tional World, thoſe particularly who have been exerciſed in Abſtract Thoughts and Metaphyſical Reaſonings, whether this be the moſt clear, ſimple and direct Method of proving that there is a God.

15. And thus, according to the meaſure of our poor Conceptions we have endeavoured to repreſent the general manner of our underſtanding the beſt and greateſt of all intelligible Objects, upon conſideration of which we find no occaſion for any Ideas, but that 'tis neceſſary to ſuppoſe it Immediate, that we perceive him not by any *Repreſentative*, but by Himſelf. And indeed, I know not whether there be any thing elſe that is ſo perceived beſides him, I mean of thoſe things that are *really* diſtinct from him. Perhaps 'tis the peculiar Privilege of that great and independant Being who exiſts by himſelf, and centers upon his own Fulneſs and Sufficiency, to be underſtood alſo by himſelf; and, as being the true intelligible Light, in whom there is no Darkneſs at all, to be *ſeen immediately*. However there are two things more, which, becauſe not *really*, but only *formally* diſtinct from him, may alſo be conſider'd as ſelf-intelligible Objects, and thoſe are *Ideas*, and *eternal Truths*.

16. Firſt the *Divine Ideas*. Theſe, if we do at all perceive (which depends upon conſiderations to be produced in their place) 'tis reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that we perceive them by themſelves, and that in great meaſure upon the

the foregoing Grounds: To which I add, That ſince whatever is perceived, is perceived either by itſelf, or in ſome other; 'tis plain, unleſs we will run on to Infinity, that ſomething muſt be perceived by itſelf. And if ſomething muſt be perceived by itſelf, then why ſhould not theſe Ideas be ſuppoſed as capable, and as worthy of that Privilege as any thing elſe that can be aſſigned? But if we will ſuppoſe them to be perceived by ſomething elſe, then however that ſomething elſe at leaſt, whatever it be, muſt be perceived by it ſelf, by which we ſhall gain nothing, but only the exchanging of a very eaſie for a more difficult Suppoſition, beſides the difficulty of conceiving what that ſomething ſhould be that ſhould repreſent theſe Ideas to us, or indeed that any thing can do it. Beſides that, 'tis againſt the very ſuppoſition and intention of Ideas, of what kind ſoever they be, to be perceived by the Mediation of other things. For Ideas, at leaſt as to * us, are not put for any other end or purpoſe, but as *Principia Cognitionis*, that other things might be known by *them*. But then if *they* too muſt be known by other things, then we have *Ideas* of *Ideas*, which will either lead us on in an infinite length, or about in an endleſs Circle. But if other things are known by *them*, then they are ſuppoſed to be known by themſelves.

* I ſay, as *to us*: For with reſpect to God they may be conſidered alſo as *Principia Operationis*, according to the diſtinction of *Aquinas*.

17. *Secondly*

17. 2*dly. Eternal Truths.* This is a neceſſary Conſequence of the other: For ſince Eternal Truths (as was ſhewn in the former part of this Theory) are in the reality of the thing, tho' not in the formality of Conſideration, the ſame with theſe Ideas, if theſe Ideas are perceived by themſelves, then eternal Truths muſt alſo be perceived by themſelves, that is, if they are perceived at all. This Condition I put for the preſent, becauſe it was put in the other inſtance, that ſo the Concluſion might not exceed what was in the Premiſes. But I ſhall ſoon take it away again: For indeed we may argue more poſitively here than in the other caſe. There we argued Conditionally and with ſuſpenſe, that the Divine Ideas are perceiv'd by themſelves, if at all. But we need not interpoſe that Caution as to *Eternal Truths*; for 'tis confeſs'd that we do actually perceive theſe, and alſo very plain that we do perceive them, as being the Objects of Science; and therefore we may conclude, that we do actually perceive them by themſelves, ſince they are the ſame in reality with the Divine Ideas which cannot be any otherwiſe perceived. And by the way (to anticipate a little what we ſhall hereafter have occaſion more particularly to inſiſt upon) ſince we have an intellectual view of Eternal Truths; this may be improved into an Argument to ſhew that we do indeed perceive the Divine Ideas alſo. But this I leave for the preſent with my thoughtful Reader, becauſe I would not divert from the thing in hand.

hand. In purſuance of which I further remark, that 'tis not very poſſible to conceive (if I may meaſure other Mens Underſtandings by my own) that Eternal Truths ſhould be perceiv'd by any *Repreſentative*. For Eternal Truths are alſo neceſſary Truths, and ſo much is ſuppoſed in their being the Objects of *Science*. But now I ſee not how any thing that is Temporary or Contingent ſhould be able to repreſent what is Neceſſary and Eternal; that is, I mean *ſo* to repreſent it as with reſpect to it, to do the Office of an *Intelligible Species*, ſo that in underſtanding the one, we may be truly ſaid to underſtand the other. For as for other groſſer and more imperfect Repreſentations, the *Hieroglyphicks* of the Imagination, they are nothing to the purpoſe. But now all things beſides Eternal Truths, that is, I mean, that are really different from them, are Temporary and Contingent, and ſo conſequently cannot reaſonably be ſuppoſed capable of repreſenting them after an Ideal or Intelligible manner; which one Conſideration by the way may ſerve to ſhew (as I elſewhere obſerve) that the true Light of our Minds, whatever it be, cannot be a Created Light, whether Body or Spirit: For the Light of our Minds, that true Light which is the univerſal Luminary of the Intellectual World, or as St. *John* expreſſes it, that enlightens every Man that comes into this, muſt exhibit to our Minds neceſſary and eternal Truths, or elſe it would be extreamly defective in

in its Office, these Truths being the principal Objects of Humane Knowledge, and about which that most eminent kind of it is employed, which we call *Science*. But now this a Created Light can never do, if 'twere for no other reason than because Temporal and Contingent, the necessary Condition of every Creature. And because it is so (to resume our Thred) it seems most reasonable to conclude, that we see not Eternal Truths by any *Representative* Similitude, but in all the knowledge which we have of them, they themselves are the immediate Objects of our Thought, and that we see them by themselves, as we do God, who is Truth it self.

18. But do we not see these Truths in God, and how then do we see them by themselves? It is very true, we do indeed see these Truths in God, and 'tis as true that we see them by themselves, against which our seeing them in God is (rightly understood) no just Objection. We see these Truths in God, and that because they are in God, and 'tis necessary that we should see them where they are. But we do not see them in God as some other things may perhaps be supposed to be seen in God, that is, by any thing in the Divine Essence that is *Representative* of them. Tho' after all, if we did so perceive them, still we should not perceive them (as we do other things) by something really distinct from them, and that because, however formally different, yet materially and really considered

ſidered, they are the ſame with God. And indeed it would be a ſtrange thing (as neceſſary as the mediate way of Perception is in other caſes) if Truth, which is the very Light of our Souls, and that which perfects our Underſtandings, and makes us Wiſe and Knowing, ſhould need the illuſtration of any thing elſe, to render it perceptible to us. So true even in this Senſe is that of St. *Auſtin*

Lumen illud, unde Animæ tanquam lucernæ accenduntur, non alieno, ſed proprio Splendore præfulget, quod eſt ipſa veritas. *Enarratio* in *Pſ.* 7.

19. We have now gone through the number of ſelf-intelligible Objects, at leaſt, of thoſe that are certainly and neceſſarily ſo. Wherein we have not wandred out of the Sphere of the Divine Eſſence, that perfect and ſtupendous Sphere, and therefore the more *perfect* becauſe it has no *Circumference*. And how ſhall we now go out of a Circle which is at once ſo comprehenſive, and ſo charming? How ſhall we leave thee, the moſt glorious and delightful of all the Scenes of Thought? Or how will any other Subject reliſh after thee? Or how will our dazzled Eyes be able ſo much as to ſee any thing elſe coming out of the brightneſs of thy Light! Stay glorious Object, we cannot yet leave thee, *abide with us, for it is even*, and lighten our Darkneſs that we may *ſee* thee. Why ſhould we haſten to deſcend from the Mount of thy Glory, it is good to be here, and

to

to enjoy so much of Heaven as thou makest upon Earth? It is good to be here, or indeed any where where thou art; and tho' we cannot find either a Tongue, or a Language to express thy Wonders, yet at least to dwell a while in a silent Contemplation of that immense Excellency, the *Vision* of which will hereafter be our *Happiness*.

But then think if thou canst, O my Soul, what a great and glorious Beauty must that be, the very sight of which will make thee happy, whose Vision is truly Beatifick, in whose very Presence is fullness of Joy, and whom to know is Eternal Life!

But we know him now, and that too by himself, and yet we are not happy. Both these indeed are true; we find the one so by Experience, and the other by Reason, and by this alone we may be admonish'd to consider how very imperfect our knowledge of him is in this Life, since it can consist with so much Misery and Sin. We know him indeed now, and the greatest Pleasure that we can relish is to know and contemplate him; but we neither do nor can know him now, as we shall know him hereafter, when we shall see him in the Light of his Glory. Now we see him through a Glass darkly, but then Face to Face. Now we know him in part, but then shall we know him even as we our selves are known. Now we see him as we can, with feeble Eyes, and in an obscure Light, but then our view of him

him ſhall be clear and diſtinct, *we ſhall ſee him as he is.*

Words of Wonder and Aſtoniſhment, and that carry a Heaven in their ſound! How great are thou, O God, and how great are thy Rewards! Bleſſed State, tremendous Happineſs! Who is able to think of thee without Amazement, or to ſpeak of thee without Confuſion, or to enjoy thee without the Invigorations of the Celeſtial Comforts, thoſe Divine Cordials of Living Water that iſſue out from the Throne! But with thee, O Lord, is the Well of Life, and in thy Light ſhall we ſee Light. For 'tis thou, O Lord, muſt ſtrengthen our weak Faculties, or elſe we ſhall not be able to indure thy Majeſtick Preſence, at which the very Angels tremble and veil their Faces, but oppreſſed with Glory, ſhall even faint under our Enjoyments, and wiſh to ſhade our Eyes from thy too powerful and overcoming Light.

But, O Lord, what is Man, that thou ſhould'ſt have ſuch reſpect unto him, or the Son of Man, that thou ſhould'ſt ſo far regard him, as to admit him to thy Beatifick Preſence, to the Viſion of thy ſelf, and to fortifie him for the bearing of it, that ſo the *Buſh*, where thou art, may not waſt or be conſumed with the Flame of thy Glory!

The Viſion of God, O what a Viſion muſt that be! To ſee thee, who art infinitely Great, and infinitely Good, and infinitely Happy, and that

that in thy ſelf, in the comprehenſive view of thy own infinite Greatneſs and Goodneſs! To ſee thee who art Being it ſelf, and the Fountain of it; who art Truth it ſelf, and the Light of our Minds, and the Life of our Hearts, and the Centre of our Deſires, and the ultimate End of our Natures; who art an Infinite Good, all Good, even Goodneſs it ſelf! To ſee all this, and to ſee it clearly, and to have all thoſe inconceivable Beauties unveiled to us, for which Angels inceſſantly praiſe thee, and which thou thy ſelf haſt been contemplating from all Eternity with infinite Pleaſure and Complacency: What a ſtrange Viſion muſt this be, and what ſtrange Effects muſt it have upon our Souls!

To make us *Wiſe*. For how Wiſe and Knowing muſt he needs be, that ſees thee the true intelligible Light, the beſt and greateſt Object of Thought! Thee who poſſeſſeſt the Ideas of all things, and who therefore art all! Thee who art immenſe and boundleſs Truth, and with whom *Wiſdom* dwells, even the eternal Wiſdom that ſitteth by thy Throne, and was with thee when thou mad'ſt the World! And to ſee alſo thy eternal and con-ſubſtantial *Word*, the univerſal Reaſon, in whom are hid all the Treaſures of Wiſdom and Knowledge, and who is that very Wiſdom that inlightens our Minds, and by * Participation of which every one is Wiſe that is truly Wiſe. And to ſee him alſo who is perſonal

* *Cuius Participatione ſit Sapiens quæcunq; Anima ſit vere Sapiens.* St. Auſtin *de Conſenſu Evangeliſtarum.* Lib. 1. Cap. 23.

ſonal Love, even thy eternal Spirit, the Divine Author and Giver of Life. And to ſee how theſe Bleſſed three Concentre in one; what an inſtructive View, what a ſcientifick Viſion muſt this be! Now we take a great deal of Pains for a little Knowledge, and are at the mercy of a Fever or a Bruiſe whether we ſhall keep that little, but then a ſudden Light ſhall break in upon our Minds that ſhall diſpel all Darkneſs, and clear all Myſteries, and remove all Difficulties, and we ſhall know without Study, and be learned without Libraries, and keep and increaſe our Knowledge for ever. And how ſhall we then deſpiſe all that is here call'd *Science*, or Learning, that of the Memory and Imagination eſpecially, *Bookiſh Learning*, when we ſhall ſee Original Truth, and be always quenching our intellectual Thirſt where the pure Springs of Wiſdom riſe? For then ſhall be the great intellectual Feaſt, when he ſhall ſit at the Table, which Wiſdom her ſelf has furniſh'd, and ſhall eat of the Bread, and drink of the Wine which ſhe has mingled.

2*dly*. To make us *Good*. For then ſhall we behold thee in the Beauty of Holineſs, or rather the Beauty of Holineſs in thee, and the very ſight of that raviſhing Appearance, will, by a Celeſtial Contagion, conform us to thy adorable Perfections, transfuſe a deiform Temper into our Souls, aſſimilate us to thy Image, and make us truly partakers of thy Divine Nature, and ſo we ſhall be *like* thee, becauſe we

ſhall *ſee* thee as thou art. And becauſe thou are infinitely Beautiful the ſight of thee will ſo inflame our Hearts with thy Love that we ſhall love thee with a Love worthy of thee, with all our Heart, Soul, Mind and Strength; and the more we ſee thee, ſtill the more we ſhall burn with Love towards thee; and the more we Love thee, the more we ſhall ſtill covet to reſemble thee, and endeavour to be like thee, that ſo we may the better enjoy thee, and be more and more Happy in thee. And thus we with open Face beholding the Glory of the Lord, ſhall be changed into the ſame Image from Glory to Glory.

The things of this World the leſs they are known, the more they are valued, and our Love of them is founded upon our Ignorance of them. Ignorance is indeed in theſe things the Mother of Devotion, and the more we improve our Acquaintance with them the more we deſpiſe them, and that becauſe of their Vanity, and thoſe Defects which we diſcover in them. But O my God, thy infinite Perfections will endure the Light and ſtand the Teſt of the moſt illuminated Intelligence, and that knowledge which leſſens the value of other things, will improve our Eſteem, and raiſe our Paſſion for thy Excellencies.

And O that Men did thus truly know thee! O that they had but one glimps of thy excellent Glory! Then would they never offend thee, then would they forever adore and love thee,

thee, then would they reſolve upon any Terms to enjoy thee, as they that *will be* Rich do to enjoy the World, they would even lay hold upon eternal Life, offer violence to the Kingdom of Heaven, and take Happineſs by force. They would never revolt from thee, but would ever continue thine.

For that alſo is another Effect of this beatifick View. The Bleſſed that behold thy Face are thereby confirmed in good beyond all poſſibility of declining from it. For the Viſion of thy glorious Eſſence has the influence of the moſt efficacious *Grace*, both to determine them to good, and alſo to confirm them in it * For thy Eſſence is the very Eſſence of Goodneſs, and thoſe that clearly ſee it will be as much influenc'd by it, as thoſe that do not ſee it are by the general Appearance of Good. And as there is now no poſſibility of Averſion from good in common, ſo there will be then no declining from thee. Happy Viſion that putteſt an end to † Sin, when ſhall we partake of thy Security, Bleſſed Light that chaſeſt away the works of Darkneſs, when wilt thou ariſe upon us? Thou ſhalt ſhew us thy Glory, O Lord, and then we ſhall ever adhere to thee. In the mean

* *Eſſentia Dei eſt ipſa Eſſentia Bonitatis. Unde hoc modo ſe habet Angelus videns Deum ad ipſum, ſicut ſe habet quicunq; non videns Deum ad communem rationem Boni.* Aquinas. Part 1. Q. 62. Art. 8.

† *Tunc non peccabimus, cum illam faciem viderimus quæ vincit Omnes Concupiſcentias. St.* Auſt. Serm. 49. De Temp. Cap. 9.

time give us thy Grace ſo to uſe our *Liberty*, that we may have the Reward to loſe it in this happy *Neceſſity*.

3*dly*. To make us *Happy*. For how can we be otherwiſe when we have a clear and intimate Viſion of thee; and the higheſt Operation of our Nature is imploy'd upon the moſt perfect Object of it? Thou, O Lord, art the beſt and greateſt intelligible Good, and we are Intellectual Beings, whoſe nobleſt Faculty is our Underſtanding, and therefore thy Viſion muſt needs be truly *Beatifick*, and to know thee can be no leſs than eternal Life. Thou art all Good, and therefore they that enjoy thee, muſt needs acquieſce in thee. The moſt Covetous cannot but here be ſatisfied; for thy Perfection is an immenſe Sea, and in thee every Faculty will find its proper Object, and every Deſire its full Contentment. We ſhall be abundantly ſatisfied with the Fatneſs of thy Houſe, and thou ſhalt make us Drink of the River of thy Pleaſures: A River that will thoroughly quench that Thirſt which the Waters that we draw out of our own Ciſterns do but inflame, and which can never be drawn dry, as being fed by the everlaſting Springs of thy infinite Sufficiency. We ſhall then love and delight in what we ſee, and have what we love, and ſhall be ever raviſhed with the Contemplation of thy Beauty, and dwell in the Communion of thy ineffable Joys, and in the embraces of thy Love,

Love, and ſhall eternally Praiſe and Adore thy Goodneſs. *Amen. Halleluja.*

But, O my God, there is a *Beatifick Temper* as well as a *Beatifick Viſion*, and Heaven imports not only an outward Poſſeſſion, but an inward State and Diſpoſition of Mind. Thy Kingdom is in great meaſure within us, and as great a good as thou art, every Soul howſoever diſpoſed, is not qualified to enjoy thee. There muſt be a Wedding Garment provided for the Marriage Feaſt. O Sanctifie us therefore and Purifie us by thy Grace, that we may be *meet* Partakers of the Inheritance of the Saints in Light, and help us to behold thy Face now in Righteouſneſs, that when we awake up after thy Likeneſs, we may be ſatisfied with it.

CHAP. VI.

That all Material Objects, and perhaps moſt Spiritual ones, are ſeen or underſtood by the Mediation of Ideas.

1. WE have in the foregoing Chapter given an Account of certain Objects that are Self-intelligible, and which are perceived by themſelves. And they are all of the *Immaterial* Kind, within which Boundary, as we have hitherto confined our ſelves, ſo I ſee not

how we can ever pass beyond it. Not that there appears any necessity to suppose, as we shall further observe by and by, that all Objects that are of this Order, are understood by us after this manner, but that there are no other so understood but they. For as for material Objects, or things of a Corporeal Nature, that they cannot be understood immediately, or by themselves, there are several Reasons to maintain, and such as are both clear in themselves, and distinct from one another.

2. First of all because these Material Objects are without the Mind. I call them *Objects* because I suppose them to be some way or other Intelligible, but that they are not Intelligible by themselves, I think this very Consideration is sufficient to evince. For since there is a necessity of some Union between the Act, or rather the Power acting and its Objects, 'tis plain, that whatever is perceived or understood, must be some way or other present to the Mind. And accordingly the Union of the thing perceived with the perceptive Power, is by *Aquinas* made as necessary to Perception as the perceptive Power it self, when he tells us, That to Vision, both Sensible and Intellectual, two things are requisite, *viz.* the visive Power, and the Union of the thing seen with the Sight. Because there is no actual Vision, but by this, that the thing seen is some way or other in the Seer. * *Ad visionem tam sensibilem quam Intellectualem,*

* Part 1. *Quest.* 12. Art. 2.

Intellectualem, duo requiruntur, Scilicet virtus visiva, & unio rei visæ cum visu. Non enim fit visio in actu, nisi per hoc, quod res visa quodammodo est in vidente. Well, but then, if whatever is underſtood muſt be ſome way or other preſent to the Mind, becauſe no Power can act upon an Object that is utterly diſtant from it, then by the ſame Proportion whatever is underſtood by it ſelf, muſt by it ſelf be immediately preſent to the Mind. But now 'tis plain, that material Objects have not with the Mind any ſuch intimate Preſence or Union. And accordingly, continues the ſame Doctor in the ſame place, That in Corporeal things it is apparent that the things ſeen cannot be in the Seer by its own Eſſence, but only by its Similitude. As for inſtance, the Similitude of a Stone is in the Eye, by which there is actual viſion, and not the very ſubſtance of the Stone it ſelf. And therefore we may conclude ſince material Objects are not by themſelves immediately preſent to the Mind, that therefore they are not by themſelves immediately perceived by it. For as where there is no Union at all of the Intelligible Object with the Intellective Power, there can be no Perception at all; ſo where there is no *immediate* Union, there can be no immediate Perception.

3. But then again *2dly*, as theſe material Objects are without the Mind, ſo alſo are they utterly *diſproportionate* to it, and therefore 'tis not reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that they are imme-

diately perceived by it, or that in the Perception which we have of them, these very things themselves are the immediate Objects that terminate that Perception. That there should be a due Proportion between the Power and its proper Object in general, and consequently between the Understanding and what is immediately perceived by it (according to that Maxim allowed by *Aquinas*, *Cognoscentis ad cognitum oportet esse aliquam Proportionem*) seems but a reasonable Supposition. And the Schools themselves are so far convinced of the reasonableness of it; that tho' they derive our Ideas from the material Species, which sensible Objects (as they imagine) impress upon the Senses, yet they find it necessary to contrive a way whereby these material Species after their admission into the common Sensory, may be refined and spiritualized before they are presented to the Understanding, *viz.* by the help of what they call *Intellectus Agens*, whose Office it is (and work enough in all reason) to purifie and refine these Species or Phantasms, that so from Material and sensible they may become (by a strange *Transubstantiation*) Immaterial and Intelligible. 'Tis besides our present purpose to lay open the Absurdity of this miserable Device, all that I think *concerning* at present to Remark, is that hereby the Schools seem to acknowledge the necessity of there being some Proportion between the Understanding and its immediate Object, since these Species of a material

terial Extraction muſt be transform'd into a like Nature with that of the Mind, in order to their being Intelligible by it. And accordingly before this Tranſmutation they are called Senſible and not Intelligible Species; which ſeems to imply, that nothing can be the immediate Object of the Mind, but what is of a Nature proportionate to it. But now there ſeems to be no manner of Proportion between the Mind and things Material, between Thought and Extenſion, or between a thinking and an extended Subſtance, which, according to the Ideas we have of them, we cannot but conceive to be as diſproportionate to each other as any two things can poſſibly be, as differing in the whole kind, and removed from each other, as I may ſay, by the whole *Diameter* of Being. And therefore I propoſe it to be conſidered, whether from hence alſo we may not reaſonably infer, that material Things are not Self-intelligible, nor conſequently the immediate Objects of the Mind. For in all Thought there muſt be Union between the Object and the Faculty, and nothing can be the immediate Object of the Mind but what is immediately united to the Mind. But how there can be any ſuch Union between a thinking Being and an extended Being, is not, I think, to be conceived.

4. But beſides that, we may ſee how much Philoſophy is concerned in the iſſue of this Queſtion; 'tis further to be conſidered, that if material

material Things were perceived immediately by themſelves, there would be no *Phyſical Science*: For Science is concerning things neceſſary and immutable, and therefore as if there were nothing but Bodies (as the old Philoſophers according to *Aquinas* were of Opinion) there would be no Science (as they alſo upon that Suppoſition are ſaid to have inferr'd,) and that becauſe theſe things are all Contingent, and in continual flux; ſo ſuppoſing there be other things of a more ſtable Nature (as for that very reaſon there neceſſarily muſt) yet if material Beings are not known by thoſe other things, but by themſelves, ſtill there would be no Science with regard to thoſe Beings. The caſe as to them would be the ſame as before; for as thoſe other things, whoſe Nature is fixed and permanent, are the Foundations of Science, as we have largely ſhewn in the former Part, ſo all the Science that is muſt be with reſpect to thoſe Foundations. 'Tis true indeed, that the Poſition of Ideas does ſufficiently ſalve the Notion of Science in the general againſt the pretences of Scepticiſm grounded upon the inſtability of ſenſible Objects, and 'twas for that very end that *Plato* is ſaid to have had recourſe to them; but yet if material Beings are ſuppoſed to be perceived immediately and by themſelves, the old Sceptical Objection taken from the mutable State of external Nature, conſidered with the Immutability that Science requires in its Object, will in great meaſure again return,

return, and ſtill as to theſe *Phyſical* things at leaſt there will be no Science. For the ſalving of which it is therefore neceſſary, that material Beings ſhould be perceived not by themſelves, but by their Ideas, and that in this Senſe alſo we ſhould think of *Corporeal* things, according to *Incorporeal Reaſons*, as St. *Auſtin* expreſſes it, ſince 'tis only according to thoſe Incorporeal Reaſons that they have, that immutability which Science requires. *De Trin.* Lib. 12. C. 2.

5. And in all this I go very much according to the Principles of the great Ideal Philoſopher, and maintainer of Science; if *Thomas Aquinas* may be allow'd to be a competent Judge of them, who thus repreſents this whole Matter. The firſt Philoſophers, ſays he, who inquired concerning the Natures of things, thought there was nothing in the World but Body. And becauſe they ſaw that all Bodies were Moveable, and thought they were in continual flux, they were of Opinion that we could have no certainty concerning the Nature of things, *&c.* But now *Plato* coming upon theſe, that he might ſalve our having a certain Intellectual Knowledge of Truth, ſuppoſed beſides theſe Corporal Things another kind of Beings ſeparate from Matter and Motion, which he called Species or Ideas, by participation, whereof every one of thoſe Singu- *Sum. Theol. Part.* 1. *Quæſ.* 84. *Art.* 1.

lars

lars and Senſibles, is ſaid to be either a Man, or a Horſe, or the like. And accordingly he maintained that Sciences and Definitions, and whatever appertains to the Act of the Underſtanding, was not to be referred to thoſe ſenſible Bodies; but to thoſe immaterial and ſeparate Beings, and that ſo the Soul did not underſtand thoſe Corporal Things, but the ſeparate Species of thoſe Corporal Things. Which account, as 'tis perhaps one of the faireſt Repreſentations of *Plato*'s Ideal Syſtem that one ſhall meet with; ſo I take it to be very right in it ſelf, both as to the neceſſity of Ideas for the ſalving of Sciences in the general, and alſo as to our knowledge of Corporeal Beings by them. For that I preſume is what is meant by the *Soul's not underſtanding Corporal Things*, not as tho' ſhe did not underſtand them at all (for then there would be no Phyſical Science *that* way) but that ſhe does not underſtand them immediately, or by themſelves, but by their Ideas; which indeed I think to be the right account of the Matter; and for this, among other Reaſons, ſince otherwiſe I ſee not how *Natural Science* (whoſe Object muſt be as ſteady and immutable as that of any other) can be either clearly conceived, or with ſatisfaction maintain'd againſt a *Sceptical* Oppoſer. With whom, as much concerned as I am for the intereſt of the Sciences, and tho' I were much better inſtructed in them than I am, I ſhould not

be

be very forward to ingage, but upon the ſuppoſition of *Ideas*.

6. I am the more ſparing in this Argument becauſe I have ſaid ſeveral things relating to it elſewhere, which the Reader for his better ſatisfaction is deſired to compare with the preſent Account. However to clear this Matter yet once more, if poſſible, to the Capacity of the meaneſt Perſon whoſe Curioſity ſhall have led him thus far in the peruſal of this Work, I offer this ſhort Reaſoning to his longer Conſideration. Science is only of Neceſſaries and Immutables. Things are Neceſſary and Immutable only as they are in Idea. Therefore things only as they are in Idea, are the Objects of Science. Or more explicitly thus: To have any Science of material Things, is to know certain, univerſal, neceſſary, eternal and immutable Truths concerning them; for if it be not concerning *them*, then 'tis not Phyſical Science, but of ſome other kind. But how concerning *them*? Not as in Nature, for ſo they are Mutable and Contingent, and ſo cannot be the Subjects of neceſſary and immutable Relations, ſuch as theſe Truths are ſuppoſed tobe. If then we know any ſuch Truths concerning them it muſt be concerning them, as they are in Idea, or according to their Ideal Reaſons. And therefore we muſt ſee and perceive them as they are in their Ideas, whenever we know or affirm ſuch Truths concerning them, or elſe 'tis plain that we can have no true Science of them.

7. There

7. There is one Conſideration more which may be added to the reſt, and that is, that if material Things were ſeen or perceived by themſelves, then they would be a true Light to our Minds, as being the intelligible Form of our Underſtandings, and that whereby they become actually Intelligent, and conſequently would be truly perfective of them, and indeed ſuperiour to them. For as the Ideas of theſe things are Perfective of our Minds, ſuppoſing, as we do, that we ſee them by Ideas; ſo if we ſee them by themſelves, then the things themſelves would be to our Minds what we ſuppoſe their Ideas to be. For whatever is the immediate Object of the Mind is the Perfection of it, as informing it. And therefore, when *Aquinas* had urged this Objection to himſelf againſt God's knowing other things beſides himſelf, that the thing underſtood is the Perfection of the Intelligent, and that therefore if God did underſtand other things beſides himſelf, then ſomething elſe would be the Perfection of God, and conſequently more noble than himſelf, 'tis remarkable that he had no other way to bring himſelf off; but by diſtinguſhing of a twofold *Intellectum*, the Primary, as I may call it, or Intelligible Species, which according to him (becauſe he ſuppoſes no other to be the immediate Object of the Mind) is the Perfection of the Underſtanding, and the Secondary, that is, the thing it ſelf whoſe the Species is, and by ſaying, that God underſtands other things

no

no otherwiſe than as the *Species* of them are contained in his own Eſſence, which is the ſame as to ſay, that he underſtands other things, no otherwiſe than by himſelf, or elſe he could not juſtly infer as he does; that it does not therefore follow, that any thing elſe is the Perfection of the Divine Intellect, beſides the very Eſſence of God himſelf. His words are, *Dicendum quod Intellectum eſt Perfectio Intelligentis, non quidem ſecundum ſuam ſubſtantiam, ſed ſecundum ſuam ſpeciem, ſecundum quam eſt in Intellectu, ut Forma & Perfectio ejus. Lapis enim non eſt in animâ, ſed Species ejus. Ea vero quæ ſunt alia à Deo, intelliguntur à Deo, in quantum Eſſentia Dei Continet Species eorum. Unde non Sequitur quod aliquid aliud ſit Perfectio Divini Intellectus, quam ipſa Eſſentia Dei.* Obſerve here, that his limitation of that Maxim of the Objection, *The thing underſtood is the Perfection of the Intelligent*, to the intelligible Species of the thing, is from his ſuppoſing *that* only to be the immediate Object of the Mind; which implies, that if the thing itſelf were ſo, that alſo would be its Perfection for the ſame reaſon. Obſerve again, that he makes thoſe Species, whereby God knows other things, to be no other than the Divine Ideas, which is in effect, that he knows other things by himſelf only, and that leſt otherwiſe ſomething elſe beſides himſelf, ſhould be a Perfection to him: Wherein he plainly confeſſes, that the immediate Object

Sum. Theol. Part 1. *Quæſ.* 14. *Art.* 5.

ject of the Mind, whatever it be, is the Perfection of it, even of the Divine Mind it self; only he denies any thing to be the immediate Object of God's Understanding besides his own Essence, that so nothing may be a Perfection to him but himself: Which, I think, is as sound Divinity as Metaphysics, most worthy of God; and I was about to say of another Celestial Attestation from him, *Benè Scripsisti de me Thoma.*

8. Upon these Considerations it appears to be a Conclusion, tho' somewhat against the suggestions of Sense, yet very much according to Reason; that Matter is not an Object self-visible, or self intelligible; that 'tis not the immediate Object of our Sight, or of our Thought, of sensible, or of intellectual Vision, but that of it self and by it self, it is utterly Dark, Invisible and Unintelligible. So that as God is that Light in which there is no Darkness at all; so Matter, on the contrary, may be said to be darkness wherein there is no light at all: A pure and an unmingled Darkness, being no more able to inlighten the Mind, than it is to act upon it, or cause any Sentiment in it, but as utterly *invisible* as 'tis *inefficacious*, and so every unperfective of our Natures, and uncapable of being the good of our Souls.

9. So far is Matter from being able to think or understand, that it is not of it self so much as *Intelligible*, and were it not for those *incorporeal Reasons*, or Ideas whereby it comes under our

our Cogniſance, it would remain an unknown, unſeen, and unthought of Being in the World. But then is it not ſtrange that That which can give no *Light* to our Underſtandings, ſhould yet be able to impart ſo much *Heat* to our Affections? And yet thus it is: All the Thought, all the Care, all the Labour, all the Paſſion, and all the Contention of Mankind is about theſe poor material Things, which are Darkneſs to our Underſtandings, and beneath the Application of our Wills, as having none of thoſe Beauties which we fondly dream of, and admire in them. And yet theſe dark unintelligible Entities, theſe intellectual Cyphers, theſe Idols that are nothing at all in the intelligible World, are the great concern of this. Theſe mean and ignoble Eſſences, as much inferior to our Souls, as ſuperior to nothing, and which the great Author of them and us ſeems to have caſt into a *Shade*, as the leſs regardable Pieces of his Workmanſhip, and to have hid from the view of our Minds, as unworthy of the adheſion of our Hearts; theſe are the things which we fooliſhly grow inamoured of, and blindly fall in love with, renouncing even the Beatifick Objects of the Glory that ſhall be revealed for the enjoyment of them. Beſides, theſe poor Beings are accounted by us the only ſubſtantial Realities, and accordingly we call them our *Goods*, and our Treaſures, while in the mean time, thoſe far more excellent and noble Eſſences of the intelligible World, the Ideal

Reaſons whereby we have the very Perception and Knowledge of them, which were when *they* were not, and would remain if they were remanded to their nothing again; theſe are eſteemed by us as Chimæras and Metaphyſical Nothings; or at leaſt, as thin ſlender Beings that have no more Subſtance than a Shadow, or an Image in the Glaſs. So much does Man act by Senſe, tho' he be diſtinguiſh'd by Reaſon, and ſo much even in this ſenſe alſo does he love Darkneſs rather than Light.

10. But from Morality again to our Metaphyſics; we have ſhewn that material Things are not perceivable or intelligible by themſelves, and conſequently that they muſt be known by their Ideas, there being but theſe two poſſible ways of knowing any intelligible Object. And indeed this is the great and principal Uſe of Ideas to repreſent *material* Things to our Minds, which are not able to repreſent themſelves to light us, as I may ſay, in the *Dark*, and to ſerve as Stars to conduct us through the black Night of the Corporeal World. And perhaps when we ſhall come to know what theſe Ideas are, we ſhall not refuſe the direction of ſuch Guides, nor think it unworthy of us, or unbecoming the Dignity of our Natures to allow that ſuch things as theſe ſhould be the Light of our Minds, and Perfective of our Underſtands, tho' Matter cannot be allowed to be ſo. In the mean time before we proceed any further, there are two or three Remarks which may be raiſed from

from the Premiſes by way of *Corollary*, and which the Reader would do well to take in his way, and into his Conſideration.

Firſt then, ſince we have ſhewn material Things are not to be perceived immediately by themſelves, but by their Ideas, whether this does not prove the neceſſity of ſuch Ideas, and ſo whether this may not be ſuperadded to the Conſiderations contained in the former part of this Work, as a further Confirmation of the Truth and Reality of an Ideal or Intelligible World.

In the next place, ſince material Things cannot be the immediate Objects of Thought, we may hence juſtly gather, that then Ideas which *are* the immediate Objects of Thought, of what kind ſo ever they be as to the Speciality of them, are certainly in the general not *Material*, that is, I mean Eſſentially conſider'd; for as to their being repreſentatively Material, that may very well conſiſt with their eſſential Spirituality.

Again laſtly, ſince material Things are not only perceived by Ideas, but that otherwiſe there can be no Science concerning them, and ſince theſe Ideas are the true and ſole Objects of that Science, we may hence further commend it to be obſerved concerning the Nature of theſe Ideas, that (whatever they be) they muſt in the general, not only be Spiritual and Immaterial, but alſo Neceſſary and Immutable, ſince otherwiſe they would be no more fit to be the

Objects of Science, than those Beings which by them are represented to our Minds; and so, tho' we had Ideas, yet still we should have no Science. And thus far by way of Prelibation concerning the Nature of our Ideas, from the Consideration of the manner of our perceiving material Things by them.

11. Now as to *Spiritual* things, we have already shewn that some of them are intelligible by themselves, in taking account of which we have gone however no farther than what is contained within the Divine Essence. And indeed I know not whether we can safely advance one step further or no. For tho' there be no Self-intelligible Objects, but what are Spiritual, yet it does not follow, that therefore all Spiritual Objects are Self-intelligible. On the contrary, perhaps there may be greater Reason to think that they are not. We cannot indeed be so positive here as in the other Case, and things must be determined as they will bear; but it seems most congruous to suppose that God is the only Self-intelligible Object, and that no other Substance but his falls under our direct and immediate View, and that all Creatures, Spiritual as well as Material, are perceived by Ideas, that so God only may be the Light of our Minds, and the Perfection of our Understandings.

12. Besides, tho' Spiritual Beings are more proportionate to our Minds than such as are Material, and accordingly may be conceived

as

as more capable of Union with them, and alſo as more fit to inlighten and perfect them as an intelligible Form; ſo that in theſe three Reſpects there ſeems not altogether that inconvenience in admitting the immediate Perceptibility of Spirits as of Bodies; yet ſtill the Argument as to *Science* ſeems to preſs here as much as in the other Caſe; ſo that if Spirits were perceived by themſelves, and not by Ideas, there would be as little Foundation to erect any Science concerning them, as concerning Bodies upon the like ſuppoſition. For tho' 'tis confeſs'd they are far more Noble and Excellent Beings than Bodies, yet it muſt be confeſſed too, that as Creatures they are not leſs Temporary, Contingent, and in themſelves Mutable, than the other, and conſequently in that regard at leaſt, not qualified to be the Objects of Science, unleſs perceived by Ideas, as we ſuppoſe Bodies to be.

13. Beſides again, as to our own Souls, which make no inconſiderable Figure in the World of Spirits, it ſeems highly reaſonable, almoſt neceſſary to think that they are to be perceived only by their Ideas, as Bodies are, ſince, if they were Self-intelligible, we ſhould, methinks, have a clear Perception of them *now*, which yet we find we have not, as intimately united, as we are with our ſelves: Whereof I know not what other account to give but that the Ideas of them, whereby only they are to be perceived, are hid from us. And if our own Souls

are perceived not by themſelves, but by their Ideas, I know not why we ſhould not think the ſame of all other Created Spirits. It ſeems therefore upon the whole to be moſt probable that God is the only Self-intelligible Object, diſcernible by his own Light, and that all Created Beings, whether Material or Immaterial, are intelligible only in the Ideal way of Perception, by thoſe intelligible Species which repreſent them to our Underſtandings. From all which we are naturally led to Remark, how ill the manner of Humane Underſtanding has been conſidered in the Schools, ſince that Specular and *Ænigmatical* Viſion, which they ſuppoſe us to have of God, if it holds any where, is indeed true only of *Creatures*.

14. And thus having ſhewn what Objects are perceived immediately by themſelves, and what by the Mediation of Ideas, the next thing we have to conſider will be (and a very great thing indeed it is) what thoſe Ideas are by which theſe mediately Intelligible Objects are perceived by us; upon which Inquiry we ſhall make an entrance in the next Chapter. All that I ſhall do towards it in this, ſhall be only to ſet down the ſeveral ſorts of Ideas, which either have been, or may be aſſigned as the formal Principles of our Knowledge, whereby we either have been, or may be ſuppoſed to perceive things, and to which the ſeveral Hypotheſes concerning the way and manner of Humane Underſtanding may be referr'd. Now of

theſe

theſe I think *M. Malebranche* has laid out a very juſt and comprehenſive Diviſion, when he ſays, That it is abſolutely neceſſary, that thoſe Ideas which we have of Bodies, and of all other Objects, which we do not perceive by themſelves, ſhould come from thoſe very Bodies, or from thoſe Objects: Or that our Soul has a power of producing thoſe Ideas: Or that God has produced them with the Soul when he Created it: Or that he produces them whenſoever we think upon any Object: Or that the Soul has, in her ſelf, all thoſe Perfections which ſhe ſees in thoſe Bodies: Or, in fine, that ſhe be united with an all-perfect Being, and that includes in himſelf, after an univerſal manner, all the Perfections of Created Beings. This Enumeration ſeems ſo full and adequate, that we cannot well doubt, but that the true way of our underſtanding the Objects that are now under Conſideration, is contained within the compaſs of it. And accordingly I think the beſt method to find out what that is, will be to proceed upon the ſame Heads, by intermixiug with what this great Man either here, or elſewhere ſays upon each of them, ſome further Reflections of our own, as there ſhall be occaſion. For indeed I ſhould be very unjuſt to my Argument, as well as unkind to my ſelf, ſhould I refuſe what Light or Aſſiſtance I may receive in the management of it from ſo great a Head. And truly, conſidering what moderate aſſiſtance I have had hitherto in the Proſecution of this Work from other

Mens Thoughts, as writing upon a Subject which few Men have thought much about, I have the leſs reaſon to decline it now. And beſides, having travelled ſo much alone in the former Stages, a little Company now towards the cloſe of the Journey may be convenient; wherefore having ſo good a Companion, let us forthwith advance upon the foregoing Heads, only taking the liberty to word them a little otherwiſe than they are expreſſed here, that we may the better accommodate them to the Contexture of our Diſcourſe, and make them fall in the more aptly with the order of our general Deſign.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

That the Ideas whereby we perceive such Objects as are mediately Intelligible, do not come from those Objects; with some occasional Considerations upon the Intellectus Agens *of the Schools, Mr.* Lock's *Principle of Sensation, and that Scholastick Maxim, That there is nothing in the Understanding but what was first in the Sense.*

1. IN that part of our Account of Humane Understanding which concerns the *manner* of it, the Reader was made acquainted, that in inquiring *how* we understand, our design was to inquire what was the immediate Object of Thought in our Perception of things. Now this we have shewn to be the very things themselves in some Intelligible Objects, as in God, Ideas, and eternal Truths. In our Perception of these things the immediate Object of our Thought are the very things themselves. But now as to things that are out of God, those of them that are Material, we have shewn to be known by Ideas, as also according to the greatest probability, those also that are Spiritual, as Angels and Humane Souls. And here not

not the things themſelves ; but the Ideas of them are the immediate Objects of our Perception. Now as to thoſe things which are *Self-intelligible*, I look upon the manner of our knowing *them* to be already ſufficiently accounted for ; ſince whence 'tis ſhewn, that ſuch or ſuch things are perceived immediately by themſelves, 'tis as much as need, or indeed can well be ſaid of them. But as to thoſe things which are known by Ideas, the greateſt part of the Enquiry remains yet ſtill behind, and that is to conſider, according to the beſt light we have in this State of Darkneſs, what thoſe Ideas are whereby we have the knowledge of them. Towards the Reſolution of which grand Queſtion, I think we may reaſonably make our entry with this plain Aſſertion, *That the Ideas whereby we perceive ſuch Objects as are mediately Intelligible, do not come from thoſe Objects.*

2. So I chuſe to expreſs the Propoſition of the Chapter, rather than to ſay with our Author, *That material Objects do not ſend forth any Species that reſemble them.* And that becauſe this latter is not, as I conceive, ſo properly the Propoſition that is to be proved, as one of the mediums of proving it. For having made an enumeration of the ſeveral ways of our perceiving things, that is, of the ſeveral ſorts of Ideas, whereby we may be ſuppoſed to perceive them, and being now to conſider by which of them they are perceived, I think the train and purſuance of our Diſcourſe requires that we ſhould ſay,

ſay, that the Ideas, whereby we perceive ſuch Objects, do not come from thoſe Objects, rather than that ſuch Objects do not ſend forth any. Beſides, I chuſe to ſay, *Objects mediately Intelligible*, rather than *Material Objects*, partly becauſe I would diſtinguiſh them againſt thoſe Objects which are Intelligible by themſelves, and not by Ideas, and partly becauſe of the greater Latitude of the Expreſſion, which being more general, will take in Spiritual as well as material Beings; ſome of which Spiritual Beings (*viz.* all that are Created) we have ſuppoſed to be of the number of mediately Intelligible Objects. Theſe *M. Malebranche* has here left out, confining himſelf to ſuch Objects as are Material, not becauſe he thought thoſe were the only Objects which were to be known by Ideas (for he intimates the contrary when he ſays, I believe there is no Subſtance purely Intelligible but that of God, that there is no ſeeing any thing with Evidence, but in his Light, and that the Union of Spirits cannot render them viſible) but, as I ſuppoſe, becauſe he thought we had at preſent no Ideas of any other; which, I believe, is very right. But yet however, ſince Spirits are ſuppoſed to be Intelligible only by their Ideas as well as Bodies, and ſince we ſhall at leaſt hereafter have an Ideal Perception of them, as well as of the other, upon this Conſideration; as alſo, that our Diſcourſe may be more juſt and intire in all its parts, we ſhall firſt make good our Propoſition with

with reſpect to *them*, ſhewing that the Ideas whereby Spiritual Beings are perceived, whenever they are perceived, are not derived from thoſe beings.

3. And that they are not, is ſo plain and obvious, that we need not ſtay long upon the proof of it; the contrary Suppoſition being not only inconſiſtent with the Notion of theſe Beings, but alſo deſtructive of their real Natures. For if theſe Spiritual Beings do ſend forth any Species reſembling them from their own Subſtance, as they muſt do if the Ideas, whereby they are perceived, do come from them, then 'tis plain that they are diviſible: And if ſo, then a double Abſurdity will follow; one by way of direct Progreſs from the Cauſe to the Effect, and another by way of Regreſs from the Effect to the Cauſe. *1ſt.* That they are Corruptible, Corruption being the effect of Diviſion. And then *2dly.* That they are alſo Extended, Extention being the ground of Diviſibility. And ſo our ſuppoſed immortal Spirits will become really mortal Bodies: Whereby it is plain, that if Spiritual Beings, ſuch as Angels or Humane Souls (for God is not at all concerned in this Diſcourſe) be perceived by Ideas, 'tis not by any Ideas derived from *themſelves*, that they are perceived.

4. Proceed we now to ſhew the ſame as to material Objects, *viz.* That the Ideas whereby we perceive them, are not from thoſe Objects. For which Aſſertion, as contrary as it is to the Principles

Principles of the common Philoſophy, I ſeem to have two very clear and diſtinct Reaſons.

1*ſt*. Becauſe material Objects do not ſend forth from them any Species reſembling themſelves.

2*dly*. Becauſe ſuppoſing they did, yet they could not be perceived by ſuch Species.

The Firſt of theſe is that which *M. Malebranche* has undertaken to maintain, in oppoſition to the *Peripatetick* Philoſophy, which, as he obſerves, holds the Emiſſion of ſuch Species from Bodies. Tho' that is not the only Philoſophy that does ſo, for he might have obſerved the ſame, if he had pleaſed, of the *Epicurean*, which teaches alſo the Emiſſion of certain fine and ſubtile Images from the Surface of Bodies continually flying up and down the Air, and that with a celerity of Motion ſwifter than the Beams of the Sun. And 'tis by theſe volatile Images that they pretend to explain *Viſion*, to which they ſuppoſe them abſolutely neceſſary. For ſo the great Recorder and Embelliſher of that Philoſophy boldly Sings of theſe Images; as boldly as if he had ſeen Bodies ſtripping and diveſting themſelves of theſe their outer Coats, and that as plainly as he ſaw the Bodies themſelves.

Dico igitur rerum Effigies tenueſq; Figuras
Mittier ab rebus, ſummo de Corpore earum.
Quæ quaſi Membrana, vel Cortex Nominitanda 'eſt,
Quod Speciem, ac formam Similem gerit ejus Imago,
Quotieſcunq; cluet de Corpore fuſa vagari.
Lucret. Lib. Quart. Oxford edit. P. 192.

Again,

Et quaſi Multa brevi Spatio ſummittere debet
Lumina Sol, ut perpetuo ſint Omnia plena,
Sic a rebus item ſimili ratione neceſſe 'eſt
Temporis in puncto rerum ſimulacra ferantur
Multa Modis Multis, in Cunctas undiq; partes.
P. 198.

Again,

Nonne vides Citius debere, & longius ire
Multiplexq; loci ſpacium tranſcurrere eodem
Tempore, quo Solis pervolgant lumina Cœlum?
P. 200.

Once more let us here him,

Eſſe in imaginibus quapropter Cauſa videtur
Cernendi, neq; poſſe ſine his res ulla videri, &c.
P. 201.

But as fond as this Philoſophick Poet, or rather Poetical Philoſopher, of theſe Images iſſuing forth from Bodies, and as much *Idols* as they are of many other Philoſophers, who are, or ſhould be Votaries of *Severer* Muſes, it ſeems very

very Abſurd and Unphiloſophical, upon many Conſiderations, to ſuppoſe any ſuch things which Mr. *Malebranche* ſhews.

1*ſt*. From the *Impenetrability* of Bodies, ſuch as he juſtly ſuppoſes theſe Species to be, ſince Bodies cannot ſend out from them Species of a Nature different from themſelves. And accordingly, as he obſerves, 'tis commonly ſaid by Philoſophers, that theſe Species are Groſs and Material, by way of diſtinction from thoſe *expreſs* Species which are Spiritualized. Theſe *impreſs* Species of Objects muſt then be little Bodies. And therefore they cannot penetrate themſelves, nor all thoſe intermedial Spaces between the Earth and the Heavens, which muſt be all full of them. Whence 'tis obvious to conclude, that they muſt needs bruiſe and grind one another, as one paſſes on one ſide, and another on the other, and that ſo they cannot render Objects viſible.

Upon this Head he further conſiders, that from one and the ſame Point of view one may ſee a vaſt number of Objects, and that therefore the Species of all thoſe Bodies ought to meet in one Point, which, becauſe of their Impenetrability, as being extended, is impoſſible. And this he further improves by adding, that there is not only a great number of the vaſteſt Objects to be ſeen from the ſame Point; but that alſo there is no one Point in all the vaſt Spaces of the World, from whence one may not diſcover almoſt an infinite number of Objects,

and

and thoſe not leſs than the Sun, the Moon, and the Heavens. And that therefore there is no Point in all the World, but where the Species of all theſe things muſt be ſuppoſed to meet; which is againſt all appearance of Truth.

2*dly*. From the variation which happen to the Species. For 'tis certain that the nearer the Object, the Species muſt be the greater, ſince the Object appears greater to us. But now what ſhould diminiſh this Species, and what becomes of thoſe parts which compoſed it when it was greater? But that which in this way is moſt inconceivable, is that if one looks at this Object with a Microſcope, the Species becomes on a ſudden five or ſix hundred times bigger than it was before; ſince by what parts it ſhould be ſo augmented in an inſtant is not to be conceived.

3*dly*. From the inſtance of a perfect Cube; which when one looks upon all the † Species of its ſides, are unequal, and yet one ſees all its ſides equally ſquare. In like manner, when in a Picture one looks upon oval Figures and Parallelograms, which to be ſure cannot ſend forth Species but what are of the like Figure, and yet one ſees there only Circles and Squares. The force of the former Argument concerning the Cube (as I underſtand it) conſiſts

† He means I ſuppoſe, as they are in the bottom of the Eye, ſince the Image of the Cube that is projected upon the Retina (ſuppoſing any ſuch to be painted there) muſt be like a Cube in *Perſpective* whoſe ſides are unequal.

ſiſts in this. That which I ſee has its ſides equally ſquare: But the Species (if any ſuch there be) muſt be unequally ſo, as in Perſpective; therefore the Species is not that which I ſee.

Laſtly, From the unconceivableneſs of ſuppoſing, that a Body that does not ſenſibly diminiſh ſhould always ſend forth from it ſelf Species on all ſides, and ſhould inceſſantly repleniſh with them vaſt Spaces all round about, and that with a ſwiftneſs not to be imagin'd. For in the very inſtant that an * hidden Object diſcovers it ſelf, one may ſee it many millions of Leagues on every ſide: Beſides that, it ſeems very ſtrange, that Bodies that are very Active, as the Air and ſome others, ſhould not have the force to ſend out any ſuch Images that reſemble them, when this is ſuppoſed to be done by Bodies that are groſs, hard and unactive.

† I ſuppoſe he means the Sun.

5. Theſe Conſiderations I have here thrown together, becauſe the Author has been pleaſed to range them under this formal Head, *viz.* That *Material Objects do not ſend forth any reſembling Species*, tho' I think we muſt divide them again; ſince, if I may preſume to rectifie any thing in ſo great a Man, and who generally writes with ſo much clearneſs and exactneſs, they will be found perhaps moſt of them to belong to the other, as directly proving the Concluſion itſelf, *That Bodies are not perceived by Species that proceed from them*, rather than that

there is no Proceſſion of any ſuch Species, as will appear by the Application which we ſhall by and by make of them to that purpoſe. Indeed I think that there is but one of theſe Arguments that diſtinctly proves the Theſis of the Chapter, that Bodies do not emit any Species, and that is the *laſt*, taken from the ſenſible Diminution that muſt needs arrive to them if they did; which indeed ſeems very convincing, and the more becauſe it is an Appeal to Senſe as well as to Reaſon.

6. But before we leave this Point, I would offer another Conſideration upon it. If Bodies ſend forth any Species that reſemble them, then the parts of thoſe Species (for I ſuppoſe them to be Corporeal) muſt be Coexiſtent, that ſo the Species may be intire in all its parts, or elſe it will not carry a due reſemblance of the Body whoſe Species it is ſuppoſed to be. Whence I infer again, That the correſponding Parts of thoſe Bodies which conſtitute thoſe Species, muſt fly off from the Surface of thoſe Bodies all at once, ſince otherwiſe ſome parts will be wanting to the Species while it has others, and ſo it will be no Species at all, as not being intire. But now it ſeems impoſſible that Bodies ſhould thus intirely and ſimultaneouſly ſtrip and uncaſe themſelves of theſe their outer Coats or Membranes (as *Lucretius* calls them) and conſequently, that we ſhould have any ſuch intire Prints and Images of them, and that becauſe even Bodies that are of one ſimple

ple ſpecifick Subſtance are not equally diviſible in all their parts, and ſo not *uniformly volatile*, as being of a firmer and cloſer Contexture in ſome parts than in others. Much leſs can this be in Bodies that are compounded of ſeveral ſorts of Subſtances, which yet are as viſible as thoſe that are moſt ſimple. For inſtance, I will ſuppoſe a Statue of a Man, whoſe Feet and Legs ſhall be of Iron, the Trunk of Wood, and the Head of Wax. Now I would offer it to be conſidered by any thinking Perſon, whether this ſo compounded Statue can ſend forth any Species like it ſelf, ſince the parts whereof it is compoſed, and whereof the Species muſt be compoſed too, being of a Texture ſo very various, and conſequently ſo differently volatile, cannot fly off all at the ſame time, but will take their leave ſome ſooner and ſome later, ſome in one manner and ſome in another, according as they can diſengage themſelves from their ſeveral Holds. But then how a juſt and intire Species ſhould be the reſult of ſo unequal and tumultuous an Effluxion of Parts will require ſome labour to conceive, and perhaps more than the Hypotheſis it ſelf is worth. For indeed I look upon this Notion of Bodies ſending forth theſe Images of themſelves (next to thoſe ſubſtantial Forms which they are ſuppoſed to have *within* them) to be as whimſical and phantaſtical an Amuſement as one can well meet with among all the Romantick Imaginations of the School-Philoſophy; and I cannot but wonder

that ſo many learned Men would ſo ſeriouſly and gravely take up, or rather ſit down with ſo childiſh and ſo extravagant a Phancy; and among the reſt my Lord *Bacon*, who ſuppoſes a kind of Eradiation of viſible Species from Bodies, and compares them to Odours. *Videntur Species Viſibilium eſſe tanquam Emiſſiones Radiorum a Corpore viſibili inſtar fere Odorum*; eſpecially conſidering the no advantage of it if it ſhould be granted. For that I go next to ſhew, *viz.*

[*Opuſcula Poſthuma* Page 136.

7. *2dly.* That ſuppoſing Bodies to emit from them any ſuch reſembling Species, yet 'tis impoſſible that they ſhould be perceived by them. Now here come in the reſt of M. *Malebranche*'s Arguments, as I ſhall ſhew diſtinctly by a ſhort Application of them.

As firſt of all, if Bodies are perceived by theſe Species, then theſe Species muſt penetrate themſelves, and all the intermedial Species between the Earth and the Heavens. But this they cannot do as being Corporeal and Impenetrable. *Ergo.*

Again, if Bodies are perceived by thoſe Species which come from them, then all thoſe intermedial Species muſt be full of them, becauſe they may any where be perceived. But if ſo, then by their various juſtlings and rencounters, they muſt needs infringe and diſorder one another, ſo as to be no longer capable of repreſenting the Bodies from whence they came.

Again,

Again, if Bodies are ſeen by Species of their own ſending forth, then a vaſt number of theſe Species muſt be ſuppoſed to meet together in one and the ſame Point, and that becauſe from one and the ſame Point multitudes of Objects are diſcoverable. But this they cannot do, as being extended and impenetrable. *Ergo.* Beſides, that there is alſo no aſſignable Point, wherein they muſt not meet.

Again, there is a great deal of variety in the intelligible Species, whereby Bodies are perceived, which ſometimes appear bigger, and ſometimes leſs, according as the diſtance is, or as they are ſeen with or without a Glaſs. If then Bodies are ſeen by their own Species, then all this great and ſometimes very ſudden change muſt be in thoſe Species. But this is utterly unaccountable, *Ergo.*

Again laſtly, if Bodies were ſeen by Species of their own; then ſince they cannot ſend forth Species of a different Figure from themſelves, theſe Species would always reſemble them, and conſequently when we look upon an Oval or a Parallelogram we ſhould never ſee a Circle or a Square. But Experience ſhews us the contrary, therefore. Or thus,

The Species which comes from Bodies muſt always reſemble thoſe Bodies it comes from.

But the intelligible Species whereby I perceive Bodies, or which I ſee when I look upon them, does not always reſemble them.

Therefore the intelligible Species, whereby I perceive Bodies is not the Species which comes from thoſe Bodies.

8. I would deſire the intelligent Reader to renew his Conſideration of theſe Arguments (eſpecially the laſt) as they ſtand now in this form, ſince, if they miſs'd him, or he them before; yet the different Dreſs and Poſture, and perhaps ſome Light and Advantage, which we have given them, may now at leaſt render them effectual to convince him, if he be not too much under the power of his Prejudices, that the Species whereby material Objects are perceived, cannot poſſibly be any Species derived from *them*, and that even ſuppoſing the derivation of any ſuch Species from them.

9. But for his better ſatisfaction I would requeſt him further to conſider with me, that tho' we ſhould ſuppoſe Bodies to be ſo fruitful as to beget, or rather to bring forth Species in their own Form and Likeneſs (which indeed would be a *Monſtrous* Birth, tho' duly *proportioned*) yet 'tis impoſſible that theſe thin ſubtil Images, to which Vapor or Smoke muſt be of a groſs Conſiſtence, ſhould without a Miracle, retain their Form, whereby they reſemble thoſe Bodies, and whereby only they can be ſuppoſed capable of repreſenting them, ſo much as for one moment: For they muſt paſs oftentimes through vaſt lengths of Air, and that, as their *Epicurean* Patron obſerves with an incredible

dible ſwiftneſs, that ſo they may be preſent to the Eye in the very inſtant that it looks towards far diſtant Objects; and the ordinary motion of the Air (ſetting aſide the Tempeſts of that great Sea) together with that ſwift motion of their own, muſt needs diſturb, diſperſe and ſcatter them immediately, ſo that theſe tender vaniſhing Off-ſprings will have that for their fate which was the wiſh of *Job*, *To die from the very Womb.* And therefore we may with a little alteration, apply that to theſe fleeting ſhades above, which the Poet ſays of theſe below.

———*Fruſtra Spectata Oculos eludet Imago,*
Par levibus ventis, volucriq; ſimillima Somno.

10. This is a ſenſible Argument; but if he is for one that is more abſtract, let him recollect what was touch'd upon on another occaſion in the former part of this Theory. It will readily be allowed, that thoſe Figures which Mathematicians deſcribe upon Paper or any other Matter are not Mathematically exact; and yet when we look upon theſe Figures we have Ideas of Figures exactly right, of perfect Circles and perfect Squares, *&c.* But now 'tis impoſſible we ſhould have theſe Ideas from thoſe material Figures, becauſe thoſe Figures cannot ſend forth Ideas more perfect than themſelves, and that becauſe the effect cannot be *P.* 52.

more perfect than its Cauſe, ſince then the Cauſe would give that to the Effect which it has not it ſelf, which is impoſſible. The Sum and the Form of this Argument is this.

Bodies cannot ſend forth any Species or Ideas more perfect than themſelves.

But the Ideas we have of ſome Bodies are more perfect than any thing that is to be found in thoſe Bodies.

Therefore the Ideas we have of thoſe Bodies do not proceed from thoſe Bodies.

11. But to conclude this Head, and at once to clear this Matter to full ſatisfaction; I ſhall add one Conſideration more to prove that ſuppoſing (what ſo many learned Men ſo ſtrongly fancy and ſo weakly maintain) that material Objects do ſend forth certain conſimilar Species or Images of themſelves; yet 'tis impoſſible that they ſhould be perceived by them, and that is in fine becauſe they are *Corporeal*. I know ſome Philoſophers talk of I know not what *intentional* Species, and of their ſucceſſive Generating and *Spawning* each other, after their firſt Emiſſion from the Object, throughout the ſeveral Points of the Medium. Which *Intentional* Species (ſo called, I think, becauſe the ſenſe *tends* to its Object by their means) tho' ſaid to be material as inhering in a Corporeal Subject; yet being by them ſuppoſed to be a certain *Quality* or *Accident*, muſt by conſequence be

be really ſomewhat Immaterial. For a Corporeal Accident, with theſe Philoſophers, ſignifies not an Accident that is a Body (for then it would be a Subſtance and not an Accident) but an Accident inhering in a Body, in Contradiſtinction to the Accidents that are in Spiritual Beings. It is to little purpoſe to go to ſhew an Hypotheſis not to be true in Fact, which in the very notion of it is not ſo much as Intelligible. And therefore notwithſtanding the many pretty things that are ſaid of theſe *Intentional Species*, I ſhall take the liberty to ſuppoſe all Species that come from Bodies (if any ſuch there be) to be Corporeal, as concluding it impoſſible that they ſhould ſend forth any Species of a different Nature from themſelves; tho' if they did, theſe Men have taken care that no advantage ſhould be made of it, it being impoſſible that an Accident or Quality ſhould repreſent a ſubſtantial Being. And therefore upon all Conſiderations, I cannot but think that the *Epicurean* Philoſophers, who, when they hold the Emanation of conſimilar Images from Bodies, do at the ſame time ſuppoſe them Corporeal, are much more conſiſtent with themſelves than theſe *Intential* Men, who contradict both their own Deſign, and the Nature of things at once, it being a plain ſtaring impoſſibility as any in Nature, that there ſhould be any Emanation from Body but what is Corporeal. And ſuch one would be ready to think the *Ariſtotelians* ſhould hold theſe Species to be by their calling

calling them Material, and by what they intimate concerning the groſſneſs of them, and from their ſetting up a particular Faculty in the Soul on purpoſe for the refining and ſpiritualizing of them. And yet if we examine and compare the accounts of theſe Men more carefully (as one muſt do ſometimes to know their true meaning) we ſhall, I think, find that they are for the *Intentional* way, that their Species are Accidents, not ſubſtantial Emanations, and that they are Corporeal only as they are inherent in a Corporeal Subject; which ſeems to be the difference between the *Ariſtotelian* and the *Epicurean* Hypotheſis. But however if they do not hold them to be Corporeal in the ſtricteſt and groſſeſt ſenſe, 'tis moſt certain that they *ought*, it being above the poſſibilities of Nature, and againſt all the light of Reaſon, that any thing ſhould be the Off-ſpring of Body but what is truly Corporeal, that is, I mean a real Body.

12. But now of theſe Species, ſuppoſing any to come from Bodies, muſt be Corporeal, then 'tis clear upon a new Conſideration, diſtinct from thoſe before inſiſted upon, that they cannot be perceived by them. For if Bodies are perceived by theſe Species, then theſe Species muſt be perceived by themſelves, and ſo be the very formal Principle of Thought, and the immediate Object of the Mind. But now we have already proved in the foregoing Chapter, that Matter cannot be perceived by itſelf, or be the immediate

immediate Object of the Mind. And if Matter cannot be the immediate Object of the Mind, then material Species or Ideas cannot, and that becauſe material Ideas are Matter. And if material Species cannot be the immediate Object of Thought, then 'tis plain again, that thoſe Species or Ideas, which are the immediate Object of Thought (as thoſe muſt be whereby Bodies are perceived) cannot be material, and conſequently cannot come from Bodies, ſince if they did they would be material, and as ſuch, not capable of being ſelf-intelligible, or immediately objected to the Mind. The very *Corporeity* then of theſe Species makes it impoſſible, that Bodies ſhould be perceived by them, and that becauſe it utterly unqualifies them for being the immediate Objects of the Mind themſelves, as they muſt be if by them Bodies are perceived. And to this purpoſe I further Remark, That if that kind of Corporeity, which the *Ariſtotelian* Philoſophy aſcribes to theſe Species, as ſlender as it is, does yet indiſpoſe them for being *Intelligible*, as in their own Opinion it does, till they are refined from it; much more then muſt this groſs Corporeity, which really belongs to them, be an invincible Bar againſt their being the Objects of the Mind, which can perceive nothing immediately, but what has as Affinity and Proportion with its own Nature. And accordingly 'tis remarkable, that even Monſieur *Bernier* himſelf

Tom. 6. *Page* 258.

in

in the excellent Abſtract which he has given us of *Gaſſendus*'s Philoſophy, found it neceſſary to go ſo far into this Sentiment as to ſay, that the Species, (which, according to him, is only a certain Ply or Trace in the Brain) is not the very thing perceived, but only the occaſion of our ſeeing that whereby we receive it.

13. And will not the Philoſophers of the School be as free to acknowledge the ſame of *their* Species, tho' not ſo groſsly Corporeal as either thoſe of *Epicurus*, or thoſe of M. *Bernier*, viz. That they are not the very things that the Mind perceives? Yes, I preſume, and more, as to thoſe of them which are *Impreſſed*. But then by the help of *intellectus Agens* ('was well I had not ſaid *Hocus Pocus*) they come in with another ſort of Species form'd out of theſe, which they, for that reaſon I ſuppoſe, call *Expreſs'd*; and theſe are the Species which the Mind has for its proper Object in the contemplation of things. But that this great Buſineſs may be fully comprehended, we muſt ſet down their intire Hypotheſis concerning the way of Humane Underſtanding, which, as far as I underſtand it, is briefly this. They ſuppoſe the Soul to be a pure Power, and of it ſelf indifferent for the Perception either of this thing or that, and ſo to need to be actuated and determined for the Perception of things by *Intelligible Species*, which are to the Mind as a formal Principle of Knowledge, by which it is carried to one Object rather than another. And thus far no doubt but they are right, that is, I mean as to all thoſe

thoſe Objects that are not *Self-intelligible*, for the Perception of which there is a neceſſity of Ideas, or as they call them, *Intelligible Species*. All the difficulty is how to come by them. Now here then they ſuppoſe that outward Objects do ſend forth certain reſemblances of themſelves, which they call Species; which Species (if I take them right) are not as M. *Malebranche* ſeems to think, and as I once thought my ſelf, ſubſtantial Emanations, but a ſort of Corporeal Accidents or Qualities, and becauſe they are imprinted by the Objects they come from upon the outward Senſes, they are therefore in this firſt State call'd *Impreſs'd* Species, Images, or Phantaſms. But then being as yet conſider'd as Material, and ſo by reaſon of their groſſneſs no way proportion'd to the Mind, they are allow'd to paſs no further than the outward Senſes, or the Phancy or common Senſe at fartheſt. So that as yet notwithſtanding the vaſt Fertility of outward Objects in ſending in Species, the Underſtanding has no Intelligible Object to contemplate. Nor is it ever like to have any, unleſs ſome very extraordinary way be found out for a ſupply. Here then they are forc'd to ſuppoſe (and a very good Expedient they think it is) a twofold Underſtanding in the Intellective Faculty, one *Agent*, and the other *Patient*. And tho' the latter be that which they properly and ſimply call the Underſtanding, as being that whereby the very formal act of Intellection is performed; yet the former they account of neceſſary

neceſſary Uſe, as ſerving to the Act of Intellection, whereof it is not capable it ſelf, by the forming of Intelligible Species for that purpoſe. For that is the proper Office of this *Agent Intellect*, to ſerve as an *under-labourer* to that which is Patient, to work, as I may ſay, at the other's *Forge*, and to hammer out for it Intelligible Species; which no doubt the other receives as joyfully as the * *Græcian* Hero did the Armour made him by *Vulcan*. Now theſe Species are formed out of the other by the dexterity of *Intellectus Agens*, which refines them and ſpiritualizes them till from material Phantaſms they become Intelligible Species. And then they aſſume the more honourable Title of *expreſs* Species, becauſe they are expreſs'd and wrought off from thoſe material Phantaſms which were firſt imprinted on the ſenſe. And 'tis by theſe expreſs Species that the Mind is ſuppoſed to perceive all material Objects. And now they have ſo richly ſet up the Underſtanding with a ſtock of Ideas, it muſt be her own fault if ever ſhe *Break*; for external Objects have an inexhauſtible Fecundity, and are continually ſending in more and more Griſt to the Mill; ſo that unleſs *Intellectus Agens* grow lazy and idle, 'tis impoſſible ſhe ſhould ever want Intellectual Proviſion.

* For ſo *Homer* of *Achilles*, Τέρπετο δ' ἐν χείρεσσιν ἔχων δεξὰ ἄγλαὰ δῶρα. Iliad. 19.

14. 'Tis

14. 'Tis a ſign Philoſophers are hard put to't when they muſt intrench upon the Province of *Poets*, and uſe *Fiction* for the ſupport of an Hypotheſis. But we have already ruin'd ſo much of this Romantick Syſtem, that we need now only conſider this one rare Expedient, upon which they lay the great ſtreſs of it, *viz.* The tranſmutation of theſe ſenſible, and as ſuch by their own Confeſſion unintelligible Species, into ſpiritual and intelligible Ideas, by the Operation of *Intellectus Agens.* And here, not to be long ingaged in fighting with Wind-mills, beſides the general oddneſs and extravagance of the Suppoſition, I have theſe few Exceptions to offer diſtinctly againſt it.

Firſt, It is at leaſt a very ſtrong Preſumption, and what cannot but give any conſidering Man a juſt Prejudice againſt this ſcholaſtick Device of an *Intellectus Agens*, that we are not at all conſcious to our ſelves of our having any ſuch intellectual Power or Faculty in us, nor of any of thoſe ſtrange Operations which are aſcribed to it, nor of any of thoſe wonderful Effects which are ſuppoſed to be done be it. We are conſcious of the other Powers and Operations of the Soul, tho' we have no Idea of the Soul itſelf. We find by Reflection that we Underſtand, Will, Senſe, Imagine, Remember, *&c.* But of this Agency of the Mind in making and forming Ideas we have no manner of Conſciouſneſs, tho' we enter into our ſelves never ſo often, and reflect upon what paſſes within us never ſo attentively.

tentively. But then that there ſhould be all this working in the Soul, and that ſhe ſhould have a Power to do ſuch extraordinary Feats, and yet know nothing of the Matter, is a very ſtrange thing, and in all appearance too ſtrange to be true.

Again, 'Tis againſt the Nature of the Underſtanding, according to the common Notion Men have of it, to make its own Object: For the proper buſineſs of the Underſtanding (as the very Name imports) is to *Underſtand*, which implies no *Agency* in it, but only what is *Immanent*, and terminates in itſelf. But as for any *Tranſient* Agency, ſuch as works an alteration in the Object, that belongs not to the Underſtanding, according to the Notion we have of that Faculty, and further we cannot go. And accordingly 'tis obſervable, that God himſelf, whoſe Underſtanding to be ſure can want no Activity that any Underſtanding can have, is yet both repreſented and conceived by us to make the World, not by his Underſtanding (any otherwiſe than as the Ideas of his eternal Wiſdom ſerve him for Exemplars in the formation of things) but by his *Will* or Power.

Again, As 'tis againſt the *Nature* of the Underſtanding to exert any Tranſient Agency upon the Object, ſo certainly it muſt needs be above her *Power* to convert a material Being, tho' but an Accident into a Spiritual. Above her Power, not only as Underſtanding, but as a created and finite Faculty. For this is ſuch a vaſt change in the

the nature of things, that one cannot well conceive how it ſhould be ſo much as abſolutely Poſſible. But however, if it be Poſſible in itſelf, we have no reaſon to think it ſhould be ſo to ſuch weak impotent Faculties as ours, eſpecially conſidering that we do not find that we have any ſuch Power as this over the nature of things in any other inſtance. For the *Philoſophers Stone*, as they call it, whereby viler Materials are pretended to be turn'd into Gold, were it true, is but a Fool to the great Metaphyſical Elixir, *Intellectus Agens.*

But after all the worſt of it is, That ſuppoſing the Underſtanding were able to work ſuch a Change in the nature of things, as to convert a material and ſenſible Phantaſm into a ſpiritual and intelligible Species or Idea; yet this great performance would be to no manner of purpoſe, nor turn to any account, as not anſwering the main End for which it is intended: Becauſe this Species after all the Refinements and Purifications which it ſhall be ſuppoſed to have undergone in this *Intellectual Purgatory*, would ſtill be no more at beſt than a *Spiritual Accident*, and ſo 'tis expreſly call'd by an Orthodox Author of their own. But then however it might be ſimply Intelligible in itſelf, as an immaterial Object at large, yet 'tis impoſſible it ſhould ſerve as an intelligible *Species* for the Perception of other things; ſo that material Objects ſhould be perceived by it, and that becauſe an Accident, tho' Spiritualized, can

never repreſent a *Subſtance*. Which, by the way, among thoſe many other Conſiderations that have been offered by Learned Men, may, to very good purpoſe, be applied to ſhew the Popiſh Doctrine of *Tranſubſtantiation* to be an utter Abſurdity and Impoſſibility upon a plain Philoſophical Ground. For here we are told, That after the ſubſtantial Converſion of the Bread and Wine into the Body and Blood of Chriſt, the Species of the Bread and Wine remain; by vertue of which remaining Species, that which is really the Subſtance of Chriſt's Body appears ſtill to us as Bread and Wine. But now, beſides all that has been ſaid againſt theſe Species, it is farther to be conſidered, that upon the ſuppoſition of this Doctrine, as well as by the general Principles of the Men that hold it, theſe *Elementary* Species muſt be *Accidents*, ſince all that is *Subſtantial* in the Elements is ſuppoſed to become another thing. For what was the ſubſtance of Bread, is now the ſubſtance of the Body of Chriſt; and therefore if any thing of the Bread remains after the ſubſtance of it is gone, that can be nothing elſe but the *Accidents*; but the Species, they ſay, remain. Therefore 'tis plain, that according to them theſe Species can be no other than Accidents. Material ones in their own Original Nature, and as they come to our Eyes from the Body that ſends them to us; and tho' we ſhould ſuppoſe them to be never ſo much Spiritualized afterwards, yet ſtill they will be but *Spiritual*

tual Accidents. But then I ſay, 'tis impoſſible, that theſe Accidents ſhould ſerve as Intelligible Species to repreſent Bread and Wine to us; ſo that in ſeeing the former we may be truly ſaid to ſee, or have the appearance of the latter, and that for this plain, and even upon their own Grounds moſt convincing Reaſon; becauſe an Accident, be it Material, or be it Immaterial, can never repreſent a Subſtance, as being a ſort of Entity, according to themſelves, of an Order and Nature wholly different from it.

15. Well, but after all (to return to the Proſecution of our Argument) is there nothing then that comes to us from material Objects? Yes, no doubt there is a fine and ſubtile Evolution of Particles which is continually working off from them, that which in the Bodies of Animals we call *Perſpiration*, and in Bodies of an Earthy Concretion, *Vapour* or *Exhalation*, occaſion'd partly by the inteſtin Motion of thoſe Particles, and partly by the ſoliciting Motion of adjacent or circumambient Bodies, among which the *menſtruum* of the Air, and the heat of the Sun may perhaps be of moſt conſiderable Influence. So that were our Senſes acute enough to diſcern it, in all probability moſt Bodies would be found to have an *Atmoſphere* round about them as well as the Earth. But then the Efflux of theſe Particles, as was before obſerved, muſt needs be very looſe, tumultuous and diſorderly, ſo as not to carry the Form or *Portraiture* of thoſe Bodies from whence

they proceed, or if there could be any ſuch Form ſuppoſed in theſe Particles, they muſt immediately loſe it again in their very trajection through the Air, whoſe reſiſtence being increaſed by the ſwiftneſs and pernicity of their Motion, would ſo diſturb and diſmember them that they would come to the Eye in quite another Figure than that wherein they firſt took Wing.

16. Well, but if we open our Eyes ſhall we not find yet ſomething elſe to come to them from Bodies? Yes there is *Light*, a certain ſubtile Ethereal Matter that comes to us from Bodies, not as from a productive Principle, as the Species are ſuppoſed to do (unleſs in thoſe Bodies which are Luminous, and then it falls under the like Conſideration with other ſubſtantial Emanations or Effluvias) but only as a *Term* from whence: That is, the Light is reflected from all ſuch Bodies as by reaſon of the *right* ſituation of their Pores do not tranſmit it, and in its return from them meets with our Eyes, and ſtrikes them with a nice and moſt delicate touch, paſſing through their ſeveral Coats and Humours in certain Lines or Chains of fine Matter, which we call *Rays*; ſome of which go on in their Trajection directly, and others with variety of Refraction, according as their firſt Incidence upon the Surface or outer Coat of the Eye (call'd the *Cornea*) is either Perpendicular or Oblique, till they ſtrike upon the Filaments of the Optick Nerve, which deduce their Original

Original from the Brain, and terminate in the back-part of the Eye, lining or inveſting the bottom of it with that fine membrane which is known by the name of the *Retina*. Here the wonderful ſtroke is made upon which ſuch great things depend, and to which we owe one of the greateſt Pleaſures of our Lives. And now Light is at our Journeys end, arrived at its *non ultra*, there being no Part beyond the bottom of the Eye of a Contexture diſpoſed to tranſmit it any further. But tho' this is as far as it can *go*, yet this is not as much as it can *do*. For by this ſtroke upon the *Retina* an Impreſſion or Movement is communicated to the Brain, which is the laſt receiver of all ſenſible Impreſſions, and the immediate Organ of Viſion as of all the other Senſes. And now Light has done all that it can well be conceived to *do*, and is at the end, not only of its *Journy*, but of its *Action* too.

17. 'Tis true indeed, there is ſomething elſe *done*: For this Movement of the Brain is accompanied with a certain Sentiment, that which we call *Colour*. For as that ſubtile Matter which ſtrikes upon the Eye, in its direct Incidence as it comes from the luminous Body, is *Light*; ſo the ſame ſubtile Matter in its reflex Incidence, as it rebounds from other Bodies, is *Colour*; that is, has the Sentiment of Colour conſequent to it. And this Sentiment is alſo accompanied with an *Idea*, which tho' really diſtinct from the other, is yet perceived at the

ſame time that the other is felt, and the Mind is conſcious of both, at the ſame time that the Eyes are directed to the outward Object, and impreſſed upon by the Light which is reflected from it. And this I take to be what we call *Seeing*. But neither is this Movement the real cauſe of that Sentiment; nor is the Light which comes to us from Bodies, the Idea of thoſe Bodies, or that intelligible Species whereby we perceive them. 'Tis true indeed, we are ſaid to ſee things *by Light*; and 'tis very right, if rightly underſtood. We do indeed ſee things by Light, as by an *Occaſion*, in as much as we have an Idea of a material Object preſented to our Minds upon the impreſſion which Light makes upon our Eyes, but Light it ſelf is not that Idea.

18. So far from being ſo, that it is not I think very conceivable (if I may meaſure other Peoples Underſtandings by my own) how Light ſhould be ſo much as a *material Species*, or *Image*; that is, I mean how the Light that is reflected to us from any Body, ſhould by that Reflection have its Rays caſt into ſuch a Syſtem as to expreſs the Form, or carry a material Reſemblance of that Body, eſpecially if it be a Body variouſly Figured and Organized. For all that can be ſuppoſed towards it, I think, is that Rays of Light ſhould be diſtinctly ſent from all the Points of the Object, which we ſhall not be difficult to grant. And then indeed, ſince the Object is ſuppoſed to have its Parts

Parts of an unequal ſituation, ſome of them more protuberant, and ſome more depreſſed; the conſequence of this will be, that the Rays, as they are continued or meaſured from the Eye to the Object, will be of an unequal Protenſion (which, tho' it implies ſome general Analogy with it, yet this ſeems far from an expreſs Reſemblance) but ſtill the Rays as they are continued from the Object to the Eye, that is the *extremities* of the Rays, which are the only parts of them wherewith the Eye is concerned, will not have that inequality of Incidence upon the *Retina*, but will fall upon that Membrane in equal lengths as upon a level, or * thereabouts. But now that the Rays of Light, ſo equally incident, ſhould carry the reſemblance of a Body whoſe Parts are ſo unequally extent, he muſt have a very ſtrong Imagination, and ſuch as is very happy in finding out the ſimilitudes and agreements of Things that can conceive.

* I ſay thereabouts, becauſe the extremity of the *Retina* may perhaps be a little incurv'd.

19. But (to omit nothing that may deſerve to be conſidered) tho' Light be not itſelf the very Species or Image of the Bodies it comes from; yet may it not do the Office of a *Limner* or *Engraver* to delineate or deſcribe the Image of them in the bottom of the Eye; ſo indeed we are told by the *Optical* Men, and accordingly that Latitude of the *Retina*, upon which the Rays of Light act, is compared to a *Painters*

Cloth, and the Conjunction of these two Cones or Pyramidal Structures of Rays which have the Crystallin for their common Basis, and whereof the one has its Point upon the Object, and the other upon the *Retina*, is call'd the Optick *Pencil*, as being the instrument whereby the Pictures or Images of things are delineated in the Eye. But now how Light should be able to delineate any such Images there (tho' it be pity Men should be robb'd of so pleasant a Conceit) I must needs confess is to me a very dark Mystery. For all that can be pretended for it is only this, That the Rays that come from the divers Points of the reflecting Object do fall upon so many opposite corresponding Points of the *Retina*. But now what's this to the delineation of an *Image?* For in the first place, 'tis not, I think, to be conceived, that such subtile and fine spun Threds as those of Light, especially when reflected from an Opake Body (whereby their force is vastly abated from what it was in their first and direct Incidence as they were shot forth from their lucid Fountain) and after they have pass'd too through so many different Mediums in the Eye, and suffer'd so many Refractions, by reason of their Diversity, should yet have so much force as to make any real Print or Impression there. Tho' supposing they could, yet it is not easie to be conceived, that from hence should result a true Image of the Body that reflects them; and that because of the equality of those Prints, it being not

not ſuppoſable that the Prints ſhould carry an exact proportion of Depth to the reſpective extancy or ſubſidency of the Parts of the Object, eſpecially conſidering that oftentimes thoſe Parts which are more extant, and ſo by reaſon of their nearneſs ſhould make a deeper Print, may yet, by reaſon of the matter whereof they conſiſt, be leſs apt to reflect the Light. So then Light cannot delineate the Object upon the Eye by way of *Sculpture*, or as an Engraver. And therefore if it does it at all, it muſt be ſuppoſed to do it by way of *Peinture*, or as a Limner. Not as if the ſubſtance of the Light, or that fine Matter which comes directly from the Luminous, and by Reflection from the Opake Body, were dawb'd off (*illineretur* I would ſay in Latin) upon the *Retina*, as the Stuff wherewith the Limner Paints, is upon the Cloth. That would be groſs and ridiculous. But only that the Rays ſtill touching and continually playing upon the Eye, ſhould, by the immediate Contact of their Incidence, delineate a Picture there. But this is as inconceivable as the other: For unleſs we could ſuppoſe a Point able to repreſent a Line, 'tis plain there can be no juſt ſimilitude between ſo many little Pecks made by an equal Incidence upon a plain and organical Body, which has Profundity as well as Length and Breadth, and ſome of whoſe Parts are more extant than others. Neither will the practice of *Perſpective* rightly conſidered, be able to furniſh them with a pertinent Objection to the contrary.

contrary. It may perhaps be pretended, that the Lines which are drawn by Painters, have that very Incidence we are ſpeaking of, and yet that they are true Images and Pictures of Organical Bodies, and accordingly we call one a Man, and another a Horſe, *&c.* I grant indeed, that their Incidence is ſuch, but then for that very reaſon becauſe it is ſo, I deny that they are true and perfect Images or Repreſentations of thoſe things, whoſe Pictures they are ſaid to be: And 'tis utterly impoſſible that they ſhould. And he muſt not underſtand what *Perſpective* means, that ſhall pretend that they are. On the contrary, by the very Principles of this Science, 'tis ſuppoſed, that they are not. For tho' *Perſpective* be ſaid to be an Art that teaches to repreſent viſible Objects as they appear to us; yet this is not to be ſo underſtood, as if it did exhibit to us in the very Lines themſelves which it ſets before us, a juſt Image or Repreſentation of the Object, but only that it teaches us to trace certain Lineaments after ſuch a manner that they ſhall appear to our Eyes as the Objects themſelves would appear; that is, to expreſs it more diſtinctly, that ſhall give or excite in us the ſame Idea, that the Object itſelf, if preſent, would do. For theſe things, as well as all others, are ſuppoſed to be ſeen not by themſelves immediately, but by their Ideas. But then 'tis not the Lines themſelves, but that Appearance or Idea which I have at the ſenſible view of them,

which

which is the true and proper Image of the Object. The Lines themſelves are not even by the Principles of *Perſpective*, wherein Painters exhibit Bodies variouſly riſing or ſubſiding upon a plain Surface, and are obliged to change and commute one Figure for another, to the end that they may appear in their natural Form and Poſture, as to Paint Circles like Eclipſes, Squares by Loſanges, *&c.* For indeed *Perſpective* is in this reſpect no better than a mere Cheat, or an Art of Deceiving: Not but that the Rules of it are Geometrically certain, but that it is an Art that teaches to deceive our Eyes, and put a Trick or Fallacy upon the beſt of our Senſes, its great Addreſs conſiſting in this, to find out ways to make things appear otherwiſe than they truly and really are; that is, like the Objects, when indeed they are not true Reſemblances of them, and ſo to make us paſs ſuch Judgments upon them, as indeed we ought not in ſtrictneſs to make, and which our Reaſon, if we attend to it, will oblige us to correct. If it be ſaid, that tho' theſe Images in the Eye are not *juſt* Images, yet why may they not ſerve to repreſent as well as thoſe in *Perſpective*? I anſwer firſt, That the Caſes are no way parallel, there being this difference between them, That the Images in *Perſpective* are not ſuppoſed to be themſelves the very immediate Objects of Viſion (ſince even according to the common Philoſophy, things are ſeen not by themſelves, but by their Species) but only to be the occa-

ſions

ſions of our having that Idea which is ſo, and which is the only true Image that repreſents the Object to the Mind. Whereas theſe pretended Images in the Eye, by the general Tenor of that Hypotheſis we are now examining, which holds, that Bodies are perceived by Species that come from them, ſhould be *themſelves* the immediate Object of Perception; and that which truly repreſents, as an Idea, which they cannot do unleſs they be juſt and perfect Images: Nor yet th n neither, for Reaſons which we ſhall by and by aſſign. But after all, if you will have theſe *ocular Images* indeed to repreſent as thoſe do in *Perſpective* (as if they repreſent at all they muſt) I ſhall only mind you to conſider how that is, and to remember, that then 'tis not the Images, but the Ideas occaſioned by them, which are the immediate Objects of the Mind, and the true Repreſentatives of what it perceives; which is to give up the very Point for which we are contending.

20. But ſuppoſe the Images of things could be thus faithfully and readily drawn upon the *Retina* by the Pencil of Light (which then ſhould have my Vote before a *Zeuxes* or an *Apelles*, an *Angelo*, or a *Vandike*, for the fineſt Painter in the World,) yet after all theſe Images could not be the immediate Objects of the Mind, nor conſequently the true intelligible Species or Ideas whereby things are perceived, and that for the ſame common Reaſon, that the other

Species

Species before mentioned cannot, *viz.* becauſe of their *Corporeity*. But beſides the incapacity of theſe Images to be the Object of our intellectual View, that they are not actually and in fact the very Images which the Mind ſees, and whereby ſhe perceives outward Objects, there want not very convincing Reaſons to ſatisfie any one that will duly conſider them. For if theſe Images deſcribed, as is ſuppoſed by the Manuſculpture or Peinture of Light in the Fund of the Eye, are the very Images which we ſee, as they muſt be if by them material Objects are perceived; then ſince we have two Eyes, in each of which the Image of the Object is ſuppoſed to be deſcribed (for you muſt know Light is a very ready Painter, and can as ſoon draw two Pictures as one) we muſt of neceſſity ſee two Images, and ſo things would appear double to us. Why they do not in fact do ſo, there may perhaps be good Reaſons aſſigned, but not, I think, upon this *Hypotheſis*. For to reſolve the apparent ſimplicity of Objects into the Re-union which the Impreſſions made in the Eyes, have afterward in the Brain by reaſon of the Coition of the Optick Nerves; by means of which each Optick Axis terminates in the ſame Point, according to the way of *Rohault* and *Legrand*, or elſe into the joynt-termination of the Axes of Viſion of both Eyes in one and the ſame Point of the Object, as M. *Regis* chuſes rather to explain it: I ſay, theſe Accounts however otherwiſe rational in them-

themſelves, and worthy of their ingenious Authors, would yet, I think, be very impertinently applied here. Theſe indeed, may, for ought I know, be good Reaſons why, notwithſtanding the duplicity of the Impreſſion we may yet have but one ſingle Idea; that is, ſuppoſing ſomething elſe to be that Idea, and that the Impreſſion is only the occaſion of exciting it; but if the Images made in the Eye are the very things which we immediately perceive, then 'tis plain that we muſt have two Ideas upon turning our Eyes towards one Object (which is what we are to underſtand by ſeeing double) and that becauſe we ſhall then ſee *two Images*.

21. But beſides the double appearance of a ſingle Object, 'tis further to be conſidered, that if theſe material Images in the Eye are the very Ideas which and whereby we ſee and perceive; then beſides that things could not be repreſented to us either bigger or leſſer than thoſe Images, which would not only contract but confound their appearances, they would alſo appear to us in a contrary Poſture and Situation, Men would ſeem to us with their Heads downwards and their Feet upwards, *&c.* And that becauſe theſe Images, ſuppoſing any ſuch to be in the Eye, muſt needs be inverted, by reaſon of the neceſſary Interſection or Decuſſation of the oblique Rays, whereby that Impreſſion which is made in the lower part of the Eye muſt come from the upper part of the Object, and that which

which is made in the upper part of the Eye, muſt come from the lower part of the Object; and ſo in like manner as to Right and Left, as all know who underſtand any thing of the Laws of *Radiation*. I ſay thus it muſt be, if theſe are the Images which we ſee. But thus it is not; and therefore I conclude, that theſe are not the Images which, or whereby we ſee.

22. Neither indeed do the Men I am now concern'd with, ſay that they are. On the contrary, tho' for Reaſons beſt known to themſelves, they have been pleaſed to ſet up *Light* for a *Limner*; and ſuppoſe the Images of things to be drawn in the Eye by its ſhining Pencil, and ſo as one would think, ſeem to prepare for a reſolution of Viſion that way, *viz.* by ſuppoſing thoſe Images to be the Objects of it; in like manner, as the other Philoſophers ſay of their *Species*, whether Subſtantial or Intentional, yet, when it comes to the pinch, there is not a Man of them that I know of, that is ſo hardy as to pretend that theſe material Images are the very Images that we ſee; but they begin to talk of other *Spiritual* Images as the true Objects of Viſion, and that which renders us *formally* ſeeing. And accordingly the great Raiſer and Improver of the Optical Science, tho' he is pleaſed in his *Dioptrics* to comply ſo far with the common Herd of Philoſophers, as to ſuppoſe ſuch Images of things, yet (which is very remarkable) he takes care to

let

let us know over and over that he thought there was no neceſſity of them, either as to Senſe in general, or Viſion in Particular. In which latter he is ſo far from ſuppoſing theſe Images to be the very Idea which the Soul contemplates, that he does not make them to be ſo much as the occaſions of it. As indeed there was no reaſon that he ſhould: For if there be no need of them as Objects, there will be leſs need of them as Occaſions, ſince the *Motions* that are impreſſed upon the Nerves, and by them derived to the Brain, will ſerve for that purpoſe as well as the moſt exquiſite Pictures in the World. And accordingly 'tis into thoſe *Motions* that he reſolves Viſion, ſuppoſing them to ſerve by the inſtitution of Nature, for the exciting ſuch and ſuch ſenſes of things in us: Wherein, I think he is very much in the right. But then, if theſe material Images in the Eye are not the very Idea which we contemplate, nor yet that whereby it is excited in us; that is, if they are neither the Object perceived, nor the occaſion of our perceiving it, then to what purpoſe they ſhould ſerve, is paſt my Skill to apprehend.

23. The ſum then is, we have conſidered the ſeveral ways whereby material Objects may be ſuppoſed to ſend forth Species, which are reducible to theſe three; the *Ariſtotelian* way which is by intentional Species; the *Epicurean* way, which is by ſubſtantial Emanations, and (which ſeems to be the laſt reſerve of this Hypotheſis;) the

the way of the *Optical* Men, which is by the Reflection of Light. And we have further ſhewn, that it is not reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that there are any Species or Images ſent forth from Bodies the two firſt ways, and that it is not intelligible how there ſhould be any in the Third. Or ſuppoſing that there are, yet we have this ſhewn in common of all of them, that 'tis impoſſible that things ſhould be perceived by any ſuch Species. And therefore we may now conclude, that the Ideas whereby we perceive material Objects, do not come from thoſe Objects. I have ſtay'd the longer upon this Matter, becauſe it is the moſt commonly received Hypotheſis concerning the Origin of our Ideas, and withal, by far the moſt Plauſible; and ſince it is ſo, I was willing to place it in all its Lights; and to give it a full and through Diſcuſſion in all the ſeveral Branches of it, whereby, beſides the laying open a very popular Error, we may make this further advantage, to reflect what a ſlender Foundation in Reaſon ſome very common and long authorized Opinions will be found to have, when they come to be examin'd. And conſequently what great reaſon we have to examine well every thing that we receive, unleſs the Authority upon which we receive it be infallible, and then indeed we have only to examine whether that which demands our Aſſent, be indeed propoſed to us by ſuch an Authority.

24. I ſhould now take leave of this Argument, but that I find my ſelf fairly invited by the occaſion of it, to offer a ſhort Reflection or two upon the Principles here laid down, whereby we may be aſſiſted to make a better Judgment than otherwiſe we could well do, upon two conſiderable Things. One is the Account which Mr. *Lock* gives of the Origin of our Ideas by the Senſes. And the other is that celebrated Maxim of the Schools, That *there is nothing in the Underſtanding but what was firſt in the Senſe.* But before I meddle with either of them, I would beg leave only to premiſe, that according to what we have before diſcours'd, we have no Ideas ſtrictly and properly ſpeaking but of material Objects. I ſay properly ſpeaking: For if Idea be taken in a large Senſe only for the thing that is thought upon, as 'tis thought upon, or as it has an Objective being in the Underſtanding, then indeed we may be ſaid to have as many Ideas as there are intelligible Objects, ſince whatever we underſtand is ſome way or other in the Underſtanding, and in this Senſe we may be ſaid to have an Idea even of God himſelf. But if Idea be taken according to its ſtrict Propriety, as we have hitherto uſed it, for that whereby we perceive any Being, as by its *Intelligible Repreſentative*; in this Senſe, I think, we may truly ſay, that we have at preſent no Ideas but of ſuch Beings as are Material. For as for Spiritual Beings, ſome of them, *viz.* Angels and humane Souls, we do not perceive at all;

all; and as for those which we do, we perceive them as I have shewn, not by Idea, but by their own immediate selves. So that if our Ideas be from our Senses, 'tis only the Ideas which we have of Bodies.

25. This being premised, I say, first as to the Principle from whence Mr. *Lock* derives our Ideas, that if by our having our Ideas from our Senses, his meaning be, that sensible Objects do send or convey Ideas from themselves to our Minds by the mediation of the Senses, as the most commonly receiv'd Opinion concerning their Original supposes; I say, if this be what he means (as indeed I once thought, and the rather because he expresses himself much after the same manner as the Schools do whose known meaning this is, according to that Maxim quoted by *Aquinas* from *Aristotle*'s Metaphysicks, *Principium Nostræ Cognitionis est à Sensu*) then it appears by the whole Tenour of this Discourse, that he has derived our Ideas from a false Original. But if his meaning be, as perhaps it may (for indeed his way of expressing himself upon this occasion is not so clear, but that one may pardonably mistake him) that sensible Objects do by the Impression which they make upon our outward Senses serve to excite Ideas in our Minds, so that we are beholding to them as the *occasions* of our having such Ideas: I say, if this be all that he means by pretending to make Sense the Original and Source

Part 1. *Quæst.* 84. *Art.* 6.

of our Ideas, I think there is nothing either ſo dangerous, or ſo *extraordinary* in it, but that we may, without ſcruple, in great meaſure, allow it him. For tho' our Ideas do not come from ſenſible Objects, as any genuine *Iſſue* or *Production* of theirs, nor are ſo much as the cauſal Reſult of any of their Impreſſions, yet there is no Abſurdity in ſuppoſing that the Author of Nature may eſtabliſh a Connexion between certain ſenſible Impreſſions, and certain *Ideas*, as well as between ſuch Impreſſions and certain *Senſations*. Nay, we find by experience, that it is ſo in Fact, that upon the Impreſſions of ſenſible Objects we have naturally ariſing in us the Ideas of thoſe Objects, as in *Seeing*, wherein, as was before noted, Idea and Sentiment go together. Nay, we not only have certain Ideas upon certain ſenſible Impreſſions; but there is reaſon to think that we cannot ordinarily have them without them, as it is again in the caſe of *Senſation*: So that I very much queſtion if a Man had never ſeen a Horſe or a Dog, that is, had an Idea of them upon ſuch a certain ſenſible Impreſſion (for that I call *ſeeing*) whether he would or could ever have had any Idea of thoſe Animals. Thus much therefore may be granted him, tho' whether it be ſo in all our Ideas, may, perhaps, admit of a reaſonable Debate, particularly as to the Idea of *Extenſion*. For tho' we cannot have the Ideas of particular Bodies, without ſome impreſſion one time or other received from theſe Bodies; yet whether the

the Idea of Matter in general, *Intelligible Extenſion*, be not an Idea always preſent with us, independently upon any Bodily Impreſſion; and if ſo, whether again we may not be able ſo to modifie it in our Thoughts, as to have the Ideas of certain Mathematical Figures, may deſerve to be conſidered. But however this be (for I am not concern'd much to inſiſt upon it) the Author is to be put in Mind, as well as thoſe that read him, not to look upon this (if this be his meaning) as any peculiar Hypotheſis, either concerning the Origin or Nature of our Ideas, or the manner of our Underſtanding by them: For let our Ideas be what they will, as to their Nature, or whence they will, as to their true Principle or Cauſe, it may ſtill be ſaid of them, that we ordinarily have them, or at leaſt perceive them by our Senſes, according to this latter meaning of that Propoſition. And accordingly I did not think fit to enlarge the Diviſion laid down concerning the ſeveral ways of Humane Underſtanding, or kinds of Ideas whereby we underſtand, by the Addition of this as an Hypotheſis diſtinct from the reſt, becauſe indeed it is a ſort of a *Tranſcendental*, too common to all to be ſet up in oppoſition to any, and ſo the Diviſion is compleat without it.

26. Come we next to that famous Axiom of the Schools, that there is nothing in the Underſtanding but what was firſt in the Senſe. This has been variouſly diſputed, and may ſtill

be ſo without any hopes of coming to a final Iſſue of the Queſtion, till the ſenſe of it be better ſettled than it is; for I think it is very looſe and indeterminate as it ſtands, and conſequently very dark and obſcure: But by the light of the foregoing Meaſures it will be much clearer what Judgment is to be made of it. For if, when they ſay there is nothing in the Underſtanding but what was firſt in the Senſe, their meaning be that there is nothing in the Underſtanding but what came firſt from ſenſible Objects, and was by them tranſmitted and convey'd through the Senſes; that is, through the Organs of Senſe to the Mind, 'tis apparent by the Premiſes, that their Maxim ſo underſtood is to be rejected, ſince it is ſo far from being thus true that *every* thing that is in the Underſtanding was firſt in the Senſe; that indeed, according to this meaning, there is *nothing* in the Underſtanding that was firſt in the Senſe. But if they mean no more than this, that there is nothing in the Underſtanding, or to expreſs it more clearly, that the Underſtanding *perceives nothing*, but by the occaſion of ſenſible Impreſſions; this may in great meaſure be allow'd, as was ſaid in the other inſtance, tho', perhaps, not altogether ſo freely or ſo far in this caſe as in the other, becauſe indeed (which is of obſervable importance) this Propoſition is much larger in its extent than the other, that going no further than our Ideas, whereas this takes in all intelligible Objects, even *whatever* the Mind perceives.

perceives. But we perceive *God*, tho' we have not properly any Idea of him; and it is not very eaſie to conceive how the Perception of a Being that is intimately preſent to our Minds, and whom accordingly we perceive by himſelf, ſhould depend upon any ſenſible Motions and Impreſſions made upon the Body. We have alſo Ideas of pure Intellect as well as of Imagination; ſuch I mean as are repreſentatively Immaterial, and ſo ſeem to carry no relation to Matter or Motion, ſuch as the Ideas of Order, Truth, Juſtice, Goodneſs, Being, *&c.* with a numerous multitude of ſuch Abſtract and purely intelligible Objects of Metaphyſical and Moral Conſideration. There are alſo eternal Truths which we perceive, eſpecially thoſe which reſult from theſe purely intelligible Ideas; and 'tis not ſo very congruous to think, that the Perception of theſe things ſhould be owing to, or depend upon the Impreſſions of Matter, nor indeed that any thing elſe ſhould, but only the Ideas of thoſe *Bodies* by which the Impreſſion is made. It ſeems to be ſutable and proportionable enough, that Bodies, by their ſeveral Motions and Impreſſions ſhould ſerve as occaſions to raiſe in us the Ideas of themſelves; but that the Perception we have of the other intelligible Objects which have no Affinity with Matter or Relation to it, ſhould depend upon the Impreſſions of it, ſeems not ſo congruous or reaſonable to ſuppoſe. As it does neither to ſuppoſe, that a thinking Being as Man is, and that has at leaſt one intelli-

gible Object always intimately present with him to think of, should yet have no manner of Thought or Perception, but remain as stupid as a Block of Marble, supposing either his Organs not to have been disposed for sensible Impressions, or that he has been always in a *vacuum* where no such Impressions could be made; which yet must be maintain'd, if according to this latter meaning of the Proposition, it be universally true, that there is nothing in the Understanding but what was first in the Sense. But however this Matter be determin'd, 'tis sufficient to our present purpose, if the Ideas whereby we understand, do not come to us from *sensible Objects*, which seems to have been abundantly proved.

CHAP. VIII.

That the Ideas whereby we understand, are not the Productions of our own Souls.

1. HAving dry'd up that great Fountain of Ideas, which is supposed to be in sensible Objects; so that there appears no hope or possibility of our being ever furnish'd with them that way, we are concern'd to carry our Inquiry further, and to consider whether that *Ideal Spring*, which fails without, may not possibly

bly be found to arise within our selves; that is, whether the Ideas, which are the immediate Objects of our Thought, and whereby we understand, be not of the Soul's own producing, which is the Hypothesis that comes next in order to be examin'd, and because it is a very wild and extravagant one, and such as has not much to say for itself, it will require the less room for its Discussion.

2. Indeed of itself it hardly deserves any; for when things are apparently true or false, there is no need of either proving or disproving them. But however since this is at least one conceivable way of accounting for the manner of Humane Understanding, by supposing that the Ideas whereby we understand are produced by our own Souls, 'tis fit and reasonable, if not out of regard to the *Hypothesis*, yet at least to do justice to our Theory, that it should be considered among the rest. And to shew that it cannot possibly be a true account concerning the Origin of our Ideas, I shall briefly lay the Refutation of it upon these two distinct Grounds.

1*st*. That the Soul has no power of producing the Ideas of those things which she perceives.

2*dly*. That supposing she had such a Power, yet she would never use it for the Production of them.

3. First

3. First the Soul has no such Power. 'Tis indeed very strange, that she should and we know nothing of it, as was observ'd in the case of *Intellectus Agens*. And 'tis again very strange, that any should so far forget themselves, and the infirmity of their Nature, as to ascribe any such Power to her. That which makes Men ready to do so, as Mr. *Malebranche* well observes, is the ordinary Conjunction of our Ideas with our Wills. Men have no sooner a Mind to think of such things, but the Ideas of them are present with them; whence they are ready to conclude, that That Will of theirs which generally accompanies the presence of these Ideas is the true cause of them, in vertue of that general Principle so ordinary with most People, that what is Concomitant with any effect, is the Cause of it, supposing the true Cause to be unknown. Whereas if Men would not be so hasty and precipitous in their Judgments; the most that can be concluded from this ordinary Concomitancy of Ideas with our Wills, is only that according to the Order and Institution of Nature, our Will is ordinarily necessary to the having those Ideas, and not that it is the true *Cause* of them.

4. But that the Soul has no Power to produce its Ideas Mr. *Malebranche* shews, because such a Production (however mollify'd or qualify'd by those that Patronize this Opinion) is a strict and proper *Creation*, and that because these Ideas are true *Realities*, as having real Properties,

perties, and as being really different one from another, and as repreſenting things that are wholly different. For 'tis plain that nothing can have no Propriety; that one nothing cannot differ from another nothing, and that nothing cannot repreſent ſomething. To which another Conſideration may be added no leſs convincing than any of theſe, and that is, that Ideas are the Objects of our Thought, and that which formally terminates the intellectual View of the Mind; and therefore if they be not truly and properly *Realities*, then 'tis plain, that nothing is the Object of our Thoughts, and accordingly when we think we think upon nothing, and ſo I have thought upon nothing all this while, which, if I miſtake not, is the ſame as to ſay I have not thought at all. This Conſideration Mr. *Malebranche* touches upon * elſewhere, and expreſſes thus. *I think upon a great many things, upon a Number, upon a Circle, upon a Houſe, upon ſuch and ſuch Beings, upon Being itſelf. Therefore all this is, at leaſt at the time when I think upon them. Aſſuredly when I think upon a Circle, upon a Number, upon Being, or upon Infinite, or upon ſuch a Finite Being, I perceive Realities. For if the Circle, which I perceive, were nothing, then in thinking upon it, I ſhould think upon nothing.*

* *Entretins ſurla metaphyſique.* Page 12.

5. 'Tis to be attended here for the right underſtanding of this, that there is no neceſſity that whatever is thought upon ſhould be a real

ſome-

ſomething in itſelf. Indeed when we think upon God, it follows that he muſt needs be ſo, and that becauſe, as we have ſhewn, he is perceived by himſelf, and therefore he muſt be in himſelf, or elſe he could not be perceived at all. But as to other Beings there is no neceſſity from their being thought of, that they ſhould be ſomething real in *themſelves*. No, in this ſenſe I can think upon things that are not, that is, that are not in themſelves; and I actually do ſo when I think upon a perfectly right Line or Circle. And 'tis certain that God thought upon his Creatures before they were, or elſe they would never have been. But however 'tis neceſſary to affirm, that whatever I think of muſt be a real ſomething, one way or other, either in it *ſelf*, or in its *Idea*, or elſe 'tis plain, that I think upon nothing. Nay, it is neceſſary that it muſt be real in its *Idea*, or that the Idea be real in it ſelf, and that becauſe 'tis the Idea that is the immediate, and indeed, in ſtrictneſs, the only proper Object of Thought, and therefore the Idea muſt really be, or be ſomething real, or elſe 'tis plain again, that I think upon nothing. 'Tis plain then, that our Ideas have a true Reality, and therefore the Production of them would be no leſs than a true and proper Creation: And therefore unleſs we will be ſo impiouſly vain in our Imaginations, as to aſſume to our ſelves a *Creative* Power, we muſt not pretend to an Ability of producing our Ideas. And indeed he muſt have a very empty

Under-

Underſtanding, that ſhall think that way to furniſh it. No, if we were not to ſee but by ſtriking a Light to our ſelves, we muſt for ever be in the Dark. Which State, tho' leſs pleaſing, would yet perhaps be more ſafe than to be the Authors of our own Light, it being much to be fear'd that Man who is already ſo apt to be puffed up with that Knowledge which conſiſts only in the Contemplation and Perception of Ideas, would have too great a Temptation to Pride, if thoſe Ideas, which are the Objects of his Underſtanding, were alſo the Creatures of his Will.

6. But beſides the general Impotency and Diſability of Man to *Create*, there is another more peculiar Conſideration that may be added to ſhew, that he cannot poſſibly produce the Ideas whereby he underſtands, and that is becauſe they are not in themſelves of a *producible Nature*: For whatſoever is produced is Temporary and Contingent, and Mutable. But the Ideas whereby we underſtand, whatever they may be in the preciſe *Speciality* of their Nature (which is not yet to be determin'd) are for certain in the General, Neceſſary, Eternal and Immutable, as being (as we have ſhewn) the *Objects* of *Science*, and the only ſtable Ground and Foundation, which it has for its Stay and Support. And therefore again we cannot produce them, and that becauſe they are abſolutely improducible. Which Argument, by the way, will hold as well to ſhew that they cannot be the Product

Product of *external Objects*, or material Beings; nay, it will serve as well to shew that they do not fall under the productive Power even of God himself, nor have any causal dependance upon his Will. And since eternal Truths are the relations of these Necessary, Eternal and Immutable Ideas, it may hence be further infer'd, that they also are no more capable of being made or produced by God, or of having any such dependance upon his Will, than the other. Which Remark here naturally offers it self against the *Cartesian* Notion of the *Positivity* of Truth. But to come back again to the Point in hand, that we have no power to produce our Ideas, we may be sufficiently satisfied by experimental Reflection. Since, if we had a power to bring them into Being, we must *(à fortiori)* retain the same Power over them when they are in Being, and so must be able to change and alter them: But we find we cannot alter them, or make them any otherwise than they are. Whence we may again conclude, that we neither do nor can produce them. But after all, to what purpose should we produce them, since there can be no Production of them, but what presuppose them? Which leads me to observe,

7. *2dly.* That tho' the Soul should be allow'd a Power of producing her Ideas, yet 'tis reasonable to think it should be a dormant and unactive Power, since she would never use it for the Production of them. This Mr. *Malebranche* handsomely

handſomely illuſtrates by the Similitude of a Painter: For, ſays he, even as a Painter, how skillful ſoever in his Art, cannot repreſent an Animal which he never ſaw, and of which he never had any Idea: So a Man cannot form an Idea of an Object, if he does not know it before; that is to ſay, if he has not already an Idea of it, which does not depend upon his Will. But if he has already an Idea of it, then he knows that Object, and ſo has no occaſion to form a new Idea of it. From whence he infers, that 'tis therefore in vain to attribute to the Soul a Power of producing its Ideas. And I think very juſtly; for when the Power is without us, the aſſerting of it muſt needs be without Reaſon.

8. This laſt Argument wants not ſo much any further Confirmation as a little clearing, that ſo the full force of it may the better appear. In order to which 'tis to be obſerv'd, that Mr. *Malebranche* ſeems to take Idea here *Relatively*, or according to its Ideal or Repreſentative Being, when he argues, that the Mind cannot make an Idea of an Object, whereof it has already no Idea, any more than a Painter can draw a Picture of an unknown Creature. And thus indeed he Reaſons rightly. But the Argument might have been laid otherwiſe, and will hold as well of Idea *abſolutely* conſider'd, or according to that reality of Being which it has in itſelf, without reſpect to any thing out of itſelf. And we may as well ſay, that the Mind

Mind cannot form an Idea without having ſome Idea of what it forms; that is, that it cannot form an Idea without having an Idea of that Idea; as that it cannot form an Idea of any Object without having an Idea of that particular Object. And then as if the Mind has already an Idea of that Idea ſhe is to make, there will be no need of making it even, as the Argument runs the other way: So that Idea at leaſt, which is the Model of her Work, muſt be ſuppoſed as always pre-exiſtent to it, and ſo cannot be effected by it. The Reſult of which put together, will reſolve into this double Conſequence, that the making of the ſecond Idea is ſuperfluous, and that the making of the firſt is impoſſible. Either of which, but eſpecially both together, is, I think, a ſufficient Ground whereon to lay the weight of this Concluſion, *That the Ideas whereby we underſtand, are not the Productions of our own Souls.*

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

That the Ideas whereby we understand are not Created in us by God.

1. WHen Natural and Humane Means fail, 'tis both Natural and Ordinary to have recourse to a supernatural Cause. And therefore since our Ideas, as we have shewn, are not derived to us from material Objects, nor yet are of our own producing, it may be proper in the next place to enquire whether they may not be produced in us by God, whether the Author of our Natures be not also the cause of our Ideas?

2. This is the Cause which Men often neglect and overlook when they *should* resolve things by it, and as often fly to it when they should *not*, when things are otherwise accountable. God indeed is the cause of our *Sensations*, and there is a necessity of resolving them into the settled and standing Order of his efficacious Will, if we will give any intelligible account of them. But as for our *Ideas*, as they are of a very different Consideration in themselves, so do they require a very different Resolution. It may indeed be no inconsistent Thought to suppose, in the general, that God who made us thinking and intelligent Creatures, should some way or other furnish us with those Ideas where-

by we think and underſtand (which is all that is reaſonable in this *Suppoſition*) but that this ſhould be by the way of an *efficient Cauſality*, as by producing or creating Ideas in us, is, I think, a very groſs and unphiloſophical Thought, as will diſtinctly be made appear by conſidering, that if our Ideas are produced by God, either they muſt be once for all concreated with us, or they muſt be created occaſionally whenever we want them, that is, as often as we think or would think of any Object. But neither of theſe is reaſonable to ſuppoſe, *Ergo*, &c.

3. That the firſt of theſe is not reaſonable M. *Malebranche* ſhews from the infinite variety and multiplicity of Ideas, which muſt needs be ſuppoſed in proportion to the like variety and diverſity of Things in the World. But he confines himſelf to the conſideration of ſimple Figures, whereof it is certain that the number is infinite. Nay, if we inſtance in one only, as an *Ellipſis*, there can be no doubt but that we may conceive an infinite number of different kinds of them, only by conſidering, that one of its Diameters may be lengthen'd out to infinity, while the other continues always the ſame. So in like manner as to a *Triangle*, ſince the height of it may be augmented or diminiſh'd infinitely, that ſide which is the Baſis remaining always the ſame, 'tis plain we may conceive infinite kinds of *them* too: Yea, as he obſerves, the Mind does in ſome ſort *perceive* this infinite number of Triangles, tho' we cannot *imagine* but

but a very few of them, nor can we at the same time have particular and distinct Ideas of many Triangles of different kinds. But however 'tis to be Remarked, that this general Idea which the Mind has of this number of Triangles of divers kinds does suffice to prove, That if we don't conceive all these different Triangles by particular Ideas: In one word, if we comprehend not Infinite, 'tis not from defect of Ideas, or that Infinite is not present to us, but only for want of Capacity and Extention of Mind. For if a Man should apply himself to consider the Properties of all the different kinds of Triangles, tho' he should continue this Study to all Eternity, he would never want new and particular Ideas, but his Mind would be wearied to no purpose. What is said of Triangles may also (as he observes) be applied to Figures of Five, Six, a Hundred, a Thousand, or ten Thousand Sides, and so on to Infinity. But now (says he) if the Sides of a Triangle having infinite Relations one with the other, make Triangles of infinite kinds; 'tis easie to see that four, five, or a thousand sided Figures are capable of admitting much greater Differences, since they are capable of a greater number of Relations and Combinations of their sides, than simple Triangles are. So then he concludes that the Mind has an infinite number of Ideas, nay, that it has as many infinite numbers of Ideas as there are different Figures to be considered; so that since there is an infinite number of different

Figures, it is neceſſary that the Mind, if 'twere only for the knowledge of Figures, ſhould have an infinitely infinite number of Ideas.

4. But now in the firſt place 'tis not at all probable (as our Author obſerves) that God ſhould Create ſo many things with the Mind of a Man. Eſpecially conſidering that there is a more ſimple and eaſie way of accounting for this Matter: For as God always acts by the moſt ſimple ways, it does not ſeem reaſonable to admit the Creation of an infinite number of Beings for the explaining how we know Objects, ſince this difficulty is reſolvable in a more eaſie and natural way. And indeed I muſt needs ſay, that this *Concreation* of ſuch numberleſs numbers of Ideas with us, is ſo extravagant and romantick a Notion, that as 'tis enough to ridicule the Doctrine of *Creation*, ſeriouſly to propoſe it; ſo if there be any other poſſible, or at leaſt tolerable Account to be given of the manner of Humane Underſtanding, the very oddneſs and improbability of the ſuppoſition, would be enough to forbid one to take up with this.

5. But indeed there is more than a high *Improbability* (tho' our Author here takes no notice of any more) that lies againſt this Hypotheſis, as we ſhall ſee by and by. In the mean time let us obſerve with him *2dly*, That tho' we ſhould ſuppoſe the Mind to have a Stock or Magazine of Ideas, in all the abundance requiſite for the Perception of things, yet it would be exceeding

exceeding difficult to explain how the Soul could make choice of them for the repreſentation of them to herſelf; for inſtance, how ſhe could perceive the Sun when it was preſent to the Eyes of the Body. For ſince the Sun does not impreſs any Image of itſelf upon the Brain, or at leaſt (to ſpeak with our Author) the Image which it impreſſes there does not at all reſemble the Idea which we have of it; nay, even ſince the Soul does not perceive ſo much as the movement which the Sun makes in the bottom of the Eye and in the Brain, it is not to be conceived that it ſhould exactly Divine, among ſuch an infinite number of Ideas, which it muſt repreſent to itſelf to imagine, or to ſee the Sun. So that I think there is good reaſon why this Hypotheſis, which accounts for the manner of Humane Underſtanding in the way of *Concreation* of Ideas, ſhould be rejected, partly becauſe of the utter improbability that God ſhould Create ſuch a multitude of Beings with every Humane Soul, and partly becauſe it is ſo very unconceivable how ſhe ſhould be able upon all occaſions ſo readily to apply them to her uſe, if ſhe had ſuch a ſtock of them concreated with her. To all which I would add this further Conſideration, whether theſe *Concreate* Ideas are not the ſame with what they call *Innate* Ideas, and conſequently whether thoſe Arguments which prove againſt the one, are not equally concluſive againſt the other.

6. But now as to the *Occasional* way of Creation, that is, that God should Create ever Moment as many new Ideas as we perceive different Objects; this, if not too extravagant to be seriously held, is yet certainly much too extravagant to need to be so refuted. But yet however (as M. *Malebranche* notes) it has already had its Confutation in the former, and may be further convinced of Falshood by this peculiar Consideration, That it is necessary that at all times we actually have in us the Ideas of all things, since at all times we can will to think of all things, which we could not do if we did not already perceive them Confusely, that is to say, if an infinite number of Ideas were not present to our Mind: For we cannot will to think of an Object utterly unknown, or whereof we have no Idea. The Argument is a little involv'd, and therefore we will make it more explicit by reducing it to form; which is this,

If at all times we actually have in us the Ideas of all things, then Ideas are not Created in us every moment that we think.

But at all times we actually have in us the Ideas of all things;

Therefore Ideas are not Created in us every moment that we think.

The

The Major or Conſequence is plain and clear. The Minor is proved thus.

If at all times we can will to think of all things, then at all times we actually have in us the Ideas of all things:

But at all times we can will to think of all things;

Therefore at all times we actually have in us the Ideas of all things.

The Conſequence, which is the only dubitable part, is again proved by this Enthymeme.

We cannot will to think of what is utterly unknown to us, or whereof we have no manner of Idea.

And therefore if at all times we can will to think of all things, 'tis plain, that at all times we actually have in us the Ideas of all things.

And ſo to return; if we have always actually in us the Ideas of all things, then by vertue of the Conſequence of the firſt Syllogiſm, the Ideas of them are not Created in us every moment as we have occaſion to think of them; which was the point to be proved in this 2d Part of the Argument. And then ſince our

Ideas are neither concreated, nor yet occasionally created, it follows that they are not created at all, which was the Point to be proved in the whole.

7. This Argument proceeds from the removal of all the Species to the removal of the Kind, that is, from shewing the Absurdity of supposing our Ideas to be Created by God, thus, or thus, to the Absurdity of supposing them to be Created by him at all. But there is a shorter and more demonstrative way of proving this general Conclusion, that our Ideas are not Created by God, and that is, because they are not in themselves of a creable Nature. Were they at all Created, I should not doubt to attribute the Creation of them to God, as thinking it more reasonable that they should be his Creatures than ours. But indeed they are not at all Created, nor at all capable of being so, and that for the reason before-mentioned, because they are Necessary, Eternal and Immutable, which no Creature can possibly be, as involving in it both Novelty, Contingency, and Mutability of Being. *Mutability*, because the Omnipotent Cause that gives it Being, cannot want Power to change the manner of it. *Contingency*, because God being absolutely Perfect in himself, and sufficient for his own Happiness, cannot be under any necessity of producing any thing out of himself, and so the Creature cannot be a necessary Emanation from him. And lastly, *Novelty* of Being, and that because

becauſe to Create being to produce out of nothing, it muſt be of the reaſon of Creation that not Being ſhould go before Being, or that what is Created ſhould firſt be nothing, or firſt not be, and conſequently if it ever be, it muſt begin to be, and ſo cannot be Eternal. Creation then is inconſiſtent with Eternity, and conſequently, that which is Eternal cannot be Created. And accordingly for this Reaſon it is that we may conclude the *Generation* of the *World* not to be a proper *Creation*, becauſe it is *Eternal*; and ſo alſo the *Word* itſelf may be concluded not to be a Creature, but truly and eſſentially God; for the ſame Reaſon, even as ſome of the ancient Fathers are obſerved to have argued.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

That the Ideas whereby we understand are not the Perfections or Modalities of our own Souls. Or that the Mind does not perceive things by Contemplating her own Perfections or Modalities.

1. WE have now made a considerable Progress in the search of those Ideas whereby we understand, which we have sought both far and near, both at home and abroad, and there remain now not many *Fields* more which we have not *beaten*. But before we go any further, let us return once more to ourselves, and see whether the Mind needs any thing else but it self for the Perception of Objects, whether it does not perceive them in itself, or if you will by itself, by considering or contemplating the Perfections of her own Essence, and so whether those Perfections may not be the Ideas whereby we understand. Perhaps after all this it may be, and therefore let this be our next Enquiry, lest, as it happens in some other cases, we seek that intellectual Light abroad which we have in our selves; like the Man who with a great deal of care and diligent Circumspecti-

on

on looks about after the Candle which he has all the while upon his own Head.

2. This indeed is very much our caſe in the Buſineſs of *Senſation*. Here we are either ſo ignorant or ſo forgetful of our ſelves as to imagine *that* Heat, that Sweetneſs, that Colour (with other ſenſible Qualities as they are call'd) to be ſomething really inherent in the things that are without us, which indeed are only in our ſelves, as being no other than certain Modifications of our own Spirits, exiſting ſometimes in one State or Manner of Being, and ſometimes in another. For indeed (ſo great is the Capacity of our Souls) our Senſations are all within our ſelves, and there it is that the Mind really perceives them, tho' by a confuſe and falſe Judgment, ſhe is apt to fancy that ſhe perceives them in the Objects that are about her. But ſhe cannot perceive them where they are not. She perceives them therefore in her ſelf, and that becauſe they are of a very different Nature from our Ideas, as repreſenting nothing to the Mind that is without, reſembling themſelves, and as being indeed no other than Modifications of the Mind itſelf, as Mr. *Malebranche* well remarks. Here therefore we need go no further than our ſelves, and that becauſe they are of our ſelves, and in our ſelves, and even our very ſelves, as being only modaliy diſtinct from us: For Pleaſure and Pain, *&c.* differ no otherwiſe from us, than as we our ſelves in one State or Manner of Being differ from

our

our ſelves in another State or Manner of Being. As to our Senſations then the Caſe is clear that they are all in the Soul itſelf, and there it is that we are to look for them, and not go abroad for that which we have at home, or ſeek our ſelves out of our ſelves. And here, if any where, that of the Poet is of remarkable importance.

——*Ne te Quæſiveris extrà.*

But now whether it be ſo as to our Ideas which repreſent ſomething anſwerable and correſponding to them out of the Mind; that is, whether theſe Ideas be in the Mind as our Senſations are (for that they are in ſome ſenſe in the Mind, as being the immediate Objects of it, is readily granted) that is, whether they are the Perfections of it; ſo that we need only conſult our ſelves, or the ſeveral eſſential Degrees of our own Being to repreſent things to us that are without us, and ſo may be ſaid to perceive things in our ſelves, and to ſee by our own Light, is quite another Queſtion, and that becauſe our Ideas are very different from our Senſations.

3. 'Tis true indeed, that this is the moſt perfect and moſt independent way of Underſtanding. And therefore if no leſs than that will content us, and we have ſo much of the *Luciferian* Ambition, as to aſpire to be like to the moſt High, we cannot take a more compendious or effectual method to compaſs it, than by aſſuming

ing

ing to our ſelves a privilege of underſtanding things in this manner. For 'tis moſt certain that this is the Divine way of Underſtanding. God ſees all things in himſelf (as we have ſhewn in the former Part of this Theory) and therefore muſt be concluded to have the Ideas of all things in himſelf, and the Ideas whereby he underſtands them, are no other than the Eſſential Perfections of his own Mind; that is, the Mind of God, as Intelligent, underſtands things by contemplating the ſeveral Perfections of the ſame Divine Mind as *Intelligible*; ſo that he underſtands things not by any proper Species of theirs diſtinct from himſelf, but by his own Eſſence (according to the expreſs Doctrine of *Aquinas*) and ſo is ſufficient to himſelf for his *Knowledge* as well as *Happineſs*, being his own Intelligible as well as Beatifick Object. 'Tis highly Decorous that it *ſhould* be ſo, and indeed, abſolutely neceſſary that it *muſt* be ſo. For in ſhort, God muſt have the Ideas of all things before he made them, or elſe he could never have made them, and thoſe Ideas, however formally diſtinguiſhable, muſt have a real Identity with himſelf, and that becauſe before the Creation of things, we can ſuppoſe nothing to have been in actual Being but himſelf. Or, as Mr. *Malebranche* is pleaſed to expreſs it, *It is certain that there was none but God only before the World was Created, and that he could not make it without Knowledge*

Page 155.

Recherche de la Verite. lib. 3. c. 4.

ledge and without Idea; and that conſequently thoſe Ideas which God had of the World are not at all different (I ſuppoſe he means *diverſe*) *from himſelf.* It is then clear, that this is and muſt be God's way of underſtanding things, to ſee them in himſelf, by contemplating the ſeveral intelligible Perfections of his own omniform Eſſence. For as all things are in God *Secundum modum Intelligibilem*, after an Intelligible manner, as *Aquinas* ſpeaks, by thoſe intelligible Perfections of his which repreſent them: So theſe intelligible Perfections of his Eſſence are the very Ideas whereby he underſtands them. So that if our aim be to climb ſo high upon the Tree of Knowledge as to be as God, this I confeſs is indeed our ready way for it. But then methinks that very Conſideration ſhould ſtrike an awful Reverence into it, and as a flaming Sword deterr us from breaking in upon it. We ſhould look upon this way of underſtanding as *Sacred*, and think it not only a proud, but a ſacrilegious Hypotheſis to pretend to it. And indeed I muſt needs ſay, that were there no other Argument to forbid its Admiſſion, that this is God's way of underſtanding is to me a juſt Prejudice that it cannot be ours, ſince we are removed from him at ſo vaſt a diſtance, that our Ways are not as his Ways, nor yet our *Thoughts* as his *Thoughts*.

4. But the Matter is capable of a ſtronger inforcement. For beſides the great Decency and Reaſonableneſs that the moſt perfect way of Underſtanding

Underſtanding ſhould be appropriated to the moſt perfect Being, we may further conſider with M. *Malebranche*, that ſince we are Finite, we do not contain in our ſelves all Beings, as God does whom we may call univerſal Being, or ſimply *He that is*, even as he ſtiles himſelf. And therefore ſince the Mind of Man can know all Beings, even Infinite Beings, and does not contain them; this is a certain proof that it does not ſee their Eſſence in itſelf. For the Mind does not only perceive ſometimes one thing and ſometimes another ſucceſſively, but it actually perceives Infinite, tho' it does not comprehend it, as was obſerv'd before. So that not being actually Infinite, nor capable of infinite Modifications at once, it is abſolutely impoſſible that it ſhould ſee in itſelf that which is not in it ſelf. Whence it is plain, that it does not ſee the Eſſences of things by contemplating its own Perfections, or by *modifying* itſelf after a different manner.

5. This laſt Expreſſion puts me in mind of another way which this Hypotheſis of ſeeing things in our ſelves has in reſerve, which is that the Ideas whereby we underſtand, are no other than the *Modalities* of our own Souls, or that the Modalities of the Soul are eſſentially repreſentative of Objects that are different from it; ſo that the Soul thinks or repreſents things to herſelf only by modifying her own Subſtance diverſly, ſometimes after one manner, and ſometimes after another. Whether the Author

of

of that old saying, *Intellectus Intelligendo fit Omnia*, that the Mind by (or rather in) Understanding becomes all things, might not have some confuse *Parturiency* of this Notion in their Thoughts, I leave to be consider'd. But if we cannot find this Notion in the ancient Schools, let us go to the *Sorbonne*; for there we have M. *Arnauld* in his Book of true and false Ideas (as I learn from the Answer to it, not having the Book itself by me) appearing openly and expressly for it. Which shews how natural the vanity of affecting Self-sufficiency and Independence is to Man, how loath he is to go out of himself for his Ideas, how willing to advance himself into a condition of Resemblance with God, and to be some way or other an *Intelligible World* to himself. And since he cannot be so by the standing essential Perfections of his Nature, which is apparently too limited to comprehend in itself, whatever is in the material or sensible World, rather than fail, he will make an Intellectual *Proteus* of his Soul, and suppose it by the different forms or manners of Being which it takes to itself, to represent such Objects as are out of itself.

6. But this is plainly to confound the most distinct things in the World, our *Sensations* with our *Ideas*. It is true indeed, that our Sensations, as representing nothing to the Mind that is either out of it, or distinct from it, are really no other than certain *Modalities* of the Soul, or (since Modes do not differ as to the thing from the

the Subſtance whoſe Modes they are) no other than the very Soul itſelf, exiſting thus, or thus, according to the ſeveral manners of Being whereof it is capable. But the caſe is far otherwiſe as to our *Ideas*. They, as repreſenting to us real Beings that are without the Soul and diſtinct from it, cannot be the Modalities of the Soul. And that firſt of all for this plain Reaſon, becauſe no Modality can repreſent any ſuch Beings, any more than an Accident can repreſent a Subſtance, as was ſaid before. And accordingly we find that Pleaſure and Pain, *&c.* do not repreſent any thing but themſelves.

7. But beſides we contemplate our Ideas as ſomething that is itſelf diſtinct from us, as well as Repreſentative of what is ſo. As is plain in the Ideas which we have of Extenſion, or of certain Figures, as ſuppoſe a Circle or a Square, or of certain Bodies, as ſuppoſe the Sun. That Idea which I have when I look towards the Sun, or, if you will, that Sun which I immediately ſee (for as for the material Sun that is not viſible by it ſelf) is at the time of my doing ſo conſidered by me as ſomething diſtinct from me; and I find it not in my Power to conceive any otherwiſe of it. Therefore it is not a Modality of my own Soul. For beſides that it would be to ſpeak againſt our Light and inward Conſcience to ſay that it was; 'tis clear that we cannot conceive the Modality of any Subſtance as a Being diſtinct from that Subſtance. As for Example, we cannot conceive a Circle as a Be-

ing different from Extenſion whoſe Modality it is. The Argument is this, We cannot conceive a Modality as a Being diſtinct from its Subſtance: But our Ideas are conceived as Beings diſtinct from our Souls. Therefore our Ideas are not the Modalities of our Souls.

8. And that they are not, a little further Reflection upon what paſſes there will abundantly diſcover to us. For if we conſider, we may obſerve, that we have a clear Intellectual view and knowledge of our *Ideas*. We contemplate them in ſo bright a Light, that we can diſcern their Properties, compare them one with another, and diſcover the Relations that are between them. As is plain in the Ideas of Figures: But now we have no ſuch knowledge of our *Modifications*. As the Soul knows not its own Being, ſo neither does it *know* the Modalities of it, but only *feels* them by a confuſe Sentiment; and accordingly cannot diſcern what Properties or Relation they are capable of, or ſo much as compare them one with another. For can we compare Heat with Taſt, or Smell with Colour? And yet why not as well as our Ideas, if either one were the ſame as the other, or if we had the ſame knowledge of the one as we have of the other. But then, ſince we have a clear knowledge of our Ideas, but not of our Modalities, it is plain that our Ideas cannot be the Modalities of the Soul, ſince if they were, they would be as dark and intelligible to us as the Modalities of the Soul are, than which nothing

nothing in Nature is more retired from the view of the Mind: Which ſtill increaſes the Paradox of ſuppoſing theſe Modalities to be *Eſſentially Repreſentative*, it being ſtrangely abſurd to ſuppoſe, that to be repreſentative of other Objects to the Underſtanding, which cannot repreſent itſelf.

9. But we need only reflect upon ſome of our Ideas to be ſatisfied that they cannot be the Modalities of our Souls. For ſome of our Ideas are general: We think upon a Circle or a Triangle in general, tho' 'tis a contradiction that the Soul ſhould have a modification in *general*. The Modality muſt be as the Subſtance is, and therefore the Modality of a particular Being cannot but be particular. But I think upon a Circle in general; that is, the Objective Reality, or Idea of my Thought, is a Circle in general: Therefore the Objective Reality or Idea of that Circle cannot be a Modality of my Soul, unleſs you could ſuppoſe that the Modification of a particular Being could be a univerſal Modification. Beſides that, after all, if our Ideas were the Modalities of our Souls, it would be a deſperate Problem to account for, how we who cannot Modifie our Souls as we pleaſe, can yet think upon what we will. Indeed ſuppoſing our Ideas and the Modifications of our Souls to be (as indeed they are) diſtinct things, there will be no difficulty in conceiving that we who have no Power over our Modifications, may yet have our *Ideas* at command, to contemplate

them when we pleaſe. But if our Modifications are thoſe very Ideas, then as far as I apprehend, it muſt follow, that as we have it not in our Power to Modifie our Souls as we will, ſo neither can we think upon what we will, becauſe we think by Ideas.

10. But I muſt not deprive my Reader of that Argument for which St. *Auſtin* has laid the Ground in what he ſo often inculcates concerning the Community of Truth, particularly when he ſays, *Quapropter nullo Modo neggaveris eſſe incommutabilem veritatem hæc omnia quæ incommutabiliter vera ſunt Continentem, quam non poſſis dicere tuam vel meam, vel cujuſquam hominis, ſed omnibus incommutabilia vera cernentibus, tanquam miris Modis Secretum & Publicum lumen præſto eſſe ac ſe præbere Communiter. Omne autem quod Communiter Omnibus ratiocinantibus atq; intelligentibus præſto eſt, ad ullius eorum proprie Naturam pertinere quis dixerit?* Wherefore you will by no means deny, that there is an immutable Truth, containing all thoſe things which are immutably true, which you cannot call Thine or Mine, or any particular Mans, but that it is preſent at hand, and exhibits itſelf in common to all that behold the things that are immutably true, as a Light, which after a wonderful manner, is at once both ſecret and publick: But that which is preſent in common to all that reaſon and underſtand, who will ſay, that it belongs properly

De libero Arbitrio lib. 2. c. 12.

ly to the nature of any one of them. And so again, *Quod ergo unum verum videmus ambo singulis Mentibus, nonne utriq; noſtrum Commune eſt?* That one Truth therefore which we both ſee with each of our Minds, is it not common to both of us? Theſe are very remarkable words, importing the univerſality and community of Truth, and they may, with a little Suppliment, be improved into a very conſiderable Argument. And Mr. *Malebranche* has ſupplied that part which was wanting ſo well, that between St. *Auſtin* and him the Argument runs full and intire. That we ſee all by one common Light, or that That one Truth which we all ſee, each by his own Mind, is common to us all; that's the Propoſition of St. *Auſtin*. But now to this * M. *Malebranche* adds, But the Modalities of our Minds are proper and particular to them. And therefore it is neceſſary that Ideas or Truths, which are only the Relations that are between Ideas, ſhould be ſomething elſe than our own proper Modalities. There muſt be an immutable and univerſal Nature which communicates itſelf to all Minds, without dividing itſelf among them; and which may be, as St. *Auſtin* expreſſes it, *Miris Modis Secretum & Publicum lumen*, at once, after a wonderful manner, both a ſecret and a publick Light.

ibid. cap. 10.

* See his Anſwer to Mr. *Arnauld*'s Book of true and falſe Ideas, Page 100. where the Argument is intire.

11. These few Arguments which I have here laid together, and whose Heads I have so far opened as to let the Reader into a more through consideration of them, may be sufficient to shew this new Account of Humane Understanding to be as false as any of the rest, which resolves our Ideas into the supposed *essentially Representative* Modalities of our own Souls. But whoever will see this whole Matter more amply laid open, and indeed almost in its full Light, let him consult M. *Malebranche*'s excellent Answer to Mr. *Arnauld*'s Book of true and false Ideas, to whose Assistance I acknowledge my self beholden for many things in the management of this Argument. For the greater Confirmation of which I shall add yet this further Consideration, that 'tis absolutely impossible that our Ideas should be the Modalities of our Souls, because we are Temporary, Contingent and Mutable Beings; whereas the Ideas whereby we think and understand (as I have already observed upon another occasion, and shall hereafter again insist upon) are Necessary, Eternal and Immutable, partly as being the Objects of Science, and partly as they are the ground, of necessary and eternal Truths, which are no other than the Relations that are between Ideas, or those very Ideas themselves, as related to one another. We see eternal Truths, and therefore also the Ideas from which they result, those Truths not differing really from those Ideas. But now eternal Truths cannot result from Ideas that

are

are not Eternal; and therefore the Ideas which we ſee are alſo Eternal: But the Ideas *which* we ſee, are to be ſure the ſame with the Ideas *by* which we ſee. And therefore again, if the Ideas *which* we ſee are Eternal, conſequently the Ideas *by* which we ſee are alſo Eternal. But then this plainly demonſtrates, that theſe Ideas cannot poſſibly be the Modalities of our own Souls, no, nor yet their Eſſential Perfections neither; and indeed, that we cannot with either Reaſon, Modeſty, or Piety, pretend to be at all a Light to our ſelves, or to underſtand things by any Ideal Reaſons of our own proper Nature, but muſt leave that as a Privilege peculiar to the infinitely great and bleſſed God, whoſe glorious Name be Hallowed and Adored by all his Creatures for ever. *Amen.*

12. And ſo much to convince *Philoſophers*. But now for the ſatisfaction of *Divines*, I think it may not be amiſs, before we conclude this Point, briefly to repreſent how far we have St. *Auſtin*'s Authority on our ſide. It cannot be reaſonably expected from the ſimplicity of the Age wherein he lived, that he ſhould enter ſo far into the ſpeciality of the Queſtion, as to determine particularly and preciſely that the Ideas whereby we underſtand are not either the Eſſential Perfections, or Modalities of our own Souls; but he ſays, that which in the generality of it extends to both, ſince he that abſolutedenies the Genus denies alſo all the Species that are contained under it. And *that* this great Fa-

ther does over and over, being very positive and express in this general Doctrine, that Man is not a Light to himself. *Anima per seipsam non lucet* (says he) *quia humiliter & veraciter cantat, tu illuminabis lucernam meam Domine. Deus meus illumina Tenebras meas, & apud te, inquit, fons vitæ, in lumine tuo videbimus lumen. Non in lumine nostro, sed in lumine tuo. Nam & Oculi nostri lumina vocantur, & tamen lux extrinsecus si desit, etiam sani & patentes in tenebris remanebunt.*

Expos. in Psal. 143.

Again, *Dic quia tu tibi Lumen non es. Ut multum, Oculus es, lumen non es. Quid prodest patens & sanus Oculus, si lumen desit? Ergo dic, à te tibi lumen non esse, & clama quod Scriptum est. Tu illuminabis lucernam meam Domine. Lumine tuo Domine illuminabis tenebras meas. Mea enim nihil nisi tenebræ. Tu autem Lumen fugans tenebras, illuminans me. Non à me mihi lumen existens, sed lumen non Patricipans nisi in Te.*

De verbis Domini, Serm. 8.

Again, *Non sum mihi ipse Lumen, nam si essem nunquam errassem.*

De verbis Apostoli Serm. 30.

Again, *Lumen tibi esse non potes, non potes, non potes.*

Again, *Vis nosse quid es? Tenebræ.* Then a little after, *Tenebræ in te Lux in Domino. Quia non tibi potes lucere, accedendo illuminaris, recedendo tenebraris. Quia non tibi lumen tu ipse es, aliunde illuminaris.*

And

And thus you see 'tis the plain and express Doctrine of this great Father of the Christian Church, and he delivers it with as much Zeal and Vehemence as if it were an Article of the Christian Faith, that we are not a Light to our selves, but are illuminated from elsewhere: That of our selves we are mere Darkness: That at most we are but *Eye*, non *Light*, *Oculus es*, *lumen non es*; which indeed is very finely expressed, as much as to say, That we are to our selves an intelligent Faculty, but not the intelligible Object or Idea. And therefore I cannot but wonder, that a Man so much in the Discipleship of St. *Austin* as Monsieur *Arnauld*, should set up his Modalities essentially Representative as an Ideal Light in the Soul, so directly in opposition to his express Doctrine, as well as great Authority. Especially considering that he herein opposes the Doctor of the Schools no less than the Doctor of the Church, whose express Conclusion it is, that God only, as being vertually all things, knows all things by his Essence. But that the Soul by its own Essence knows nothing. *Solus Deus, cum sit virtualiter Omnia, Cognoscit per Essentiam suam Omnia. Anima autem nulla per Essentiam Cognoscit.* *Sum. Theol. Part.* 1. *Quæs.* 84. *Art.* 2.

Again, in the same place very expressly and remarkably to our purpose, he says, That if there be any Understanding which knows all things by its Essence, it must be that whose Essence

ſence has all things immaterially in itſelf, even as the Ancients ſuppoſed the Eſſence of the Soul to be actually compounded of the Principles of all material things, that it might underſtand all things. But this he tells us is proper to God, that his Eſſence be immaterially comprehenſive of all things, inaſmuch as the effects do vertually pre-exiſt in their Cauſe. And accordingly he concludes, That God only underſtands all things by his own Eſſence, and that this way of Underſtanding does not belong either to Men or Angels. His words are, *Si aliquis Intellectus eſt qui per Eſſentiam ſuam Cognoſcit Omnia, oportet quod eſſentia ejus habeat in ſe immaterialiter Omnia, ſicut antiqui poſuerunt Eſſentiam animæ actu Componi ex Principiis Omnium Materialium, ut Cognoſceret Omnia. Hoc autem eſt proprium Dei, ut ſua Eſſentia ſit immaterialiter Comprehenſiva Omnium, prout Effectus virtute præexiſtent in Cauſa. Solus igitur Deus per Eſſentiam ſuam Omnia intelligit, non autem Anima Humana, neq; etiam Angelus.*

13. Upon this very conſiderable Teſtimony I remark (leſt ſome of my Readers ſhould happen to overlook it) that it ſeems according to *Aquinas* it was an Hypotheſis among the Ancients, that the Soul conſiſted of, and ſo had in it the Principles of all material Things. And that which put them upon ſo odd an Hypotheſis, it ſeems was, that they might thereby render an Account of the poſſibility of our Underſtanding things, which, according to them, muſt be ſuppoſed

ſuppoſed to be done by vertue of thoſe material Principles, ſerving the Soul in the Nature of Ideas for the underſtanding material Objects: Which falls in very much with what we have here expreſſed by the Soul's underſtanding things by its own *eſſential Perfections*, only that this Hypotheſis is a little more particular, and a great deal more groſs, in ſuppoſing theſe Eſſential Perfections of the Soul to be *Material*. But by this we may ſee what ſhifts Men were put to to give an account of the manner of Humane Underſtanding, and with what ſottiſh Extravagances they will take up, rather than go out of themſelves for the Light of their Minds, or acknowledge themſelves beholden to any other Ideas than what the Perfections of their own Natures can furniſh them with: Nay, rather than fail, will even debaſe thoſe Natures, and place them on a level with the Beaſts that periſh, rather than aſcribe their Illumination to any thing ſuperiour to themſelves, or that is even diſtinct from themſelves, chuſing rather to be a ſelf-ſufficient independent Body, than a dependent Spirit. And indeed, ſo natural is the vanity of affecting Self-ſufficiency and Independency, that even *Man* has the Ambition to aſpire to it, and that poor impotent Creature who cannot Live, Move, or have any Being without another, would yet pretend to *underſtand* by himſelf. But this is a privilege which our judicious School-Divine thinks too great to be allowed either to Men or Angels, and fit to

be

be reſerv'd only to God himſelf. And ſince he has with ſo good Judgment lodged it in *him*, here, with all Humility and Adoration let us leave it, as an incommunicable Branch of his Royal Prerogative, and a Flower of his Imperial Crown, without being either ſo impious as to deny this ſuperexcellent way of underſtanding to *Him*, or ſo fooliſhly vain as to aſſume it to our *ſelves*. For in this ſenſe alſo we may truly ſay with the Pſalmiſt, *Such knowledge is too wonderful and too excellent for us, we cannot attain unto it.*

14. We have here gone over a great deal of Ground, and have now but one Field more to beat, and ſo begin to draw near, if not to what we ſeek after, yet at leaſt to the end of our Enquiry, ſince if we do not find what we look for here, we muſt e'en give over all Hopes of finding it any where, and ſit down in a ſatisfied and quiet (tho' not lazy) ignorance of the manner of our Knowledge, contenting our ſelves with the poſſeſſion of the thing. But tho' we have found no ſatisfaction in any of the foregoing Ways or Attempts for the unfolding this myſterious Secret of our Intellectual Nature, unleſs it be that only of *Scio me hactenus nihil Scire*, it would however be too ſoon to give over yet, ſo long as there is room for any further ſearch: For if we will find Knowledge and Underſtanding, we muſt (as the wiſe King adviſes) ſeek for it as for Silver, and ſearch for it as for hid Treaſures. And therefore having examin'd

the

the four firſt Hypotheſis of our Diviſion, and diſcover'd the inſufficiency and falſhood of them, let us now apply our ſelves to the Conſideration of that which remains. And that our acceſs to it may be the more gradual and leſs ſurpriſing, before we offer any thing more immediate and direct, we will firſt interpoſe a Chapter concerning the poſſibility of it, which is as follows.

CHAP. XI.

That 'tis poſſible that the Ideas whereby we underſtand, may be the Divine Ideas, and conſequently that there is no neceſſity of having recourſe to any other.

1. THO whatever is poſſible is not forthwith actually true, yet whatever is actually true muſt be poſſible, and conſequently poſſibility is one ſtep towards actual Truth: And a very conſiderable ſtep too it is in ſome caſes. If God be a poſſible Being, that is, whoſe Nature or Eſſence implies no contradiction or Repugnance that he ſhould be, then it neceſſarily follows that he actually is, ſince, if he were not, it would be utterly impoſſible that he ſhould

ſhould ever be. That's one Caſe, and a very rare and ſingular one it is (as all things concerning God are;) for here the poſſibility plainly and immediately infers the Act; and perhaps 'tis the only caſe wherein it evidently does ſo. But there is another caſe wherein it bids fair for the recommending it, and that is when the poſſibility ſeems to lie only on one ſide. 'Tis true indeed, that mere naked poſſibility, tho' preſuppoſed to the actual truth of a thing as the Ground and Foundation of it, will go but a very little way in Argument towards the inferring it, there being many things in themſelves poſſible, which yet never were, nor perhaps ever ſhall be. But when all other ways of ſolving an apparent Effect that can well be conceiv'd, ſeem deſperate and impoſſible, then to ſay that it may admit of a Solution in this or that way, is a conſiderable *Offer*, and if proved, a conſiderable *Argument*. And therefore ſince it is ſo, and we have ſhewn all the other Suppoſitions or conceivable Accounts concerning the way and manner of Humane Underſtanding to be falſe, it will be a great Point gain'd if we can prove that which remains to be ſo much as *poſſible*, and that 'tis at leaſt ſo much as that (whatever becomes of the actual truth of it) is the Concluſion which is here undertaken to be proved.

2. The Poſition of this Chapter involves a ſuppoſition. It is here ſuppoſed that there are *Divine Ideas*, or that God has in himſelf the I-

deas

deas of all things. This I beg leave to ſuppoſe here, becauſe I have already given a large and profeſſed Account of it in the former Part of this Theory. But if the Reader of this Part which I can by no means adviſe) ſhould happen to be a ſtranger to the other, or ſhould have forgot it, and not be willing to renew the peruſal of it, he may take this ſhort hint in his way for his preſent ſatisfaction. God when he made the World muſt have the Ideas of thoſe Creatures which he made, or elſe he could not have made them: And ſince when he made them there was nothing in actual Being beſides himſelf, thoſe Ideas cannot be conceiv'd as any thing really diſtinct from his own Eſſence, but only as the ſeveral intelligible Degrees or Perfections of it, and ſo he has the Ideas of all things in *himſelf*. And accordingly theſe Ideas as being really Co-eſſential with him, tho' repreſentative of things without him, I call *Divine Ideas*. This is what I would here ſuppoſe. That which is here aſſerted, is, that 'tis poſſible that theſe Divine Ideas may be the very Ideas whereby we think or underſtand, or (as I have otherwiſe expreſſed it) that are the immediate Objects of our Thoughts in the Perception of things.

4. Now of the poſſibility of this there can be no reaſonable doubt if we conſider in the firſt place, that theſe Ideas are in themſelves moſt Intelligible, and ſo fit to be the immediate Objects of Thought, or elſe nothing can be ſo. God

God is the most Intelligible Object in himself: For as *Aquinas* well argues, since every thing is Intelligible so far as it is in Act, God who is the most pure Act without the least mixture of Potentiality, must be in himself most Intelligible. And therefore since these Ideas of things which are in God, have a real Indentity with the Divine Essence (as by the Doctrine of the Schools themselves, every thing that is in him is concluded to have) it follows that they must be in themselves of the most Intelligible Nature: Which may also be argued from their most perfect Spirituality, and the great proportionableness which they thereby have to the Mind or Understanding.

4. But we are further to consider, That as these Ideas are by reason of the Spirituality and Divinity of them most Intelligible in themselves, so nothing hinders from the nature of the thing, but that they may be Intelligible to *us*: And that because they are intimately present with us, and have an immediate Union with our Minds. 'Tis most certain that God himself hath so; and accordingly the Apostle in his Discourse with the *Athenian* Philosophers takes notice (which he would not do if it had not been Strictly and Philosophically true) that *He is not far from every one of us*, and that *in him we live, and move, and have our being*. And therefore since these Ideas in the reality of their Nature are the same with God, it follows that they

Acts 17.

they must be as intimately present, and as immediately united to us as God is, and so must be Intelligible to *us* as well as in *themselves*.

5. There wants one Consideration more to fill up the Argument, and that is, that as these Ideas are Intelligible to us; so if we do understand them, we shall not fail to understand other things *by* them, and that because they are in themselves essentially Representative of all other things, as being the exemplary Measures whereby they were made, and the Intelligible Forms whereby they were known and designed before they were made. When therefore these Ideas are perceived or understood, those other things which were made by them, are understood in them as far as they are capable of being understood at all, and that because these Ideas are the Intelligible Reasons or Essences of those things, and the ground of all those Eternal Truths that are affirm'd of them, as well as of those Sciences which respect those Truths, as we have shewn at large in the former part of this System.

6. Now these three things are sufficient to conclude our Point. For when we say, that 'tis possible that the Divine Ideas may be the Ideas whereby we understand, the meaning more explicitly will resolve into this, that we may understand *them*, and other things *by* them. Now as for the understanding *them*, the possibility of this appears partly from their being in themselves of an Intelligible Nature, and

partly from the immediate Union and intimate Preſence which they have with our Minds. And as for the underſtanding other things *by* them, the poſſibility of this likewiſe appears from the Eſſential Repreſentativeneſs of their Nature, whereby they expreſs all that belongs to the real Eſſence, and that 'tis properly *Intelligible* in things; that is in other words, we may for any thing that appears to the contrary, underſtand theſe Ideas in themſelves, becauſe of their *abſolute* Nature as they are Eſſential Perfections of God, and we may underſtand other things *by* them, becauſe of their *Relative* Nature, or as they are Ideas repreſentative of things that are out of God. And ſince in theſe two things conſiſts the full of what is intended by our underſtanding by the Divine Ideas, *viz.* That we ſhould underſtand *them*, and other things *by* them, and both theſe appear to be poſſible, it therefore clearly follows, that 'tis poſſible that we may underſtand by thoſe Ideas, or elſe there will be no Ideas by which it will be poſſible for us to underſtand; and that becauſe 'tis impoſſible there ſhould be any that are either more Intelligible in themſelves, or more intimately preſent to us, or more repreſentative of other things. So that I think we have ſufficient warrant to conclude, that theſe Ideas are every way qualified to be the immediate Objects of our Thoughts, and that there is nothing *in them* that ſhould hinder us from underſtanding *by* them.

7. All

7. All that can here be to any purpose Objected, is, Whether there may not be an hindrance or incapacity in *ourselves*, by reason of the disproportion of our Faculties to so excellent an Object, tho' there be no impossibility from the Object itself. But this can be no Objection if we can consider, first, That the Question at present is not concerning the Act, but the Possibility, and as to this, there can be no reason to question but that God, who, as our Religion teaches us to believe, will discover himself to us hereafter, may, if he so pleases, discover himself to us now. But besides we are to consider 2*dly*. That God does discover himself to us now; for we have an Intellectual View or Perception of him even in this Life, tho' not by abundance of degrees so clear and perfect as we hope to have hereafter, when our Vision of him shall be *Beatifick*. But however, some Perception of him we have, and that which we have is Direct, Immediate and Essential: For God, as we have shewn above, cannot be known by any Idea distinct from himself, as other things are, and therefore we must know him by himself; and how imperfect soever that Knowledge be, his own Divine Essence is the immediate Object of it, or else 'tis plain that we have no Notion at all of him. But then if we can have any Intellectual Sight (tho' never so imperfect) of the *Absolute* Nature of God, much more may we see his *Relative* Nature, or that in him which respects Creatures; that is, the Divine Ideas, al-

ways ſuppoſing that it be this Pleaſure to reveal them to us; which, whether it be or no, is an Enquiry that lies beyond our preſent Concern, which goes no further than the abſolute poſſibility of the thing.

8. And for the fuller Confirmation of this, it may not be improper to be further conſidered, That theſe are the Ideas which are the immediate Objects of the Divine Intellect, that God both underſtands *them*, and his Creatures *by* them, and that it is the Intelligible World that repreſents to him the *Natural*. For as God has the Ideas of all things that he has made in himſelf, according to that of St *Auſtin*, *Deus habet intus quicquid Operatur Foris*: He has within whatever he works without; ſo he knows them all by thoſe Ideas. For he knows all things in himſelf, as ſufficing for his own Light as well as Happineſs, and if he knows all things in himſelf, it muſt be by *that* of himſelf which relates to what is out of himſelf, even thoſe Intellegible Perfections of his Eſſence that are repreſentative of whatever does or can exiſt without it, which is what we intend by the Divine Ideas. But then if God underſtands by theſe Ideas, then it ſeems things may be thus underſtood, and ſo this is in the general a poſſible and truly conceivable way of underſtanding. But then beſides, if theſe are the Ideas by which God underſtands, why may not we underſtand by the ſame? If this be his way of

In the Appendix of his Sermons. *Serm.* 10.

of underſtanding why may it not alſo be ours? 'Tis true indeed, it would be a vain Preſumption to think that we ſhould be able to underſtand as he does in one ſenſe; that is, that as he underſtands all things in *himſelf*, ſo we ſhould be alſo able to underſtand things in *ourſelves*, becauſe this would import a very high Perfection in *us*. But this hinders not but that as God unſtands all things in himſelf, ſo we may underſtand all things in *Him*, becauſe then all the Perfection that is in this way Underſtanding redounds to God.

9. But then to wind up this whole Matter, if it be poſſible (as I think by a due Conſideration of the Premiſes, it will appear that it is) that the Ideas whereby we underſtand may be the Divine Ideas, then it evidently follows, that there is no abſolute Neceſſity (at leaſt from the Nature of the thing) of our having recourſe to any other, and that even tho' we ſhould ſuppoſe other ways to be as poſſible as this. 'Tis true indeed, I know not any other way that we can have recourſe to; but ſuppoſing we could, there would yet however be no abſolute Neceſſity of our taking up with it, ſo long as this is acknowledged to be poſſible. But whether this be actually the very way of Humane Underſtanding or no, the mere poſſibility of it is not ſufficient of itſelf to determine. That depends upon other Meaſures, the Conſideration of which we ſhall adjourn to the following Chapter.

CHAP. XII.

Wherein is considered what Reasons there are to think that the Divine Ideas are actually the Ideas whereby we understand. With some explanatory Account of this Ideal System.

1. 'TIs no small satisfaction to a pensive Traveller after he has wandered up and down through wild Deserts and Pathless Woods, and has in vain attempted many cragged Hills and inaccessible Rocks and Precipices, at length to fall into a *passable way*, tho' he knows not yet whether it will lead him, or whether it be the right way or no. To apply this to our present Case, I need only say, that after some tryal made upon the several Hypotheses of Humane Understanding, we have at length found one that is *Possible* and *Intelligible*, which is more than can be said of any of the rest, and what, after so many vain and fruitless Enquiries, may be lookt upon as a considerable Atchievement. I do not mean in respect of my own Abilities so as to value my self as a *Discoverer*, but in respect of the thing itself, it being indeed a very considerable and chearing thing to meet with any Light after so much Darkness, tho' it be only the *glimpse* of a *possibility*. And so much indeed I shall not doubt to affirm, that we have found; but

but whether this way of Underſtanding which we affirm to be poſſible, be the very actual way whereby we underſtand, is a Queſtion that is not to be determin'd without that *Modeſty* and *Reſerve* which is due both to the Sublimity of the Argument, and the Infirmity of him that handles it.

2. There is a twofold *Reſerve* which is to be uſed in our ſpeculative Reſearches. One that reſpects the *Things* that we have under Conſideration, and another that reſpects that degree of *Aſſent* wherewith we adhere to them. That which concerns the Things themſelves, is that we don't *Outer la matiere* (as the French ſpeak) puſh things too far, over ſtretch the Matter, or indulge our inquiſitive Humour too much about things that are greatly removed from us, or much above us, and that lie in the Dark; but that we govern our Curioſity within reaſonable Bounds, contenting ourſelves with being *Wiſe unto Sobriety*. That *Reſerve* which concerns our Aſſent, is again capable of being conſidered two ways, *1ſt*. That we forbear * giving it to any thing but what is clear and evident, ſince every thing that has the appearance of Truth, is not always true. *2dly*. That when we do inwardly give it, as finding it reaſonable ſo to do, we uſe not however any undue Freedom in the manner of expreſſing our Aſſent, by being too Poſitive or Dogmatical in our Affirmations, which favours of too much Confidence and

* That is abſolutely.

Reliance upon our own Judgments, and is therefore in decency to be avoided, tho' we think ourselves never so much in the right. I have endeavour'd to govern myself by these measures in this Theory, and I hope this is the Temper which I have hitherto used; and I must strangely forget myself and my Argument too, should I now in this Part of it begin to discontinue it; and therefore tho' we have been somewhat positive in affirming the simple *possibility* of our Understanding by the Divine Ideas (because indeed I think 'tis very clear that we may so understand) yet that we actually do understand by them, I shall not take upon me absolutely to affirm. The Question *How we understand*, is too difficult and abstruse to be peremptorily decided by me, or by any Man else. I pretend only to examine which of all the conceivable ways of it appears to be most reasonable, which is enough to answer the design of a modest Theory, and to satisfie all reasonable Curiosity either in the Writer or in the Reader. And accordingly having shewn it to be absolutely possible that we may understand by the Divine Ideas; I now proceed to consider what rational Grounds and Inducements there are to think that we do actually so understand.

3. To set out then, the first rational Ground that may be offer'd for this way of Understanding, is, because all other ways that we can think of appear upon a fair examination to be false and impossible. We have shewn that it is not rea-

sonable

ſonable to think there are any Ideas but the Divine Ideas; and ſuppoſing that there were, yet that we do not underſtand by them, nay, that they cannot be the Ideas whereby we underſtand. And we have further ſhewn not only that there are Divine Ideas, but that there is a poſſibility of our underſtanding by them. But then ſince the other ways are falſe, whether that alone be not ſufficient to conclude this to be true, eſpecially ſince it appears otherwiſe to be poſſible. For as we argued in the Chap. foregoing after this manner, This way is poſſible, therefore no other is neceſſary; ſo whether we may not now as well argue thus; the other ways of underſtanding are impoſſible, therefore this is neceſſary, is what I ſhould think deſerves to be well weighed by every Reader that is not in too much haſte to conſider.

4. The Traveller who by conſulting his Map, or otherwiſe is competently ſatisfied that the way to ſuch a Place muſt lie within the compaſs of five Roads, and afterwards upon trial finds four of them not to be paſſable, has he not great reaſon to conclude without any further enquiry, that the fifth which remains is the right, eſpecially if he perceives it to lie open and fair? But now how does our Caſe differ from his, and if *he* may ſo conclude, then why may not *we*? For the Syllogiſm would be no other than this. The Ideas whereby we underſtand, muſt be either ſuch as come from external Objects, or ſuch as are produced by ourſelves, or created by God,

or

or the Essential Perfections or Modalities of our own Souls, or lastly the Divine Ideas. But they are not any of the former; therefore they are the last: Which Conclusion being as true as the Premises, whoever will not submit to it, stands oblig'd to shew, either that there is some other way of understanding which we have not mention'd, and so that our Enumeration is not just; or that one of the other which we have mention'd may possibly be it. And indeed I do not well perceive how either of these can be done; and therefore the Argument must be allow'd, or at least I see not how it can be answer'd.

5. This last Argument proceeds from the exclusion or removal of other ways to the position of this as the only way of understanding that remains, and indeed that is possible. But now to argue more nearly from the Nature of the thing itself. The Ideas whereby we understand are Necessary, Eternal and Immutable: But there are no Ideas so qualified but the Divine; therefore the Ideas whereby we understand are the Divine Ideas. This Argument we have already used upon another occasion, *viz.* to shew that our Ideas are neither produced by ourselves, nor created by God, nor yet the Perfections or Modalities of our own Souls. But it is as applicable to this purpose to shew what they are, as well as what they are not, to shew them to be Divine, as well as not to be any thing Created; for 'tis, I think very plain, that

hat That muſt be Divine, whatever is neceſ-ary, Eternal and Immutable; ſo that we need ot be at the pains to prove that part of the Ar-ument. But now as to the other, that the I-leas whereby we underſtand are Neceſſary, E-ernal and Immutable; this ſeems demonſtra-ble two ways, which, tho' we have already ouch'd upon, we ſhall here briefly, and if we an diſtinctly reſume, not without ſome im-provement as well as variety.

6. The firſt way is from their being the Ob-ects of *Science*: It is with conſent allow'd, that cience is of Neceſſaries, *&c.* Therefore things as they are in Nature are not the Objects of it. Therefore the Science which we have of things reſpects only the *Ideas* of thoſe things, or elſe 'tis plain that we can have no Science of them. But then again, ſince Science is of Neceſſaries, therefore the Ideas of thoſe things are neceſſary, *&c.* And then ſince theſe Ideas of things are alſo the Ideas whereby we underſtand them, as being ſuppoſed to be the Objects of that Science which we have of them, it ſeems thence to fol-low by an equality of Conſequence, that there-fore the Ideas whereby we underſtand are alſo neceſſary, *&c.* For Science is of Neceſſaries, and therefore, as if there were no Ideas there could be no Science: So if we did not know things by thoſe Ideas, we could have no Science of thoſe things; but if we do know things by their Ideas, then the Ideas of thoſe things are alſo *our* Ideas, or the Ideas whereby we underſtand them, and conſequently the one

will

will be as neceſſary as the other: So that the Argument will now run diſtinctly in this form.

The Ideas whereby we underſtand are the Objects of Science:

But the Object of Science is neceſſary, *&c.*

Therefore the Ideas whereby we underſtand, are neceſſary, *&c.*

Beſides, we underſtand things by their Ideas, therefore in ſhort, the Ideas of things are the ſame with the Ideas by which we underſtand.

7. But before we give any further Proof of the Concluſion of this Argument, there is another way of proving the major Propoſition of it, *viz.* That the Ideas whereby we underſtand are the Objects of Science, we have ſhewn that material Beings are not in themſelves, or by themſelves at all Intelligible; therefore all the Knowledge or Perception which we have of them is by their Ideas. And therefore the Ideas whereby we perceive thoſe Beings are again the Objects of all that Science which we have of them. And that not only becauſe the things in themſelves have not that immutable ſteddineſs which *Science* requires in its Object, which is the ground upon which the laſt Argument proceeds) but becauſe they are not in themſelves ſo much as Abſolutely, or at all *Intelligible.*

ble. And indeed since we perceive these things only by their Ideas, it seems plainly impossible that the Science which we have of them should be concern'd any further than those Ideas whereby we perceive them. So that what we call the Knowledge of *Things*, is in strictness no other than the Perception of our own *Ideas*.

8. Which is further confirm'd by that very considerable Maxim of the Metaphysical School, that the actual existence of things is not necessary to Science, or as *Suarez* expresses it, that *Science Abstracts* from it. 'Tis true it does so: Not indeed from all Existence, or from Existence absolutely (for then Science would have nothing real for its Object) but from Existence in a certain respect, as it signifies the actual Existence of things in Nature. From that it does Abstract, and accordingly the existence of things in this Sense is not at all necessary to Science, but wholly accidental; that is, it is not necessary to Science, that the Object of it should *so* exist. For whether things do thus exist or not, our Science of them is, or may be the same, as is plain in the Science of *Geometry*, which is concerning such Lines and Figures as have no real Existence in Nature, at least according to that exactness of Perfection wherein that Science considers them as I have * formerly observ'd to another purpose. But then this one Consideration seems sufficient to demonstrate

Disput. 1 *Sect.* 5 *Num.* 39.

* See the 1st. Part of this Theory, *Page* 51.

monſtrate that the things themſelves, as they exiſt in Nature, are not the proper Objects of that Science which we are ſaid to have of them. For what can be more plain, things as they naturally exiſt cannot be the Objects of our Science, and that becauſe our Science conſiders them according to a State or Degree of Perfection which they have not as they naturally exiſt. Here then our Science does not only *abſtract from Exiſtence*; but (what is much more conſiderable) is concerning things that have no real Exiſtence in Nature at all. Tho' if it did only abſtract from the real Exiſtence of things in Nature, that would be ſufficient to prove that thoſe things cannot be the Objects of it: Becauſe upon the ſuppoſition of this Abſtraction it would be indifferent to Science (as indeed it is) whether theſe things did exiſt or no, and ſo our Science of them would continue the ſame, even tho' they were annihilated, which can never be ſaid of the real Object of Science. It ſeems then a plain rational Collection, that the things in Nature are not that real Object. And therefore all the Science which we have of them, muſt be reſolved into thoſe Ideas whereby we perceive them, as being the only true and proper Objects of that Science. Which again proves thoſe Ideas to be Neceſſary, Eternal and Immutable.

9. The other way of proving the ſame Concluſion, is from their being, as the Objects of *Science*, ſo alſo the ground of *Eternal Truths*.

Theſe

Theſe Truths are no other in general, but certain immutable Relations of things. But what things? Not things that exiſt in Nature: For theſe things are Contingent, Temporary and Mutable; and 'tis impoſſible (as we have abundantly ſhewn in the former Part) that ſuch things ſhould be the Subjects of Neceſſary, Eternal and Immutable Relations. Therefore they are the Relations of Ideas, and thoſe Ideas muſt be as Neceſſary, as Eternal, and as Immutable as thoſe Truths are which reſult from them, it being impoſſible that eternal Truths ſhould reſult from Ideas that are not Eternal. So indeed we ſpeak according to the *formality* of the thing; but indeed in the *Reality* of it, theſe Eternal Truths are the ſame with Ideas, as all Relations are with their Subjects and Terms. And therefore again, theſe Ideas are Neceſſary, Eternal, *&c.* as having a real Identity with eternal Truths.

10. Well, but how does it appear that theſe Ideas are *our* Ideas? Why, we ſee theſe eternal Truths, we contemplate them, and have a clear Intellectual view of them, and therefore alſo of thoſe neceſſary and immutable Ideas which are the ground of them, thoſe Truths being not really (tho' formally) different from thoſe Ideas. But then, as I ſaid before, the Ideas *which* we ſee, muſt be the ſame with the Ideas *by* which we ſee, and that becauſe being eſſentially Repreſentative, in ſeeing them we are ſuppoſed to ſee what is repreſented by them. And there-

fore

fore, if the Ideas which we see are Eternal, consequently the Ideas by which we see are also Eternal. And now we seem to have proved all that is necessary to infer our Conclusion. For if the Ideas whereby we understand are Necessary, Eternal and Immutable, as they appear to be from this double Consideration, as they are the Objects of Science, and as they are the ground of eternal Truths, then the Ideas whereby we understand, and which are the immediate Objects of our Mind, cannot reasonably be thought to be any other than the Divine Ideas, and that by vertue of that Principle which is the common Basis of the whole Argument (and which seems too clear to need any Proof it self) *viz.* that there is nothing Necessary, Eternal, or Immutable, but the Divine Nature.

11. But besides, our Ideas are very great things, not only in themselves, as representing whatever is Intelligible in other things, but also with respect to us who understand them; for they are the Principles of our Intelligence, the Light of our Minds, and the Perfection of our rational Natures. Not indeed the *formal* Perfection of them, which consists not in the Ideas themselves, but in the *Perception* of those Ideas (for the formal Perfection of the Mind, however otherwise dependent upon that which is without her, is always some Operation of her own) but they are the *Objective* Perfection, or that which perfects, meliorates, and improves our Intellectual Natures by way of Object, or

as

as Objects do their Powers or Faculties, which are imploy'd about them. For as the Perfection of the Understanding consists in Knowledge, so all our Knowledge consists in the Perception of our Ideas. They are the immediate Objects of the Mind, and consequently all the knowledge which she has of Created Things, as various and as extensive as it is, lies within the compass of their lucid Sphere. It may indeed come short of it, or be retrench'd within it; but it cannot possibly exceed it, or pass beyond the limits of it. We cannot understand what we have no Idea of, and that because we understand by our Ideas. Our knowledge must needs fail us whenever our Ideas do, and that because our Ideas are the immediate Objects of our Knowledge. But then that which is the immediate Object of the Mind is the Perfection of it, as informing it, and rendring it actually intelligent, which therefore argues our Ideas to be the Perfection of our Minds: Which by the way, if it was not the true Reason, may yet serve for a very rational Account of that Platonick Notion (otherwise not so easie to comprehend) that the Happiness of the Soul consists in the *Contemplation* of *Ideas*, which seems also espoused by St. *Austin*, when speaking of these Ideas, and of the sight which the Soul has of them, he has these remarkable words, *Quarum visione fit beatissima*. Tho' indeed I think this is to be understood in a

Lib. Octoginta trium Quæstionum Quæst 46.

qualify'd Senſe: For exactly ſpeaking the ſupreme Happineſs of the Soul cannot conſiſt in the Contemplation of *Ideas*, ſince Ideas, as Divine as they are, import not the Eſſence of God as it is abſolutely in itſelf, but only as it relates to Creatures, as we have ſhewn in the former Part. Whereas our Supreme Happineſs conſiſts in our Viſion of God, as he is according to his abſolute Nature, or as he is in himſelf, that which St. *John* calls *the ſeeing him as he is*. But perhaps St. *Auſtin* might not ſo minutely weigh this, or by *moſt Happy* might mean no more than very Happy: And that indeed is very true: For as there is a great deal of Pleaſure in Knowledge; ſo a clear contemplation of Ideas will go a great way towards Happineſs, and that becauſe theſe Ideas are the proper and immediate Objects of the Mind, and ſo *truly*, tho' not *moſt* Perfective of it. And accordingly *Aquinas* maintains that God underſtands other things by his own Ideas, or by the Species of them contain'd in his own Eſſence, and that to obviate the inconvenience urged in the Objection, *viz.* That if he underſtood other things ſomething elſe would be a Perfection to him that is not himſelf: Which ſuppoſes that his own Ideas are a Perfection to him, as being the immediate Objects of his Mind; and for the like reaſon, ſo will our Ideas be to our Minds. But then (which is the reſult of all this) I would offer it to be conſider'd, whether God be not the only true good of our Souls, and conſequently

quently whether any thing can be ſafely admitted to be the Perfection of our Minds but what is *Divine*. And accordingly as *Aquinas* ſuppoſes God to underſtand by his own Ideas, leſt other things ſhould be a Perfection to *him*; ſo whether it be not as reaſonable to ſuppoſe that we underſtand by thoſe ſame Ideas of his, leſt any thing beſides God ſhould be a Perfection to *our* Natures, or a Light to our Minds.

12. But 'tis further Conſiderable, that our Ideas are not only the Light of our Minds, but a common and univerſal Light, a Light that is as general and as diffuſed as the Intellectual Nature, that extends as far as there is any Faculty to ſee it, and that ſhines even in the Darkneſs, tho' it be not comprehended by it. Thoſe many great and fine things which St. *Auſtin* has ſaid of the Community and Univerſality of Truth, are equally applicable to our Ideas, as being of the ſame real Nature with it. As for Truth he muſt be a great ſtranger to her, and to himſelf too, that ſhall look upon it as a Poſſeſſion in *Peculiar*. Truth is no Man's Property or Incloſure, but a common and publick Benefit. She dwells indeed in every Man, and has an Oracle in every Breaſt, but is confin'd to no Man, nor to any Place or Time, but is always and every where Intelligible, and to every one, as being at once a ſecret and a publick Light, as St. *Auſtin* ſpeaks. That Truth which I contemplate is not mine, ſince another may contemplate it as well as I,

and that Truth which another contemplates is not his, since I may contemplate it as well he. Yea, we shall see the same Truths, and tho' *Mine* and *Thine* be a necessary distinction in the enjoyment of lesser Goods, which can not be Communicated at once to many, yet we enjoy the greatest Blessings all in common, and there is no division of Truth, tho' there be of the Languages wherein we express it. The Curse that multiplied the latter has left the former still one, simple and intire; and tho' there is such a national variety in Tongues, yet in the Retirements of the Mind there is more Conformity, since the * Truth that dwells there is neither Hebrew, nor Greek, nor Latin, nor Barbarous, but speaks one simple, uniform and universal Language, and such as is intelligible to the whole World. But now our Ideas being the same in the Reality of the thing with Truth; all this which we here say of Truth will be as truly applicable to our Ideas. And consequently we may say of *them*, that *they* also are Common, Universal, Unconfined, and Omnipresent. And we find by experience, that we have all the same common Ideas, tho' we do not equally attend to them, view them with the same distinctness, and order, and dispose them alike in our Thoughts. In this indeed there is an infinite variety according to the different Capacities of Men, and the

* *Intus in Domicilio Cogitationis nec Hebræa nec Græca nec Latina, nec Barbara veritas. St.* Aug. *Confes.* L. 11. C. 13.

the as different Uſe and Application of thoſe Capacities, and from hence proceeds all that Diverſity which is in *Thinking*. But as to the Ideas themſelves, they are the ſame in all Minds, as appears by our being able by agreement to unite them to certain ſenſible Signs, and by the uſe of thoſe Signs to excite thoſe Ideas. And indeed all *Speech* ſuppoſes this; for unleſs we had all the ſame Ideas in our Minds, 'tis impoſſible we ſhould be able to diſcourſe or maintain any Converſation with one another. I do not ſay, that we have always the ſame Ideas whenever we uſe the ſame Signs, or rather that we always uſe the ſame Signs for the ſame Ideas. But however our Ideas muſt be the ſame in themſelves, or we muſt abſolutely have the ſame Ideas in common between us, or elſe they would not be capable of being ſignify'd by a common Sign, and ſo we could never converſe together, becauſe we ſhould have always different Ideas, tho' we uſed the ſame Signs, which would be to converſe in Words and not in Thoughts, like Parrots, and not like Men. 'Tis plain then that we muſt have the ſame Ideas, tho' we do not always uſe the ſame Signs to expreſs them, as in thoſe that ſpeak *different* Languages, nor yet always intend the ſame Idea by the ſame Sign, as in thoſe that talk Falaciouſly and Ambiguouſly in the ſame. But ſtill I ſay the Ideas muſt be the ſame in themſelves, or elſe we could not talk at all:

Which seems to argue an intelligible as well as a sensible Luminary; that there is a Sun for Minds as well as for Bodies, and that we see all in one common Light with our Understandings, as well as with our Eyes; that is, that there is an universal, intelligible Nature which communicates itself to all Minds, without dividing itself to any. But then whether this common, universal, unconfined Light can be any thing less than *Divine*; or whether this universal Nature which so undividedly Communicates itself to all that is Intellectual, can be any thing less than *God*; And accordingly whether this again does not prove, that the Ideas whereby we understand are the Divine Ideas, I leave to be considered by as many as think it worth their while to know how they understand; which, one would think, should be one of the first Questions that should engage the Curiosity of a rational Mind.

13. But what if after all we should take a shorter Line to our Point, by arguing thus, The Truths which we see are Divine Truths, therefore the Ideas which we see are also Divine Ideas. For as we have already argued the necessary and immutable Nature of our Ideas from the necessity and immutability of Truth, and from that necessary and immutable Nature of theirs infer'd their Divinity, because nothing can be Necessary or Immutable but what is Divine: So why may we not more directly and immediately argue the Divinity of our Ideas from the Divinity of Truth? For as for the *Anticedent* of the Argument

gument we have abundantly ſhewn in the former Part that Truth is of a Nature truly Divine, according to the expreſs Doctrine of St. *Auſtin*. And as for the Connexion between the Antecedent and the Conſequent, that depends upon two things which we have alſo already ſhewn, and are therefore now only to recollect; one is, that Truth is in reality the ſame with the Ideas from which it reſults: And the other is, that theſe Ideas are alſo *our* Ideas, or the Ideas which we ſee, and which are the immediate Objects of our Thought and Perception, and that becauſe we ſee theſe Truths which are ſuppoſed to be really the ſame in Nature with theſe Ideas: Therefore we ſee alſo theſe Ideas; and therefore if the Truths which we ſee are Divine Truths, it ſeems a reaſonable Concluſion to infer, that then the Ideas whereby we underſtand are of a Nature no leſs Divine.

14. But the Argument may be propoſed as directly and with the ſame Compendiouſneſs in relation to *Science*, as we have here done it with reſpect to *Truth*. Before we argued, that our Ideas were neceſſary, becauſe the Objects of Science, and Divine, becauſe Neceſſary. But now we may proceed more immediately from their being the Objects of Science to their being Divine. The Objects of Science are the Divine Ideas: But our Ideas are the Objects of our Science; therefore our Ideas are the Divine Ideas. The firſt Propoſition ſeems abundantly clear from the Na-

ture of Science; which, as it muſt be of Ideas, becauſe of the Contingency and Mutability of all things in *Nature*; ſo thoſe Ideas muſt be the *Divine* Ideas for the ſame reaſon, as is obvious to be Collected. Then as to the ſecond Propoſition (upon which the main ſtreſs of the Argument reſts) *viz.* That our Ideas are the Objects of our Science, this we have in great Meaſure ſhewn already, and may now further conſider, That as 'tis plain that the things in Nature cannot be ſo becauſe of their Contingency and Mutability; ſo ſuppoſing they were never ſo Neceſſary and Immutable, yet ſince we know them not by themſelves but by their Ideas (which are then *our* Ideas) ſtill they cannot be however the *immediate* Objects of our Science, which muſt reſolve into the Perception of our own Ideas: Therefore our own Ideas are at leaſt the *immediate* Object of our Science And ſince the Objects of Science are ſuppoſed to be the Divine Ideas, therefore again, the Ideas whereby we underſtand, are the Divine Ideas.

15. After all, it ſeems reaſonable to think, that if things are underſtood by Ideas, (as we now ſuppoſe, and is generally granted that they are) they ſhould be underſtood by the ſame Ideas by which they were made, eſpecially ſince that is an Intelligible, and the only Intelligible way of underſtanding them. But now things were made by the Divine Ideas, as we have ſhewn in the former Part. And there-

fore

fore even upon this Conſideration, it ſeems a reaſonable Thought to ſuppoſe, that they are alſo underſtood by the ſame Divine Ideas, even by that Intelligible World which we have there ſo largely deſcribed. For ſince Ideas, according to the Remark of *Aquinas*, may be conſidered Speculatively as the Princi- *Part* 1. *Quæſt.* 15. *Art.* 3. ples of the Knowledge of Things, as well as practically, as the Principles of their Faction or Formation (in the former of which reſpects they may be call'd *Reaſons*, as in the latter *Exemplars*) why we ſhould divide the Principle of *Knowledge* from the Principle of *Faction*, by ſuppoſing things to be made by one ſort of Ideas, and underſtood by another ſort, I know no good Reaſon, eſpecially ſince we can find no ſuch other ſort of Ideas, by which it is poſſible they may be underſtood. To which we may add, that unleſs we perceive things by the very ſame Ideas whereby they were made, there will be no Conſequence from the diſtinction of our Ideas to the diſtinction of Things, as was obſerved before, and ſo we ſhall have no mark whereby to diſtinguiſh them, which is not to be ſuppoſed.

16. That which we have here expreſſed by our Underſtanding by the Divine Ideas, M. *Malebranche* is pleaſed to expreſs by our ſeeing all things in God; which way of ſpeaking is alſo not altogether *unſcholaſtick*, as appears from that Queſtion put by *Aquinas*, *Utrum videntes Deum*

per

per essentiam, Omnia in Deo videant, and may, for ought I know, be very right, if rightly understood. But there lies the Danger, and therefore I must beg leave to *prefer* the other way of speaking which we have hitherto used, not only as more clear and determinate in itself, but also as less offensive to common Ears, who by the sound of our seeing all things in God, may be tempted to imagine not only that the things themselves are immediately and properly seen, which rather *strikes* in with the vulgar Presumption, than *opposes* it; but (which perhaps is that which has drawn so much Prejudice upon this Notion) that things as they are in Nature, are really in God, and that they are seen in him, according to those sensible Appearances which we have of them, by reason of those Sensations which always accompany our Ideas in Vision; whereas by our seeing things in God, no more is to be understood, nor does the Author of this Expression understand any more by it, than that as things are in God after an intelligible manner, *viz.* by those essential Perfections or Ideas of his which represent them; so they are those Divine Ideas which are the immediate Objects of our Thoughts in our Perception of Things, which we are supposed to understand by those Divine Ideas, as far as they are capable of being at all understood by us. For the sensible World is not Intelligible immediately by itself, and therefore 'tis necessary there

there ſhould be ſome Intelligible World or other by which it may be underſtood, which Intelligible World, according to this Hypotheſis, are the Divine Ideas. Or, things in Nature are not Intelligible in themſelves, as is plain from their diſtance and diſunion from our Minds, and the abſurdity of ſuppoſing that our Souls ſhould quit our Bodies, and travel over vaſt Spaces of Air to make a viſit to the Sun and Stars, whenever we take a view of thoſe far diſtant Objects; therefore they muſt be underſtood by ſomething that has a more immediate Union with our Minds, and which repreſents theſe things to it, that is by their Ideas. And ſo the ſenſible muſt be ſeen or underſtood by an Intelligible Sun, which repreſents that to the Mind which cannot repreſent itſelf. And ſo much is generally granted in effect, tho' not in theſe Terms. 'Tis generally allow'd, that the things without us are not perceived immediately by themſelves, but by their Ideas. The only Queſtion is, by *what* Ideas, or what theſe Ideas are! Here we divide, ſome aſſign one ſort of Ideas, and ſome another ſort. So that all that this Hypotheſis *of ſeeing things in God*, adds to the Vulgar, or has peculiar to itſelf from any of the reſt, is preciſely this only, that theſe Ideas are the Divine Ideas, or that the Divine Ideas are the Ideas whereby we underſtand. And therefore ſince this is the true Senſe into which that Hypotheſis muſt be reſolved, I thought fit

to

to expreſs it ſo at firſt, to prevent any Cavils or Miſapprehenſions, to which the other way of ſpeaking might be apt to expoſe it, with Men that judge of Propoſitions by their Sound rather than by their Senſe.

17. But however there are *two things* which we may, and muſt in the very ſtrictneſs of the Expreſſion be ſaid to ſee, or perceive in God, there being no other inſtructive way of expreſſing it; and thoſe are Ideas and Eternal Truths. The Reaſon of the Difference is, becauſe other things being not perceiv'd by themſelves, but by their Ideas, this leads to enquire *by what Ideas?* To which when we ſay, *by the Divine Ideas*, the Queſtion is properly and directly anſwer'd. But now Ideas are not perceiv'd by Ideas again, nor are Eternal Truths (as we have ſhewn) perceiv'd after an Ideal manner, by any thing that repreſents them to our Minds, as being ſelf-intelligible Objects. And therefore we cannot ſay that they are perceiv'd by the Divine Ideas, ſince they are not at all *Ideally* perceiv'd. And therefore if we will ſay any thing that is particularly inſtructive (for to ſay that they are perceiv'd *by themſelves*, is too general) we muſt ſay that they are perceiv'd in God: As indeed 'tis moſt plain and certain that they are ſo perceiv'd. For being, as we here ſuppoſe, *ſelf-intelligible*, they muſt be perceiv'd where they are. But they are in God: And therefore 'tis neceſſary that in Him they muſt be perceiv'd. And ſo far we may be poſitive,

that

that whatever is Eternal, all neceſſary and immutable Natures, with whatever Relations that are between them, or Reſult from them, muſt be perceiv'd in God, and that becauſe they are in God, who only is Neceſſary, Immutable, and Eternal; which, by the way, plainly demonſtrates that there is a God, as alſo that the Divine Eſſence may be, nay actually is, in ſome degree the immediate Object of our intellectual View even in this Life. But as for things that are *without*, Contingent Beings, Senſible Objects, Creatures, it may be more proper to ſay, that they are ſeen by the Divine *Ideas*, nor can they be rightly ſaid to be ſeen in God (as not being really in him) any otherwiſe than as that ſignifies that they are ſeen or underſtood by thoſe Ideas which in God are repreſentative of them.

18. But however ſince M. *Malebranche* thinks fit ſo to expreſs this Notion, let us take a compendious View of thoſe Arguments whereby he endeavours to make it appear reaſonable; which may be added to what we have already offer'd, as a new Set of Auxiliary Conſiderations that come in for the further Confirmation of this Hypotheſis, that the Ideas whereby we underſtand are the Divine Ideas. I ſhall therefore give my Reader a ſight of his Reaſons, with ſome Improvements of my own as there ſhall be Occaſion.

19. Suppoſing then the Poſſibility of our ſeeing things in God, partly becauſe God has in himſelf

himself the Ideas of all things which he has created, and partly because he is intimately united to our Souls by his Presence: I say, supposing upon this double Consideration, that the Mind *may* see in God the Works of God, if he pleases to discover to it that in himself which represents them, he proves it most reasonable to think that he will do so, rather than create an infinite number of Ideas in every Mind.

First, From the *Simplicity* of the Divine Operation. For it appears not only from Reason, but from the whole Oeconomy of Nature, that God never does that by very difficult ways, which may be done by ways that are simple and easie. God does nothing in vain, and without Reason. That which Characterizes *his* Wisdom, and *his* Power, is not to do little Things by great Means: That's against Reason, and is the Character of a limited Intelligence. But, on the contrary, to do great Things by simple and easie Means: 'Tis thus that with Extension alone he produces whatever we see admirable in Nature, and even that which gives Life and Motion to Animals. For as for those who will needs have substantial Forms, Faculties, and Souls in Animals, different from their Blood, and from the Organs of their Body, in order to the performance of their Functions, they do in effect suppose God to be short in his Understanding, or that he is not able to effect those admirable things by Extension only. They measure the Power of God, and his Sovereign Wisdom,

by

by the Littleneſs of their own Underſtanding. And therefore ſince God *may* make our Minds ſee all things barely by willing that they ſhould ſee what is in the midſt of themſelves, that is, what there is in him that has a Relation to thoſe things, and which repreſents them, there is no Appearance at all that he ſhould do it otherwiſe, and that for this purpoſe he ſhould produce as many Infinities of infinite Numbers of Ideas as there are created Minds. The Force of this Argument, if we take a more collective View of it, will, as I conceive, reſolve into this. God acts by the moſt ſimple ways that are poſſible. And therefore ſince to make us underſtand by exhibiting to our Minds his own Ideas, is poſſible in it ſelf, and alſo a much more ſimple way than to create Ideas on purpoſe for that End, 'tis in all reaſon to be preſumed that that is the way whereby we underſtand *rather* than the other. And indeed I ſee not what is wanting in the Argument to make it conclude: Only perhaps we may enlarge the Concluſion beyond a Comparative to an Abſolute Extent, by caſting the Argument into this Form.

God acts by the moſt ſimple ways that are poſſible. But to make us underſtand by the Divine Ideas, is the moſt ſimple way of making us underſtand that is poſſible.
Therefore the Divine Ideas are the Ideas whereby God makes us underſtand.

I leave the Reader to consider whether this Argument concludes or no, tho' I confess I see not which Proposition in it he can reasonably deny. For tho' (as was noted before) from the bare possibility of this way we cannot justly infer the Actuality of it; yet when 'tis consider'd, that it is of all others the most *simple*, as well as *possible* in *itself*, this will go a great way in recommending the actual Truth of it to any one that can attentively stay his Thoughts upon the Perfection of God, and the most wise and perfect manner whereby he proceeds in all his Operations, whether of *Grace* or *Nature*. And besides, to give this Argument a further improvement, tho' from the supposed possibility of any other way of Humane Understanding, it would not follow that this is not necessary, because among several ways or means that in themselves are equally possible, one only with respect to the Agent may be necessary upon the account of its Simplicity; yet if this appear to be in itself possible, considering that it is also the most simple too, there can be no necessity pretended for any other; and consequently no reason why any other should be assigned: For as God *cannot* do any thing in vain, so neither *should* we. And I think Ideas any more than other Beings, are not to be multiplied without necessity.

20. Before

20. Before we pass over this Argument, I would crave leave by the way to interpose a further Reflection, and it is upon that (in my Judgment very remarkable) Passage which our excellent Author has occasionally dropp'd concerning the Souls of *Brutes*, when he says, That *those who would needs have Souls in Animals different from their Blood and bodily Organs, in order to the performance of their Functions, do in effect suppose God not able to effect those admirable things by Extension only.* The reason of which Consequence may not perhaps lie open to every Reader; but it depends upon the same common Principle, the simplicity of the Divine way of Procedure. God is here supposed to act after the most *simple* manner, that is, not to imploy more means than are necessary for the obtaining his end, not to do any thing superfluously, not to use more means when fewer will do, or greater means when lesser will do; in one word, to come at his Point by the shortest Line, and consequently if it be possible to make Brutes perform what they do, by Matter and Motion only, not to indue them with any higher Principle. Therefore, those who suppose a Principle of Thought in Brutes for the performance of their Functions, do by consequence suppose, or must be obliged to say, that God cannot procure those Effects by Matter and Motion only, since, if he could, that being the most simple way, he must by vertue of this Principle, in all rea-

ſon be preſumed to do it. But now, that it is impoſſible for an infinitely wiſe and powerful God, by an apt diſpoſition of Matter and Motion (that which we call *Mechaniſm*) to make Brutes have thoſe Appearances which we obſerve in them, what conſidering Man will maintain? And if it be poſſible for the Actions of Brutes to be thus performed, then conſidering the ſimplicity of this way whether the poſſibility of it may not be added to what we have before diſcourſed upon this Occaſion, as another Argument to conclude it true. And the ſame may in proportion be applied to our preſent Queſtion concerning the Ideas whereby we underſtand.

21. The next Conſideration which the Author inſiſts upon to make it appear reaſonable, that we ſee things, becauſe God wills that That which is in him, which repreſents them, ſhould be diſcover'd to us, and not becauſe we have as many Ideas created with us as we are capable of ſeeing Things, is becauſe this places created Spirits in an intire dependance upon God, and the greateſt that can be. Since upon this Suppoſition, we cannot only ſee nothing but what is willing we ſhould ſee, but we can ſee nothing but what God himſelf makes us ſee; to which purpoſe he quotes that of St. *Paul* to the *Corinthians*, That *we are not ſufficient of our ſelves to think any thing as of our ſelves, but our ſufficiency is of God.* Telling us that

2 *Cor.* 3. 5.

that it is God himſelf that enlightens Philoſophers in that Knowledge which ungrateful Men call Natural, tho' it comes to them only from Heaven. *For God has ſhewed it unto them.* That it is He that is properly the Light of the Mind, and the *Father* of *Lights*, as he is expreſly call'd by St. *James*. That it is he who inſtructs Men in Science, *that teaches Man Knowledge.* In a word, that He is the *true Light, which enlightens all thoſe that come into this World*, according to the like Saying of the *Evangeliſt* St. *John*. Which laſt Text (to which he might have added what goes before, *and the Life was the Light of Men*) appears to me to be the moſt to his purpoſe; and indeed I cannot but think it of conſiderable Importance, and that it is not capable of being illuſtrated by any Interpretation ſo fully as by this; *viz.* That the Eternal *Word* and Wiſdom of God is our Light, not only *efficiently*, as aſſiſting our Intellectual Faculties, but *Objectively*, as being himſelf the immediate Object of our Minds, by thoſe Ideas or Reaſons of Things which are contain'd in him. Eſpecially, conſidering that the ſame Divine Perſon of whom it is here ſaid, That he is the *true Light* that lighteth every Man that comes into the World, is pleaſed alſo to ſay of himſelf, That he is the *Truth*.

Rom. 1. 19.

Jam. 1. 17.

Pſal. 94. 10.

Joh. 1. 9.

22. For the farther Inforcement of this laſt Argument, the Author remarks that it is not eaſie to comprehend diſtinctly the Dependence which our Minds have upon God in all their particular Actions, ſuppoſing that they have all that which we diſtinctly know to be neceſſary for them in order to act, or that they have the Ideas of all things preſent with them of their own.

For as for that general and confuſe Word, *Concourſe*, by which Men pretend to explain the Dependence which Creatures have upon God, that does not awaken any diſtinct Idea in an attentive Mind. And yet 'tis very neceſſary that Men ſhould diſtinctly know how they can do nothing without God. And indeed however our Dependence upon God in the Buſineſs of Underſtanding may be otherwiſe explainable, yet I muſt needs confeſs my ſelf ſo far of our Author's Mind, as to think that it is in no way ſo conſpicuous as in this. For ſhould it be alledg'd (which is all that I know of that can be ſaid in the Caſe) that we depend upon God *immediately* (for as for a *Remote* Dependence, concerning that there can be no Queſtion) as to the *Formal Act* of Thinking, wherein we may be ſuppoſed to be aſſiſted by the Divine Concurrence inabling us to exert it, according to the way of the Schools; yet however it muſt needs be allow'd, that our Dependence is not ſo great if we depend upon him only as to the *Act*, as it would be if we depend upon him for

for the Act and *Object* too; and I know not whether the one may not be as neceſſary as the other, that ſo God may have the intire Glory of our Thoughts, the Creature nothing to boaſt of; and that thoſe Words of St. *Paul* may be every way verify'd, that *we are not ſufficient of our ſelves to think any thing as of our ſelves, but that our ſufficiency is of God.* To whom be Glory.

23. But to return again to our Author, who draws his next Argument (upon which he lays great ſtreſs) from the manner of our perceiving things. We find by Experience, that when we have a Mind to think upon any particular thing, we forthwith caſt our view upon all Beings, and then afterwards apply our ſelves to the Conſideration of the Object we propoſe to think on. But now it is certain, that we cannot deſire to ſee any Object, but that we muſt ſee it already, altho' confuſely and in general. And therefore ſince we may deſire to ſee all Beings, ſometimes one, and ſometimes another, it is certain that all Beings are preſent to our Minds; and it ſeems that all Beings cannot be preſent to our Minds any otherwiſe, than becauſe God is preſent to them, who in the Simplicity of his Being contains all Beings.

24. He remarks, moreover, under this Head of Argument, that the Mind, in all probability, would not be capable of repreſenting to it ſelf the univerſal Ideas of Kinds and Species, unleſs it ſaw all Beings included in one. For every

Creature being a particular Being, we cannot ſay, that we ſee any thing created, when we ſee, for Inſtance, a Triangle in general. And he thinks that we cannot well give an Account of the manner, how the Mind knows ſeveral Abſtract and General Truths, unleſs it be by the Preſence of him that can inlighten the Mind by an infinite variety of Ways.

25. He continues farther, that the Beſt, the moſt Sublime, the moſt Solid, and the firſt Proof of the Exiſtence of God, or that which ſuppoſes the feweſt of things, is the Idea which we have of Infinite. For it is plain that the Mind does perceive Infinite, tho' it does not comprehend it, and that it has a very diſtinct *Idea* of God, which it cannot have but by the Union which it has with him: Since it is not to be conceiv'd, that the Idea of a Being infinitely Perfect, ſuch as that which we have of God, ſhould be any thing that is created. The Senſe of which Argument, or at leaſt that which is neceſſary, by way of Supplement, to compleat it, ſeems to be this, that in the Perception which we have of God, the Divine Eſſence it ſelf is the immediate Object of that Perception, it being impoſſible that any thing that is not God ſhould repreſent him to our Thoughts, or that he ſhould be perceiv'd by any *Idea* diſtinct from himſelf, according to what we have before diſcours'd. Therefore God himſelf is the immediate Object of our Minds; and if ſo, then it ſeems reaſonable to think that the Di-

vine

vine Ideas are ſo too; and that as we immediately perceive God, ſo we perceive Things in God, *viz.* by thoſe Ideas of his which repreſent them.

26. He adds another Argument in this Place, which, with thoſe that are uſed to the abſtracter ways of Reaſoning, may perhaps paſs, he thinks, for a Demonſtration. It is impoſſible that God ſhould have any other Principal End of his Actions but Himſelf. Therefore it is neceſſary that not only our Natural Love, that is, the Motion which he produces in our Mind, ſhould tend toward *him*, but moreover that the Knowledge and the Light which he gives it, ſhould make us know ſomething that is in *him*: For whatever comes from God, can only be for God. Should God create a Spirit, and give it for an Idea, or for the immediate Object of its Knowledge, the Sun, God would then, he conceives, create that Spirit, and the Idea of that Spirit, for the Sun, and not for himſelf. God cannot therefore create a Mind to know his Works, unleſs that Mind does in ſome manner ſee God in ſeeing his Works. So that unleſs we did in ſome manner ſee God, we ſhould ſee nothing, even as if we did not love God, that is, if God did not continually impreſs upon us the Love of Good in general, we ſhould love nothing. For that Love being our Will, we can love nothing, nor will any thing without him, ſince we cannot love particular Goods, but by determining towards thoſe Goods, that

Movement of Love which God gives us towards himself: So that as we love nothing but by that neceſſary Love which we have for God, ſo we ſee nothing but by that natural Knowledge which we have of God. And ſo all the particular Ideas which we have of Creatures, are no other than Limitations of the Idea of the Creator, as all the Motions of the Will for the Creatures, are only Determinations of that Movement which we have towards the Creator.

27. This laſt Argument will perhaps require more Attention of Thought, to comprehend the full Moment and Importance of it, than moſt Readers are able or will be willing to beſtow upon it. However I do not think it will be to much purpoſe to go about to make it clearer by any farther Illuſtration: For as for thoſe who either want Capacity, or are not uſed to abſtract Speculations, all the Illuſtrations in the World will hardly make them Maſters of it. And as for thoſe who have applied themſelves much to the way of Meditation, they will eaſily penetrate the Force of it by their own Attention. And accordingly with them I leave it to conſider of it, as it lies before them, while in the mean time I proceed to take an Account of what our Author has farther added concerning this way of Human Underſtanding, in the *Illuſtrations* which he has given us upon that Occaſion.

28. His firſt Argument is taken from the *Univerſality* of that Reaſon, whereof Man is Partaker.

Partaker. It is agreed, says he, that all Men are capable of knowing Truth, and even the least enlighten'd among the Philosophers, do consent that Man partakes of a certain Reason, which they do not determine: Therefore it is, that they define him to be an Animal partaking of Reason; for there is no body but knows, at least confusely, that the essential Difference of Man consists in the necessary Union which he has with the universal Reason; tho' who it is that includes this Reason, is what Men neither ordinarily know, nor are much concern'd to discover. I see such and such Truths, and I am sure that there is no Body in the World but who may see the same as well as my self. But I do not see these Truths in the Minds of others, nor again do they see them in mine; therefore it is necessary that there be an universal Reason that inlightens me, and all other intelligent Beings: For if the Reason which I consult, were not the same which answers to the *Chinese*, it is evident that I could not be so certain as I am, that the *Chinese* did see the same Truths that I see. There is therefore a Soveraign and Universal Reason which all Men consult whenever they enter into themselves; upon which occasion he cites that remarkable Passage of St. *Austin*, which indeed is very opposite to the purpose, *Si ambo videmus*, &c. If we both see that it is true what you say, and we both see that it is true what I say, where, I pray, is it that we see it? Why, neither I in you,

you, nor you in me, but both of us in that very incommutable Truth which is ſuperiour to our Minds.

29. He argues again from the *Neceſſity* and *Immutability* of that Reaſon which we conſult. It is certain that the Ideas of things are Immutable, and that Eternal Truths and Laws are neceſſary. It is impoſſible that they ſhould not be ſuch as they are. But I ſee nothing in my ſelf that is Immutable or Neceſſary. I might not be, or not be what I am. 'Tis poſſible there may be Spirits that are not at all like me; and yet I am well aſſured there cannot be any [Spirits that ſee other Truths or other Laws than thoſe which I ſee: For every Spirit muſt needs ſee that two and two make four, and that one's Friend is to be preferr'd before one's Dog: Therefore it is neceſſary to conclude, that the Reaſon which all Minds do conſult, is a neceſſary and immutable Reaſon.

30. He argues further from the *Infinity* of the ſame Reaſon. The Mind of Man clearly conceives that there are, or may be an infinite number of intelligible Triangles, Tetragons, Pentagons, and other of the like Figures. It does not only conceive that the Ideas of Figures will never be wanting to it, and that it ſhall always diſcover new ones, tho' it ſhould eternally apply itſelf to thoſe ſort of Ideas only, but it alſo perceives Infinity in Extenſion. The Mind ſees clearly that the number which multiplied

tiplied by itſelf, produces 5, or any of the numbers between 4 and 9, between 9 and 16, between 16 and 25, *&c.* is a Quantity, a Relation, a Fraction, whoſe Terms contain more Figures than can be made from one Pole of the World to the other. It perceives clearly that 'tis a Relation ſuch as God only can comprehend, and that 'tis impoſſible to expreſs it exactly, becauſe to expreſs it requires a Fraction whoſe two Terms are Infinite. Many like Examples might be aſſigned; from whence it may be concluded, not only that the Mind of Man is limited, but that the Reaſon which he conſults is Infinite. For, in fine, the Mind clearly ſees Infinity in this Reaſon, tho' it does not comprehend it, ſince it can compare incommenſurable Numbers with one another, and diſcern their Relations, tho' it cannot compare them with Unity; or to conſider only what is moſt ſenſible, 'tis plain that the Reaſon which Man conſults is Infinite, ſince we can never exhauſt it, and it has always ſomething to anſwer upon whatever demand.

31. But now to ſubſume (for what he has hitherto premiſed is but one part of the Argument) theſe are all Divine Characters. And therefore if it be true that the Reaſon whereof all Men participate, is *Univerſal*, *Immutable*, *Neceſſary*, *Infinite*, it is certain that it is not at all different from that of God himſelf: For it muſt be an infinite and univerſal Being only that includes in himſelf an univerſal and infinite

infinite Reaſon. All Creatures are particular Beings, therefore the univerſal Reaſon is not Created. No Creatures are Infinite, therefore again Infinite Reaſon is not a Creature. But the Reaſon which we conſult is not only Univerſal and Infinite, it is alſo Neceſſary and Independent, and in one ſenſe we conceive it as more Independent than God himſelf: For God cannot act but according to this Reaſon: He in ſome ſenſe depends upon it: He muſt conſult and follow it; but God conſults none but himſelf, he depends upon nothing; this Reaſon therefore is not diſtinct from himſelf, it is therefore Co-eternal and Con-ſubſtantial with him. We ſee clearly that God cannot puniſh an Innocent; that he cannot ſubject * Spirits to Bodies, that he is obliged to follow Order. Therefore we ſee the very Rule, the Order, the Reaſon, the Wiſdom of God: For what other Wiſdom than that of God is it poſſible we ſhould ſee, when we fear not to ſay, that God himſelf is obliged to follow it?

* That is, Innocent Spirits.

32. But after all, can we conceive a Wiſdom that is not the Wiſdom of God? *Solomon*, who ſpeaks ſo well of Wiſdom, does he diſtinguiſh of two ſorts of it? Does he not teach us that the Wiſdom which is Co-eternal with God himſelf, and by which he eſtabliſhed that Order which we ſee in his Works, is the very ſame Wiſdom which preſides over all

all Spirits, and which Legiſlators conſult to make juſt and reaſonable Laws? And for this he appeals to the eighth Chapter of the *Proverbs*, and, as I humbly conceive, very pertinently to his purpoſe: For indeed I find it very difficult not to think that whoever ſhall attentively read and conſider that Chapter (with good part of that which follows) will find theſe two diſtinct things very clear and obſervable in it. 1. That the Wiſdom there ſpoken of, by the Characters which are given of it, appears plainly to be no other than the *Divine* Wiſdom, even the Eternal Word, the ſecond Perſon of the Bleſſed Trinity, who is elſewhere call'd *The Wiſdom of God*; not as inlightening him Efficiently, but Objectively, as being the Eternal Object of his Contemplation and Knowledge, in which he ſees *himſelf*, as being the brightneſs of his Glory, and the expreſs Image of his Perſon, and in which he alſo ſees all his *Works*, and all that he *can* work, and calls thoſe things that be not as tho' they were, as being preſent to him by this his Co-eſſential Word and Wiſdom which has the eternal Reaſons and Ideas of them, in whom all Fulneſs dwells, and in whom are hid all the Treaſures of Wiſdom and Knowledge, even thoſe *Theſauri rerum Intelligibilium*, thoſe immenſe and infinite Treaſures of intelligible Things, which according to St. *Auſtin* are contained in the Wiſdom of God. 2*dly*. That

De Civ. Dei. Lib. 11. *Cap.* 10.

this

this Divine Wiſdom is repreſented here as that Wiſdom which God conſults, and whereby he directs and conducts himſelf in the ordering of his Works, and alſo as that very Wiſdom which teaches, inſtructs, and inlightens Men, to which purpoſe it is very remarkable that the ſame Perſon who elſewhere ſays of himſelf, *I am Truth*, ſays here, *I am Underſtanding*. So that in ſhort God and we are here repreſented as ſeeing by the ſame Light, and that Light as Divine; and he that is the Wiſdom of the Father, and was poſſeſſed by him in the beginning of his Ways, delights alſo to be with the Sons of Men, * tho' in different degrees of Relation, as being the common Light of the World, but the Bridegroom of his Church.

* Which may ſerve to lay a Foundation for the diſtinction of the Light of Nature and the Light of Grace. The Light of Nature according to the Principles of this Theory, being that Light with which the Divine Word inlightens all Men *Objectively* by itſelf. The Light of Grace that wherewith he inlightens his Church *efficiently* by his Spirit.

33. Upon this occaſion, I cannot, without ſome admiration, remark the ſtrange harmonical Correſpondence that is between this Chapter of the *Proverbs*, and the firſt of St. *John*'s Goſpel: *In the beginning was the word*, ſays St. *John*. Anſwerably to which ſays *Solomon*, in the Perſon of the Divine Wiſdom here, *The Lord poſſeſſed me in the beginning of his way, before his*

his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning or ever the Earth was. When there were no depths I was brought forth, &c. Again, says St. *John*, *The word was with God.* And says Wisdom here, then was I by him. Again, says St. *John*, *And the Word was God.* Agreeably to which, Wisdom is here said to be brought up with him, whereby she figuratively denotes herself to be Co-eternal, and consequently Co-essential with God. Again, says St. *John*, *All things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made.* And here also Wisdom is represented as assistant to God, in the Creation of the World, by her Presence. *When he prepared the Heavens, I was there*, &c. *And when he appointed the Foundations of the Earth, then was I by him.* That is, in all reasonable Construction, as a Co-assistent for the more orderly Direction, and apt Disposition of his great Work: As is thus handsomly represented by the Christian * Poet. * *Vida.*

——*Deus æthereos cum mundi excuderet Orbes,*
Æreasq; plagas conflaret : Cumq; liquores,
Et circumfusas laticum suspenderet undas,
Libraretq; suo tellurem pondere nixam,
Inq; vicem validis connecteret omnia vinclis,
Ipse aderas Operi indulgens, nutu omnia firmans,
Omnia componens. Sine te nihil : Omnis ubiq;
Est per te Decor, & rerum pulcherrimus Ordo.

Again,

Again, says St. *John*, *In him was Life*. And says Wisdom here, *Whoso findeth me, findeth Life*. But St. *John* farther says, that this Life was the Light of Men. And here the Divine Wisdom echoes it to him again, *Counsel is mine, and sound Wisdom, I am Understanding. By me Kings reign, and Princes decree Justice. I lead in the way of Righteousness, in the midst of the Paths of Judgment*. St. *John* says again, that this Light shineth in the Darkness. And Wisdom is here represented, as crying and calling to the Simple and Foolish, *O ye Simple, understand Wisdom, and ye Fools be ye of an understanding Heart*. As also in the Chapter following, as inviting Fools to her Intellectual Banquet, *Whoso is simple, let him turn in hither*: As for him that wants Understanding, she says to him, *Come eat of my Bread, and drink of the Wine which I have mingled*. In fine, St. *John* proclaims the Eternal Word as the true Light of the World, that lighteth every Man that comes into it: In answer to which, besides what was already noted to this purpose, Wisdom here farther says, that her Delights are with the Sons of Men. And accordingly she exhorts them to hearken unto her, to hear Instruction, and be wise, leaving with them this encouraging Benediction, *Blessed is the Man that heareth me, watching daily at my Gates, waiting at the Posts of my Doors*; that is, (if my Reader will accept of my Paraphrase upon the Text) that minds and heeds me, consults, studies, and contemplates me, and

and attends constantly to my inward Light, waiting for the pure Answers of Interiour Truth, and diligently improving all Opportunities, which he enjoys under the Direction of so near and so Divine a Teacher, of growing wiser and better.

34. But that which I would here principally remark, is, that as the Harmonical Consent of these two Divine Writers in so many Counterparts, shews, that they spoke from the same *Spirit*; so it seems a good Presumption, that they also spoke concerning the same *thing*, and that *Wisdom* here with *Solomon* is the very same that the *Word* is with St. *John*: As also that St. *John*'s *Word* signifies no other than *Solomon*'s *Wisdom*, according to the better Importance of the Original, λόγος, which certainly does not answer to *Verbum* (the Counterpart of that being ῥῆμα) but to *Sermo* or *Ratio*, however the Latin Interpreters, without any reason from either Grammar or Divinity, came to render it otherwise. And I farther note that in both they are *Substantial*, and in both *Divine*, and that this Divine, Substantial Wisdom, or Word (for I take them to be only different Expressions for one and the same thing) are in both made to be the *Light* of *Men*. And accordingly the Philosophy of *Solomon*'s Devotion is no less considerable, than the Piety of it, who when he prays for Wisdom, particularizes that very Divine Wisdom which is here consider'd, as being with God, and co-assistent to him in the For-

mation of his Works, *Give me Wisdom that sitteth by thy Throne.* And again, says he, *Wisdom was with thee, which knoweth thy Works, and was present when thou madest the World, O send her out of thy Holy Heavens, and from the Throne of thy Glory,* &c. Wherein the wise Prince, no less Philosophical than Devout, seems to desire to have a more intimate Union with the Divine *Word*, so as to partake more liberally of the Communications of its Ideal Light and Truth, or else it will not be very easie to put any intelligible Sense upon what he says, so as to make him pray not only with the *Spirit*, but with the *Understanding* also.

35. And indeed to what *Word* or *Wisdom* should he address himself for Illumination, but to that Word and Wisdom which has the Ideas of all things, and in which shine those Eternal and Immutable Truths that result from those Ideas? Philosophers may talk of their *Verbum Mentis*, the Word of the Mind; but there is no Word of the Mind that I know of, but the Word of the Eternal Mind. For sure that Word which is the Wisdom of God, is fittest to be also the Light of Men. Even that Divine Word which was incarnate, that was first with God, and afterwards with us, that became sensible because we were not wholly intellectual, and that put on a Cloud of Flesh, because we could not so well endure to behold his naked Glory full of Grace and Truth. For then it was that the

the great Intelligible *Sun* ſuffer'd an Abatement of his Splendor to accommodate his Light to the infirmities of our Eyes, and (to allude to an Expreſſion of St. *Auſtin*) became, as it were, a *Moon* to comfort and refreſh our Night. *Carnis Manifeſtatione tanquam Luna conſolans Noctem.* And that Divine Wiſdom who was Bread above to the Angels (to allude to another Expreſſion of his) became Milk below for the Nouriſhment of our Infant Underſtandings. *Oportebat ut Menſa illa Angelorum lacteſceret, & ad Parvulos perveniret.*

In Pſal. 73.

De Temp. Sermo 127.

36. But now we talk of the Angels, it will be a thing of ſome importance to the Point in Hand, to remark, that it is the poſitive and expreſs Doctrine of St. *Auſtin*, that God is the Light of their Underſtandings, and particularly that they ſee things in his Divine Word or Wiſdom. *Nunquid Angelis Codices ſunt Neceſſarii? Videndo legunt, vident enim ipſam veritatem, & illo Fonte ſatiantur unde nos irrogamur.* Here he ſuppoſes Angels to have no need of Books, becauſe they read by ſeeing; that is by ſeeing God (for otherwiſe all reading is by *ſeeing*) whoſe Viſion illuminates them, as being the Viſion of Truth itſelf. Again, ſpeaking of the Word that was in the Beginning, that was with God, and that was God, he breaks out into this paſſionate ſtrain of Divine

De Diverſis Sermo, 9.

Rhetorick, *O Cibus & Panis Angelorum, de te implentur Angeli, de te ſatiantur & non faſtidiunt. De te vivunt, de te ſapiunt, de te beati ſunt. Ubi es propter me? In Diverſorio anguſto, in pannis, in præſepio,* &c. Here he makes the Angels to depend upon the *Word*, as much for their Light and Knowledge, as for their Life and Happineſs. Again, ſpeaking of the Creation of Angels as reducible under that Text, *Let there be Light, and there was Light*, he has theſe remarkable words, *Si rectè in hâc luce creatio intelligitur Angelorum, profectò facti ſunt participes lucis æternæ, quæ eſt ipſa incommutabilis Sapientia Dei, per quam facta ſunt Omnia, quem dicimus unigenitum Dei Filium, ut eâ luce illuminati quâ Creati fierent Lux, & vocarentur Dies participatione incommutabilis Lucis & Dei, quod eſt verbum Dei, per quod & ipſi, & omnia facta ſunt. Lumen quippe verum quod illuminat omnem hominem in hunc mundum venientem, hoc illuminat & omnem Angelum mundum, ut ſit Lux non in Seipſo, ſed in Deo.* I cannot ſtand to mark out all that may deſerve Conſideration in this, upon many accounts very obſervable Paſſage, only here are three things which every Reader ſhould obſerve, 1. In General, that he makes the Angels not to be Light in themſelves. 2. That according to him they are made partakers of the Eternal Light. 3. That that Light is the immutable Wiſdom or Word of God. Again,

De Diverſis Sermo 49.

De Civ. Dei, Lib. 11. *Cap.* 9.

gain, says he, speaking of the Angels, *Ab eis consulitur Incommutabilis veritas, tanquam Lex Æterna in illâ eorum Curiâ Superna. Neq; enim sibi ipsis sunt veritas, sed Creatricis participes veritatis, ad illam moventur tanquam ad fontem vitæ, ut quod non habent ex seipsis, capiant ex ipsa.* Where, besides the notion itself of God's being a Light to Angelical Understandings, which is obvious to be observ'd, you have also the very manner of expressing it, in that they are said to *Consult* the immutable Truth. To all which I add, That he expresly tells us, That the Angels do know the Creature in the Wisdom of God, as in the Art whereby it is made. From these places it is clear, that according to St. *Austin*, the Divine Word or Wisdom is the Light of Angels, and that they see and understand things in it. And so the Schools also have thought fit to say after him, in the account which they give us of that *Morning*-Knowledge which they ascribe to the Angels. Well, but now, if the eternal Word and Wisdom of God be the Light of Angels, why should it not also be the Light of Men, and if they see by it why should not we too? It does not seem very Congruous to suppose that they should see by one Light, and we by another. There is but one Sun for Bodies, and why then should there be two for Spirits, especially since the same that inlightens the

De Civ. Dei, Lib. 16. *Cap.* 6.

De Civ. Dei, Lib. 11. *Cap.* 29.

one may alſo inlighten the other, were the number of them infinitely greater than it is. It is true indeed, the Angels have in this the advantage of us, that we do not ſee ſo well as they, neither as to the clearneſs, nor as to the extent of our Sight, but methinks we ſhould both ſee the ſame *things*, and have the ſame immediate Object for our Underſtandings: For otherwiſe, if the Reaſon which we conſult be not the very ſame which anſwers to them, then beſides the incongruity of our ſeeing by different Lights, I would further offer it to be conſider'd, whether the ſame Argument which M. *Malebranche* uſes with regard to the *Chineſe*, be not every whit as true in reſpect of the *Angels*; that is, that we cannot be certainly aſſured that they ſee the ſame Truths that we do, and ſo, for ought we know, they may have an Arithmetick and Geometry quite different from ours, and there may be *Sciences* of Men and Angels as well as *Tongues*.

37. But after all, ſince Wiſdom has ſo liberally furniſh'd her Table, why ſhould we ſtraiten her Gueſts, by confining it to the Angels only, eſpecially ſince they do not devour what they eat, but what ſatisfies their intellectual Hunger remains as intire as before to feed and ſatisfie ours. *Manducant Angeli, manducant Superna virtutes, manducant Cœleſtes Spiritus, manducant & ſaginantur, & integrum manet quod eos ſatiat & lætificat.* Wiſdom herſelf cries as if ſhe

St. Auſt. *de Temp. Sermo* 127.

ſhe fear'd her Table would not be ſufficiently furniſh'd with Gueſts, *Come eat of my Bread, and drink of the Wine which I have mingled*; and we, it ſeems, are afraid leſt ſhe ſhould have too many, and accordingly very mannerly withdraw: But perhaps with more Modeſty than Reaſon; for the Treaſures of Ideal Light are inexhauſtible, and the number of Spectators would only add to the *Magnificence*, without indangering the *Sufficiency* of the intellectual Feaſt. For her Celeſtial Bread cannot waſt, nor can the Springs of her Wine fail. And therefore it ſeems every way moſt reaſonable to think, that the ſame Divine Word that is the Light of Angels, inlightens us too, that we all eat of the ſame Spiritual Meat, and all drink of the ſame Spiritual Drink: So that in this Senſe alſo *Man does eat Angels Food.* And therefore St. *Auſtin* was very conſiſtent with himſelf when having ſaid, *vident ipſam veritatem*, he immediately adds upon it, *& illo fonte ſatiantur unde nos* * *irrogamur.* Suppoſing the ſame Fountain to be common to both with this only difference, which is only of Degrees, that we have only ſome refreſhing Dews or Sprinklings of that lucid Fountain whereof they enjoy the full Satiety.

* I ſuppoſe it ſhould be *irrigamur*, or *irroramur*.

38. But this Conſideration taken from the manner of the Angelical Knowledge holds yet more ſtrongly in reſpect of the *Divine*. For

as to the manner of that, it is, I think, unqueſtionably certain, and the Authority of the Schools, as well as the manifold Reaſon of the thing will allow me to ſay ſo, that God is a Light to himſelf, his own Intelligible Object, and that he ſees and knows all things in himſelf, even in his Eternal and Co-eſſential *Word*, which is therefore very ſignificantly, and with great propriety ſaid to be his *Wiſdom*, as being the immediate Object of his eternal Contemplation at once * expreſſive of himſelf, and of all his Creatures, and containing all thoſe Ideas and immutable Truths which furniſh Matter for Science, and are ſufficient to imploy even an infinite Mind. God therefore underſtands all things *in* his *Word*, even as he made all things *by* his *Word*. But then the ſame Conſideration will return again, tho' perhaps with more force than in the other Caſe, to make it appear moſt reaſonable that *we* underſtand ſo too. For beſides that, that Word which is the Wiſdom of God is in itſelf fitteſt (as I noted before) to be the Light of Men, if it be not actually and *de facto* ſo; but God and we ſee by different Lights, and that Reaſon which anſwers to us when we meditate with Attention, be not the ſame which he conſults, then how are we ſure that we ſee the ſame Truths that he does, nay, how indeed that we ſee any Truths at all, and that we

* *Verbum ejus eſt, Expreſſivum non ſolum Patris ſed etiam Creaturarum.* Aquinas Part 1. Quæſt 34. Art. 3.

we are not deceived even in our cleareſt Perceptions? And what advantage this may give either to the Sceptical againſt *Science*, or to the Libertin and Profane againſt *Morality* and *Religion*, I leave to the profeſſed Friends of both to conſider, and whether for the avoiding ſuch fatal and ruinous Conſequences it be not moſt adviſable to ſuppoſe, that God and we ſee by the ſame common Light, and that That eternal Word, which is the Wiſdom of the Father, is alſo our Wiſdom too, the great intelligible Sun of the whole Rational World, and that true Light that inlightens every Man that comes into this, πηγὴ σοφία ὁ λόγος θεῦ.

39. Nor need any one fear leſt this ſhould place us upon a level with God in reſpect of Knowledge. There will ſtill be a vaſt and a ſufficient Difference between our way of Underſtanding and his. 'Tis true indeed, we have upon this Hypotheſis the very ſame *Word* for the immediate Object of our Underſtandings that God himſelf has; but this Word is ours only by Union of Preſence, whereas it is his by Identity of Eſſence, and accordingly God is ſaid to *poſſeſs* the eternal Wiſdom, to enjoy it as his own, whereas our Communion with it is expreſſed by her *delighting to be with the Sons of Men.* Again, we only apprehend that Word, and that very imperfectly, which God fully and perfectly comprehends. And again, in the laſt place, God ſees all things in himſelf; whereas we ſee things in *Him*; and becauſe we do

do ſo, tho' it ſhould be allowed that we both ſee by the ſame common Light; yet this is ſo far from equalizing our way of Underſtanding with God's, that on the contrary, it moſt eminently ſhews how immediately and intirely we depend upon him, and what blind unintelligent Creatures we ſhould be without him, that he is much more neceſſary to our Minds than the Sun is to our Eyes; that we ſhould have no Knowledge, nor even ſo much as Thought, but be all over Intellectual Night and Darkneſs, if his Divine Light did not ſhine upon our Underſtandings. In fine, That we are not ſufficient of our ſelves, as the Apoſtle ſpeaks, to think any thing as of our ſelves, but that our *whole* ſufficiency is of God. And ſure, that which tends ſo abundantly to ſet forth our Dependence upon God, muſt be very ignorantly and impertinently pretended to make us equal with him; nay, it cannot be pretended to equal us with the *Humane Soul of Jeſus Chriſt*, in whom the fulneſs of the God-head is ſaid to dwell Bodily, and who by an adorable Conſociation of the Humane Nature with the Divine ſubſiſted by the *Word*, and had a perſonal Union with it, and ſo was partaker of its Light without meaſure. To ſay, that the Knowledge of Jeſus Chriſt as Man was *Infinite*, would, I conceive, not be convenient. But we may ſay of it, what the *Carteſians* ſay of the Extenſion of the World, that it is *Indefinite*, that tho' we do and muſt acknowledge ſome Bounds in it, yet we know

know not well where to fix them, or when to ſtop. And therefore, tho' the ſame Divine Word that inlightned him, be ſuppoſed alſo to inlighten us; yet there is no Neceſſity, nor indeed Poſſibility that it ſhould inlighten us ſo much as it inlightned him; and therefore we may ſay what a certain Scholaſtick Writer of ſome Account in his time, and that ſeems no Enemy to the preſent Hypotheſis, quotes from *Hugo de Sancto Victore*. *Quod ſi omnes hac Sapientia ſapiunt quicunq; ſapiunt, multo magis hac Sapientia ſapuit illa anima quæ ipſi Sapientiæ unita fuit.* Nor does it equal us with our Brother-Intelligences the *Angels*, nor yet even with *one another*, ſince, tho' we are ſuppoſed to ſee all by the ſame common Light, yet we may partake of it in different degrees, according to the different meaſure of our Capacities, and the attention wherewith we apply them. And therefore we may ſay again what the ſame *profound* Doctor quotes from the ſame Author, *Una Sapientia eſt qua omnes ſapiunt, nec tamen uno modo ſapiunt, quia participando ſapiunt.*

Bradwardin de cauſa Dei, Lib. 3. Cap. 40. P. 773.

Ibid.

40. We are upon an infinite Subject, and 'tis not to be expected that I ſhould drain it; but there is one Conſideration more which I think fit to add, and the rather becauſe I have already made uſe of it upon another Occaſion. It was obſerv'd before concerning our *Ideas* that they are Objectively Perfective of our Minds, and

and thence deduc'd as a reaſonable Concluſion that they were no other than Divine. Now the ſame may be ſaid as to *Truth*. Man is capable of a twofold Perfection, Moral and Intellectual: And as the Love of good perfects his Mind morally, ſo the knowledge of Truth perfects it intellectually. But now if Truth were not in itſelf of a Nature apt to perfect the Mind, 'tis impoſſible that the knowledge of it ſhould be any Perfection to it, any more than the profoundeſt Ignorance. The knowledge of an unperfective Object can be no intellectual Perfection, even as the Love of an unperfective Object can be no moral Perfection. For Knowledge is the formal Perfection of the Mind, and all formal Perfection does ſuppoſe that which is Objective, even as formal Happineſs ſuppoſes objective Happineſs, that is, ſomething in the Object that is apt to meliorate the Being of him that enjoys it. But now Truth is no otherwiſe to be enjoy'd than by the knowledge of it; and accordingly that formal Perfection which accrues to the Mind by the knowledge of Truth, muſt ſuppoſe alſo ſome Objective Perfection; that is, ſomething in the Nature of Truth that has an aptneſs to perfect the Nature of him that contemplates it. If then the knowledge of Truth perfects the Mind in the way of Form, Truth itſelf muſt be ſuppoſed to be Perfective of it in the way of Object. But now nothing can *thus* perfect the Mind, but what is ſuperiour to the Mind. Indeed there is noneceſſity that what

formally

formally perfects the Mind ſhould be ſuperiour to it; for an Act or Operation of its own, or a certain Modification of its Being, that which we call a Sentiment or Senſation may be the *formal* Perfection of it. But that which perfects the Mind as an *Object* muſt of neceſſity be ſomething that is above it. Therefore the Truth that we ſee, and in the Perception of which a new Perfection accrues to our Minds, is ſomething ſuperiour to the Mind. But now as nothing is below the Mind but Body, ſo as St. *Auſtin* obſerves, nothing is above it but God. *Nihil potentius iſta Creatura quæ Mens dicitur Rationalis, Nihil hac Creatura ſublimius. Quicquid ſupra iſtam eſt, jam Creator eſt.* Therefore the Truth which we perceive, and become more perfect in the Perception of is ſomething *Divine* in its Nature. Or if you ſhould ſay, that the *Angels* are of a Nature ſuperiour to the rational Mind (tho' you ſee St. *Auſtin* was of another Opinion) and conſequently that there is no neceſſity that what is ſuperiour to the Mind, ſhould be God; yet this would ſignifie no great matter in the main. For the Argument would but be ſet a little further off for the preſent, to return again upon us another way. For as the Angels ſee Truth as well as we; ſo 'tis certain that the Truth which they ſee, is a Perfection to their Minds as well as it is to ours. Therefore at leaſt the Truth which the Angels ſee is Divine. And then, ſince, as I noted before, it is not reaſonable

Expoſ. in Evangel. S. Joan. Tract. 23.

ſonable to think, that they ſhould ſee one ſort of Truth and we another; from hence we are furniſh'd with a very rational Ground to infer again, that therefore the Truth which we ſee, is alſo Divine.

41. But as concerning the Divinity of Truth, there are many other Arguments to demonſtrate *that* ſuch as are taken from its Neceſſity, Eternity, Immutability, Independency, *&c.* as I have ſhewn at large in the former Part of this Theory, to which the Reader is deſired to have recourſe. In the mean time to reconcile him the better to this, I ſhall preſent him with a Paſſage out of M. *Malebranche*, wherein he touches upon the ſame Ground upon which we laſt argued, tho' he expreſſes himſelf ſomething otherwiſe, and has not fill'd out the Argument in all the Parts of it. *The whole World is convinc'd* (ſays he) *that the Knowledge of Truth, and the Love of Vertue make the Mind more perfect, and that the blindneſs of the Mind, and the diſorder of the Heart make it more imperfect. The Knowledge of Truth, and the Love of Vertue then can be nothing elſe but the Union of the Mind with God, and a kind of Poſſeſſion of him. And ſo the blindneſs of the Mind and the diſorder of the Heart can likewiſe be nothing elſe but the ſeparation of the Mind from God, and the Union of that Mind to ſomething that is beneath it, that is to ſay to the Body, ſince 'tis this only Union which can make it imperfect and miſerable.*

De la Recherche de la Verite. Tom. 2. Cap. 5.

Therefore

Therefore to know Truth is to know God, &c. And indeed this I take to be the reaſon by the way, why the knowledge of Truth does conduce to the Perfection of our Mind, even becauſe it is a ſort of Union with God, and does in ſome degree put us in poſſeſſion of him who is infinitely Perfect himſelf, and the ſource of all Perfection: For as we argued *thus* before from the Effect to the Cauſe; Truth is Perfective of the Mind, therefore it is Divine: So we may proceed, and that more directly thus from the Cauſe to the Effect; Truth is Divine, and therefore it is Perfective of the Mind. For if the Queſtion were ask'd, why is Truth Perfective of the Mind that contemplates it? The Anſwer, I think, muſt be becauſe it is *Divine*, or if that be not the reaſon of it, I believe it will not be very eaſy to aſſign any, that ſhall ſatisfie an attentive Enquirer that examines what Anſwers he receives. But then ſince the Divinity of Truth is that which makes it Perfective of the Mind, if the Conſequence of this be that no other Truth is really Perfective of it but only what is *Divine*, even that Truth which is founded upon the Divine Ideas, as being the Habitude and Relation that is between them, and accordingly is Neceſſary, Eternal and Immutable as thoſe Ideas are. I ſay, if it hence follows, that this Ideal, Neceſſary and Immutable Truth be the only Soul-perfective Truth, and that all other ſorts of Truth, how concerning ſoever in point of *Uſefulneſs* or *Intereſt* to be known, can

yet

yet give no real Perfection or *Intellectual Improvement* to the Mind that knows them, the *Learned*, who lay so much stress upon the knowledge of these other Truths, valuing them not only for their use (for that in many Cases is allow'd) but for their intrinsick Excellency, and the intellectual Accomplishment and Improvement which the knowledge of them derives upon the Mind, are humbly desir'd to excuse me if I cannot in their favour either alter the Nature, or break the Connexion of things. It seems to me a clear Principle) and, I think it is in great measure * St. *Austin*'s) that the Soul cannot become in any degree more Perfect or Happy, but by the Possession or Participation of God, and therefore as those Truths which perfect the Soul, must be something Divine; so those Truths which are not Divine (as none but Necessary and Ideal Truths are) cannot perfect the Soul. And therefore, as those that know them ought not to think themselves the wiser, or the more Intellectually improved in their Minds, for the knowledge of them; so those who know them not, ought not, if they would conduct their Studies by Reason, to apply themselves to the knowledge of them, but only upon the account of that accidental Usefulness and Concernment in our Interest which they may sometimes have, and not upon the account of their intrinsick Excellency,

* *Non facit animam beatam nisi unus Deus. Participatione Dei sit beata.* Expos. in Evangel Joan. Tract 23.

Excellency or Essential Perfectiveness of the Understanding, which is none at all.

42. The Truth then which we see is Divine, as Perfective of the Mind, and is therefore Perfective of the Mind that sees it, because it is Divine. And this perhaps may be one Reason (not to exclude those others which are given by *Suarez* in his Consideration of this Question, *Unde Oriatur Difficultas veritatem assequendi*) why we meet with so much Difficulty in the contemplation of Truth, and must use so much Attention and Application of Thought to see her as she is in herself, even because of the *Divinity* of her Nature, and the Corruption of ours, which makes that at present, we cannot unite ourselves to God without Pain and considerable Effort, as M. *Malebranche* expresses it. But however this be, this at least will bear a more positive Assertion, that if there be not some Truth that in the reality of its Nature is Divine, it will be impossible to give an intelligible Account of a plain Distinction (plain I mean as to the thing, tho' not quite so obvious as to the Reason and Manner) and such as is acknowledged by all the World, and that is the great distinction of *necessary* and *contingent Truth*. But supposing some sort of Truth to be Divine, as resulting from the Divine Ideas, and *formally* consisting in that Relation which is between those Ideas, tho' *really* the same with them, this distinction will be very distinctly accountable:

Tom 1. *Disput.* 9. *Sect.* 3.

For we may conceive the matter thus; Truth, according to the formality of it, consists in Relation. There are then as many sorts of Truth as there are of Relations; and as we may conceive Relations of three sorts, that of one Idea to another Idea, that between a Thing and its Idea; and lastly, that which is between Thing and Thing; so in proportion to this we may also conceive three sorts of Truths; that which respects Ideas, that which respects Things, and their Ideas, and that which respects Things only. But now these three sorts of Truth, if more generally considered, will lay us a Foundation for that twofold Order or Distinction of Truth which we are inquiring about. For 'tis plain, that of these three sorts of Truth, those that are between the Divine Ideas themselves are Necessary, Eternal and Immutable, as the Ideas themselves are upon which they are founded; and so we have the former part of the Distinction. But then as for those Truths which respect created things, or which respect Ideas and those things (for both these come here under one general Consideration) 'tis as plain that they are both Contingent, and subject to all that change, to which the Creature itself is liable, since the Contingency of one of the Terms is sufficient to found a Contingent Relation or Truth. And so we have also the latter part of the

See more to this purpose in the former part of this Theory, p. 327. See also M. *Malebranche Recherche de la verite.* Tom. 2. Lib. 6. Cap. 5.

the Distinction, which is now, I think, abundantly clear as well as intire.

43. And as these Divine Ideal Truths are (as we have shewn) the only Truths that perfect the Mind; so, as M. *Malebranche* very happily observes, they are also the only Truths which we endeavour to discover by the sole Exercise of the *Mind*. For we generally make use of our Senses to discover others. We make use of our Eyes and Hands to assure ourselves of the Existence of Things, and to find out the Relations of Equality or Inequality, which are between them. They are only *Ideas* whose Relations the Mind can infallibly know by it self alone, and without the use of the Senses. In which curious and very important Remark these two distinct Things are contained. 1*st*. That we discover Ideal Truths by the sole Operation of the Mind: For thus we know and can demonstrate, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, not by measuring them (for that way would be as unaccurate as 'tis unartificial) but from an intellectual View and Consideration of the Ideal Natures of these things. 2*dly*, That these are the *only* Truths which we can so discover: In all other Truths our Senses are concern'd, and we must be beholden to our Eyes, and to our Ears, and to our Hands, for the knowledge we have of them; and a Man would be ridiculous that should go to prove by

Recherche de la verite. Tom. 2. Lib. 6. Chap. 5.

mere Reaſon, that ſuch a one won the Plate at a Horſe-Race. In Truths of *Right* we need conſult our Reaſon only: But Truths of *Fact* we muſt learn by Senſe; for as to theſe, our inward Maſter that teaches us in the School of the Breaſt, will give us no anſwer, tho' we ſhould conſult his Divine Oracle never ſo long: For indeed he has nothing to do with theſe Truths of Fact, contingent mutable Truths, as not belonging to his Divine Ideas, whereas the Truths of Right, Neceſſary and Immutable Truths, are no other than the eternal Relations of thoſe very Ideas. And this indeed I take to be the Reaſon (or elſe it will be a difficult undertaking to aſſign any) why neceſſary and immutable Truths are knowable by the ſole intellectual Application of the Mind, and Contingent ones not, *viz.* becauſe theſe neceſſary Truths are the Relations of Ideas, and thoſe Ideas are Divine, and our Souls having an Union with theſe Divine Ideas, or with that Divine Word or Wiſdom of God wherein theſe Ideas are, we need only to apply our Minds to perceive thoſe Ideas which are contained therein, as alſo thoſe Truths which reſult from thoſe Ideas. Or in other words, theſe Truths, by reaſon of the Divinity of their real Nature, being intimately preſent to our Minds, there needs only an attentive Application of the Mind to diſcover them, and to let us into the knowledge of them. But now it being quite otherwiſe in Contingent Truths; that is, theſe Truths being not the Relations

of

of Ideas, nor contain'd in the Divine Omnipresent Word, nor consequently having this pressential Union with our Minds, which the others may be conceived to have, hence it comes to pass that the sole Application of the Mind in the way of rational Speculation will not serve to discover these; but we must come to the knowledge of them some other way, *viz.* by *sensible Information*. Now if this Account be rational (and the intelligent Reader is desired very attentively to weigh it before he pronounces whether it be or no) this again will prove that 'tis by the Union which we have with the eternal Word or Wisdom, that universal Reason that inlightens all Spirits, that we become capable of thinking, that the Truth which we see, is Divine, and that the knowledge which we have of Truth, is, in some degree, a participation of the Divine Nature, and a kind of Possession of God himself.

44. But then if so, not to let a thing of this Importance pass without some Reflection, how will this Consideration redound to the *Honour* of the *Sciences*, and serve to advance the Dignity and Glory of them? For as * formal Science, or Science as in the Mind, is nothing else but a clear Perception of Truth: So Objective Science, or Science, as in the Thing, is really that very Truth itself which we perceive. And then since that Truth is of a Divine Extraction, and has a real

* See more concerning this twofold Distinction of Science in the former Part, Page 127.

Divinity in its Nature, what a Divine Thing must all *true* Science be, and what a sublime and noble Employment to be exercised in the Study and Contemplation of it? And how worthy of a rational Mind, of a thinking Creature, who is made and designed for Truth, and therefore naturally desires to *know*, and when he does so dwells with Prudence, and converses with *Wisdom*, sits down with her at her intellectual Feast, and eats the Bread (even the living Bread of Truth) and drinks the Wine which she has mingled. For the Study of the Sciences is a natural Abstraction of the Mind from the Creature, and a Conversion of it towards God and his Divine Light, and so much as any Man comprehends of them, so much he comprehends of the Divine Nature, and has a kind of Beatifick Possession and Enjoyment of it. For to apply ones self to the Sciences, is the same as to contemplate Truth, and to contemplate Truth is indeed to contemplate God. Divinity then is a larger Study than Men are ordinarily aware of; there is something of it diffused throughout all the Sciences, and a good Philosopher is a *Natural* Divine as well as a lover of God; which may serve to shew us, by the way, with how little Knowledge and true Light (how flaming soever their Zeal may be) those People would talk who should go to cry down and disparage Science under the opprobrious Terms of *vain Philosophy*, and *Carnal Reason*, &c.

'Tis St. *Austin's* saying, *Verus Philosophus est Amator Dei.*

It

It is true indeed, there is such a thing as vain Philosophy, and there is but too much of it in the World, but then 'tis that which is Chimerical and Imaginary, and is not really what it pretends to be, that which the Apostle calls *Science falsly so call'd.* And this Wisdom of the World is indeed Folly, and that not only with God, but even with truly wise and considering Men. And there is also such a thing as *Carnal Reason*, even that which the Apostle calls a *Fleshly Mind*; that is, a Mind that is under the Power and Dominion of Carnal Lusts. And there is also another sort of Carnal Reason, and that is when the Understanding (for Reason must be here taken Subjectively for the Power that Reasons, since to say, that Objective Reason, or Truth is in any sense Carnal, is Nonsense) is so far under the possession of sensible Prejudices and Impressions, as to be blinded and misled by them in the search of Truth. This latter Reason may be said (to distinguish the better of these things) to be Philosophically Carnal, as the other may be said to be morally so. And thus far there may be vain Philosophy and carnal Reason; and because there is a Philosophy that is vain, there is the more need of a true Philosophy to discover the Vanity and Deceit of it. But to say, that true Science is vain, if you speak of formal Science, is a Contradiction, if of Objective, it is so and more: For Objective Science is the same as *Truth*; and to say, that Truth is Vain or Carnal, is not only

falſe and contradictious, but, at leaſt in the Conſequence of it, *Impious* and *Heretical*. They therefore who talk againſt Science ſay they know not what, and have nothing but the want of it to plead their Excuſe. Nor yet are they that *reſpect* it altogether faultleſs, ſince they court it generally as a Humane Accompliſhment, without regarding the Divinity of that Truth which they contemplate, or returning Thanks to the eternal Wiſdom for the Living Bread wherewith ſhe feeds them. Indeed the Learned and the Ignorant joyn in this, that the one are not ſenſible of what they *want*, nor the other of what they *have*. And therefore M. *Malebranche* had but too much reaſon for this Reflection. 'It is true, that there are a great 'many People who are perſwaded that God is 'their true Good, who love him as their All, 'and who ardently deſire to increaſe and fortify 'that Union which they have with him. But 'there are but very few who evidently under-'ſtand, that to know Truth, is to unite them-'ſelves to God according to their natural Pow-'ers; that it is a kind of Poſſeſſion of God him-'ſelf to contemplate the true Ideas of Things; 'and that the abſtracted views of certain gene-'ral and immutable Truths, which govern all 'the particular ones, are the Efforts of the 'Mind, quitting the Body, and uniting itſelf to 'God. Metaphyſicks, Pure (I ſuppoſe he means 'Speculative) Mathematicks, and all the univer-'ſal Sciences which regulate and include the

'particular

'particular ones, as the universal Being includes 'all particular Beings, appear Chimerical to al-'most all Men, even to those that are Good and 'Pious, as well as to those who have no Love for 'God. Insomuch that I dare hardly say, that 'the Application to these Sciences is the Appli-'cation of the Mind to God, and that the most 'Pure and Perfect that one is naturally capable 'of. And that 'tis in the view of the intelligi-'ble World, which these Sciences have for 'their Object, that God himself knows and pro-'duces this sensible World, from which Bodies 'receive their Life, as Spirits live upon the o-'ther.

45. He says well, *Live upon the other:* For the Life of the Soul is *Thought*, as the Life of the Body is *Motion*; for I know of no other Life that Body can be conceived to have. And when Spirits think *well*; that is, when the Perceptions of the Understanding are just and clear, and the Consentings of the Will are Regular and Orderly, then the Soul is not only in *Life* but in *Health*; a state or manner of Being which is attended with a Pleasure, which those who have the Sense and inward Feeling of it, only know. And as that which supplies Nourishment to the Life of the Body, is said to be the *Food* of the Body; so that which nourishes and maintains the Life of the Soul, may, in proportion, be said to be the Food of the Soul. And then since the Life of the Soul consists in Thought, that which is the immediate Object

of

of that Thought, must be the true and proper Food of this intellectual Life. And then again, since, according to the present Hypothesis, the intelligible World with its Ideas and immutable Truths, is supposed to be that Object, it will therefore, upon the same Supposition, be a proper way of speaking (perhaps more proper than figurative) to say, that these Divine Ideas and Ideal Truths are the Food of the Soul, and that the Soul lives upon the Intelligible, as truly as the Body does upon the natural and sensible World. And accordingly, I cannot but think it very remarkable, not only that the eternal Wisdom should talk of killing her Beasts, and furnishing her Table, and invite Men to eat of her Bread, and drink of the Wine which she had mingled, but that he who was that very eternal Word and Wisdom, and who also expressly affirms, that he is the *Truth*, should elsewhere call himself *Bread*, and the Bread of God, and the Bread that came down from Heaven, the Bread of Life, yea, and the Living Bread. And should also so expressly speak of our eating him, and feeding upon him. For not to exclude what other Theological Senses are usually put upon these Expressions, it must, I think, be allow'd, that they strike in no less surprizingly than agreeably with this Ideal Hypothesis, according to which the Divine Word or Wisdom is the true Spiritual Bread upon which the Soul feeds and lives, as being the

Prov. 9.

Joh. 6.

immediate

immediate Object of those her intellectual Operations wherein her Life is supposed to consist. And therefore St. *Austin* makes the Word to be the Food of Rational Creatures, *Rationalis Creatura Verbo illo tanquam optimo cibo suo pascitur.* And particularly to be the Bread of Angels: So *that*, according to him, the whole Intellectual World, Men and Angels, feed and live upon this Bread, this Living, this Immortal, this ever Satisfying, never Perishing Bread of Truth, which is that true Celestial *Manna* wherewith God feeds his *Israel* both in Heaven and in Earth, both in Time and in Eternity.

De lib. Arbitrio. Lib. 3. Cap. 10.

46. And thus having shewn upon what rational Grounds this Ideal Hypothesis stands, by pointing out some of the chiefest Arguments that may be alledged in its favour. I shall now, for the prevention of all misunderstanding, and such numerous, but unconcerning Objections as may thence arise (for indeed I think those that are, or may be here urged, will be found generally to proceed from a wrong apprehension of that which is truly the Point in Question, and so to conclude quite besides it) add a few things by way of *Explanation* of it. I am not ignorant, that the more Methodical and Artificial way is first to state the right meaning of a Question before we proceed to the proving of either of its Parts. But I should not have been so easily Intelligible in giving the right State of a Question which depends upon so many things,

if

if the rational Conſiderations had not been premiſed. Firſt, becauſe in thoſe rational Conſiderations a great many things are contained, which concern the right underſtanding of it, and which now I need only hint at, whereas otherwiſe I muſt have laid them out more at large. Upon which Conſideration, if I have made a little bold with the Laws of exact Order and Method for my Reader's Convenience as well as my own, I hope he will pardon me, ſince to him it cannot be very material in what Order the State of the *Queſtion* (or as now perhaps it ought rather to be call'd, the Explanation of the *Concluſion*) proceeds, ſo long as he has ſuch an account of it as may ſerve to let him into an exact Comprehenſion of what is truly meant and intended by it. By which means he will be the better able to judge both of the Arguments on one ſide, and of the Objections on the other.

47. When therefore we ſpeak of our ſeeing or underſtanding Things in God (that we may not put any thing either upon our ſelves or others, but what is clear and diſtinct) the meaning preciſely is, as we expreſſed it at the firſt, that the Divine Ideas, that is, thoſe Ideas of things which are in God, whereby he knows things, and whereby he produced them, that thoſe very Ideas are the Ideas whereby we underſtand: Which, if we reſolve it into a more explicit Senſe, will include theſe two things. 1. That the Divine Ideas are themſelves the immediate

Object

Object of our Thoughts and intellectual Perceptions. 2. That other things may be said to be so far (only) seen or perceived by us, as we see those Ideas which represent them. For indeed the Divine Ideas as they are the *Immediate*; so strictly speaking are they the *only* true and proper Objects of Thought. As for other things, they cannot in the severity of the Expression, be said to be seen or perceived at all. For when we say, that we see them in their Ideas, all that we can reasonably be supposed to mean, is, that we see them so far forth as we see their Ideas: So that still 'tis not the things themselves, but the Ideas of them which we truly and properly see. And how strange soever this may sound or appear, all those who suppose things to be seen not immediately by themselves, but by their Ideas (as I think the generality of Philosophers do) must be obliged to say the same, *viz.* That they are the *Ideas* of things only which are strictly perceived by us, let those Ideas be of what kind soever you will please to suppose them, since if the things themselves were so seen or perceived, there would be no need of any Ideas at all. All that is peculiar here, is, that these Ideas being in our way supposed to be *Divine*, we are consequently to say, that the proper Objects of our Thought are the *Divine* Ideas. So that according to this Hypothesis, when 'tis said, that we see the *material* World, or any particular part of it in the *intelligible* World, the meaning is not as if the material

terial World, or that particular part of it were really and properly seen by us. No, as 'tis the intelligible World which upon this supposition, is the immediate Object of the Mind; so that *Sun* which we really see, is not that Sun which we turn our bodily Eyes towards. But the Sun which we really see is the *Intelligible Sun*, or the Idea of the Sun. But as for that Sun which our Eyes regard, that as being material and far distant from us, neither is nor can be any otherwise seen by us, than as the Idea of it is presented to our intellectual view: Which therefore is the sole real Object of the Mind, and consequently the only thing we can properly be said to *see*.

48. But for the prevention of all gross and confused Apprehensions, which our Imagination may be apt to suggest to us in this Matter, it is necessary I should further note, and the Reader very heedfully observe, that tho' the Divine Ideas are here supposed to be the Ideas by which we understand, yet this Hypothesis is not so to be conceived as if we did see things in the intelligible World, according as they appear to us in that sensible view which we have of them. No, we see things in the intelligible World, as they are in the intelligible World. But we must not imagine that they are there as they appear to us. No, they are there only by their Ideas; and consequently 'tis by the Ideas of them that we see them. We see nothing therefore in the Intelligible World relating to things

things out of it, but only the pure and mere Ideas of thoſe things. But things do not appear to us ſo as they are there, no, nor yet ſo as they are truly inthemſelves. The reaſon of which is, becauſe (as has been remarked before) in the view which we have of ſenſible Objects, * there is Sentiment as well as Idea. As ſuppoſe, in the view of Body there is the Sentiment of Colour, and the Idea of Extenſion. Or, when we look ſuppoſe on the Sun, there is the Idea of a Circle, and the Sentiment of Light. The Idea repreſents the pure Eſſence of the Thing which we are ſaid to ſee, the Sentiment, perhaps, is a Mark or Indication of its Exiſtence, it being not eaſie to aſſign a Reaſon why God ſhould touch us with a Sentiment upon his exhibiting to us ſuch an Idea, but only to admoniſh us of the exiſtence of that thing whereof we have an Idea, or that That Idea which he preſents to us does repreſent ſomething Created and actually exiſting out of himſelf. And of this the Sentiment may be a kind of natural Mark, as inducing us to believe that the thing perceiv'd is the cauſe of it, becauſe, upon the preſence of the thing to our Minds we have the Sentiment. And this, perhaps, is the reaſon why theſe things go together in our Perceptions of ſenſible Objects. But go together they certainly do, and becauſe they do ſo, our Senſe and Imagination ſo far impoſe upon our Underſtanding,

* See Converſations *Chretiennes, Entretien* 3. Page 79.

derſtanding, that we confound them one with another, Cloath our Ideas with our Sentiments, or if you will aſſume our Sentiments into our Ideas as eſſential Parts of them, and ſo out of both make up as it were one intire ſenſible Object. And from this confuſe mingling of our Sentiments with our Ideas, it is that things (which we judge of by the Ideas we have of them) come to be inveſted with certain *Qualities* as we call them, and put on all that ſenſible Appearance wherewith our Fancies dreſs them up to us, and wherein we are ſo accuſtom'd to conſider them, that we hardly know how to abſtract from it. But abſtract from it we muſt if we will conſider things rightly. 'Tis certain, that God does not ſee things according to thoſe ſenſible Appearances which we have of them in himſelf: Nor do we ſee them ſo in him: For he ſees them by their Ideas, and ſo according to this Hypotheſis do we. But they are not in their Ideas as they appear to us, no nor in their own real Natures. The ſhort then is, we ſee nothing in the Intelligible World but the pure Ideas of things, and all the reſt we *feel*. And if you will have it in one word a juſt diſtribution of each, I think it is this, that the Idea we ſee in God, but the Sentiment we feel in our ſelves. And therefore to this purpoſe ſays Mr. *Malebranche*, *Tho' I ſay that we ſee material and ſenſible Things in God, it muſt be well obſerv'd, that I do not ſay that we feel them,*

Recherche de la Verite. Tom. 1. Lib. 3. Cap. 6.

them, or have the Senſations of them in God, but only that we have them from God who acts in us; for God well knows ſenſible things, but he does not feel them. When we perceive any ſenſible Object, there is in our Perception, Sentiment, and pure Idea. The Sentiment is a Modification of our own Soul, and 'tis God that cauſes it in us: And he can cauſe it tho' he has it not, becauſe he ſees in the Idea which he has of our Soul, that it is capable of it. As for the Idea which is found join'd with the Sentiment, that is in God, and we ſee it becauſe it is his pleaſure to diſcover it to us. And God joins the Sentiment to the Idea, when the Objects are preſent, to the end that we may believe them ſo to be, and ſo may enter into ſuch Sentiments and Paſſions as we ought to have in relation to them. To which, as being a full and ſatisfactory Account of the Matter, I have no more to add, but only from hence further to note,

49. That this will help us to underſtand how Material, Mutable and Corruptible Things may be ſaid to be ſeen in God, without imputing any of theſe Imperfections to him. 'Tis certain there is nothing Material, nothing Mutable, nothing Corruptible in God, and how then can ſuch things be ſaid to be ſeen in him? There is indeed in this ſome appearance of difficulty. 'Tis eaſie enough to conceive that things of an immutable Nature, ſuch as *Ideas* and *eternal Truths* may be ſeen in God, as indeed it ſeems neceſſary to conceive that they muſt; for where ſhould they be ſeen elſe? But as to mutable

Things, to ſuppoſe the ſame of them, will ſeem perhaps a hard ſaying, and ſuch as every one will not well know how to receive. But 'tis but ſtrictly to attend to what is meant in this Hypotheſis by that way of ſpeaking, and the difficulty vaniſhes. For tho' theſe things which are of a Nature ſo vaſtly different from the Divine, ſhould be ſuppoſed to be ſeen in God, yet 'tis no otherwiſe than as they *are* in God. And as they are in God by their Ideas, ſo 'tis by thoſe Ideas that we are ſuppoſed to ſee them. The ſeeing them therefore in God ſignifies no more than that the Ideas of them which are in God, are perceived by us, or that we ſee that in God which refers to them. So that, properly ſpeaking, we ſee only the *Ideas* as was ſaid before, they being the immediate Objects that terminate our Intellectual View, and conſequently we ſee nothing really in God but what is indeed *Immutable* (for the Intelligible Eſſences of things are ſo) tho' that Immutable which we ſee in God be repreſentative of ſomething mutable that is out of him. There is therefore according to this way of underſtanding it (which is the true ſenſe of this Ideal Hypotheſis) no more real inconvenience in ſuppoſing Mutable, than there is in ſuppoſing Immutable Things to be ſeen in God, ſince even when we are ſaid to ſee the former, that whereby we ſee it, and conſequently that which we properly ſee, is always the latter. But how then, you'll ſay, are the former ſeen by us? Why in a ſecondary and

leſs

leſs proper Senſe, inaſmuch as we are ſuppoſed to ſee that which intelligibly repreſents them; For 'tis ſtill to be remembred, that according to this Hypotheſis, the *Intelligible World* is always the immediate Object of our Perception, even in the view which we have of the ſenſible, and that becauſe we ſee the Senſible by the Intelligible. And therefore if St. *Auſtin* confined the Viſion of Things in God, only to immutable and incorruptible things, or at leaſt made mention only of ſuch, and that leſt the ſuppoſition of our ſeeing mutable Things in God, ſhould imply ſome Imperfection in him, I think it was an unneceſſary ſcruple: For beſides that God muſt be ſuppoſed to ſee ſuch things in himſelf or elſe to be ignorant of them (which would certainly be one of the greateſt Imperfections that we could affix to him) if the Ideas of mutable Things are in God, as they muſt be, or elſe they could not have been Created by him, where is the real inconvenience in ſaying, that mutable Things are ſeen in God, ſince they are ſuppoſed to be ſeen only by thoſe Ideas? But now as to the Ideas of mutable Things being in God, therein St. *Auſtin* is expreſs. *Apud te rerum Omnium inſtabilium, ſtant cauſæ, & rerum Omnium mutabilium immutabiles manent Origines, & Omnium, irrationabilium & temporalium ſempiternæ vivunt Rationes.* And therefore why he ſhould ſtick to ſay, that thoſe things are ſeen in God, whoſe Ideas he confeſſes to be

Confeſ. Lib. 1. Cap. 6.

in him, I see no reason, if indeed he did stick at it. For tho' the things be mutable, yet the Ideas of them are (as he says) immutable, and since they are seen by those Ideas, still that which we really see in God is supposed to be Immutable. And therefore it need be no matter of Question or Debate, whether mutable Things, or only immutable Things are seen in God, since rightly understood both suppositions will resolve into one.

Reponse au livre de Mr. Arnauld *des vrayes & des Fausses Idees.* Chap. 7. Pag. 103.

50. And accordingly Mr. *Malebranche* in his Debate with M. *Arnauld* undertakes, by Consideration, not much unlike these to reconcile a Difficulty that may arise from the *apparent* Difference that is between St. *Austin* and himself, with relation to the Point now under Consideration: For St. *Austin*, says he, does not say, that we see sensible Objects in God, but only immutable Natures, as Numbers, and intelligible Extension. I do not say the things which are numbred, nor that Extension which is material: Whereas I have affirm'd that we see in God all things universally which we see by Idea. Now to make it plainly appear, that notwithstanding the seeming diversity of these two Sentiments, there is yet no essential Difference between them, he remarks from the place last quoted out of his Research of Truth and some others, That 'twas always his Supposition that in the Perception which we have of Bodies, there

was both Sentiment and pure Idea, the Sentiment of Colour, and the Idea of Extenſion, or, as he calls it, intelligible Extenſion. And that we ſee in God the intelligible Extenſion, and feel in ourſelves the Colour, with relation ſuppoſe to the Sun, or an Horſe, or an intelligible Tree. But now, even according to St. *Auſtin* Intelligible Extenſion, which is the Object of Geometry, the Idea by which all Bodies are known, and according to which they were all Created, is no leſs than Numbers of a Nature Immutable, Neceſſary, Eternal, and which one cannot ſee but in God. And by conſequence, ſays he, there is at the bottom no difference between his Sentiment and mine. But that which hindred that Holy Doctor from ſpeaking as I have done, was, That having that Prejudice upon him, that Colours are in the Objects, ſince we ſee not Objects but with Colours, he thought that 'twas the Object itſelf that we ſee. He could not therefore ſay, that we ſaw thoſe Colours in God, which are not at all of a Nature Immutable, Intelligible, and common to all Minds, but a ſenſible and particular Modification of the Soul, and, according to St. *Auſtin*, a *Quality* ſpread upon the Surface of Bodies. But certainly if St. *Auſtin* had thought, that to ſee a Tree for inſtance, it would be ſufficient, that God ſhould make us have a Sentiment of Green annex'd after a certain manner to that intelligible Extenſion, which all Men conceive as clearly as they do Numbers,

he would not have been at all afraid of admitting in God ſomething corruptible or ſubject to change, in ſuppoſing the Ideas of his Works to be the Objects of our Perceptions, when we look upon thoſe his Works: For yet once more, I do not ſay that we ſee in God Colours, of which our own Modalities are repreſentative; but intelligible Extenſion, an immutable Nature, according to St. *Auſtin*, and to which this Colour is referr'd, or is annex'd by the Laws of Union of Soul and Body, to the end that we may judge that there are Bodies which have ſome Relation to us, *&c.* Which account I think to be moſt nicely fine, and ſufficient to ſatisfie any one that wants neither Penetration nor Reflection to underſtand it. But the Matter is Subtil, and the Reader muſt bring ſome Attention with him as well as the Writer, or elſe tho' one write never ſo clearly and intelligibly (which I take to be in a high degree the Talent and Character of this truly great Man) one is not ſecure of being always underſtood. And yet the Writer muſt bear the blame, and be thought obſcure, when oftentimes the true fault is either want of Capacity, or want of Attention in the Reader. And 'tis the lot of thoughtful Writers oftentimes to meet with curſory Readers.

51. But for the ſetting this Theory right in the apprehenſions of all that ſhall think it worthy of their Conſideration, there are one or two things more which I am concern'd to mind them

them of. One is, that altho' it be here ſuppoſed as the moſt Rational, and indeed only conceivable Account of the manner of humane Underſtanding, that the Divine Ideas are the Ideas whereby we underſtand, as being the immediate Objects of the Mind, yet it will not hence follow, that we ſee the very Eſſence of God, becauſe we ſee all things in him according to the above-ſtated Senſe of that Expreſſion. For tho' the Ideas that are in God are of his Eſſence, or not any thing really different from it, and ſo in that Senſe may be ſaid to be the Eſſence of God, according to that of *Aquinas*, *Idea in Deo nihil eſt aliud quam Dei Eſſentia*; yet 'tis to be conſider'd, that they are not the Eſſence of God purely and abſolutely as it is in itſelf; but as it is in relation to Creatures, according to the ſeveral degrees of its Participability whereby it is communicable to them. And therefore, ſays *Aquinas* again, *Ideo habet rationem Ideæ, Secundum quod ad alia comparatur, non autem Secundum quod comparatur ad ipſum Deum.* And therefore tho' theſe Ideas are really Eſſential to God, or *quid Divinum*, as every thing that is in God is (for that I take to be the true ſenſe of that Scholaſtick Maxim, *Quicquid eſt in Deo eſt Deus*) yet we cannot in ſeeing theſe Ideas be rightly ſaid abſolutely and ſimply to ſee the Eſſence of God, but only in a certain reſpect, or ſo much of it as relates to Creatures. For as Mr. *Male-*

Part 1. *Quæſ.* 15. *Art* 1.

Ibid.

Converſations Chretiennes. Entretieu 3. P. 73.

branche very *Angelically* diſtinguiſhes upon this occaſion, *There is a great deal of difference between ſeeing the Eſſence of God, and ſeeing the Eſſence of things in God: For tho' we ſee not any thing but God when we ſee the Eſſence of things in God, we ſee not God however but with relation to Creatures. We ſee not the Perfections of God, but ſo far as they repreſent another thing than God. So that tho' we ſee God, and that we cannot poſſibly ſee any thing but him, ſince God does not conſerve Spirits but for himſelf, yet we may ſay, in a ſenſe, that we ſee only Creatures: For altho' God ſees only himſelf, yet it is certain that he ſees Creatures; when he ſees that which is in himſelf that repreſents them. In like manner, tho' we ſee nothing but God by an immediate and direct view, yet we ſee in God that which repreſents them: For as for Creatures in themſelves, they are inviſible.* Tho' after all, if it did follow from hence that we did ſee the Eſſence of God, I know not where the real inconvenience would be. It is indeed a Conſequence which would be ill drawn from our Ideal Principle, but there is no Abſurdity that I know of in the Conſequence itſelf. On the contrary, I think it to be (rightly underſtood) a certain and undeniable Truth. For tho' we cannot ever *comprehend* God, nor have at preſent a Capacity of making any great or very clear diſcoveries of his Nature, which is hid from us in Clouds and thick Darkneſs, or if you will in an inacceſſible Light, yet 'tis plain

and

and acknowledg'd that we have some Notion and Perception of him, and since (as we have shewn) this Perception of him cannot be by any Idea or intelligible Species that is distinct from him, it follows that we must perceive him immediately by himself, or else 'tis plain that we have no Perception of him at all. But 'tis acknowledg'd and experimentally certain, that we have a Perception of him, and therefore 'tis by himself that we perceive him: Which, as was before remarked, is a clear demonstration of his Existence. And I am confirm'd in this Thought by finding Mr. *Malebranch* to concur with me in it. *But above all* (says he) *observe that God or Infinite is not visible by an Idea, which represents him. Infinite is to its self its own Idea. It has not any Archetype; It may be known, but it cannot be made. There are none but Creatures, but such and such Beings that are feasible, that are visible by Ideas which represent them, even before that they were made. One may see a Circle, a House, a Sun, whether there be any in actual Being or no: For all that is Finite may be seen in that which is Infinite, which includes the intelligible Ideas of it. But that which is Infinite cannot be seen but in it self; for nothing Finite can represent Infinite. If one therefore thinks upon God, he must of necessity be. Such a particular Being, tho' known, may yet not exist. One may see its Essence without its Existence, its Idea without its Self. But one cannot see the Essence of Infinite without its Existence, the Idea*

Entretiens sur la metaphysique. Page 44.

Idea of Being itself without Being: For indeed Being has no Idea that represents him. He has no Archetype that contains all his intelligible Reality. He is to himself his own Archetype, and he contains in himself the Archetype of all Beings. And thus you well perceive that this Proposition, there is a God, is by itself the most clear of all Propositions that affirm Existence of any thing. And that it is even as certain as this, I think, therefore I am. These are great and excellent Words, and the sum of them consists of these three distinct Things, That we have some sight of God, That we see him by himself, and that therefore he is. My concern at present is with the second of these: Upon which I remark it as a plain and necessary Conclusion, that therefore we have some intellectual View of the Essence of God even in this Life, how dark and imperfect soever it be, since we see him by himself and not by Idea. And indeed if we did not see God in some degree, as we could not *talk* of him, so neither do I see how 'tis possible we should *Love* him: For I think it in the general a certain Truth, that we can love nothing but what we see. And therefore as for those places of Scripture which speak of our not seeing God in this Life, I think they must be understood of that clear, full, perfect and glorious Vision of him which is *Beatifick*. And so indeed no Man can see the Face of God in this Life, nor yet in the next neither, without Holiness and Purity of Heart. *Blessed*

are

are the pure in heart for they shall see God. And they only: *For without Holiness no Man shall see the Lord.*

52. Another thing which I shall add for the right understanding of this Ideal System, and the preventing all imaginary Difficulties and Objections, is concerning the Divinity of *Truth*. How this is to be understood there have been several intimations given up and down in the course of this Work, for the information of all equitable and heedful Readers. But for their better Satisfaction, they are desired to consider this fuller and more recollected Account. Truth cannot be the Effect of God's Will, because all God's Wills do suppose Truth. And therefore 'tis plain from this very Consideration (besides those many others insisted upon in the former Part) that Truth cannot be any thing really different from God. And yet to say that Truth is God, will be a Proposition that is not true *in Sensu Formali*, as the Schools speak. Truth in the formality of it does not imply so much as an absolute Reality, much less can we say that it is formally God. It implies only a Relation of Equality or Inequality, Agreement or Disagreement. But then that Relation being between Ideas, and those Ideas being Divine, and Truth which is a Relation of those Ideas being for that Reason, or as such really the same with them, it must hence follow that Truth must be really something Divine, as having all that real Divinity which

which its Ideas are ſuppoſed to have. But yet ſtill we cannot ſay that Truth is formally God, nor conſequently can we be ſaid to ſee God himſelf in ſeeing Truth. And therefore if St. *Auſtin* argues us to ſee God in this Life by the knowledge which we have of eternal Truths, and that (according to M. *Malebranche*) after this manner; Truth is Increated, Immutable, Immenſe, Eternal above all things. It is true by itſelf, it does not derive its Perfection from any thing. It makes Creatures more perfect, and all Spirits naturally deſire to know her. But nothing can have all theſe Perfections but God; therefore Truth is God. But we ſee theſe immutable and eternal Truths, therefore we ſee God. I ſay, if St. *Auſtin* reaſons after this manner, he muſt be equitably and fairly interpreted, or elſe what he ſays will not be right; for the moſt that can in rigour be concluded from his or any other Ground is that Truth is ſomething really Divine, as having a real Identity with what is ſo, *viz.* the Divine Ideas, and conſequently that in ſeeing Truth we ſee ſomething Divine. And ſo much I think is neceſſary to be ſaid. M. *Malebranche* indeed ſeems to diſtinguiſh between ſeeing God in ſeeing Truth, and ſeeing God *when* we ſee Truth; in that tho' he will not allow the former, he yet allows the latter: For, ſays he, firſt, we do not ſay that we ſee

Recherche de la Verite. Tom. 1. Liv. 3. Chap. 6.

Ibid.

ſee God in ſeeing theſe Truths, as St. *Auſtin* ſays; but in ſeeing the *Ideas* of thoſe Truths. Then he ſays again, So that according to our Sentiment we ſee God when we ſee eternal Truths; not that theſe Truths are God, but becauſe the Ideas upon which theſe Truths depend are in God. But indeed, exactly ſpeaking, as I humbly conceive, we cannot be ſaid to ſee God neither in the ſeeing of Truth, nor yet *when* we ſee Truth. And that becauſe the Ideas of eternal Truths, tho' really Divine, are yet no more formally God than Truth itſelf is. And conſequently, tho' in ſeeing thoſe Truths we alſo ſee thoſe Ideas, becauſe of the real Identity that is between them (which is the ground upon which he goes) yet we cannot be properly ſaid to ſee God, becauſe thoſe *Ideas* are not formally God. The moſt that can in ſtrictneſs be pretended, is that we ſee ſomething Divine, and that indeed we truly do, and may accordingly ſay as we did before, that the knowledge which we have of Truth, is in ſome degree a Participation of the Divine Nature, and a kind of Poſſeſſion of God himſelf, as being a Poſſeſſion of ſomething that really belongs to his Eſſence. From whence it will follow, that this Propoſition *There is a God*, is as certain as that there is Truth.

53. There is yet a further Reflection which it may be convenient to throw in to this explanatory Account to make it more full and intire, and that is concerning the *Divine Illumination.*

nation. We oftentimes ſpeak of God's inlightning us, and being our Light, *&c.* For the right conceiving of which it is to be conſider'd that Man is capable of being inlighten'd two ways, *Efficiently* and *Objectively:* And that 'tis God that does both. God inlightens us *Efficiently* by his Spirit, aſſiſting our intellectual Faculties, and purging our Hearts from thoſe Luſts and Prejudices which darken and pervert our apprehenſions of things; and, according to this Hypotheſis, *Objectively* by his *Wiſdom.* The former is what we are to underſtand by that Grace of Illumination which is ſpoken of in our common Theology. The latter (at leaſt ordinarily ſpeaking) is not Grace, but, as is here ſuppoſed, our natural way of Thinking and Underſtanding, that whereby we are rational or intelligent Beings. I ſay, *ordinarily* ſpeaking; for if any one ſhall think fit to call the Union of this Divine Wiſdom to the Humane Nature of Jeſus Chriſt by the name of Grace, I ſhall not be forward to contend with him. In a larger ſenſe no doubt it is ſo. And ſo Mr. *Hooker* is pleaſed to call it, when he tells us, that 'The 'Union of the Fleſh, with the 'Deity, is to that Fleſh a gift 'of principal Grace and Favour.' And indeed 'tis not to be imagin'd what the Influences and Communications of that excellent Grace were, nor how unmeaſurably the Powers of that Soul muſt needs be illuminated which was ſo inwardly

Eccleſiaſtical Polities. Lib. 5. Page 297.

inwardly united to the very Eſſential Wiſdom of God. Tho' to ſuppoſe that the Soul of Jeſus Chriſt, by vertue of this Union, becomes *Omniſcient*, would, I conceive, be no more warrantable than to ſay, that his Body, by vertue of the ſame Union, is *Omnipreſent*. Nay, perhaps the *Ubiquitarians* may of the two have the better Plea. But to return to the Point in Hand, tho' God in both the Senſes premiſed, be here ſuppoſed to be our true and ſole Light, to inlighten us Efficiently as well as Objectively; yet as it is the latter Senſe that belongs to the Conſideration of the preſent Theory, ſo it is that which we would be underſtood chiefly to intend.

54. Beſides this explanatory Account which we have here given of our *Meaning*, there is another ſort of Explanation that might be added, which for diſtinction ſake, we may call an Explanation of the *Thing*, which conſiſts in opening and unfolding the particular manner of it, by ſhewing how God exhibits his Ideas to our Minds, and how we ſee and underſtand them, and all things by them, and particularly whether the intelligible World has ſuch a Relation to that which is Material and Senſible, that there are in it particular and preciſe Ideas for every thing; as ſuppoſe, an intelligible Sun, an intelligible Tree, *&c.* and that we ſee one of thoſe preciſe Ideas whenever we look upon one of thoſe Bodies. Or (as Mr. *Malebranche* ſeems rather to think) that we

we see things in God by the various and different Application which he makes to our Minds of *Intelligible Extension*, sometimes after one manner, and sometimes after another, in conjunction with those different Sensations which we have with it upon the impression of Bodies, particularly that of *Colour*, which serve to specifie, particularize, and distinguish our Ideas, and to make them represent the several *differences* of Bodies, as well as to inform us of their *Existence*. But I shall not so far indulge either my own, or my Readers Curiosity, as to enter into any nice Disquisition of such mysterious Speculations, these being some of those things that belong to the *Reserve* of a Theory; which, tho' it ought to be as clear as the *Day*, as far as it undertakes or pretends to explain, yet to imitate the agreeableness and beauty of it too, ought not to attempt to explain every thing, but to have some *Clouds* mingled with its *Light*. I shall therefore leave every one to conceive of this Matter as he pleases, or as he can. And the rather because it concerns only the *Modality* of the Hypothesis. All that is *Essential* to it, is, that as God contains in himself, after an Intelligible manner, the Perfections of all Beings, both Actual and Possible, and by these intelligible Perfections or Ideas, knows the Essences of all things (for as for his Knowledge of their *Existence* that depends upon other Principles, with which our present Theory is not so immediately

iately concern'd) ſo that God is alſo our true Light, as well as a Light to himſelf; that thoſe intelligible Perfections of his are the immediate Objects of our Minds, and that ſo we ſee and underſtand the Works of God by the Perfections of their Creator, even by thoſe very Ideas whereby they were made. But as to the preciſe *Manner* how this is done, this, whatever I may think of it to my ſelf, I pretend not to explain to others, but leave them to conceive of it in ſuch a way as upon their own private Reflection, ſhall appear to them to be moſt reaſonable. But whether they conceive it in one way or in the other, there is one thing which they are always to remember to carry with them as *common* to both, *viz.* That tho' Sentiment does always accompany Idea in the Viſion or Perception which we have of Bodies, yet 'tis the *Idea* only which we *ſee*; ſo that the immediate Object of our Thought is always Divine and Immutable, tho' that which we *feel* be as mutable as our ſelves, as being only a certain manner of our own Being, however apt we may be to confound it with our Ideas, and from thence to tranſfer it to the things which we perceive by them.

55. And now after all, as to the Way and Manner of Humane Underſtanding, as we have here repreſented it; this I am ſatisfied of, that no Body can, upon juſt grounds, ſay, that it is *not* ſo. Nor do I abſolutely and peremptorily ſay that it is ſo. I only propoſe it as an Hy-

 potheſis,

potheſis, that exhibits a very rational and conceivable Account of the thing, and ſuch as every way appears to be the moſt reaſonable and conſiſtent of any that has been yet advanced, or that the Mind of Man can frame to itſelf. That the Divine Ideas are the Ideas whereby we *underſtand*, ſeems proved beyond all poſſibility of reaſonable Exception. And this part of the Theory I am in good meaſure perſwaded of, and can hardly forbear being poſitive in. That which ſeems more liable to be queſtioned, as well as more againſt the Grain of common Prejudice, is whether the ſame Divine Ideas are alſo the Ideas whereby we *ſee?* And here indeed our ſenſible Prejudices, if we yield to them, will be an Objection, tho' not only againſt the Divine Ideas, but againſt Ideas in general. But then when 'tis remember'd and well conſider'd, that according to the account before given concerning *Thought* and *Viſion*; Seeing is a ſort of Thinking, and but another way of Underſtanding, as differing from it only in the manner whereby the Idea is received, and the Degree whereby it is more ſtrongly impreſſed upon the Mind, it ſeems moſt agreeable to Reaſon, that as the *Subject* of Underſtanding and Viſion is one and the ſame (the Soul being the common Subject of both) ſo the *Object* ſhould be the ſame too; and conſequently, that as the Divine Ideas are the Ideas whereby we Think and Underſtand, ſo the ſame Divine Ideas ſhould be alſo the I-

deas

deas whereby we See, Seeing being only a certain peculiar way of Underſtanding.

56. And thus having ſet this Theory in its true and full Light, with ſome account of the Grounds and Principles upon which it ſtands, I now leave it to the Conſideration of the rational World, who is deſired to judge of it fairly and equitably, and with that allowance which is due to humane Infirmity, as well as very needful to me, according to that Senſe which I have of my own; and particularly as to the Concluſion which this laſt Chapter inclines to favour, the competent Reader (who perhaps is not always the moſt *Learned)* is deſired to judge of it, not only by thoſe rational Conſiderations which are therein contained, but alſo by thoſe other preceding ones which are imploy'd to ſhew the utter unconceivableneſs and impoſſibility of ſuch other ways of reſolving the manner of our Underſtanding, as either are, or may be pretended: For all is to be taken into the Account, and when it is ſo I am apt to fancy it will weigh pretty heavy; always provided, that the Hand that holds the Scale holds it even, and that there be nothing but *Reaſon* in the other end of the Ballance: For Reaſon will deal with Reaſon, but there is no contending againſt Mens Prejudices, till they themſelves will be pleaſed to lay them down: And indeed till then they are neither fit to reaſon nor to be reaſoned with. But however, tho' I think this to be not only a rea-

ſonable, but the moſt reaſonable, and indeed only intelligible Account of Humane Underſtanding; yet having a due ſenſe both of my Subject and of my Self, I would not be thought to be Poſitive or Decretory in it, but only to propoſe it as an *Hypotheſis*, and to be conſidered rather as an *Enquirer*, than as a Dogmatical *Aſſertor*. And yet, after all, I ſhall preſume ſo far, not upon my Capacity, but upon that application of Thought which I have beſtowed upon theſe things, as to ſay, and I ſay it not raſhly, that if this account of Humane Underſtanding, or of the Ideas whereby we underſtand, be not right, I ſhall pretty much deſpair of ever coming to know how it is that we underſtand, or whence, or what our Ideas are. For to ſay with Mr. *Locke* that we have them from our *Senſes*, gives me no ſatisfaction at all: For if he means that they are derived to our Minds by way of a real Phyſical Emiſſion from ſenſible Objects: This, as I have abundantly ſhewn, is a falſe account of the Origin of our Ideas. But if he means only that they are *occaſion'd* by the impreſſions which are made my thoſe Objects upon our Organs of Senſe, that indeed may be ordinarily true; but then to ſhew how little a way this will go towards a reſolution of the preſent Theory, there are two things to be remarked, *1ſt*. That there is nothing *Peculiar* in this Account; for it may be applied to any Hypotheſis, ſince let our Ideas be what they will, it may

may be ſtill ſaid of them, that, according to this Senſe, we ordinarily have them from our *Senſes*. 2*dly*. That there is nothing *Inſtructive* in it. It gives no Light into the main Queſtion that concerns the Theory of Humane Underſtanding, ſince, tho' our Senſes ſhould be allow'd to be the occaſions of our Ideas, it ſtill remains to be inquired what thoſe Ideas are. And as I ſhould think my ſelf little the wiſer as to the manner how I underſtand till this Queſtion be reſolved; ſo I ſee not how the being told that my Ideas come from my Senſes, will help me to reſolve it, nor conſequently to what great purpoſe it ſhould ſerve. I would not be thought to ſlight or undervalue the performance of this ingenious Author, which I allow to be very valuable and conſiderable in many reſpects, and that he has deſerved well of the Publick for thoſe many uſeful Truths which he has clear'd, and thoſe many great Diſcoveries which he has made in the Intellectual way. But as to the Account which he has given us of *Ideas* (which ought to have been the great Subject of his undertaking, in an *Eſſay of Humane Underſtanding*) that, I think, is as Lame and Defective as any thing can well be, ſince; in that Senſe, wherein it would have been to the purpoſe, it appears not to be true, and in that ſenſe wherein it is true, it is not much to the purpoſe. If this Cenſure be thought too ſevere, I ſhould be glad to be ſhewn how to mollifie it. In the

mean time, as to the preſent Account, that which is the great omiſſion in Mr. *Lock*'s is ſufficiently ſupplied here, by that ſpecial Enquiry which we have made into the Nature of thoſe Ideas whereby we underſtand. So that if our Account be true, it cannot be denied but that it is very much to the purpoſe. And to convince that it is true, I have offered as much as I think convenient at this time in the way of *Reaſon*, only there are ſome few things which I have to offer in the way of *Authority*; for the conſideration of which this laſt enſuing Chapter is purpoſely deſigned.

CHAP.

CHAP XIII.

Wherein is consider'd how far the Grounds of this Hypothesis are laid by the Schools, and the Hypothesis itself confirm'd by the Authority of St. Austin: *With some concluding Reflections upon the whole, relating to Morality and Religion.*

1. LAbour at once recommends and justifies the indulging ones self some Ease and Refreshment, and therefore after all this toil and travel of *Thought*, let us now a little repose our selves upon the Bed of *Authority*. I cannot say, that we have that of the Schools on our side as to this latter Part of our Theory, which concerns the manner of Humane Understanding. They give a very different Account of it as we have * already shewn, and such, as like the rest of their Philosophy, seems to proceed upon *sensible Prejudices*. And the great Prejudice seems to be this, We have our Ideas upon the presence of sensible Objects, therefore our Ideas are from those Objects. In like manner, as is generally argued in the other Case, we have our Sensations upon the impressions of Bodies; therefore Bodies are the efficient

* See the 7 Chap. of this 2d Part. at the 13 Paragraph.

cient Causes of those Sensations. And indeed one Consequence is as good as the other, tho', if my Logick be right, neither of them are extraordinary. If they are, *reddat mihi minam Diogenes.*

2. It is true indeed, that the Schools make one very promising advance towards us when they talk of the Souls understanding things in the *eternal Reasons*, which eternal Reasons are with them the same as *Ideas*, according to the promiscuous use of those Terms in St. *Austin.* But then they fall off again from us by distinguishing of a twofold manner whereby one thing may be said to be known or understood in another. Either as in the *Object that is known*, as when one sees in a Glass the Images that result from it; and in this Sense, according to them, the Soul does not at present see things in their eternal Reasons, tho' at the same time they allow that the *Blessed* do so, whom they suppose to see God, and in him all things. Or else, as in the *Principle* of *Knowledge*, as when we say those things are seen in the Sun, which are seen by the Sun. And in this Sense they allow that the Soul knows things in the eternal Reason, by the participation of which we know all things; and that for this Reason, because that intellectual Light which is in us is nothing else but a certain participated Similitude of the increated Light, wherein the eternal Reasons are contain'd. So that in short, according to the Doctrine of the Schools, we do

not

not at present see things in their eternal Reasons *Objectively*, as if those eternal Reasons were the immediate Objects of our Understanding, but only *Casually*, as *Aquinas* is pleased to distinguish. Part 1. Quæs. 84. Art. 5.

3. Well, but however in the first place they expressly own that there are such eternal Reasons or Ideas of things, tho' they will not allow them to be the immediate Objects of our Understanding. The Schools are for an intelligible World as well as we, and their intelligible World happens to be the very same with ours. As they are for a World of Ideas, so they place these Ideas in God: And they own not only the Truth, but the Necessity of this Supposition. This *Aquinas* repeats no less than four times in the very same Article. 'Cum omnia sint à 'Deo, non à Casu Facta, Ne- 'cessarium est in ejus mente omnium Ideas 'præexistere Objectivè, ad quarum Similitudi- 'nem omnia Condita sunt. *Again*, Necesse 'est ponere in Mente Divina Ideas. *Again*, 'Necesse est ponere Ideas. *And again*, Quia 'Mundus non est Casu factus, sed à Deo per 'Intellectum agente; Necesse est quod in Men- 'te Divina sit forma ad Similitudinem cujus 'Mundus est factus, & in hoc consistit ratio 'Ideæ.' And as they affirm the Ideas of all things to be in God, so they consequently suppose God to make all things, and to know all things Part 1. Quæs. 15. Art 1.

things by thoſe Ideas. But now this will go a great way towards our Ideal Syſtem, whereof they may reaſonably be thought herein to have laid the grounds, however they came not to build upon them. And that for the like reaſon that we ſuppoſe our ſelves, in the former Part, to have laid the Foundation of this. And indeed, ſince they own the Doctrine of the Divine Ideas, than which certainly none can be more repreſentative of things, why ſhould they look out for any other Materials of Thought, or Objects of Underſtanding, and put themſelves to invent I know not what *Intentional Species*, and I know not what *Intellectus Agens*, again to refine thoſe Species into an intelligible State and Temper, with a deal of ſuch Philoſophick, or rather Romantick Revery, eſpecially conſidering that according to themſelves, this ſhall be the way of our Underſtanding in the other Life, and that they own the neceſſity of our Underſtanding by ſome Ideas or other even in this?

4. Indeed did they ſuppoſe (what I preſume the Vulgar do, but what no *Philoſophy* that I know of does) that Objects are ſeen immediately by themſelves, then tho' they ſhould hold never ſo aſſuredly, that the Ideas of all things are in the *Divine* Mind, it would not be at all ſtrange, if they did not make theſe Ideas to be the Objects of *ours*: For when things are ſuppoſed to be ſeen by their very ſelves there is no occaſion for the Divine Ideas, nor indeed for

any

any other. But now they are as little for the immediate visibility of things as we are, and as much for the necessity of Ideas in order to the Perception of them. As they will not allow the Soul to understand things by its own Essence; so neither by the immediate Essence of the things themselves, but by their *Species*. So that they have their intelligible World again (such as it is) in this sense also as well as we; that is, I mean, that as they acknowledge the Ideas of all things to be in God, as was noted before; so they also stand for the necessity of some Ideas or other, or as they call them Species, for the Perception of things. So that still, according to themselves, there is a certain intelligible World, which is the immediate Object of our Thought. But then, why should not the Divine Ideas be this Intelligible World? Why will they apply themselves rather to Bodies for the Light of their Minds, and to their own Souls for a distinct faculty to refine and spiritualize that Light, especially considering those two great Axioms of their own, that God and Nature do nothing in vain, and that 'tis in vain to have that done by more means, which may be done by fewer? But then, why again do they multiply so many other Ideas besides those that are Divine? For since they own these Ideas, and the necessity of our perceiving things by some, would it not be a pursuance of their own Principles, and of that train which they themselves have laid, to suppose these

Ideas

Ideas to be the Ideas whereby we underſtand? Yes it would, but that ſince the Corruption of Humane Nature Men are afraid to meet with God, and ſtill fly from him as ſinning *Adam* did, and would rather ſuppoſe a Power in Bodies, as to cauſe their Senſations, ſo alſo to furniſh them with Ideas, depend upon themſelves, or upon ſomething beneath themſelves, rather than owe their dependance to God, or acknowledge him to be either the Light of their Minds, or the only true Good of their Souls.

5. But after all we muſt not forget (tho' it looks as if they themſelves did) that other Maxim of theirs, That Science is of Neceſſaries and Immutables. It is indeed very right: But then it ſhould be conſider'd withal, that Ideas muſt be the Object of it; and that not only becauſe there can be nothing elſe in the Nature of things that is Neceſſary and Immutable, but alſo becauſe our Ideas are, as themſelves allow, the immediate Objects of the Mind, and therefore all Science muſt unavoidably reſpect our Ideas and their Relations, as the true Object of it. But then 'tis plain by their own Maxim, that theſe Ideas muſt be Neceſſary and Immutable. And if they can find any ſuch beſides the Divine, they muſt have a good *Invention*, but if not, then by their own Principle they will be oblig'd to acknowledge theſe to be the Ideas whereby we underſtand. And indeed when all is conſidered that might reaſonably induce them to it, and that e-

ven

ven of their *own*, it is much to be admired how they came not to do it, especially considering how much this Hypothesis of Humane Understanding is favour'd by St. *Austin*, whose Authority is so sacred with them upon other occasions.

6. And this is the Authority (not because I have no other, but because I know no greater) upon which we shall now devolve our selves for the more advantageous Recommendation of the System which is here proposed. St. *Austin*, as I think, was a Man of a large Capacity, and of great Thought and Reflexion, and one, had the Sciences been then as much improved, and the Art of Thinking reduced to such a Method as it is now, from whom we might reasonably have expected the very utmost that the Force of Human Nature could ever have arrived to. There are two sorts of Thinking Men to be observ'd among Writers, not to mention a Third, which amends the Defects of each. Some there are that think pretty much while they are actually writing, but not much at other times; and so their Composition is elaborate, their Method formal, their Expression pretty correct, and their Sentences laid out in harmonical and proportionably returning Periods, and so all goes off with the generality of Readers smoothly and plausibly; but after all, when it comes nicely to be examin'd, there is little or nothing in it, tho' perhaps oftentimes more than there should be, and that because more than is true. Others

again

again there are, who think much habitually, and at other times; but not altogether ſo much while actually engaged in writing, becauſe it may be they write in haſte, or cannot well endure the Fatigue of thinking intenſely and writing at the ſame time: And ſo accordingly their Thoughts are great, and their Concluſions generally right, as being ſuch as have frequently paſſed in their Minds before, tho' neither the one be always reſolv'd into their proper Principles, nor the other always diſpoſed according to the exacteſt Order; that is, in ſhort, their Matter is good and ſubſtantial, but they are ſometimes a little negligent in the manner. Of this latter Character I take St. *Auſtin* to be: He thought much; but writing ſo much as he did, and being otherwiſe ſo much employ'd as he was, it cannot be expected that he ſhould be always ſo juſt and accurate (as Men are now) in the Diſpoſal and Expreſſion of his Thoughts. Tho' as to the latter, I think it may be properly remarked, that as no Man has ſaid greater Things than he, ſo none has expreſſed them more happily than he oftentimes does; and that not ſo much becauſe he labour'd to do it, as becauſe with that Fineneſs of Wit, and Natural Taſte of good Senſe which he had, he could not well do otherwiſe. So that upon the whole, and with due allowance for the Diſadvantage of the Age wherein he writ, I take him to have been a very Great, as well as a very Good Man, and worthy

worthy of all that Reverence and high Esteem which has been paid to his Name, both in the School and in the Church; upon which Consideration I the less admire to find him quoted so much as he is, even by those who are the least addicted to Authority, I mean the Modern Philosophers. For indeed this Father stands them in great stead, some of the best Foundations of the new Philosophy being laid in his Principles. And my Opinion is, that if the Schools had follow'd St. *Austin* more than they have done, and *Aristotle* less, they would have left us another System of both Physical and Metaphysical Doctrine than what the World now possesses.

7. As far therefore as any regard is due to *Authority*, I think it is due to his: And to render what I shall produce from this Great Man the more considerable, I must premonish my Reader before-hand, that he may have some reason to expect that my Quotations should be very choice, and that he should not look upon this as an ordinary Common-place way of writing. I shall not be so vain as to commend any other part of my Work, of whose great Defectiveness I am not insensible; but I might perhaps without Vanity be allow'd to speak up a little for my Quotations, and especially those from St. *Austin*; and that because in reading his Works, I was at the Pains to mark out, and make short References to whatsoever appear'd to me of considerable Importance, either in it self,

ſelf, or with relation to the preſent Theory. But I ſhall not trouble my Reader with all, but only with a few of the moſt remarkable Paſſages, which, without any farther Formality, we will take in the ſame Order as they lie, leaving the regular Diſpoſal of them to thoſe who have Leiſure and Inclination to be more Methodical.

8. The firſt remarkable Paſſage which occurs to our purpoſe is in his *Retractations*; where having ſaid ſomething ſomewhere concerning Science, as if it were a Recollection of ſomewhat that was known before, thereby ſeeming to favour the *Platonick* Notion of Pre-exiſtence, he retracts it, and reſolves thoſe right Anſwers which are given by the Ignorant concerning certain Sciences, when they are aptly interrogated, into the Preſence of the Eternal Reaſon to their Minds, wherein they ſee thoſe immutable Truths. ‘ Quodam loco dixi, quod Diſ-
‘ ciplinis liberalibus eruditi ſi-
Retract. Lib. 1. *Cap.* 4. ‘ ne dubio in ſe illas Oblivione
‘ Obrutas eruunt diſcendo, &
‘ quodammodo refodiunt. Sed hoc quoq; im-
‘ probo. Credibilius eſt enim propterea vera
‘ reſpondere de quibuſdam Diſciplinis, etiam
‘ imperitos earum, quando bene interrogantur,
‘ quia præſens eſt eis, quantum id capere poſ-
‘ ſunt, Lumen Rationis Æternæ, ubi hæc im-
‘ mutabilia vera conſpiciunt, non quod nove-
‘ rant aliquando & Obliti ſunt, quod Platoni,
‘ vel talibus viſum eſt. Theſe are very remarkable

kable Words, and what are capable of a farther Improvement, as being no leſs applicable to the great Queſtion of *Innate Notions*. For, as St. *Auſtin* ſays here, the right Anſwers of Ignorant Men, upon a due Interrogation to certain Queſtions, is not from their having known them formally, and forgotten them ſince; but becauſe the Light of the eternal Reaſon is preſent to them: So it may in like manner be ſaid (or elſe it will not be very eaſy what to ſay) that the ready Aſſent which is ſo univerſally given to certain Truths upon the firſt propoſal of them, is not becauſe thoſe Truths are *Innate*, but becauſe the Light of the eternal Reaſon, Word, or Wiſdom where thoſe Truths are, is preſent to Mens Minds to be conſulted by them upon every occaſion: And when they do conſult it they cannot but immediately perceive ſeveral Truths by it, becauſe of their great intelligibility and plainneſs to be perceived; and they cannot but aſſent to what they clearly perceive.

9. He has another very remarkable Paſſage to the like purpoſe in the ſame Book: For having ſaid that the Soul brought with her into the World all the Arts, and that what we call Learning is only Remembring; he here puts in a caution that he would not have this underſtood in favour either of Tranſmigration or Pre-exiſtence, as if the Soul ſhould be ſuppoſed to have learnt in another Life what it anſwers to without having learnt it here; ſince this he ſays

may be, becauſe ſhe is an intellectual Nature, and is united to intelligible and immutable Things. And that ſhe is ſo made, or is of ſuch a Nature, that when ſhe applies herſelf to thoſe things to which ſhe is united, or to herſelf, as far forth as ſhe ſees thoſe things, ſo far ſhe anſwers rightly concerning theſe. Which indeed is an excellent Account of the Matter, and what again is as applicable to the Queſtion of *Innate Notions*, as every one that underſtands any thing of that Queſtion may eaſily perceive.

Ibid. Cap. 8. His Words are, 'Illud quod Dixi omnes Artes animam ſe-'cum attuliſſe mihi videri, nec aliud quicquam 'eſſe id quod dicitur diſcere quam reminiſci ac 'recordari, non ſic accipiendum eſt quaſi ex 'hoc approbetur, animam vel hic in alio Cor-'pore, vel alibi ſive in Corpore ſive extra Cor-'pus aliquando vixiſſe, & ea quæ interrogata 'reſpondet cum hic non didicerit, in alia vita 'ante didiciſſe. Fieri enim poteſt ſicut jam in 'hoc Opere ſupra diximus (refering to the place before-mentioned) ut hoc ideo poſſit, quia 'Natura intelligibilis eſt, & Connectitur non 'ſolum Intelligibilibus, verum etiam Immuta-'bilibus rebus. Eo Ordine facta eſt, ut cum ſe 'ad eas res movet, quibus connexa eſt, vel 'ad ſeipſam, in quantum eas videt, in tantum 'de his vera reſpondeat.

10. Again, in his Confeſſions he owns God to be the only teacher of Truth, and thence concludes, that what he learnt was from him, becauſe

becauſe it was true. 'Me 'autem jam docueras Deus 'Meus, miris & occultis mo- 'dis, & propterea credo quod tu me docueris, 'quoniam verum eſt, nec quiſquam præter te 'alius eſt Doctor veri,' *&c.* *Confeſ.* Lib. 5. Cap. 6. As alſo to be the only Light, 'Hominis A- 'nima quamvis Teſtimonium 'perhibeat de Lumine, non eſt 'tamen ipſa lumen, ſed verbum Dei Deus eſt 'lumen verum quod illuminat omnem homi- 'nem venientem in hunc mundum.' *Again*, 'Non enim lumen nos ſumus, 'ſed illuminamur à te, ut qui 'fuimus aliquando tenebræ, 'ſimus lux in te.' *Again*, 'Illi 'intelligunt, qui ejus vocem 'acceptam foris, intus cum ve- 'ritate conferunt. *Again*, 'Ecce 'in te veritas video, *&c.* *Again*, 'Ipſum eſt verbum tuum, quod '& principium eſt, qui & lo- 'quitur nobis, ſicut in Evangelio per Carnem 'ait, & hoc inſonuit foris auribus hominum ut 'crederetur, & intus quæreretur, & invenire- 'tur in Æterna veritate ubi omnes Diſcipulos 'bonus & ſolus Magiſter do- 'cet.' *Again*, 'O Sapientia 'Dei Lux mentium, *&c.* *A- gain*, 'Si ambo videmus verum 'eſſe quod dicis, & ambo videmus verum eſſe 'quod dico, ubi quæſo id videmus? Nec ego

Ibid. Lib. 7. Cap. 9.

Ibid. Lib. 9. Cap. 4.

Ibid. Lib. 10. C. 6.

Ibid. Lib. 10. C. 37.

Ibid. Lib. 11. C. 8.

Cap. 11.

Ibid. 12. Ca. 25.

'utiq; in te, nec tu in me, ſed ambo in ipſa 'quæ ſupra mentes Noſtras 'eſt incommutabili veritate.

Ibid. Lib. 13. Cap. 15.

'*Again*, ſpeaking of the Angels, 'Vident faciem tuam Semper, & ibi le-'gunt ſine Syllabis temporum, *&c.* Non clau-'ditur codex eorum, nec plicabitur liber eorum, 'quia tu ipſe illis hoc es, *&c.*

Cap. 16.

Again, 'Anima mea ſicut 'terra ſine aqua tibi quia ſicut ſe illuminare de 'ſe non poteſt, ita ſe ſatiare de ſe non poteſt, 'ſic enim apud te fons vitæ, quomodo in lumi-'ne tuo videbimus lumen.

11. *Again*, In his Book of Muſick, ſays he, 'In lumine 'tuo videbimus lumen, *&c.* In 'lumine ſcilicet Chriſto accipiendum, qui Sa-'pientia Dei eſt, & lumen toties appellatur.

De Muſica. Lib. 6. Cap. 16.

12. *Again*, in his Soliloquies. 'Deus Intelligibilis lux, 'in quo, & à quo, & per quem 'intelligibiliter lucent, quæ intelligibiliter lucent omnia. *Again*, 'Exaudi 'Deus Meus, Salus mea, lux 'mea, vita mea.

Soliloq. Lib. 1. Cap. 1.

Ibid.

13. *Again*, In his Book *de Magiſtro*, 'De univerſis quæ in-'telligimus non loquentem qui 'perſonat foris, ſed intus ipſi menti præſiden-'tem conſulimus veritatem, verbis fortaſſe ut 'conſulamus admoniti. Ille autem qui Con-'ſulitur, docet, qui in interiori homine habi-

De Magiſtro, C. 11.

tare

'tare dictus est Christus, id est, incommutabilis Dei virtus atq; Sempiterna Sapientia. 'Quam quidem omnis rationalis anima consulit, sed tantum cuiq; panditur, quantum 'capere propter propriam, sive malam sive bonam voluntatem potest. Et si quando fallitur 'non fit vitio consultæ veritatis, ut neq; hujus 'quæ foris est lucis vitium est quod corporei 'oculi sæpe falluntur. *Again*, 'De his quæ intelliguntur, in- Cap. 12. 'teriorem veritatem ratione 'consulimus. *Again*, 'Cum Ibid. 'de iis agitur quæ mente con- 'spicimus, id est intellectu atq; ratione, ea 'quidem loquimur quæ præsentia contuemur 'in illa interiore luce veritatis qua ipsæ qui dici- 'tur homo interior illustratur & fruitur. Et hunc 'quoq; noster Auditor, si & ipse illo secreto ac 'simplici oculo videt, novit quod dico sua Con- 'templatione non verbis meis. Ergonè hunc 'quidem doceo vera dicens, vera intuentem? 'Docetur enim non verbis meis, sed ipsis rebus 'Deo intus pandente mani- 'festius. *Again*, 'In iis quæ Cap. 13. 'mente Cernuntur frustrà cernentis loquelas 'audit quisquis ea cernere non potest, nisi quia 'talia quamdiu ignorantur utile est Credere. 'Quisquis autem cernere potest intus est Disci- 'pulus Veritatis, foris judex 'loquentis, *&c. Again*, Illi qui Cap. 14. 'Discipuli vocantur, utrum vera dicta sint a- 'pud semetipsos considerant, interiorem scili-

Ibid. 'cet illam veritatem pro viri-
'bus intuentes. *Again*, 'Per
'homines ſignis admonemur & foris, ut ad eum
'intro converſi erudiamur, quem diligere &
Ibid. 'noſſe beata vita eſt. *Again*, Ego
'vero didici admonitione ver-
'borum tuorum nihil aliud verbis quam admo-
'neri hominem ut diſcat---utrum autem vera
'dicantur eum docere ſolum qui ſe intus ha-
'bitare cum foris loqueretur, admonuit. Quem
'jam favente ipſo tanto ardentius diligam,
'quanto ero in diſcendo provectior. Veruntа-
'men huic Orationi tuæ ob hoc habeo Maxi-
'me gratiam, quod omnia quæ contradicere,
'paratus eram præoccupavit atq; diſſolvit, ni-
'hilq; abs te derelictum eſt, quod me dubium
'faciebat, de quo non ita mihi reſponderet ſe-
'cretum illud Oraculum, ut tuis verbis aſſere-
'batur. Theſe Paſſages are very great, and very expreſs to our purpoſe, as indeed is the deſign of this whole Book, being a Dialogue between himſelf and his Son *Adeodatus*, wherein he ſhews, that 'tis not by Mens Words that we receive Inſtruction, but from the eternal Truth, *viz.* Jeſus Chriſt the Word of God, who informs us inwardly of all Truth, that ſo we may underſtand how truly it is ſaid by Divine Authority, that we ſhould call no Man Maſter upon Earth.

De lib. Arb. Lib. 2. Cap. 2. *Again*, In his Book *de libero Arbitrio*. 'Donabit quidem
'Deus, ut Spero, ut tibi vale-
'am

am reſpondere, vel potius ut ipſe tibi eadem, quæ ſumma omnium Magiſtra eſt Veritate intus docente, reſpondeas. *Again*, 'Veruntamen quæſo te quid de ipſa ſapientia putas exiſtimandum? Singulas quaſq; ſuas arbitraris ſingulos quoſq; homines habere Sapientias? An vero unam præſto eſſe communiter omnibus cujus quanto magis quiſq; fit particeps, tanto eſt ſapientior? Then a little after, 'Num aliam putas eſſe ſapientiam niſi veritatem, in qua cernitur & tenetur ſummum Bonum? Then again more poſitively, 'Si ſummum Bonum omnibus unum eſt, Oportet etiam veritatem in qua cernitur & tenetur, id eſt ſapientiam omnibus unam eſſe Communem. *Again*, 'Quod ergo unum verum videmus ambo ſingulis mentibus, nonne utriq; noſtrum Commune eſt? Manifeſtiſſimè. *Again*, Hoc ergo verum poteſt quiſq; ſuum proprium dicere, cum incommutabiliter contemplandum adſit omnibus qui hoc contemplari valent? *Again*, 'Quapropter nullo modo Negaveris eſſe incommutabilem veritatem hæc omnia quæ incommutabiliter vera ſunt continentem, quam non poſſis dicere tuam vel meam, vel cujuſquam hominis, ſed omnibus incommutabilia vera cernentibus, tanquam miris modis ſecretum & publicum lumen præſto eſſe ac ſe

Ibid. Cap. 9.

Cap. 10.

Ibid.

Cap. 12.

'præbere communiter. Omne autem quod 'communiter omnibus ratiocinantibus atq; in- 'telligentibus præſto eſt, ad ullius eorum pro- 'priè Naturam pertinere quis 'dixerit? *Again*, 'Tantum 'mens debet intelligere, quantum propius ad- 'moveri atq; inhærere potuerit incommutabili 'veritati. *Again*, 'In teipſum 'redeas, atq; intelligas te id 'quod attingis ſenſibus Corporis probare aut 'improbare non poſſe, niſi apud te habeas 'quaſdam Pulchritudinis leges, ad quas referas 'quæq; pulchra ſentis exteri- 'us. *Again*, 'O Suaviſſima 'Lux purgatæ mentis Sapientia----Væ qui ſe a- 'vertunt à lumine tuo, & obſcuritati ſuæ dul- 'citer inhærent. *Again*, (which 'is a Paſſage very remarkable) he ſhews that we cannot conceive any thing better in the Creature which eſcaped the thought of him that made it, by this Argument, becauſe if we ſee any thing better we muſt ſee it in the Divine Reaſons. 'Neq; enim 'tu potes aliquid melius in Creatura cogitare, 'quod Creaturæ Artificem fugerit. Humana 'quippe anima naturaliter Divinis ex quibus 'pendet connexa rationibus, cum dicit melius 'hoc fieret quam illud, ſi verum dicit, & videt 'quod dicit, in illis quibus con- 'nexa eſt rationibus videt. *Again*, 'Non enim Cogitatione videret fuiſſe fa- ciendum,

Ibid.

Cap. 16.

Ibid.

Lib. 3. Cap. 5.

Ibid.

'ciendum, nisi in iis rationibus quibus facta 'sunt omnia. *Again*, 'Si tu 'laudaris videndo quid facere Cap. 16. 'debeas, cum id non videas nisi in illo qui est 'incommutabilis veritas, quanto magis, *&c.*

15. *Again*, In his Book *de vera Religione*, 'Noli foras ire, in *De vera Relig.* Cap. 39. 'teipsum redi, minteriore ho- 'mine habitat veritas. *A-* Ibid. Cap. 49. *gain*, 'Omnia quæ de hac luce 'mentis nunc à me dicta sunt, nulla alia quam 'eadem luce manifesta sunt. Per hanc enim 'intelligo vera esse quæ dicta Cap. 55. 'sunt. *Again*, Non aliunde 'Sapiens Angelus, aliunde homo, sed ab una 'incommutabili Sapientia & Ibid. 'Veritate. *Again*, Ecce u- 'num deum colo, unum omnium Principium, '& unam Sapientiam, qua Sapiens est quæcunq; 'anima Sapiens est.

16. *Again*, In his Epistles. 'Veritas lumenq; animæ ratio- *Epist* 3. *ad Volus.* 'nalis non nisi Deus est. *A-* *Epist.* 56. *ad Di-* *gain*, 'Omnibus animis se frui *oscor.* 'valentibus veritas communi- 'ter præsto est. *Again*, Eo ip- *Epist.* 120. *ad Ho-* 'so quo forinsecus bene admo- *norat.* 'nentem Judicio non errante approbamus, 'quid aliud quam internum lumen Magistrum 'nos habere testamur? *Again*, *Epist.* 132. *ad Flo-* 'Dum tamen firmissimè tene- *rentinam.* 'as quòd etsi aliquid salubri-

ter

'ter per me ſcire potueris, ille te docebit qui 'eſt interioris hominis magiſter interior, qui in 'corde tuo tibi oſtendit verum eſſe quod dici-'tur, *&c.*

17. *Again*, In his Book *de Trinitate*, 'Cur ergo in Scriptu-'ris nunquam fere de ſapientia 'quicquam dicitur, niſi ut oſtendatur à Deo 'genita vel creata. Genita ſcilicet per quam 'facta ſunt omnia, Creata vero vel facta, ſi-'cut in hominibus, cum ad eam quæ non crea-'ta, nec facta, ſed genita eſt, convertuntur & 'illuſtrantur. *Again*, Speaking of the ſtrange-neſs how an unjuſt Mind ſhould be able to ſee what a juſt Mind is, 'Illud 'mirabile eſt, ut apud ſe ani-'mus videat quod alibi nuſ-'quam vidit, & verum videat, & ipſum ve-'rum ſcilicet juſtum animum videat, & ſit ipſe 'animus, & non ſit juſtus animus quem apud 'ſeipſum videt. Num eſt alius animus juſtus 'in animo nondum juſto? Aut ſi non eſt, quem 'ibi videt, cum videt & dicit quid ſit animus 'juſtus? An illud quod videt, veritas eſt in-'terior præſens animo, *&c.* *Again*, 'Vivendum ſic eſſe Dei 'Miniſtris, non de aliquibus auditum credi-'mus, ſed intus apud nos vel potius ſupra nos, 'in ipſa veritate conſpicimus. *Again*, 'In Deo conſpicimus 'incommutabilem formam Juſtitiæ ſecundum 'quam

De Trin. Lib. 7. Cap. 2.

Ibid. Lib. 8. Cap. 6.

Cap. 9.

Ibid.

'quam hominem vivere oportere judicamus. *Again*, Shewing how the eternal Word differs from the Word of our Mind, or rather that it does not really differ at all, 'In 'illa igitur æterna veritate ex 'qua temporalia facta sunt om- Lib. 9. Cap. 7. 'nia, formam secundum quam sumus, & se- 'cundum quam vel in nobis, vel in Corpori- 'bus vera & recta ratione aliquid operamur, 'visu mentis aspicimus, atq; inde conceptam 'rerum veracem notitiam, tanquam verbum a- 'pud nos habemus, & dicendo intus gignimus, 'nec à nobis nascendo discedit. The Words are in themselves very excellent, as well as very remarkably pertinent to our present purpose. To which we may add that *Book* of *Light* which he Lib. 14. Cap. 15. speaketh of, and wherein he supposes wicked Men to read the immutable Rules of Justice.

18. *Again*, In that imperfect Treatise which he has *De Genesi ad literam*, speaking of the Wisdom which is in God, he calls it, Illa sapientia quæ non par- Cap. 6. 'ticipando sapiens est, sed cujus participatione 'sapiens est anima quæcunq; sapiens est. And in his other perfect Treatise of that Title he says, 'Aliud autem est lu- 'men quo illustratur Anima. Lib. 12. Cap. 31. ---Nam illud ipse Deus est. *And*, Inde est quicquid intelligit.

19. *Again*,

19. Again, in his Book of Evangelical Questions, speaking of the Son of God, he says, 'Ipse est mentis 'nostræ lumen.

Quæs. Evan. Lib. 1. Qu. 1.

20. *Again*, in his Book *de Consensu Evangelistarum*, he has these positive Words, 'Nos vero, esse 'quandam Summam Dei Sapi-'entiam, cujus participatione 'fit sapiens quæcunq; anima fit verè sapiens, 'non tantum concemdimus, verum etiam maxi-'mè prædicamus. *Again*, 'Qua-'propter cum sit ipse Christus 'Sapientia Dei per quem (*rather* quam) creata sunt omnia, cumq; nullæ 'mentes rationabiles sive Angelorum sive ho-'minum, nisi participatione 'ipsius sapientes fiant. *Again*, 'Inde rursus pergit ad testimonium Joannis, & 'commendat amicum Sponsi non gaudere nisi 'propter vocem sponsi. Ubi admonet animam 'humanam non de se ipsa sibi lucere nec beari, 'nisi incommutabilis participatione Sapientiæ.

De Consens. Evangel. Lib. 1. Cap. 23.

Lib. 2. Cap. 35.

Lib. 3. Cap. 10.

21. *Again*, In his Book *de Civitate Dei*, 'Si sapientia Deus 'est, per quem facta sunt om-'nia sicut Divina autoritas veritasq; monstra-'vit, verus, Philosophus est amator Dei. *Again*, He owns those Philosophers as coming nearest to the truth of Christianity, who think thus of God, 'Quod & rerum 'Creatarum sit effector, & lu-'men

De Civ. Dei. Lib. 8. Cap. 1.

Cap. 9.

'men cognoſcendarum, & Bonum agenda-
'rum, quod ab illo nobis ſit & Principium Na-
'turæ, & Veritas Doctrinæ, & Fœlicitas Vitæ.
Whom he afterwards calls, Ibid.
'Principium noſtrum, lumen
'noſtrum, Bonum noſtrum. *A-*
gain, Hæc itaq; Cauſa eſt cur Cap. 10.
'iſtos cæteris præferamus, quia cum alii Philo-
'ſophi ingenia ſua ſtudiaq; contrivcrint in re-
'quirendis rerum Cauſis, & quinam eſſet Mo-
'dus diſcendi atq; vivendi, iſti Deo Cognito
'repererunt ubi eſſet Cauſa conſtitutæ univer-
'ſitatis, & Lux percipiendæ veritatis, & fons
'bibendæ Fœlicitatis, Sive ergo iſti Platonici,
'ſive quincunq; alii quarumlibet gentium Phi-
'loſophi de Deo iſta ſentiunt, Lib. 11. Cap.
'nobiſcum ſentiunt. *Again*, 10.
'Neq; enim multæ, ſed una
'Sapientia eſt, in qua ſunt immenſi quidam
'atq; infiniti theſauri rerum intelligibilium, in
'quibus ſunt omnes inviſibiles atq; incommu-
'tabiles rationes rerum, etiam viſibilium, quæ
'per iſtam factæ ſunt. *A-*
gain, Speaking of Angels, 'Ab Lib. 16. Cap.
'iis conſulitur incommutabi- 6.
'lis veritas, tanquam lex æterna in illa eorum
'Curia Superna; neq; enim ſibi ipſi ſunt veritas,
'ſed creatricis participes veritatis. Ad illam
'moventur tanquam ad fontem vitæ, ut quod
'non habent ex ſeipſis, capiant ex ipſa.

22. *Again*,

De util. Cred. C. 15.

22. *Again*, In his Book *de utilitate Credendi*, 'Deus eſt 'veritas nec ullo pacto ſapiens 'quiſquam eſt, ſi non veritatem mente contin-'gat.

Contra Epiſt. Manich. Cap. 36.

23. *Again*, In his Book *Contra Epiſtolam Manichæi*, 'Per 'homines commemoratio ali-'qua ſignis verborum fieri poteſt, Docet autem 'unus verus Magiſter, ipſa incorruptibilis ve-'ritas, ſolus Magiſter interior, qui etiam jam 'exterior factus eſt, ut nos ab exterioribus ad 'interiora revocaret.

De Pec. Merit. & Remiſ. Lib. 1. Cap. 25.

24. *Again*, In his Book *de Peccatorum Meritis & Remiſſione*, 'Illud quod in Evangelio poſi-'tum eſt, erat lumen verum 'quod illuminat omnem hominem, *&c.* ideo 'dictum eſt quia nullus hominum illuminatur 'niſi illo lumine veritatis quod Deus eſt, ne 'quiſquam putaret ab eo ſe illuminari à quo 'aliquid audit ut diſcat, non dico ſi quenquam 'magnum hominem, ſed nec Angelum ei con-'tingat habere Doctorem.

25. *Again*, In his Commentaries upon the *Pſalms*. 'Lumen illud unde ani-

In Pſal. 7. 'mæ tanquam lucernæ accen-'duntur, non alieno, ſed proprio ſplendore præ-

In Pſal. 8. 'fulget, quod eſt ipſa veritas. *Again*, Filius Dei virtus & ſa-'pientia Dei eſt, qua illuſtratur omnis quiſquis 'veritate

'veritate ſapiens efficitur. *Again*, 'Eſt noſter ſol juſtititiæ 'veritas Chriſtus, non iſte ſol qui adoratur à 'Paganis & Manichæis, *&c.* Sed ille alius, cujus 'veritate humana natura illuſtratur, ad quem 'gaudent Angeli. *In Pſal.* 25. *Again*, Upon thoſe words, *Send forth thy Light and thy Truth*, ſays he, Ipſe eſt lux 'tua & veritas tua. Hæc nomina duo, res una. 'Quid enim aliud lux Dei niſi veritas Dei? Aut 'quid veritas Dei niſi lux Dei? Et hoc utrunq; 'unus Chriſtus. Ego ſum lux mundi, *&c.* Ego 'ſum via, veritas & vita. *In Pſal.* 42. *Again*, 'Videte quid eſt, Fratres, 'in anima humana. Non habet ex ſe lumen, 'non habet ex ſe vires. Totum autem quod 'pulchrum eſt in anima, virtus & ſapientia eſt. 'Sed nec ſapit ſibi, nec valet ſibi, nec ipſa ſibi 'lux eſt, nec ipſa ſibi virtus eſt, eſt quædam 'Origo fonſq; virtutis, eſt quædam radix ſapi-'entiæ, eſt quædam ut ita dicam regio incommu-'tabilis veritatis. Ab hac anima recedens tene-'bratur accedens illuminatur. Accedite ad 'eum & illuminamini. *In Pſal.* 57. *Again*, 'Ut ſcirent ſe tanquam lucer-'nas de illo lumine quod immutabiliter lucet, 'accenſas. Nulla quippe Creatura, quamvis 'rationalis & intellectualis, a ſe ipſa illumina-'tur, ſed participatione Sempiternæ veritatis 'accenditur. *In Pſal.* 118. *Again*, 'Semper 'foras exis, intro redire de-'trectas. Qui enim te docet intus eſt. *In Pſal.* 139.

26. *Again*,

26. *Again*, In his Expoſition on St. *John*'s Goſpel. Having occaſion to mention thoſe words of the Pſalmiſt, *With thee is the well of life, in thy light we ſhall ſee light*; ſays he, 'In terra aliud 'eſt fons, aliud lumen. Sitiens quæris fontem, '& ut pervenias ad fontem, quæris lucem. 'Fons ille ipſa eſt lux. Sitientibus fons eſt, 'cæco lux eſt. *Again*, Hoc 'ipſum animæ quod Intellectus '& Mens dicitur, illuminatur luce Superiore. 'Jam Superior illa lux, qua Mens humana illu-'minatur Deus eſt. *Again*, 'Magiſtrum unum omnes ha-'bemus, & in una Schola 'Condiſcipuli ſumus. *Again*, Speaking of thoſe words, 'Accedite ad eum & 'illuminamini, *ſays he*, Si ergo accedendo illu-'minamini, & recedendo tenebramini, non erat 'in vobis lumen veſtrum, ſed 'in Deo veſtro. *Again*, 'Ha-'bemus intus Magiſtrum Chriſtum. Quic-'quid per aurem veſtrum, & os meum capere 'non potueritis, in corde veſtro ad eum con-'vertimini, qui & me docet quod loquor, & 'vobis quemadmodum dignatur diſtribuit. *Again*, 'Inſinuavit nobis ani-'mam humanam & mentem 'rationalem quæ ineſt homini, non ineſt Peco-'ri, non vegetari, non beatificari, non illu-'minari, niſi ab ipſa Subſtantia Dei. *Again*, upon

Expoſ. in Evan. Joan.

Tract. 13.

Tract. 15.

Tract. 16.

Tract. 19.

Tract. 20.

Tract. 23.

upon thoſe words, 'Ego ſum lumen mundi, 'qui ſequitur me non ambulabit in tenebris, 'ſed habebit lumen vitæ, *ſays he*, 'Non enim ſufficit dicere, Tract 34. 'qui me ſequitur non ambulabit in tenebris, ſed 'habebit lumen; Addidit enim (*rather* etiam) vi- 'tæ. Sicut ibi dictum eſt quoniam apud te fons 'vitæ. Videte fratres mei quomodo verba domi- 'ni cum illius Pſalmi veritate concordent. Et 'ibi lumen poſitum eſt cum fonte vitæ, & à do- 'mino dictum eſt lumen vitæ. In iſtis autem 'uſibus Corporalibus aliud eſt lumen, aliud fons. 'Fontem fauces quærunt, lumen oculi. Quan- 'do ſitimus quærimus fontem, quando in tene- 'bris ſumus quærimus lumen. Non eſt ſic a- 'pud Deum. Quod lumen eſt, hoc eſt fons. 'Qui tibi lucet ut videas, ipſe 'tibi manat ut bibas. *Again*, Tract. 54. 'Non ſic loquitur veritas, intelligentibus men- 'tibus intus loquitur; ſine ſono inſtruit, intelli- 'gibili luce perfundit.

27. *Again*, In his Expoſition on the firſt Epiſtle of St. *John*. 'Sonus verborum no- 'ſtrorum aures percutit, magiſter intus eſt. No- 'lite putare quenquam hominem aliquid dicere 'ab homine. Admonere poſſumus per Strepi- 'tum vocis noſtræ; ſi non ſit intus qui doceat, 'inanis fit ſtrepitus noſter. Adeo fratres vultis noſſe? Nunquid non Sermonem iſtum omnes audiſtis? Quam multi hinc indocti exituri ſunt? Quantum ad me pertinet, omnibus locutus ſum. Sed quibus unctio illa intus non *Expoſ. in Epiſt. 1 St. Joan.* Tract. 3.

'loquitur, quos Spiritus Sanctus non docet, in-'docti redeunt. Magisteria forinsecus adjuto-'ria quædam sunt, & admonitiones. Cathe-'dram in cœlo habet qui corda docet.

De Verbis Dom. Sermo. 8. 28. *Again*, In his Volume of Sermons. 'Dic quia tu tibi 'lumen non es. Ut multum, 'oculus es, lumen non es. Dic, à te tibi lumen 'non esse, & clama quod Scriptum est, tu illu-

De Verbis Apost. Sermo 30. 'minabis lucernam meam Do-'mine, *&c.* *Again*, Non sum 'mihi ipse lumen, nam si essem 'nunquam errassem. *Again*, Lumen tibi esse, 'non potes, non potes, non potes. *Again*, Illu-'minandi sumus, lumen non sumus. *Again*, 'Vis nosse quid es? Tenebræ. *Again*, Audies 'ab Apostolo, fuistis aliquando tenebræ, nunc 'autem lux. Sed addit lux. Sed ubi? in Do-'mino. Ergo tenebræ in te, lux in Domino, 'quia non tibi potes lucere, accedendo illumi-'naris, recedendo tenebraris, quia non tibi lu-

De Diversis Sermo 9. 'men tu ipse es, aliunde illu-'minaris. *Again*, Nunquid 'angelis codices sunt necessarii, '*&c.* Absit videndo legunt. Vident enim ip-'sam veritatem, & illo fonte satiantur, unde

De Diversis Sermo 40. 'nos irrogamur. *Again*, Su-'periori loco propter præconi-'um præsidemus, sed in una 'Schola Communem magistrum in cœlis habe-

De Diversis Sermo 44. 'mus. *Again*, Conamini co-'gitare fratres, lumen veritatis,

'tis, lucem ſapientiæ, quomodo ubiq; præſens 'eſt omnibus, *&c.*

29. There are a few more remarkable Paſſages, which becauſe they happen'd to be overlook'd in their proper places, I ſhall now add here. 'Errores & falſæ 'Opiniones vitam contaminant, *Confeſ.* Lib. 4. Cap. 15. 'ſi rationalis mens ipſa vitioſa 'eſt, qualis in me tunc erat neſciente alio lu- 'mine illam illuſtrandam eſſe, ut ſit Particeps 'veritatis, quia non eſt ipſa Na- 'tura veritatis. *Again*, Do- *Confeſ.* Lib. 9. Cap. 9. 'cente te Magiſtro intimo in 'Schola Pectoris. *Again*, 'U- *Confeſ.* Lib. 10. Cap. 26. 'biq; veritas præſides omnibus 'conſulentibus te ſimulq; reſpondes omnibus 'etiam diverſa conſulentibus, liquidè tu reſpon- 'des, ſed non liquidè omnes 'audiunt. *Again*, Intus utiq; *Confeſ.* Lib. 11. Cap. 3. 'mihi, intus in domicilio cogi- 'tationis, nec Hebræa, nec Græca, nec Latina, 'nec Barbara veritas, ſine oris & linguæ Orga- 'nis, ſine ſtrepitu Syllabarum, diceret, verum 'dicit. *Again*, Quis docet Cap. 8. 'nos niſi ſtabilis veritas? Quia '& per creaturam mutabilem cum admonemur, 'ad veritatem ſtabilem duci- *De Ordine.* Lib. 1. Cap. 4. 'mur. *Again*, Nec enim al- 'tus Apollo eſt, qui in ſpelun- 'cis, in Montibus, in Nemoribus nidore thuris 'pecudumq; calamitate concitatus implet in- 'ſanos, ſed alius profecto eſt, alius ille altus

'veridicus, atq, ipſa (quid enim verbis ambi-'am) veritas. Cujus vates ſunt quicunq; poſ-'ſunt eſſe ſapientes. *Again*, 'Principium creaturæ intel-'lectualis eſt Æterna ſapientia, 'quod Principium manens in ſe incommutabi-'liter, nullo modo ceſſat occulta inſpiratione 'vocationis loqui ei Creaturæ, cui Principium 'eſt, ut convertatur ad id ex quo eſt, quod ali-'ter formata ac Perfecta eſſe non poſſit. Which laſt excellent Words let me preſent to the Engliſh Reader, as M. *Malebranche* tranſlates them. The eternal Wiſdom is the principle of all Creatures capable of Intelligence. And this Wiſdom remaining always the ſame never ceaſes to ſpeak to its Creatures in the ſecret Receſs of their Reaſon, that they may turn towards their Principle. Since there is nothing but the view of that eternal Wiſdom which gives Being to Spirits that can finiſh or accompliſh them, and give them the laſt Perfection whereof they are capable.

De Gen. ad litt. Lib. 1. Cap. 5.

30. If any ſhall think theſe Citations from St. *Auſtin* long, they may make them as much ſhorter as they pleaſe. For my own part I could eaſily have ſtay'd with him longer, not only becauſe I like his Company, but becauſe he has abundance more to the like purpoſe. But as I would not for my Readers ſake go through with him, ſo I could not without ſome denial to my Subject as well as Humour, have left him much ſooner. And now I have, I hope

hope to be excuſed, if not thank'd, for the pains I have been at in making this *Collection*, which, tho' St. *Auſtin*'s Works are common, yet, conſidering how large they are, and how they may be commonly read, I cannot but think to be of ſome value and conſideration. And I do accordingly recommend it to be conſidered with as much Heed and Attention, as it is put together with Care and Fidelity. You ſee here how this great Doctor and Father of the Chriſtian Church eſpouſes the Notion we are upon, and expreſſes it with great variety, placing it in all its Lights, and that it may be the better ſeen in them, doing by it as the Maſters of *Perſpective* do by great Edifices, ſometimes giving a view of one ſide, and ſometimes of another, that ſo the whole Fabrick may not fail one way or other to come under a diſtinct view. Some of his Expreſſions relate to the preſence of the Eternal Reaſon to Mens Minds, ſome to the Union that the Soul has to the intelligible World. Some again to the impoſſibility of our being a Light to ourſelves, ſome tend to ſhew that God only is our Light, Maſter and Teacher; and particularly the eternal Word or Wiſdom of God. Some relate to the interiority of Truth, ſome to our conſulting it, ſeeing it, and receiving Anſwers from it, as from a ſecret Oracle. Some to the Unity of Wiſdom, and Community of Truth, and our participation of both Truth and Wiſdom. Some to thoſe

Laws of Order and Proportion, thoſe Ideal Meaſures or Reaſons, whereby we judge of the Beauty of things: And ſome again to our ſeeing in thoſe very Ideal Reaſons, whereby things were made. Some to the Community of Light that is between Angels and Men, nay, even between Men and God himſelf. Some to the Original which the Word of our Minds takes from the view which we have of the eternal Truth, imploying the real Identity between our Word and the eternal Word, inaſmuch as the eternal Word is the Object of our Thought. Some to the Divinity of Wiſdom, and thence inferring that a true Philoſopher or lover of Wiſdom, is a lover of God. Some to the ſuperiority of that which inlightens us, that it muſt be ſomething better and more excellent than the Soul, and that That ſuperiour Light is Divine. Some again to ſhew that the Object of our Knowledge and of our Happineſs is the ſame; and that as we are not Beatify'd, ſo neither are we Inlightn'd but by the very Subſtance of God, with other things of like Nature, as the Reader may obſerve. In fine, here is ſuch variety of Expreſſion, and diverſity of Poſture, that there is hardly a *ſide* of our Syſtem but what is ſome way or other turn'd to our view: So that you have not only his *Authority*, but, as it were, his *Comment* and *Paraphraſe*. And indeed I cannot but think it a little ſtrange, that a thing ſo variouſly and ſo much inculcated as this is, ſhould ſo far eſcape

ſcape the notice of *Learned* Men, as this ſeems to have done. And that Men who deal much in Antiquity, and that appear conſiderable for their Acquaintance with Eccleſiaſtical Writers, ſhould yet ſeem to ſtartle at this Notion as a ſtrange ſingular Amuſement. But if ſo, at what rate do theſe Men read the *Fathers?* For whatever becomes of the *Reaſon* of this Notion (whereof ſome other Men may perhaps be as competent Judges as themſelves) yet ſure it cannot be pretended to be altogether deſtitute of *Authority*, or to be ſo *Novel*, as by their ſurprize at it, and prejudice againſt it, they ſeem to imply. You ſee that here the Concluſion, or if you will, the *Hypotheſis* of this Theory (for I propoſe it for no more) is in great meaſure St. *Auſtin*'s, and that we have done little more (I mean as to what concerns our Underſtanding by the *Divine Ideas*) than to find out Premiſes for his Concluſion, to reſolve it into Principles, diſpoſe it into a right Method, and reduce what lies looſely and at large in the *Sea* of his Writings, into the order of a regular Syſtem. But as to the Subſtance of the thing, there he has been in great meaſure before-hand with us. And therefore, ſince what is here propoſed to the view, and ſubmitted to the Judgment of the Rational World, is in the main and fundamental Parts of it the expreſs Doctrine of St. *Auſtin* (who by the way delivers himſelf much more poſitively in it than I do) I ſee no juſt Foundation for the prejudice

or imputation of Novelty or Singularity, nor ſhould I reaſonably expect it from thoſe who pretend to be lovers of *Antiquity*. But if they be indeed ſo, they ſhould, after all, conſider that the moſt ancient thing is *Truth*, which is always old let it be born into the World when it will, and that if the Propoſition of this Theory were never ſo Novel as to humane Accounts, or with reſpect to the time of its appearance among Men; yet this, as every Body knows, is no juſt Objection in things of a Rational and Philoſophical Nature (wherein, as liberty of Philoſophizing is indulged, ſo new diſcoveries are allowed to be continually made) whatever force it may have in matters of Faith, and that depend upon Divine Revelation. But now this Theory is of as Rational a Nature as any thing that can come well under humane Conſideration, and accordingly is to ſtand or fall purely by Rational Meaſures: So that indeed I need not to have produced ſo much Authority for it, were it not out of compliance with the Infirmity of ſome Men (I beg their pardon for ſo calling it) who have a natural Prejudice againſt whatever wants it, tho' otherwiſe never ſo rational in itſelf; and withal to let them ſee, that, if they pleaſe, after all, to think me in an *Extravagance*, I am neither alone in it, nor with ordinary Company.

31. I know no ill Conſequence that can be fairly drawn from this Hypotheſis rightly underſtood, ſo that if it ſhould appear to be an Er-

ror,

ror, it would however, I think, be a very harmleſs one. But I know ſeveral good ones, and ſuch as are of the moſt important Moment. For tho' our Syſtem be in itſelf purely Philoſophical, and ſo has a right to the uſual Liberties and Privileges that belong to Matters of that Nature, yet there are ſome great things of near Concernment to Religion and Morality that depend upon it, as I ſhall now briefly remark in a few concluding Reflections, which perhaps to thoſe that duly conſider them, may have the force of ſo many *Arguments*.

Religious and Moral Inferences from the foregoing Principles.

32. In the firſt place, if our Hypotheſis be true, and the account here given of Humane Underſtanding right, then it plainly and neceſſarily follows, that there is a God. I do not ſay that the Hypotheſis itſelf directly proves it (tho' in ſome parts of it we have done that too) no, it rather ſuppoſes it. But this I ſay, that if this Hypotheſis concerning the manner of our Underſtanding be true, it clearly and immediately follows that there muſt needs be a God, and conſequently all thoſe rational Conſiderations which have been offered towards the ſhewing it to be true, are in effect ſo many Arguments for that which is the Foundation of all Religion, the Being of a God. It is, I confeſs, no ſmall Prejudice with me againſt the other Accounts of Humane Underſtanding, that they are all of them (except one) conſiſtent with

Atheiſm.

Atheiſm. The Fool that ſays in his Heart there is no God, may ſafely take up with them, and if he be not too *much* a Fool, may, perhaps, find ſomething in ſome of them that may be for his purpoſe, and ſerve to confirm, or at leaſt to humour him in his Opinion, or rather his Wiſh. But now this Hypotheſis is plain Antipodes to it, and ſuch as no Atheiſt can hold without a manifeſt Contradiction, ſince 'tis by the Union we have with God and his Divine Ideas that we are here ſuppoſed capable of Thought and Underſtanding. From every Act of which we may as well conclude the Divine Exiſtence as our own, it being as plain a Conſequence upon this Hypotheſis, *I think, therefore, God is*; as, *I think, therefore I am.*

33. And as this Hypotheſis ſtands in a Diametrical oppoſition to *Atheiſm*, ſo alſo is it as direct againſt *Arianiſm*, as implying the co-eſſentiality and conſubſtantiality of the Divine *Word* with God the Father, ſince the eternal Word and Wiſdom of God is here ſuppoſed to be the great Luminary of the whole intellectual World, the ſoveraign and univerſal Reaſon, whereof all Spirits participate, and by participation of whole Ideal Light they become Rational or Intelligent, capable of Thought and Underſtanding, being only *Eyes* to themſelves, as St. *Auſtin* expreſſes it, but not *Light*. God only, according to this Hypotheſis, is that, and therefore ſince the Word is here ſuppoſed

to

to illuminate us, by his Ideas, and by his eternal Truths, it follows, that according to the Principles of this Theory, the Word must be of the very same Essence and Nature with God the Father; and tho' the Person of the one be not the same with the Person of the other, yet that the God-head of the Father and of the Son (as 'tis expressed in the *Athanasian* Creed) is all one, the Glory equal, and the Majesty coeternal. Besides, it is further to be considered, that as our Ideas are supposed not to be created, so the *Truth*, which we contemplate according to this Hypothesis, is Necessary, Eternal, and Immutable, and consequently not the Creature or Effect of God, and consequently of the same Divine Nature with him. And then since, according to this Hypothesis again, the *Word* is supposed to be this Truth, according to what he says also of himself, *I am the way, the truth, and the life*; as also in his Prayer, *Sanctifie them through* (or in) *thy truth, thy word is truth* ὁ λόγος ὁ σὸς ἀλήθειά ἐστι (which is not so reasonable to understand of the written Word, as of the personal *Word*, the Word that St. *John* speaks of when he says, *In the beginning was the word*, &c. And so St. *Austin* understands it, 'Quid ergo: Sancti-
'fica eos in Veritate, nisi Sancti-
'fica eos in me? Et hoc a-
'pertius insinuare non desinit: Sermo inquit
'tuus veritas est. Quid aliud dixit, quàm ego
'veritas

Expos. in Evan. Joan. Tract. 108.

'veritas ſum? Græcum quippe Evangelium 'λόγ@ habet, quod etiam ibi legitur, ubi dictum 'eſt, in Principio erat verbum, *&c.*) I ſay, ſince the *Word* is here ſuppoſed to be that very Neceſſary, Eternal and Immutable Truth, it hence again follows, that the Word is truly and eſſentially Divine, and that it was not only in the beginning with God, but alſo was God, as the ſacred Evangeliſt ſpeaks. Indeed as for thoſe that ſuppoſe that Truth is not Neceſſary and immutable in itſelf, and by its own Nature, but made ſo by the poſitive Conſtitution or Legiſlation of God; and ſo, tho' Hypothetically Neceſſary, is yet abſolutely and ſimply Contingent; and tho' perhaps the firſt of the Creatures, yet ſuppoſe it to be really as much a Creature as any of the reſt, made by the free and arbitary Will of God, and not ingender'd of his Subſtance by a neceſſary Emanation from his Being; I ſay, they that conceive thus of Truth, beſides their undermining and overthrowing the Foundations of Science and Morality (for if Truth be a poſitive thing, then all is overturn'd) they do alſo in effect, tho' I hope not apprehenſive of that conſequence, ſpoil and diveſt the *Word* of his Divinity, and that becauſe the *Word* being really the ſame with Truth, muſt undergo the ſame fate with it. But now this Divinity of the *Word*, upon which the Truth of the *Chriſtian* Religion does as much depend as the Truth of Religion in general does upon the Being of God,

God, is in our Theory very ſafely and ſecurely lodged. So that 'tis as impoſſible for any Man that holds this Hypotheſis to be an *Arian*, as to be an *Athieſt*.

34. But then again upon the Suppoſition of this Theory (which methinks ſhould be another advantage to it) we are placed in the greateſt and moſt immediate dependence upon God. If the premiſed Account of the manner of our Underſtanding be true, the dependence that we and all other intelligent Beings have upon God, will be found to be as great as a Creature can well be conceiv'd to have upon his Creator, and that it makes us ſo very dependent upon him, ſeems to me a ſtrong Preſumption that it is true. For as 'tis Metaphyſically certain that we depend upon God vaſtly more than Men, even amongſt the Learned, generally imagine, or are willing to believe: So 'tis evident that our dependence upon God has a great influence upon Religion, as being the Ground and Foundation of ſome of the principal and moſt weighty Duties of it, which we owe and juſtly pay to God, not ſo much perhaps for our firſt receiving our Being from him, as upon the account of that immediate and continual dependence which we have upon him. So that notwithſtanding the bold and forward offers that have been made by ſome Men towards the ſetting up the Creature upon a bottom of its own, I cannot but look with a very jealous Eye upon all ſuch Opinions as tend to leſſen that eſ-

ſential

ſential dependence which we have upon God; and *Durandus* is to me a *Pelagian* in *Metaphyſicks*. But now it is far otherwiſe as to this Theory, wherein that Creaturely dependence upon God, which both Religion and the ſoundeſt Metaphyſicks require, is carried out to its full extent. God is here acknowledged as the only Object that is truly perfective of our Natures, and conſequently as our *Light*, as well as our *Good*. We are here ſuppoſed to depend upon God, not only for our Being, but for the whole Perfection of it, whether it be in the way of *Idea*, or in the way of *Sentiment*. As we can feel nothing unleſs he Modifies us, ſo neither upon the Principles of this Syſtem, is it poſſible that we, or the brighteſt Intelligence he has created, ſhould be able to know any thing, unleſs he inlighten us, and that not only Effectively, but Objectively. For in ſhort, as we have our intellectual Faculties from him, ſo we are here ſuppoſed to have our Ideas in him, without which our intellectual Faculties would be as Eyes without Light, and we ſhould be able to ſee nothing tho' we were all *Mind*. So that in this way of conceiving things, we depend as much upon God for our *Underſtanding*, as the greateſt *Anti-pelagian* could ſuppoſe us to do as to our *Will*, as being no more able to think or underſtand without the Divine *Light*, than we are to Will or Act what is Good without the Divine *Grace*.

35. Again,

35. Again, upon this Hypotheſis we are under peculiar ingagements of Love and Gratitude towards God, whom we are to regard, not only as our Chief, but as our only Good, the good of our Underſtandings, as well as the good of our Wills, and to Bleſs, Thank and Adore him, not only for that rational Nature, and thoſe intellectual Faculties which he has given us, but alſo for the immediate Illumination of that Nature, and for being himſelf the luminous and excellent Object of thoſe Faculties. Had God only been the cauſe of our Pleaſure, and ſomething elſe been the light of our Minds, as 'tis not eaſie to conceive how God could be ſaid to have made us intirely for himſelf; ſo neither is it that he ſhould be ſo completely our *good*, as he is now: Nor conſequently how we could reaſonably love him ſo intirely as now. For ſtill that ſomething elſe would have a fair pretence to put in for a part in our affectionate and grateful Acknowledgements, ſince whatever is the Light of our Underſtandings, is ſo far perfective of our rational Nature. For the prevention of which competition it appears, by the way, very reaſonable that Sentiment and Idea ſhould in this reſpect alſo go together, and that the ſame Divine Being that is the cauſe of our Pleaſure, ſhould alſo be the Fountain of our Light, that ſo our whole intellectual Good may concenter in God, as our only perfective and beautifying Object. And ſo, according to this

this Hypotheſis, it is. All our freſh Springs are here ſuppoſed to be in him, the Well of *Truth* as well as the Well of *Life*, and God that cauſes our Sentiments, is here alſo ſuppoſed to furniſh us with Ideas, nay, himſelf to be our intelligible Light. He is therefore now the intire good of our Souls, and conſequently the intire Object of our Affection, and there now appears a particular and very emphatical Reaſon why we ſhould love him with our whole *Mind*, as well as with our *Heart*, *Soul* and *Strength*. In ſhort, this Hypotheſis does not ſend us one way for the furniture of our Knowledge, and another way for the cauſe of our Sentiments, but he that cauſes the one, is here ſuppoſed to be the Object of the other, and ſo all Competitions are removed, and God is intirely placed upon the Throne of the Heart: Where let all the intellectual World Love, Bleſs, Adore and Praiſe him, for ever and ever, *Amen*.

I.

SIng, then ye bleſs'd Attendants on his Throne,
Hymns as immortal as your Joys above;
The Fountain of your Bliſs and Knowledge own,
And as you ſhine with Light, ſo burn with Love.

II.

Praiſe the great Author of your brighter Day,
To us below a Star, to you a Sun:
With never ſilent Harps this Tribute pay,
And Hallelujahs that are ſtill begun.

III.

You ſee the riſing Springs of Life and Light,
Which with a double Tide your Breaſts o'erflow,
O praiſe the beatifick Object of your Sight,
Whoſe good's your Life, and by whoſe Light you know.

IV.

You need not fear the exhauſting of your Lays,
While you in Song exalt your Heavenly King,
He has a boundleſs Theme to employ your praiſe,
As you a whole Eternity to Sing.

The *Pagans* that Worſhipped the Sun, did it, I preſume, for his *Light*, as well as for his *Heat*; and truly could I have the ſame Notion of the Sun that they had, and which moſt People now have, I ſhould think it reaſonable if not to Worſhip him, yet at leaſt to pay him ſome very peculiar Acknowledgement; and were I to Worſhip any *Creature*, it would, I think, upon this Suppoſition, be the *Sun*, which is generally preſumed to give us *Light* as well as *Heat*, and by that Light to diſcover to our view the Beauties of the ſenſible World, which accordingly we are ſaid to ſee in, and by the Light of the *Sun*. But this, as currant as it paſſes, I take to be a very confuſe way of talking, and ſuch as proceeds wholly upon the prejudice of Senſe, as moſt common forms of Expreſſion do. 'Tis falſe in both the Parts of it; for the Sun neither gives us Light, nor does Light properly diſcover any Objects to us: For Light, that is, that Light whereof we are inwardly conſcious when the Sun Shines, as we ſay, is a Sentiment of our Souls (as much as a *Taſte* or a *Smell*) upon which the Sun has no Power. Nor can this Light, as being a Sentiment, ſhew or diſcover any Object to us. For 'tis not *Sentiment*, but *Idea*, that is repreſentative of Objects. 'Tis not to be hop'd, that Philoſophy ſhould ever prevail againſt the Corruptions of Prejudice and Cuſtom; but if we will ſpeak of things rather as they are, than as they ſeem, I think

we

we muſt ſay, that the material Light of the Sun, or that ſubtile Matter that iſſues from it (which is the only Light that the Sun can be truly ſaid to give) ſtriking upon our Eyes, upon this luminous Impreſſion a Sentiment of Light follows, and upon that Sentiment an Idea of Body. And this makes us imagine that 'tis the *Light* that diſcovers the Body to us, makes it *viſible*, as we ſay, and that we ſee the Body in, or by the Light of the Sun. And ſo we do indeed in a large and improper Senſe: We ſee Body inaſmuch as we ſee the Idea which repreſents it (for properly ſpeaking we do not ſee Body at all) and we may be ſaid in ſome ſenſe to ſee by the Light, inaſmuch as the impreſſion of the material Light with that Sentiment of Light which follows upon it, is the occaſion of our having that Idea. But neither does the Sun give us that Sentiment, nor does the material Light, or that Sentiment of Light which we feel within our ſelves, ſhew or diſcover to us the Body which we are ſaid to ſee. No, 'tis the *Idea* only which does that, and 'tis the Idea only which we properly ſee, and whereby we ſee, that is, as by a proper *medium*, the Light, whether you take it for the material Light of the Sun, or for the Sentiment of Light, contributing no otherwiſe to our ſeeing Bodies, than as they may be occaſions of our having thoſe Ideas which repreſent them to our Minds. I ſay *Minds*; for as 'tis the Idea

only that is properly seen, and not the Body; so 'tis the Mind only that sees, and not the Eye, Seeing being indeed a sort of Thinking, and terminating immediately upon Idea, as all other Thought does, and differing no otherwise from it than as to the manner of our having that Idea, which I need not further explain. I know how hard it is to persuade People out of the prejudices of Sense, improved by Custom and Education, and confirmed by a certain *Philosophy*, which very much favours and indulges them, and we are forced sometimes to comply with them in the received forms of speaking; but however we may *talk*, let any one that can abstract from these Prejudices employ his Thoughts distinctly about this Matter, and *conceive* any otherwise of it if he can. We do not then truly see by the Light of the Sun, any more than we are warm'd by his Heat, but we see by an *intelligible* Light. For we see by Idea, and since, according to the Principles of this Theory, that Idea is in God, it hence follows, that God is truly all that to us which the Heathens of Old, and almost all People now vainly imagine of the *Sun*, that he is indeed our Light, the Light of our Minds, the *true* Light, as the Evangelist says, or our intelligible Light, as St. *Austin* calls him. 'Deus 'Intelligibilis lux, in quo, & 'a quo, & per quem intelligi- 'biliter

Soliloq. Lib. 1. Cap. 1.

'biliter lucent, quæ intelligibiliter lucent om-'nia, and therefore ought to have the higheſt Love, and the loweſt and moſt proſtrate veneration of all Spirits, as the true Sun of the intellectual World, the bright and inlightning Object of their Underſtandings. And therefore well might the Seraphick Father go on, after he had laid down this with ſome other Principles, to this Act of Adoration, 'Exaudi, De-'us meus, Salus mea, Lux mea, Vita mea.

36. Furthermore, if the Divine Ideas are the Ideas whereby we Think and Underſtand, as by the whole Tenor of this Theory, there appears great Reaſon to believe, then it will hence follow again, that the Divine Word or Wiſdom in which thoſe Ideas are, is our only true Teacher and Maſter that inlightens our Underſtandings, and whom conſequently we are to conſult by all inward Application and Attention for the knowledge of thoſe Truths which depend upon thoſe Ideas. And that *Words*, whether *Spoken* or *Written*, inſtruct us no otherwiſe than occaſionally, that is, no further than as they ſerve as ſigns to admoniſh us to convert our Minds to him who is the true intelligible Light of them. According to what St. *Auſtin* has more largely deduced to this purpoſe in his excellent Book *De Magiſtro*, which is a deſigned Proſecution and Improvement of this very Notion. Men may ſpeak to the Ear, but he has his Chair in

Heaven that teaches the Heart. *Cathedram in cælo habet qui corda docet.* It is he that teaches Man Knowledge, that gives Underſtanding to the Simple, and that opens the Eyes of the Blind: On him therefore we ſhould fix our Eyes for Spiritual and Intellectual Light, and to him we ſhould hnmbly and devoutly apply our ſelves for Inſtruction in the words of *Job*, *That which I ſee not teach thou me*, Job 34. 32.

And as a further improvement of this (to remark ſomething upon this occaſion that relates to *Learning* and *Study*) we may hence fairly collect, that ſince we underſtand by the Divine Ideas, it is to *them* that the Bent and Application of our Minds ought to be directed and addreſſed (for which way ſhould we turn our Eyes but whence our Light comes) and that *Books* ought to be read and ſtudied no further than as they ſerve as Means or Occaſions to ſuggeſt to our Thoughts, or excite in our Minds ſuch Ideas. But 'tis the Ideas themſelves, and thoſe Truths which reſult from them, which are the proper Subjects of Study and Contemplation, ſince they are the things which we immediately perceive, and which by the Perception of them, render us truly Wiſe and Knowing: For ſo much we know (after all our poring in Books) and no more, as we perceive of Ideas and their Relations, and 'tis to be ſuppoſed that we Study that we may know; and therefore methinks thoſe Ideas

which

which are the immediate Objects of our Knowledge, ſhould be alſo the proper Subjects of our Study. And if this reflects upon the common Practice of that Exerciſe, how ſhall we help it? Men have a wrong Notion of Learning, and that leads to a wrong Application of Study. There is a certain Perſon that has written a profound Treatiſe (too profound indeed for me, for I underſtand not much of it) concerning true and falſe Learning, *De eruditione ſolida, Superficiaria, & Falſa.* But I think there is no great need of being ſo very Elaborate upon a thing of an obvious Conſideration. Learning, according to the cleareſt Notion I have of it, is, in ſhort, neither more nor leſs in general, than *Acquired Knowledge:* And true Knowledge is the knowledge of *Things.* And ſo it was accounted in the firſt and beſt Ages of the World. This was the Wiſdom of *Adam* in Paradiſe; and this was the Wiſdom of *Solomon*, that which he was poſſeſſed of, and that which he prayed for. And the Wiſdom of the Heathen Philoſophers (ſuch as it was) not to ſay alſo the Fathers of the Church, was chiefly of this kind. Thoſe venerable Ancients, upon whoſe *Writings* ſome now ſo value themſelves, were themſelves chiefly conſiderable for the knowledge of *Things.* But now the Tables are turned. Learning is now changed from the knowledge of *Things* to the knowledge of *Books.* And

accordingly inſtead of ſtudying *Things*, Men ſtudy *Books*, and thoſe not always the beſt neither, nor in the beſt Order; and that Study which was formerly, and is truly the proper Exerciſe of the Mind, is now become the labour of the Eye and of the Hand, a mere *manual Servility*. Inſtead of the Sciences, thoſe neceſſary and immutable Truths which are the Feſtival Proviſion wherewith Wiſdom ſpreads her Table, and which are the contemplation of Angels: Men now ſtudy one another, and read not ſo much for intellectual Light as for reading's ſake, uſing Books as ſome do the Languages wherein they are written, more as an *End* than as a *Means* (whereby the Progreſs that might be made in the knowledge of Things is very much retarded) and ſo meaſure their Learning, not by the juſtneſs and exactneſs of their Underſtandings, and the clearneſs of their Thoughts and Conceptions of Things, but by the number and variety of Books which they have gone over, and he is eſteemed the moſt Learned Man, not that has the cleareſt and moſt rational Head, but that has the biggeſt *Common-place*. But after all, it is not what I Read, but what I Know of the Nature of things that makes me Wiſe, and if I can be as Wiſe by reading a few Books, as you are by reading a great many, or by reading no Books at all, only by my own private Thoughts and Reflections,

by

by the mere Contemplation of Ideal Truth. ----Ay, but if Men ſhould thus betake themſelves to the thinking and contemplative Way, what will become of *Old Learning?* I am ſorry, and a great unhappineſs indeed it is, that any thing ſhould be called *Old Learning*, that will not bear the teſt of Thinking. But if by *Old Learning* they mean the Knowledge of *Truth* (as indeed I know no other Learning, whether New or Old) they need not fear, there is no ſuch great Danger to be apprehended. Truth is a thing of a fixed, ſettled and immoveable Nature, that will always remain, the ſame Yeſterday, to Day, and for Ever. Nor will Thinking be found to be any Enemy to it. I wiſh I could ſay the ſame of that unceſſant, inſatiable, promiſcuous, diſorderly and injudicious Courſe of Reading that ſome Men lay out their time in, to the Corruption rather than the Improvement of their natural Senſes. 'Tis plain then, that they who ſhall talk after this manner, do confine what they call Old Learning to *Books*. But I would fain know what thoſe Books were written for? Certainly thoſe Books were written for the knowledge of *Truth*, or at leaſt ſhould be ſo. And why then ſhould our Learning be placed in the knowledge of thoſe Books? Or if they will needs place Learning in the knowledge of *Books*, inſtead of *Things*, why muſt it needs be in *old* Books? But after all, Books whether

ther New or Old, do not inlighten us; no, not so much as for the seeing of *themselves*. they are our Ideas only that do that, as being the immediate Objects of the Mind, and therefore 'tis to the consideration of *them*, and those Truths which result from them, that we are directly and finally to apply our Studies, and to Books or Men (which are as *living* Books) no farther than as they may serve as occasions to present such Ideas, or Ideal Truths to our intellectual view. But in what Order and Method this is to be done, I leave to those who have professedly undertaken to consider of the proper method of Study, thinking it sufficient for my present Purpose, as well as mean Abilities, to assign and point out the true and proper *Object* of it.

Only by my Reader's good leave I shall adventure upon this occasion to commend to him this further Remark, that there are three things in *Study*, which by him that would undertake to treat justly and fully of it (which neither my Leisure nor my Ability sufficiently qualifies me for) are, as I think, distinctly to be considered. First there is the Object of Study. *Secondly*, There is the method of Study; and there is lastly the manner of Study. By the *Object* of Study, I mean those things to which the Application of the Mind is to be determin'd, which, as we have shewn, are Ideas and Ideal Truths. By the *Method* of Study, I mean that Order of Priority

Priority or Posteriority, according to which this Application is to be made, and these things are to be considered and made the Subjects of our Contemplation, which in general ought to be according to the natural Order of Dependency which the things have among themselves; but what that is I pretend not to define. By the *Manner* of Study here as a distinct Head of Division from the rest, I understand those Means and Ways which are to be used in this Application: Which in general are these two, *Reading* (under which I comprehend also Conversation with the Learned, there being a reading of Men as well as of Books) and *Thinking*, or private Meditation; But chiefly the latter of these: For since, according to the Principles of this Theory, Ideas and Ideal Truths (the true Objects of our Study) are within our selves, by reason of that Union which we naturally have with the Divine Word or Wisdom, the universal Reason of all Spirits; it follows that the most direct and natural Way for the discovery of Truth, is, instead of going abroad for Intelligence, to retire into our selves, and there with humble and silent Attention, both to consult and receive the Answers of interior Truth, even of that Divine Master which teaches in the School of the Breast. According to that Admonition of St. *Austin*, who advises that we should not go abroad, but rather enter into our selves

ſelves, and that for this very reaſon, becauſe Truth has her Habitation in the inner Man. *Nolie foras ire, in te ipſum redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas.*

37. Many are the uſeful Inferences that might be offer'd to Conſideration from this fruitful Principle; but I begin to grow weary, and ſo perhaps does my Reader too. But let us advance one ſtep further, and then we will ſit down. Be it then in the laſt place obſerv'd, that this Hypotheſis lays the Foundation of *Humility*, which itſelf is the Foundation of all practical Religion, as low as is poſſible, and makes Pride appear to be the moſt unreaſonable, I was about to ſay, the moſt *unphiloſophical* Sin in the World; eſpecially that Pride which we are naturally moſt ſubject to, and which upon ſome Hypotheſis (that particularly which ſuppoſes our Ideas to be of our own creating, or to be the *Modalities* or *Perfections* of our own Souls) there is no inconſiderable Colour and Pretence for, and which perhaps was the Pride of Angels, and which ſo ſoon chang'd them into Devels; I mean the Pride of our Knowledge and Underſtanding. For ſince, according to the Principles of this Syſtem, we are ſuppoſed to be capable of Thinking by the Union which we have of the eternal *Word*, to become rational and intelligent Creatures, by participation of the univerſal Reaſon, and actually to underſtand by the Divine Ideas, that is, in one

one word, to be all Darkneſs in our ſelves, and *Light* only in the *Lord*: To be proud of our Knowledge upon theſe Principles, is to be proud that we depend upon God, which is indeed a proper Argument for Humility, and the beſt that I know of, but it muſt be a ſtrange Chymiſtry of corrupt Nature that ſhall extract Pride out of it. Indeed the Doctrine of Divine Grace, as 'tis managed by St. *Auſtin* againſt the *Pelagian* Hereſie is not a greater mortifier and ſubduer of Pride than this is. That indeed ſubdues the Pride of Man one way, and this another, but both effectually in their ſeveral kinds. For as no Man has reaſon to be proud of his *Goodneſs*, becauſe the good that he does is owing both firſt and laſt to the influence of the Divine *Grace* preventing us, that we may have a good Will, and working with us when we have that good Will: So no Man has reaſon upon this Suppoſition to be in the leaſt degree proud of his *Knowledge*, becauſe, beſides the Divine Concurrence with him in the *Act* of his Underſtanding (that which before we called *formal* Thought) which this Hypotheſis allows in common with the reſt, there is this peculiar in this way, that the Divine Ideas are here ſuppoſed to be the *Object* of it, and we to ſee and know ſo much, and no more, than God is pleaſed to diſcover to us of himſelf. So that every way Boaſting is excluded, that no Fleſh

Fleſh may glory in his Preſence, but that he that Glories ſhould Glory in the Lord, ſince the *Word of God moſt high is the Fountain of Wiſdom, and all Wiſdom cometh from the Lord, and is with him for ever:* To whom, for all the Communications of his Grace and Truth, be univerſal and everlaſting Glory and Thankſgiving. *Amen.*

Eccleſ. Chap. 1. v. 1. & 5.

FINIS.

The TABLE OF THE CONTENTS.

CHAP. I. *A Preliminary Consideration concerning the Principles of Thought, or what it is that Thinks in us. With a full Discussion of that great Question, Whether Matter can Think?* Page 1.

CHAP. II. *A Digression concerning the Souls of Brutes, whether they have any Thought or Sensation in them or no.* p. 58.

CHAP. III. *Of Thought.* p. 101.

Sect. 1. *Of formal and objective Thought, with some Reflections upon the Scholastick use of that Distinction.* p. 102.

Sect. 2. *Of direct and reflex Thought.* p. 117.

Sect. 3. *Of Thought of Perception, and Thought of Volition: Wherein also of Idea and Sentiment.* p. 123.

Sect. 4. *Of Active and Passive Thought, with a Reflection upon the Scholastick Distinction of Agent and Patient Understanding.* p. 132.

Sect. 5. *Of simple and complex Thought, with some Remarks concerning Knowledge.* p. 139.

Sect. 6. *Of clear and confuse Thought, with some incidental Structures upon the Criterium of Truth.* p. 150.

Sect. 7. *Of abstract and concrete Thought, with some Remarks upon the usefulness of Abstraction for the greater clearness and extent of Thought.* p. 172.

Sect. 8. *Of pure and impure Thought, with some account of the Difference between Pure, Intellect and Imagination.* p. 179

Sect. 9. *Thought and Vision compared, with a fuller Illustration of the difference between Thought in the way of Idea, and Thought in the way of Sentiment, with some Philosophical Remarks upon the latter.* p. 188.

CHAP. IV. *An entrance upon the Explanation of the manner of our Thinking, containing a general Distribution of intelligible Objects into their several kinds.* p. 264.

Chap. V.

CHAP. V. *That some intelligible Objects,* viz. *of the immaterial Kind, are seen or understood immediately, or by themselves, with an occasional Argument for the existence of a God, and some Devotional Reflections upon the Beatifick Vision.* p. 277

CHAP. VI. *That all material Objects, and perhaps most Spiritual ones, are seen or understood by the mediation of Ideas.* p. 309

CHAP. VII. *That the Ideas whereby we perceive such Objects as are mediately Intelligible, do not come from those Objects; with some occasional Considerations upon the* Intellectus Agens *of the Schools; Mr.* Lock's *Principle of Sensation, and that Scholastick Maxim, That there is nothing in the Understanding but what was first in the Sense.* p. 329

CHAP. VIII. *That the Ideas whereby we understand, are not the Productions of our own Souls.* p. 376

CHAP. IX. *That the Ideas whereby we understand, are not created in us by God.* p. 385

CHAP. X. *That the Ideas whereby we understand are not the Perfections or Modalities of our own Souls: Or that the Mind does not perceive things by contemplating her own Perfections or Modalities.* p. 394

CHAP. XI. *That 'tis possible that the Ideas whereby we understand may be the Divine Ideas, and consequently that there is no necessity of having recourse to any other.* p. 413

CHAP. XII. *Wherein is considered what Reasons there are to think that the Divine Ideas are actually the Ideas whereby we understand, with some explanatory account of this Ideal System.* p. 422

CHAP. XIII. *Wherein is considered how far the Grounds of this Hypothesis are laid by the Schools, and the Hypothesis itself confirmed by the Authority of St.* Austin; *with some concluding Reflections upon the whole relating to Morality and Religion.* p. 519

The END.